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WOMEN'S STATUS AND FAMILY DYNAMICS

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Women and Families: Evolution of the Status of Women as a Factor and Consequence of Changes in Family Dynamics

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SUMMARY

WOMEN AND FAMILIES

EVOLUTION OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN AS A FACTOR AND CONSEQUENCE OF CHANGES IN FAMILY DYNAMICS

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INTRODUCTION

Increased autonomy of women and improvements in their political, social, economic and health statuses were fundamental principles espoused at the international conferences in Cairo (1994) and Beijing (1995). A priority among the recommendations in the Global Plan of Action for Population is the implementation of programmes taking into account the results of research carried out on the role and status of women, notably within family structures. It is indeed at the level of the family that current economic, social, demographic, educational and health conditions are experienced, and relations among family members are deeply affected by changes in these factors.

Women are at the heart of this change because of their many different roles in the fields of health, education, fertility, employment, housing, and migration. They take on new roles, namely economic roles which affect their position within the family. New living arrangements between parents, children, relatives and previous generations are emerging, which call into question the roles of family all members. Households headed by women are becoming more widespread. Migrants in urban areas or abroad are also adapting to the new roles of men and women in migration.

The relations between the status of women and family dynamics can be analysed from two separate and complementary standpoints, given that the status of women can be at the origin of as well as the consequence of family changes. Therefore the following issues may be pertinent research topics:

a) The effects of changes in women's different roles on family dynamics: changes in households, in kinship networks, new family configurations, changes in the role and status of women as a factor bringing about change in family dynamics.

b) Changes in the status of women as a consequence of family dynamics. In new family forms, what are the roles assumed by women? How

do these new family forms affect women, their promotion, their autonomy and their living conditions? How do they affect women relations with other family members, especially young children and elderly relatives? How do they affect gender relations?

CICRED (Committee for International Cooperation in Research in Demography), with the support of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and of the Permanent Mexican Delegation at UNESCO, invited its member research centres from all over the world to take part in a seminar on the following theme: "Women and Families: Changes in the Status of Women as a Factor and a Consequence of Changes in Family Dynamics". There was a substantial diversity of fields of research, issues and methodologies presented at the seminar. This diversity demonstrated not only a rich variety of approaches, but also examples of changes in the status of women and their consequences for family dynamics in varied cultural, social, economic and demographic contexts.

The seminar was held February 24-26, 1997, at UNESCO in Paris. More than forty researchers representing their research centres participated. Backgrounds of the researchers were very varied, both by the affiliations of their centres (universities, international organisations, population centres, etc.) and by the countries involved. The seminar was focussed on the following themes: the status of women, women's roles, family dynamics, family structures, economic roles and gender relations. This book publishes a selection of the papers presented at the seminar.

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The first chapter, by **Peter McDonald,** entitled "Gender Equity, Social Institutions and the Future of Fertility", adopts an institutional approach and aims to provide a theoretical explanation for low fertility in developed countries. The new liberal economic programme which influences the activities of men and women has reversed the conditions which enabled higher fertility in Northern Anglo-Saxon countries. According to McDonald, for fertility to increase in developed countries, policies will need to recognize the fact that children have value for society as a whole and not only for the parents. Gender equality within the family deserves as much encouragement as gender equality in education and in the work place and must be supported by institutions.

In Japan, there has been concern about fertility since 1989, when the media launched the catchy slogan "1.57, the shock", referring to the possible future effects of very low fertility. **Hachiro Nishioka**, in chapter 2 on "Evolution of the Status of Japanese Women: Real or Not?", emphasizes that the national and local governments are not actively concerned with the problem. Consequently, each woman must manage on her own, and child care is very much dependent on cohabitation with grandparents. As the opportunity costs to women become more important, they increasingly hesitate to marry and to have children. A sharing of household tasks with husbands is also necessary so that wives who work are not alone in bearing the double burden of employment and household work. Substantial change will be required, in the direction of the values and perceptions of women, in order to bring about real cooperation between women and men.

Sweden provides a good example of the relationship between family policies, economic activity and fertility, as **Livia Sz. Olah** demonstrates in chapter 3, "The Gendered Impact of Public Policies on Second-Order Birth Rates: The Cases of Sweden and Hungary". This research studies the impact of family policies and parental leave on second births. Her analysis demonstrates that incentive policies have in fact influenced fertility, increasing second-order births. Olah also obtains very interesting results concerning gender relations by showing how the active participation of men in bringing up children is encouraged by policies and is positively linked to the size of the families.

The notion of the status of women can be approached by using proximate variables such as schooling and economic activity. This is how **Banu Akadli Ergöçmen** examines family life in Turkey in chapter 4 entitled "An Overview of Women's Status and Fertility in Turkey". Ergöçmen insists on the importance of culture and history and especially the traditional patrilineal structure as an explanation of the dominant role of men in Turkish society. She also insists on the importance of education for women, which decreases their fertility, enables them to have a say in the choice of a spouse and increases their autonomy. She stresses the fact that traditional and modern attitudes and behaviors coexist in Turkish society today, noting that progress made in women's education has brought about improvements in the status of women and in gender relations.

In chapter 5, **Maria Coleta de Oliviera** presents " Some Notes on the Family as a Social Mechanism of Social Protection in Brazil". She emphasizes that the Brazilian family can no longer respond to the increasing demands of its members. As a consequence, she proposes that social welfare policies should be rethought by the Brazilian government, taking into account current changes in family structures.

The consequences of the different family life cycle stages for the economic roles of women are analysed by **Ewa Fratczak** in chapter 6, "Family, Fertility and Migratory Careers of Polish Women". She studies family histories, fertility and migratory careers of Polish men and women born between 1909 and 1943, using semi-parametric proportional hazards models. She examines the processes of family formation and dissolution. She observes that the probability of getting married is a function of generation, gender and professional activity. The break-up of marriages is essentially due to the death of one of the spouses. Age at marriage, place of birth and source of income (agricultural or non-agricultural) of the household are very important variables in explaining the probability of migration in Poland.

Chapter 7 on "Women and Family: Headship Status in Metropolitan Areas of Brazil, 1991" by **Ignes Helena Perpetuo and Maria do Carmo Fonseca** presents the main results of a study based on the Brazilian census. After examining literature on poverty among women heads of households, they give an account of relationships between socio-economic variables such as income and education and the status of household head in urban areas. They also use two demographic variables, the number and the ages of children, demonstrating that there is a positive correlation between income and the number of children and the role household head, which does not confirm the usual hypothesis that there is greater poverty among households headed by women. Further research is needed, but the study suggests that there are family recompositions and mutual aid arrangements within households.

Chapter 8, by **Sonia Catasus Cervera and Clotilde Proveyer Cervantes,** "Gender and Heads of Households in Cuba Today: Demographic and Sociological Considerations", observes several changes favourable to the status of women, such as increased levels of education for women and higher female labor force activity rates, which in turn have brought about a drop in fertility and a reduction in the average size of families. Based on sociological analysis, observations point to the fact that despite the influence of patriarchal relations deeply rooted within Cuban consciousness, changes have been observed in the relationships between couples, and these changes vary according to social category. Decisions are more often made in common, communication between spouses is more frequent and Cuban women have gained greater autonomy.

In chapter 9, entitled "The Second Demographic Transition from a Gender Perspective - The Case of Catalonia", **Montserrat Solsona i Pairó** explains the recent tendencies in the process of the constitution and breaking up of families. She draws attention to the specific aspects of Catalonia's case in Europe in relation to changes in the composition of households: few households made up of people who are not related, the emergence of new forms of inter-generational cohabitation and of mutual aid within the family, very low fertility and high female labor force activity. Catalonian women are much

more independent than women in the rest of Spain, but they remain with their family of origin longer than in the rest of Western and Northern Europe.

Radu Felician Halus, in chapter 10 entitled "Evolution of the Structure and Composition of Families in Romania During the Last Few Decades", shows how women are developing more and more economic activities outside the household and that their economic responsibilities and roles are increasing within the family. It is true that the number of Romanian women living alone is increasing, but the model of the nuclear family, two parents with children, is not called into question : more than half the families are couples with children, one third of the couples are without children and the rest of the families are single-parent families. In 1995, fertility was low (1.34 children per woman) and the abortion rate was high (213 abortions for 100 live births). More than half of the women who were household head are living alone. The ageing of this group seems to indicate that the increase in its numbers is explained by the greater proportion of widows.

On a related theme, chapter 11 on "Women in One-parent Families in Russia" by **Irina E. Kalabikhina** shows that almost all of these families are headed by women. They are the result of divorces and more generally of changes in sexual and reproductive behaviour (births out of wedlock). The status of women family heads is insecure and the fathers have little contact with their children, despite a change in divorce legislation. What is more, these families are also economically insecure with a low standard of living.

In chapter 12, **Jean Wakam**, highlighting one of the important roles of the African family, analyses "The Status of Women and the Welcoming of Family Members from Outside the Family Nuclear in Africa: The Cases of Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal". His objective is to evaluate the impact the status of female heads of households has on their behavior regarding the inclusion of persons from outside the family nucleus, compared to that of their male counterparts. He finds that among women as with men, socio-economic status is positively linked to the size of the family, and that women household heads include more persons from outside the family nucleus than men in similar economic situations and situations of comparable responsibility. Wakam concludes by questioning the idea that the improved status of women and the accession to the title of head of household is automatically accompanied by a nuclearisation of families and therefore by the refusal to include other members.

A major hypothesis when talking about the status of women, family life and gender relations is that paid work increases the autonomy of women. **Rebecca Miles-Doan** tests this hypothesis in chapter 13 on "Women's Economic Roles in the Context of Economic Adjustment Policies in Jordan : The Implications for Women's Status". What are the possibilities for women to re-negotiate the sexual division of labor of household chores and their status in the family when they have a professional activity? Miles-Doan shows that in

Jordan this opportunity depends naturally on the type of activity and on the salary, but also on the family life-cycle stage and family structure. However, in all cases, the economic activity of women calls into question the economic role of men in the context of economic crisis and structural adjustment policies.

The activities of Guatemalan women in rural areas are traditionally limited to domestic chores, as described by **Alfredo Méndez-Domínguez** in chapter 14 on "The Relationship Between Women's Nontraditional Work, Family Organization and Female Empowerment in Rural Guatemala". The recent development of non-traditional activities (weaving, trade in local markets, sub-contracting) provides women with more profitable work opportunities, which results in changes in the organization of families. Women who are employed in non-traditional work outside the home give priority to relations with the brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of their husbands. The husband's family helps wives by taking on some of the domestic chores that the wives used to do alone when they did not leave home to go to work.

The objective of **Silvia Lopez Estrada** in chapter 15 on "Women's Home-based Work in Tijuana, Mexico: Time-space Household Arrangements and Gender Relations" is to study the cases of women who have taken on salaried employment at home to confront a situation of economic crisis. She examines the relations between the productive and reproductive roles through time and space strategies. In fact, these Mexican women have very difficult working conditions. Their domestic space is reduced because of their professional activity, they work long hours and wages are very low. As for the consequences of home-based work for women's status and of their position within the family, Lopez Estrada states that they vary greatly according to economic status, but on the whole they heighten the woman's status within the family.

Results from a survey being carried out in Côte d'Ivoire are presented by **Benoît Ogni Kanga** in chapter 16 on the "Role and the Status of Women in a Plantation Economy". The disintegration of the traditional family, schooling of children and the departure of the young has reduced the size of the labor force working on the plantations. In this context polygamy becomes a means by which men can increase the work force and the size of their farms. Women are entrusted with production and look after the cultivation and the sale of food products to compensate for the fall in plantation income. Despite their important economic role, their status remains dependent on that of their husbands. They benefit little themselves from the income they bring in, which is mainly devoted to the survival of the family.

Chapter 17 by **Khaled Louhichi** studies "The Impact of Emigration of the Husband on the Status of Women - The Case of Egypt". He distinguishes between two effects of migration on the status of women. He observes at first a loss of personal freedom, reduced professional activity and a withdrawal within

the domestic environment. He then points out that the women whose husbands had emigrated experience later greater freedom and attain improved status within the patriarchal structure of the family.

P. K. B. Nayar and Sobha S. Nair follow the same approach in chapter 18 on "Factors Contributing to Changes in Women's Roles within the Family and their Influence on Women's Status". For the region of Kerala in India, the authors raise the question of the conditions in which a professional activity may allow a woman to gain more autonomy from her family. They point out that the women able to obtain greater autonomy through work are those whose salary and/or level of education is higher than that of their husbands and whose family structure is the nuclear type.

Chapter 19 by **Karen Oppenheim Mason** is entitled "How Family Position Influences Married Women's Autonomy and Power in Five Asian Countries". It presents the results of a comparative analysis of the relation between the woman's position within the family, her power and autonomy, in five countries in South and Southeast Asia, based on a project using specific surveys. According to the variables used (freedom of movement, interpersonal control, economic power) results differ from one country to another, highlighting the considerable influence of the socio-cultural context which remains to be explained in greater detail. However, for the whole area, Mason obtains results which contradict some conventional hypotheses, for instance by showing that marriage with a man who is a relative does not increase the woman's economic power. She also observes an inverse relationships between fertility and decision-making power and autonomy: the more children a woman has, the less autonomy she has. From a policy perspective, economic and social changes and changes within the family will be needed to make it possible to improve the status of women in this Asian region.

In chapter 20, "Examining Women's Status Using Core Demographic and Health Surveys Data", **Sunita Kishor and Katherine Neitzel** present the sources and indicators which make it possible to analyse the situation of women in developing countries. The Demographic and Health Surveys were not intended to evaluate the status of women, but among the data collected some information may give indications. Based on already available data (the proportion of women among household heads, the difference in the level of education between spouses, female labor force activity...), Kishor and Neitzel compare the situation of women in the countries where Demographic and Health Surveys have been carried out most recently and propose criteria for classification as well as a new summary indicator of women's status.

In chapter 21 on "Distribution of Power Within the Extended Family and Human Reproduction - The Case of Burkina Faso", **Nacro Kourtoum** also looks at the status of women from the perspective of the decision-making power of women, the subject of her ongoing research project in rural Burkina Faso.

Kourtoum presents her objectives: the first one is to establish the links between fertility, the use of contraceptive methods and women's decision-making power; the second objective is to determine the existence of preferences for boys instead of girls; finally, the last objective is to identify which strategic measures should be taken.

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At the conclusion of the seminar, Maria Eugenia Cosio-Zavala presented to all of the centres attending the seminar a project for developing a research programme at CICRED on the theme of "Women and Families". A working group will be created to propose research activities, notably a project for comparative surveys on this theme with the collaboration of CICRED member centres.

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GENDER EQUITY, SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF FERTILITY

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The persistence of very low levels of fertility in many advanced countries has added a new dimension to the development of theory relating to fertility change. This paper proposes a general theoretical explanation of these very low levels of fertility by building upon the empirical work and theory-building of several previous studies (Chesnais, 1996; Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 1988; Van de Kaa, 1996; Hobcraft and Kiernan, 1995; Hobcraft, 1996; Rindfuss, Morgan and Offutt 1996; Rindfuss, Brewster and Kavee 1996; McNicoll 1994; Folbre 1994; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Greenhalgh, 1995; Micheli, 1996) The thrust of the argument is that very low levels of fertility in advanced countries today can be explained in terms of incoherence between the levels of gender equity applying in different social institutions. More specifically, the theory states that, in countries with very low levels of fertility, the levels of gender equity in institutions which deal with people as individuals, such as education and the labour market, will be high compared to the levels applying in institutions which deal with people as members of families, such as industrial relations (the terms and conditions of employment), services, government transfers, and in the family itself. Put more simply and in terms similar to those already expressed by others (Chesnais, 1996: 738; Esping-Andersen, 1996: 67), if women are provided with opportunities near to equivalent to those of men in education and the labour market, but these opportunities are severely curtailed by having children, then on average, women will restrict the number of children that they have to an extent which leaves fertility at a precariously low long-term level.

THE CONTEXT OF VERY LOW FERTILITY

An understanding of these very low levels of fertility is important because the present levels of fertility are so low that, if maintained in the long term, they would threaten the future existence of the peoples concerned. For example, in a stable population with the level of fertility applying in 1995 in Italy, population size would drop in just 100 years to only 14 per cent of its initial level. The corresponding percentages consistent with the 1995 fertility levels of some other countries with very low fertility are 15 per cent for Spain, 17 per cent for Germany, 26 per cent for Greece and 28 per cent for Japan. Even with a Total Fertility Rate of 1.70, the level applying in France in 1995, a stable population would fall to 50 per cent of its initial size in a 100-year period. In 1985, Teitelbaum and Winter referred to the tendency for societies in fear of population decline to adopt pronatalist policies "verging on the draconian" and this was said in the context of what the authors saw as the "future slow growth (or even decline)" of the populations of Western countries (Teitelbaum and Winter, 1985: 1-2). Given knowledge of the fertility rates of the past decade, these authors might have been even more urgent in their concern about the possibility of pronatalist policies verging on the draconian.

It is important to consider also that the average fertility level may distort the story of low fertility. When fertility is generally low, it will become very low through the decisions of some women, not all women. If 20 per cent of women have no children and 20 per cent have one child, then this 40 per cent of women are contributing only 0.2 children to the Total Fertility Rate. For such a society to have replacement level fertility, the remaining 60 per cent of women would have to have an average of 3.2 children each. This is extremely unlikely in societies today where the norm for those planning to have children is to have two children. At the other end of the fertility distribution, a comparison of fertility by birth order in Australia and Italy (Total Fertility Rates in 1995 of 1.82 and 1.18 respectively) shows that some 70 per cent of the additional fertility in Australia is due to births of order three and above. Giorgi (1993) has shown that changes in the total second- and third-order birth rates account for most of the drop in Italian fertility over the past 20 years, that is, women are stopping at one or two children. Thus, the argument about very low fertility is not simply about women having no children, but about some women have fewer children than they might otherwise have had. Chesnais (1996), for example, reports that achieved fertility in Italy is well below desired fertility. A similar finding applies to Japan (Retherford, Ogawa and Sakamoto, 1996).

In an era in which we have come to understand the momentum of population increase, it is remarkable that we are yet to appreciate that the same momentum applies to population decrease. Furthermore, with very low fertility, as the population decreases in size, it also ages extremely rapidly to form an age structure in the shape of an inverted pyramid. In these potential

future populations, there will be many more people aged 75 years and over than will be aged 20 years and under. It is again remarkable, given the knowledge that fertility is the dominant determinant of age structure, that the numerous studies of policies for ageing societies pay so little attention to fertility. Indeed, it is argued in this paper that new liberal economic agendas to deal with ageing involving cuts to government expenditure on family services and increased insecurity of employment, tend to depress fertility even further by making family life even less sustainable. As Esping-Andersen has said: "The *real* demographic problem in continental Europe is not ageing but low fertility and low activity" (Esping-Andersen, 1996: 78).

Despite the current blinkered approach in most countries, it is inevitable that more and more countries will be seeking policies which aim to maintain fertility at levels closer to the replacement level. That is, there seems little question that pronatalist policies will become a central part of the political agenda in the near future. The generally-held wisdom is that past and present pronatalist policies have been largely ineffective (McNicoll, 1995). This wisdom is another factor which is temporarily holding down the demand for pronatalist policies, but future demand is inevitable. Better understanding of the causes of very low fertility will assist in defining policies which are both effective and socially responsible.

Excluding the former Eastern bloc countries which need to be considered separately, the countries in 1995 which had very low Total Fertility Rates (below 1.50) were Italy, Spain, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Greece, Portugal, Japan, Hong Kong and Macau (Monnier and de Guibert-Lantoine 1996; US Bureau of the Census 1997). This list is somewhat surprising because these are countries with cultures which are known to attach a high value to families and to be socially conservative in regard to family functioning. The incidence of divorce, childbearing outside of marriage and relationships alternative to marriage is much or somewhat lower in these countries than in countries with higher fertility rates such as the Nordic countries and the English-speaking countries (Monnier and de Guibert-Lantoine, 1996). They are also countries which express more conservative values in regard to the role of women, especially mothers. In regard to policies related to family services, taxation systems and industrial relations, all of the very low fertility countries have arrangements which make the employment of mothers more difficult than it is in the Nordic countries or in the English-speaking countries.

INSTITUTIONAL MODELS OF FAMILY

Throughout this century until the 1970s, the assumed institutional form of the family in all currently advanced countries was the male breadwinner model under which the father goes out to work while the mother

stays at home to look after the children. The principle underlying this model is that there is a natural differentiation between men and women which requires the man to be the provider and protector and the woman to be the carer and reproducer. The antithesis of the male breadwinner model of the family is the gender equity model. In the gender equity model of the family, there is income earning work, household maintenance work and caring and nurturing work, but gender has no specific relationship to who does which type of work. The principles upon which this model are based are equal respect for men and women, equality of resources and capabilities, parity of participation in socially valued activities, and an end to male-centred measures of social value (Fraser, 1994).

The male breadwinner model reached its zenith in the 1950s when Parsons and Bales (1955) described it as being ideally suited to advanced capitalist societies which revolve around individual achievement and social and geographic mobility, and Bowlby (1953:15) referred to the father's role in regard to the children as one of keeping the mother in a harmonious, contented mood. Academic psychologists deemed all those who did not want to live in this family form as being socially deviant (Ehrenriech, 1983). All other social and economic institutions were founded on the assumption that the male breadwinner model was the universal institutional form of the family. While women might be educated for reasons of gentility or to be better wives and mothers, the primary purpose of the education system was to produce the next generation of male breadwinners. Men were paid higher wages than women for the same work and employers were encouraged to favour men over women in the job selection process. In Australia, the great symbol of the hegemony of the male breadwinner model was the Basic Wage, a wage sufficient for a man to support a wife and three children. Introduced in 1907, it continued to be the foundation of the wage-fixing system until 1973. Industrial relations was concerned with jobs and wages for men, not working conditions for parents. Trade unions and employer organisations were male-oriented. Child care services had no policy priority and were regarded as only serving the needs of unfortunate mothers who did not have the support of a husband. The breadwinner model was the basis of the tax-transfer system with allowances for children being directed to the wallet rather than to the purse. Social security and social insurance systems also were premised and generally still are premised on the notion that the husband would be supporting the wife and children. In most countries, there were no benefits for sole mothers unless they had proven themselves deserving by being deserted by their male breadwinner. Women married early and had their children early because they were confident that their support was guaranteed by social and economic institutions. The relatively high fertility of the baby-boom era can be interpreted as a consequence of the coherence around the male breadwinner model of the family of all social and economic institutions.

In the past 30-40 years, different institutions in society have been moving away from the assumption of the male breadwinner model of the

family in the direction of a gender equity model. They have done so, however, at differing speeds, leading to substantial gaps between social and economic institutions in regard to the model of family that they presume. The theory proposed here is that it is these gaps or the extent of incoherence between social institutions in regard to the presumed model of family which leads to very low fertility. Among institutions most pertinent to the present argument, the assumption of the male breadwinner model has almost been eliminated from the education system and the system of market employment. Today, in almost all advanced countries, women are educated to the same standard as men and, in many countries now, to a higher standard. Women are educated for employment in the paid labour force just like men. Delay of childbearing and the formation of long-term relationships mean that young women spend a considerable number of years in full-time, paid employment without the concern of care of children or, for that matter, care of partner. In most countries, there is equal pay for equal work and the level of discrimination against women in employment selection has been reduced substantially relative to the 1950s through mechanisms such as equal employment opportunity legislation. Parents very actively encourage their daughters to pursue education and paid employment. Overall, a relatively high degree of gender equity applies in the institutions of education and the labour market and this offers considerable opportunities to women to pursue roles other than that of being a mother.

As a consequence of these changes, the social and economic world of young people in all advanced countries today is very different from that faced by young people in the 1950s. The present generation of young women do not see their future in terms of the male breadwinner model of the family. Indeed, most would not stake their future living standard on the assumption that they will be fully dependent upon the earnings of a man. Likewise, many young men do not wish to be in a position where they are fully supporting a dependent wife. They see their own living standards being enhanced if their partner is also earning. Societies and economies have become geared to the two-income couple or the one-income single. These changes are reflected in the decline in fertility rates under the age of 25 years and in the high labour force participation rates for women aged 25-34 years, now the main childbearing ages in advanced countries.

In all advanced countries, however, institutions more related to family and parenthood have been much slower to move away from the male breadwinner model and to adapt to the new realities facing young people. This has placed pressure upon fertility rates in all countries, but where social and economic institutions have adapted more rapidly to the gender equity model, as in the Nordic countries, the English-speaking countries and perhaps France, fertility has not fallen to very low levels. On the other hand, in countries where attitudes to the family have remained closer to the male breadwinner model, where employment for mothers has been restricted by lack of family support services (child care, school holiday care, aged care), where societal arrangements make it difficult to combine work and family

(school hours, hours of work, employer expectations in regard to work and family priorities, leave conditions) or where the tax-transfer system remains geared to the male breadwinner model, fertility rates have plummeted. Different countries score differently on the extent of movement to gender equity in each of these social institutions, but the overall picture is that very low fertility countries score considerably lower on average than do the countries which do not have very low fertility.

THE INSTITUTION OF THE FAMILY AND GENDER EQUITY

Among the social and economic institutions related to family which affect fertility rates, the most important is the family itself. Micheli (1996: 39) points out the very low fertility countries in Europe are those classified by Le Play in the nineteenth century as having "the lineage (*souche*) family, characterised by enduring patriarchal stability". The institutional or organisational form of the family constitutes an important part of a society's idealised morality. As such, family is one of the defining principles of the culture of every society and the family as an institution is very resistant to change (McDonald, 1994). The fertility rates of Greeks and Italians in Australia provide a particular example of the importance of family organisation and idealised morality in the determination of fertility rates. Over the past 20 years, the fertility rates of both first and second generation Greek- and Italian-Australians have followed the course of fertility in Greece and Italy respectively. In the mid 1970s, their fertility rates were above those of Australians of British-Irish origin and fertility occurred at relatively younger ages. Now, their fertility rates are very low (Total Fertility Rate below 1.50) and their age patterns of fertility are the same as those in Italy and Greece and older than that of Australians of British-Irish origin (Abbasi Shavazi and McDonald, 1996). At the same time, however, Australians of Greek and Italian origin continue to adhere to conservative attitudes to the family and to the superiority of the adult male in the family context (Tsolidis, 1995; Vasta, 1995; Khoo and Shu, 1996; McDonald, 1991). As large groups in a multicultural society, Italian-Australians and Greek-Australians have been able to maintain significant features of their culture. The incidence rates of divorce, ex-nuptial births and relationships alternative to marriage are much lower than they are in the dominant culture, and patriarchy prevails. At the same time, young women of Italian and Greek origin in Australia, now mainly of the second generation, have the same opportunities and achievements of other Australians in education and in market employment. Conditions applying in other Australian institutions related to family, such as family services, tax and social security and industrial relations apply to Italian and Greek Australians as they do to all other Australians, however, family organisation or morality modifies usage of or access to these conditions. For example, among southern Europeans in Australia, care of dependent

members, young or old, sick or disabled, is considered to be the responsibility of the family, more especially its female members. As a consequence, family support services provided by government, by voluntary organisations or by the market, while available, are used only as a last resort. Thus, in this 'social experiment' in which all else is controlled other than the nature of family organisation, fertility rates are very low for groups whose family organisation remains closer to the male breadwinner model.

Using a cross-national, legislative perspective, Therborn (1993) has established that there is a strong relationship between the development of children's rights in Western nations and the forms of legal patriarchy that applied at the beginning of this century and which still persist to varying degrees. He divides children's rights into three categories: the child-centred family (equal parental rights and the best interest of the child as a paramount principle); equality between children of married and non-married parents; and integrity (restraints on child abuse by parents). It is striking that Therborn's classification of countries into four groups in terms of the timing of movement towards children's rights and away from patriarchy bears a close resemblance to groups based upon current fertility levels. Change occurred first in the Nordic countries, then in the English-speaking countries, then in the Germanic countries and finally in the southern European countries. It is an interesting proposition indeed that fertility is lowest in countries which have a long tradition "of protecting males from the consequences of their sexuality at the expense of the rights of children" (Therborn, 1993: 263), but, more generally, it is perhaps not surprising that fertility is higher where the law has a longer tradition of valuing children. The law provides a good reflection of idealised family morality. If patriarchy is enshrined in the law, or if its removal from the law is of recent origin, then the idealised morality of the family can also be expected to be patriarchal, and hence, of a male breadwinner form.

Family organisation in East Asian countries is also male-dominated and fertility in these countries, led by Japan, is falling to very low levels. Fertility in Hong Kong, Macau, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore is already below the current levels in the Nordic countries and in English-speaking countries. In these Asian countries, however, a woman's status tends to decline substantially upon marriage rather than upon the birth of a child and as a consequence, marriage rates have dropped sharply for women, most particularly for more highly educated women (Jones, 1995). Single women are able to be economically and socially independent and this is what many now prefer. Non-marriage then becomes part of the explanation of low fertility, but lying behind it is the combination of a patriarchal family structure with relative gender equity in education and market employment.

In the advanced countries which do not have low fertility, gender equity within the family is more advanced. The early experience of intimate relationships of young people is often of alternative relationships in which

the underlying principle is that each member contributes half of the expenses (Singh and Lindsay, 1996). Often also, the young woman in the relationship is earning more than her male partner, presuming a heterosexual relationship. She often also has a higher level of education. Because the main purpose of the relationship is the relationship, like Anthony Giddens' pure relationships (Giddens, 1992), the relationships of young people are vulnerable. Many have also experienced the ending of the relationships of their parents and have seen their mothers, or much less often, their fathers, left in financially dependent or precarious situations (McDonald, 1986). The recognition that relationships are vulnerable means that young women believe that they need to be in a position where they are able to support themselves financially. Mothers and fathers of young women tend to support this direction as do young men. The movement towards gender equity within the family in Nordic and English-speaking countries has been documented in studies of changing family values (Glezer, 1982; Lesthaeghe and Meekers, 1986; Palomba and Moors, 1993; Evans and Mason, 1996; Rindfuss, Brewster and Kavee, 1996). The values shown in Table 1.1 were derived from a national random survey of Australians conducted by the Australian National University in November 1996. The data show that, at least in terms of expressed values, a large majority of Australians, both men and women, have adopted the gender equity model. Not shown in the table, however, is the fact that women are much more likely than men to agree strongly with each of the propositions. Research in Australia also has shown that men's behaviour lags considerably behind their expressed attitudes and values (Glezer, 1982). Even in Sweden, where the conditions of women's employment are highly favourable, there is a considerable degree of occupational segregation of men and women (Hoem, 1995). Thus, gender inequity is still prevalent in all countries, but some countries have made considerable change while others are resistant to change because of the strength of the underlying idealised family morality.

Studies of family formation in Australia have shown that there seems to be an increasing tendency for the man to hold back and leave the decision about the timing of a first child to the woman. Most men still approach having a child with the view that the child will have little impact on their own work force participation, but young men today are considerably more sensitive than older generations to the impact that a child will have on their partner's work force participation. Men concerned about the impact of the loss of the wife's income on their own standard of living may actively discourage childbearing. In the next generation, which will be more sensitive to gender equity, the need to maintain equity in the relationship will also be an important reason that a birth may be delayed or never occur. Loss of equity may be too great a threat to the relationship.

A similarly-worded item to the third item in Table 1.1 has been asked in surveys in the United States over a long period. The level of community agreement in 1991 was about the same as it was in Australia in 1996. Furthermore, between 1970 and 1991, the percentage of married women of

childbearing age in the United States who agreed that *it is better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family* fell from 80 per cent to 27 per cent (Rindfuss, Brewster and Kavee, 1996: 469). In contrast, a similarly worded question attracted 64 per cent agreement from Japanese women in 1993 and 75 per cent from Japanese men (Retherford, Ogawa and Sakamoto, 1996).

Table 1.1. – Gender equity values in Australia, Australians aged 18-54 years, 1996

Statement	Per cent agreeing	
	Men	Women
If both the husband and wife work, they should share equally in the housework and care of the children	95	95
There should be satisfactory child care facilities so that women can take jobs outside the home	88	93
It is better for the family if the husband is the principal breadwinner and the wife has primary responsibility for the home and the children	34	31
Ideally, there should be as many women as men in important positions in business and government	84	88

Source: Negotiating the Life Course Survey, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, November 1996.

GENDER EQUITY AS REFLECTED IN INCOME TRANSFER SYSTEMS, SERVICES AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Other social institutions, either explicitly or implicitly, are modelled upon assumptions about the nature of family organisation in the society. Government or government-approved income transfer arrangements frequently remain modelled upon the male breadwinner family. For example, occupationally-related social insurance or social welfare schemes, common in Continental Europe, favour men over women where women's employment is limited by childbearing. Earnings-based benefit calculations in such schemes assume the male breadwinner model of family as they are likely to provide much higher benefits to men than to women. While such schemes may be seen as providing an incentive for women to work, the incentive only applies fully if women are thoroughly committed to work, which is difficult in these countries if the women are mothers. Of course, such schemes also have social equity implications but the impact of social inequity on fertility is complex.

Arrangements for joint income tax for couples are usually structured so that joint after-tax income is highest when the income is earned by one person and lowest when the two persons earn the same amount. This occurs if the rates of taxation by income level are progressive or if tax deductions or rebates are provided for a dependent spouse. Such structures can provide substantial work disincentives for the partner of an income earner (Gustavsson and Stafford 1994; Zimmermann 1993). Esping-Andersen (1996) has provided calculations which show that the tax system in Sweden is neutral to the size of the wife's earnings and the effect is modest in France (an elasticity of 0.93). However, the impact is greater in other countries (an elasticity of 0.71 in Belgium, 0.58 in Germany and 0.52 in the Netherlands). Near-neutrality also applies in Australia, but the Australian system has become less neutral since 1997 when a new tax concession for one-income families was introduced. Transfers through the tax system, including lower taxes and tax rebates for children, are usually paid in greater proportion to men rather than to women. Men are less likely than women to direct this money into the purchase of family services. In countries with tax systems which are not punitive to the earnings of a second earner, fertility is higher.

The division of countries on the basis of fertility levels mirrors Esping-Andersen's classification of welfare systems. He says that the Continental European countries, in sharp contrast to the Nordic countries, are "service-lean yet very transfer-heavy". That is, while they may provide money to families in the form of transfers, they score poorly in the provision of family services. He shows that the ratio of expenditure on services to expenditure on transfers is 0.33 in Denmark and 0.29 in Sweden, but 0.16 in Germany and 0.06 in Italy (Esping-Andersen 1996: 67-71). In social systems which have not moved fully to gender equity (the situation in all societies), expenditure on services usually provides greater benefits to women than to men, because women are the substitute providers of family services if these services are not provided by the state or by the market. Thus, expenditure on tax transfers is consistent with the male breadwinner model of the family while expenditure on services is consistent with a gender equity model. Obviously, among all family services, provision of child care is highly beneficial to the employment of women and hence to a higher level of gender equity. However, the argument applies also to other services including services for aged persons, education, health and housing services. Again, low expenditure on family services matches low fertility.

Besides the provision of child care, Gustavsson and Stafford (1994) have argued that the relatively higher fertility in Sweden is related to more flexible working conditions, such as the availability of part-time work, flex-time and liberal conditions for absence. Chesnais (1996) has recently documented the less favourable conditions relating to the employment of mothers in Italy and Germany in comparison to Sweden. In Germany, a mismatch between the hours in which schools are open and the hours that paid employment is available makes it more difficult than in other countries

for a parent to work only during the hours that his or her children are at school. In general, countries which have low levels of part-time work also have very low levels of fertility. According to the OECD (1993: 198), the percentages of employed women who were employed on a part-time basis in 1993 were 48 per cent in Norway, 45 per cent in the United Kingdom, 42 per cent in Australia, 41 per cent in Sweden, 37 per cent in Denmark, 36 per cent in New Zealand, 26 per cent in Canada and 25 per cent in the United States. On the other hand, the corresponding percentages in the very low fertility countries were 8 per cent for Greece, 11 per cent for Portugal, 12 per cent for Italy, 14 per cent in Spain, 21 per cent in Austria and 31 per cent in Germany. If the gender equity model of the family were to be fully implemented, these working conditions would be available to both parents regardless of gender. Again, this tends to be the case in the Nordic countries and is also the case in Australia. In practice, however, in the Nordic countries and in Australia parental leave and part-time work are much more likely to be taken up by mothers than by fathers. It can be argued, however, that greater usage of these conditions by mothers is a necessary stage in the movement to fuller gender equity. In the future, when many more young women will have a higher earning capacity than their male partners, if these conditions are available to men, they will be more likely to be taken up by men. Again, fertility tends to be higher in countries which provide more family-friendly working conditions.

GENDER EQUITY, INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY AND SOCIAL EQUITY

Gender equity, intergenerational equity and social equity are not independent. The above discussion of the relationships between gender equity and fertility is directed to future childbearing and thus to young women and young men. Older generations who have benefited from past systems are often in the forefront of policy changes which make childbearing more difficult for the younger generation. The new liberal economic approach of small government and lower and flatter taxes redirects the nation's wealth from those with children to those without children. Goods and services taxes which provide no compensation for those with children obviously affect those with children to a much greater extent than those without children because children are consumers but do not earn income. Cutbacks in public provision of major services such as education and health services, or increases in charges for these services, affect those with dependents to a greater extent than those without dependents. For the mainstream of the population, having children is highly associated with feeling secure about one's financial future. This in turn is related to a sense of security about employment and housing. Unemployment, very low wages, increased job insecurity and large increases in the costs of housing, again all components of economic policies

now in favour, provide a clear disincentive to people to have children. Ironically, these new liberal economic policies are often justified on the basis that societies need to prepare for the imminent burden of ageing of the population (National Commission of Audit: 1996), yet the intergenerational inequity that they imply will make ageing a far greater problem through its impact on fertility.

These issues are not problems for those who are very wealthy because they can afford to pay for services. For example, in any country, the highly-paid, professional couple will be able to have children because they can afford to pay for a nanny and other services which support children. However, the options of paying for expensive services will not be affordable for the wide, middle-income range of couples. This has been less of a problem in the United States because of the low wage rates of family services workers, some of whom are outside the legal wage framework. It can be argued that the United States approach supports higher fertility, but it clearly involves questions about social equity or exploitation of the weak and about the quality of child care which children receive. From the perspective of the child, child care should not be child minding but early childhood education, and child-care workers should be qualified in this field.

It is also argued that the range of new liberal economic policies referred to above, through their impact on the labour market, produce a group who are outside the normal opportunity structure irrespective of whether or not they have children (Esping-Andersen, 1996). For this group, nothing is lost by having children because they have no opportunity to succeed in the mainstream economy. By having children, they are able to participate in family life which at least provides some meaning to life. Hence, present policy directions may lead to both those at the very top and those at the very bottom of the income distribution being more likely to have children while childbearing is restricted for those in the broad, middle range of incomes. From this perspective, low fertility is related to social equity. It is little wonder, in this environment, that the middle class may object to the state supporting the children of the poor when they themselves feel that they are unable to have the number of children that they would prefer. Gender equity also enters this picture because the principal targets of middle class objection to state support of the poor have been poor mothers.

There are other examples of the interplay of gender equity, intergenerational equity and social equity. For example, if the couple is the taxation unit as distinct from the individual, the benefit of splitting of joint income between partners for tax purposes is generally much greater for high income-earning males than for low income-earning males. Government tax expenditure then is directed to wealthy males and away from the provision of child-related services and hence away from gender equity. As, on average, young men have lower incomes than older men, intergenerational equity is also associated with this form of social inequity. It is also the case that most one-income couples with children are likely to have a much lower living

standard than two-income couples without children or one-income singles. Social transfers usually fall a long way short of making up the difference. In addition, a husband with dependent children and a dependent wife is in a much more vulnerable position when he comes to negotiate his individual contract with his employer. So men also may see themselves as being better off without children.

Now in agreement with the new liberal economic agenda, depressed economies are not conducive to childbearing. This would seem to be a substantial part of the story of rapid decline in the fertility rates of the former Eastern bloc countries in the 1990s. It has also been suggested that this decline may be related to the demise in the 1990s of a formerly superior system of state-provided family services in these countries (Chesnais, 1996).

THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HAVING CHILDREN

People have children because they have expectations or hopes about how this transition will affect their lives. They weigh up alternatives within their personal and cultural context (McDonald, 1996). In formal terms, when fertility is subject to a high degree of control and barring physiological problems, a woman or a couple will have a child when the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs. Benefits and costs can be seen as both psychic and economic. The neoclassical economist will want to place an economic value upon the psychic costs and benefits of having children, but while the elegance of this approach can be appreciated, the measurement problems are formidable. Maintaining the psychic dimension also allows room for a degree of irrationality in decision making. Thus, here, the psychic-economic dichotomy will be maintained. Today, the economic benefits of having children can be dismissed as applying to only a tiny fraction of the population in advanced countries (wealthy entrepreneurs with family businesses, monarchs). This is in agreement with Caldwell's (1976) intergenerational wealth flows hypothesis, that is, when the wealth flow reverses, economic considerations alone would lead people to have no children. Thus the only benefits of having children are the psychic benefits. These are numerous in their range and culturally and individually specific. The difficulty in measuring this dimension makes it impossible to have precise intercultural predictive models of fertility. That is, differences in Total Fertility Rates in advanced countries today may partly reflect unmeasured cultural differences in the psychic benefits of children. Any theory, such as the one proposed in this paper, can only be argued in broad terms. We do know, however, that because most people still have at least one child, the psychic benefits of having children are powerful.

There are also psychic costs of having children and these also are many and various. However, in the context of this paper, one psychic cost of having children needs to be emphasised: the psychic cost deriving from detachment from the paid labour force. This can include the effects on the person of loss of personal income, loss of autonomy, dependency upon the partner, loss of social networks, loss of self-esteem and regret in the knowledge of skills unused. Today, loss of interest by the male partner may also be involved. These costs are likely to be higher for women who have been trained to a higher level for participation in paid employment. Thus, it is not surprising that fertility rates are lower for women with higher qualifications. Of course, this has been the case for over a century (although less so in the baby-boom era), but the impact on societal fertility is now much greater because a much higher proportion of women have high levels of education and expectations that they will participate fully in the paid labour force. Also, delayed childbearing means that most young women have experienced the psychic benefits of paid employment and, thus, they have a clear understanding of the loss of these benefits through having children. Again, it should be recalled that low societal fertility can be due to the decisions of some women rather than all women.

The economic costs of children are conventionally divided into two categories, direct costs and indirect or opportunity costs. Direct costs are expenditures made due to the presence of the child, including food, clothing, a larger house, more use of energy, education and medical costs of children, and so on. The indirect or opportunity cost is the loss of income related to time out of the labour force to care for children. When all social and economic institutions are geared to the male breadwinner model, very few women are in paid employment and hence, the opportunity costs for women of not working, while high, have little relevance. It follows that, as under the breadwinner model, indirect costs of children are irrelevant, the most appropriate way for governments to increase the incomes of those with children is to provide child-related benefits through the tax-transfer system. However, as the education and employment institutions move in the direction of gender equity, more women have incomes from paid employment and these incomes far exceed any child-related, tax-transfers that governments make. The economic costs of children then become dominated by the loss of income that childrearing imposes on women. Thus, as societies shift away from the male breadwinner model in the direction of a gender equity model of family, the emphasis shifts from direct to indirect economic costs.

The shift in emphasis from direct costs to indirect costs has other important implications for perspectives on fertility. First, direct costs are paid over the lifetime of the child and are spread into the future. They have less force, therefore, than indirect costs which are immediate, up front costs. Second, while parents think that children are expensive, they tend to heavily underestimate the direct costs of children. Indirect costs, however, are

usually known precisely because it is the current income of the woman that she will lose immediately once she leaves the labour force.

Thus, the principal components of change in the calculus of fertility decision-making have been the increased psychic costs of children and the increased relevance of the economic opportunity costs of having children. Both of these costs increase as the level of incoherence between social and economic institutions on the dimension of gender equity increases.

CONCLUSION: POLICY DIRECTIONS IN SUPPORT OF FERTILITY

This paper has argued that very low fertility as observed in many advanced countries today is the result of incoherence in the levels of gender equity inherent in social and economic institutions. Institutions which deal with women as individuals are more advanced in terms of gender equity than institutions which deal with women as mothers or members of families. There has been considerable advance in gender equity in the institutions of education and market employment. On the other hand, the male breadwinner model often remains paramount in the family itself, in services provision, in tax-transfer systems and in industrial relations. This leaves women with stark choices between children and employment, which, in turn, leads to some women having fewer children than they would like to have, and very low fertility. Palomba and Moors (1993: 40) refer to the fact that women in Italy and the Netherlands often wanted to have more children, but, once one had become a parent for the first time, structural obstacles arose through the lack of social organisation and support for families with children.

The problem of very low fertility can be addressed by draconian measures such as: withdrawal of access to the means of fertility control; allowing particular peoples, those with very low fertility, to disappear; dividing women into two classes, those who are in paid employment and those whose occupation is to produce children, with the latter being paid for childbearing; or reproducing children artificially. Draconian measures are presumed to be unacceptable. Beyond this, in theory, there are two policy choices: to roll back gender equity so that women have much reduced opportunity in education and market employment (a return to the full-scale breadwinner model of the 1950s) or to advance gender equity in social institutions related to the family so that women and men are able to combine market employment with having children. The first of these, a return to the 1950s, plainly is unrealistic in all advanced countries today. The waves of feminism have already broken upon their shores. The institutions of education and market employment are not going to return to the 1950s. Hence, a more rapid shift to gender equity in all social institutions is the only feasible option.

The core change required is the one that is the most difficult. Gender equity needs to be promoted within the family itself. Changes in cultural values are slow and idealised family morality is resistant to change. The direct role of government in changing family values is limited. The study by Therborn (1993), however, shows that past legislative actions taken by governments in relation to the status of children are related to current levels of gender equity. The issue here is whether legislation can lead social change or whether legislation follows social change. If it is the latter, the legislation to which Therborn refers will simply not occur in cultures which are reluctant to give up the dominance of adult males in family organisation. However, all countries have made some of these legislative changes and this leaves hope that further legislative change is possible. In addition, as the status of women in education and market employment improves, changes in the family may be more likely. Thus, countries with very low fertility should give consideration to the range of legislation that has been enacted in Nordic and English-speaking countries in relation to children's rights and gender equity. Change in the institution of the family is also possible on a generational basis, that is, it will always be difficult to exact changes in existing couple relationships, but a different socialisation of children can lead to change in the next generation. In this regard and in other respects as well, human relations education based on a gender equity perspective can be included in school curricula. Young women have been the leaders of the movement towards gender equity. They need to be supported in this endeavour by governments and the media. These are positive initiatives, but on the negative side, the message can go out to men that they risk having no descendants if they do not change their own role within families.

Consideration needs also to be given to changing existing transfer systems, supply of family services and industrial relations policies in the directions described above which favour gender equity. With regard to fiscal policy, "the liberal economic agenda which pervades advanced economies today does not reward sacrifice. Rather it says that the over-riding purpose in life is devotion to self" (Esping-Andersen, 1996). The notion that a liberal economic agenda can run hand-in-hand with a conservative family agenda is false. The conservative family agenda asks women to sacrifice themselves to a conservative family ideal in which they make all the sacrifices. Yet, at the same time, the liberal economic agenda offers women great rewards, but those rewards fall rapidly with each successive child. The future peopling of the society is the vast gulf in the logic of this liberal economic agenda. To this agenda, children are not producers in the market, so they are of little social value. Indeed, if they keep skilled women out of market employment or disrupt their performance, then children make a negative contribution to the liberal economic agenda.

The new liberal economic agenda is reversing the directions which have produced higher fertility in Nordic and English-speaking countries, and fertility rates in these countries have begun to fall again in recent years. The

family-friendly industrial relations policies of the 1980s are being reversed in the interests of efficiency. And indeed, there is no question that it is more efficient for employers to hire people who will not be disturbed by the counter demands of family responsibility. Work arrangements make it difficult to combine work and childrearing and the workplace still has a male breadwinner approach to its practices and procedures. The employee is expected to put the workplace first, to be available out-of-hours and not to have sick children or children who are on school holidays. The job insecurity implicit in individual contracts also implies that the worker can go without work for short periods or can move around the country at short notice. In the interests of fiscal responsibility, the level of access to family-related welfare services is being cut. Again, it is unquestionable that governments will save money if they do not provide these services. However, marketisation and privatisation, if not subsidised or closely monitored by government, will inevitably provide access more readily and at a higher quality to those who can afford to pay for family services. This direction also gives rise to the possibility of exploitation of people who can only work outside the formal economy and raises questions about the quality of services which are provided. Cutting family services and lowering taxes is a breadwinner model approach. It does not allow for rewards to be made to those who make the sacrifices that have to be made to support this system in the long term. Using Australia as an example of this trend, the report of the National Commission of Audit which promotes a liberal economic agenda urges that support to families with children should be limited to only poor families (1996: 123). Thus, services like child care and education are placed on the cost-cutting agenda. The costs of raising children are defined by the Commission as a private responsibility. The message is: you had them, you pay for them. Also, after 20 years in which benefits for children have been paid in the form of cash to the mothers of the children, in 1997 the Australia government reintroduced child allowances (which are means-tested and paid mainly to the principal earner) through the tax system. Women then become dependent upon men for purchase of family services, i.e., we have the breadwinner model again.

Chesnais (1996) recently characterised countries with very low fertility under the heading "nations of families" while those with somewhat higher fertility were classified as "nations of individuals". The arguments in this paper lead to a different classification. The issue is not about families versus individuals but about the nature of the prevailing family organisation, that is, whether family is characterised by male supremacy or by gender equity. Indeed, individualism is the result of the incoherence between a liberal economic agenda in combination with an insistence upon traditional, male-dominated family organisation. It is this combination which is fatal to childbearing. The liberal economic agenda needs to find space in its program for children. This can only be achieved through programs which emphasise gender equity and programs which recognise that governments must be involved in providing very substantial transfers through services or

money to those who have children. In short, policies need to give explicit recognition to the fact that children are valuable to the whole society, not just to their parents.

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2

EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE WOMEN'S STATUS: TRUE OR NOT?

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After World War II, fertility in Japan declined, though later than in some other developed countries. The TFR was below the replacement level by the mid 1970's, and this decline continued, with the TFR as low as 1.42 in 1995.

As M. Atoh has noted (1996), there are several hypotheses for the low fertility in developed countries: the technical and legal factor hypothesis including the contraceptive revolution (widespread use of modern contraception) and legalization of abortions; the economic factor hypothesis including increased costs of childbirth and child care, changes in the benefits of children and opportunity costs; and the cultural factor hypothesis as reflected by changes in people's values. To explain the very low fertility in Japan, which can be considered as a second demographic transition, Atoh has focused on the roles of people's values and the changes in value and has been examining the relationship between the changes in people's values and the decline in fertility rate. People's values changed greatly in the 1980's concerning parent-child, husband-wife and man-woman relationships. These values are related to the role and status of women in family and society. Since the mid-1970's, women's participation in higher education has been growing, the percentage of employed women has increased and women's wage level has risen, resulting in a smaller wage differential between men and women. The above-mentioned changes in people's value consciousness were caused by the substantial changes in women's social and economic status. Therefore, Atoh concluded that the trend to remain single (lower fertility phenomenon, see Tables 2.1 and 2.2) in Japan since the mid-

1970's is connected with the sex role revolution mentioned by Davis (1984) rather than with general individualism. I here examine further the reasonableness of the connection between Japan's lower fertility phenomenon with the sex role revolution mentioned by Davis, and I propose and examine a new hypothesis.

Table 2.1. – Percentage Single, by Sex and Age

Age	Male					Female				
	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995
15-19	99.8	99.3	99.6	98.5	99.1	98.6	97.8	99.0	98.2	98.8
20-24	91.6	90.0	91.5	92.2	92.3	68.3	71.6	77.7	85.0	86.5
25-29	46.1	46.5	55.1	64.4	66.4	21.6	18.1	24.0	40.2	49.0
30-34	9.9	11.7	21.5	32.6	37.3	9.4	7.2	9.1	13.9	19.9
35-39	3.6	4.7	8.5	19.0	22.6	5.5	5.8	5.5	7.5	9.7
40-44	2.0	2.8	4.7	11.7	16.5	3.2	5.3	4.4	5.8	6.6
45-49	1.4	1.9	3.1	6.7	11.4	2.1	4.0	4.4	4.6	5.7

Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Population Census.

Table 2.2. – Decomposition of the Decline of the TFR, 1950-1995

	1950-60	1960-70	1970-80	1980-90	1990-95
	Change in total fertility rate				
Beginning	3.65	2.00	2.13	1.75	1.54
End	2.00	2.13	1.75	1.54	1.42
Change	-1.65	0.13	-0.39	-0.20	-0.12
Women's age	Effect of change in marital fertility				
15-19	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
20-24	-0.06	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
25-29	-0.24	0.10	-0.05	-0.01	-0.03
30-34	-0.50	0.01	-0.07	0.14	0.04
35+	-0.57	-0.04	-0.04	0.05	0.03
Total	-1.38	0.08	-0.14	0.16	0.03
Women's age	Effect of change in proportion married				
15-19	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
20-24	-0.22	-0.22	-0.14	-0.13	-0.02
25-29	-0.04	0.04	-0.09	-0.20	-0.09
30-34	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04

35+	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00
Total	-0.27	0.05	-0.24	-0.36	-0.15
Source: Calculation of Institute of Population Problems					

Figure 2.1.– Number of live births and TFR in Japan, 1925-1995



The paper concludes that, the K. Davis-mentioned sex role revolution should be considered in two phases. One is the phase of increased resources followed by changes in values, and the other is the phase of a particular social system, that is how to position and incorporate the value changes in the system. As for the former, some changes occur universally where social industrialization has progressed to some extent. It is well known that these changes bring about a decline in the birth rate. As for the latter, however, the process of restructuring the society in response to changes in women's resources varies depending on the society and its culture. A lower birthrate is brought about in some cases, but not in other cases.

In Japan, women's consciousness has surely changed, supported by increased resources. However, its change is still incomplete and has not been accompanied by institutional support and changes in social systems, including gender roles. There is interaction between incomplete change in women's consciousness and the absence of institutional support or changes in the social system. Therefore, the phenomenon of balance between women's opportunity costs and the trend to remain single has emerged, leading to Japan's recent lower birthrate. A substantial change such as an increase in resources possessed by women is not necessarily connected directly with a lower fertility rate, but has compound influence together with social system factors.

That is to say, it cannot be concluded that the lower birthrate results from only the factor of an evolving sex role revolution. The Total Fertility Rate has recovered to nearly the replacement level in northern European countries where sexual equality has progressed more than in Japan. The recovery could not be realized without institutional changes and support by social systems such as gender role equalization. I think that the Davis-mentioned sex role revolution has not yet been essentially realized in Japan. It is reasonable to think that an incomplete sex role revolution brings about the phenomenon of a lower fertility rate. Using the available data, I intend to verify the hypothesis of social systems as important cultural factors.

EXPANSION OF OPPORTUNITY COSTS: INCOME OPPORTUNITIES LOST DUE TO LABOUR FORCE WITHDRAWAL BECAUSE OF MARRIAGE, CHILDBIRTH AND CHILD CARE

The expansion of educational opportunities is apparent from the continuous increase until the mid-1970's in the rate of students going on to high school and college or university (see Table 2.3). As for high schools, sex differences vanished in the 1960's, and enrollment rates of girls exceeded those of boys in the 1970's. The situation that almost all students go on to high school has continued, and 97% of

the pertinent cohort were eligible for entrance in 1995. As for universities or colleges including junior colleges, the differences have continued to diminish since the second half of the 1970's; the number of girls exceeded boys in 1989 and almost half the girl students entered universities or colleges in 1995, with 47% of the cohort eligible for entrance in 1995. Indeed, women's trend toward higher education is directly connected to a delay in marriage and higher age at first marriage.

Table 2.3. – College and High School Enrollment Rates by Sex.

Year	High School		College, University	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
1950	48.0	36.7		
1960	59.6	55.9	14.9	5.5
1970	81.6	82.7	29.3	17.7
1975	91.0	93.0	43.0	32.4
1980	93.1	95.4	41.3	33.3
1985	92.8	94.9	40.6	34.7
1990	93.2	95.6	35.1	37.4
1991	93.5	95.8	36.3	39.2
1992	93.9	96.2	37.0	40.8
1993	94.2	96.5	38.5	43.4
1994	94.6	96.8	40.9	45.9
1995	94.7	97.0	42.8	47.5

Source: Ministry of Education, School Basic Survey.

Increased wages and reduced wage differentials have accelerated women's economic independence, though the reduction in differentials was less than in many European countries. Gender differentials are smaller for the younger generation (see Table 2.4). The expansion of opportunity costs is also connected with changes in attitudes. The traditional family gender role model, as expressed in statements such as 'men go to work outside and women keep house', has clearly been fading (see Table 2.5). The number of women employed will continue to increase in the future, regardless of marital status.

Table 2.4. – Sex Differentials in Monthly Regular Income by Age (The ratio of female wage level to male wage level) (%)

Year	Age group							
	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-44	45-49	50-54	55-59
1965	78.2	67.1	58.1	52.1	44.7		46.0	
1970	79.7	67.7	54.5	50.5	47.9		49.5	
1975	85.3	75.5	63.9	55.9	54.1	56.1	53.5	58.2
1980	87.2	77.4	64.7	54.9	49.5	49.8	53.8	59.7
1985	88.2	81.0	69.0	58.9	52.2	49.9	52.0	62.3
1990	87.4	82.3	72.3	62.6	56.3	52.4	51.1	56.7

1995	89.7	83.9	75.8	66.4	59.4	54.1	52.0	54.9

Source: Ministry of Labour, Basic Survey on Wage Structure.

Table 2.5. – Attitudes toward "Men go to work and women keep house" (%)

Year	Approval		Opposition		D.K.	
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
1972	83.8	83.2	8.7	10.2	7.5	6.6
1979	75.6	70.1	17.4	22.8	7.0	7.1
1992	65.7	55.6	28.6	38.3	5.7	6.1

Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Survey on Women's Consciousness.

GENDER ROLE AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM

In Japan, the problem of a low fertility rate has been focused on since the massmedia made a great fuss in 1989 about the catchphrase "the 1.57 shock". This focus included future possible effects of fewer children. The Japanese Government has not adopted any clear population policies, but has conducted back-up measures by establishing the system of allowances for children in 1972 in order to stabilize the economic life of families raising children. This system provides 5,000-10,000 yen to 0-to-2-year-old children every month (see Table 2.6). The allowances, however, can be provided only when the family's income in the previous year was below approximately 2.4 million yen, nearly $20,000 for a family of four. Therefore, this system is hardly useful for middle income families.

Table 2.6. – Children's Allowance of Several Industrialised Countries.

	Japan	Sweden	England	France
Object	Under 3	Under 16	Under 16	Under 16
(Age)	(-)*	(under 20)	(under 19)	(under 20)
Birth order	Allowance per month ($)**			
1st	41.7	70.4	55.9	-
2nd	41.7	70.4	45.4	104.9
3rd	83.3	164.0	45.0	133.7
Limitation	$20,000 (per year)	Nothing	Nothing	Nothing

* ( ) = Case of student. **The list reflects values prevailing on Jan. 31, 1997.
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare

Figure 2.2 — Relation between co-residence with their mother and working rate by prefecture



Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Employment Status Survey.

Figure 2.3 — Relation between co-residence with parents and TFR by prefecture



Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Population Census. Ministry of Health and Welfare, Vital Statistics.

Government and municipalities have not actively dealt with the problem because they consider it as basically a private matter for each couple or family. However, as the birthrate in Japan has further declined recently and the social impact cannot be ignored, they are examining back-up measures seeking to promote a higher birthrate, including economic ones such as the introduction of a paid child-care leave system which guarantees income before childbirth. In Japan, economic assistance such as the above-mentioned children's allowances are incomplete and support systems including not only facilities but also a child-care leave system, etc., are insufficient. Therefore, every woman has needed to supplement public policies by herself. Women's compatibility between work and child care has greatly depended on whether the family lives with parents or not. Living with parents has functioned somewhat as an institutional supplement. Living with parents has an interrelation with women's working and fertility, as may be seen in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, respectively.

However, changes in household living arrangements after World War II were in a sense the process of losing free support resources (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). Unless new institutional supplements and personal support networks are formed, burdens on individuals will increase. As women's opportunity costs become larger, more women will hesitate to marry and to have children. (It should be noted that the model of the modern family with a two-child norm became common all over the country - see Table 2.9.)

When living with parents is not possible or the young generation has a tendency to avoid living with parents, the closest personal supporters are husbands. The gender role model of the modern family has faded in their consciousness. However, it is important to note whether changes in consciousness are followed by substantial changes in behaviour or not.

Table 2.7. – Household Living Arrangements, by Types of Family, Percentage Distributions

Year	Relatives households							Non-relatives house-holds	One-person house-holds	Total
	Nuclear-family households					(5)	Total			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	Total					
1960	7.3	38.2	1.1	6.4	53.0	30.5	83.6	0.3	16.1	100.0
1970	9.8	41.2	0.8	4.9	56.7	22.7	79.4	0.3	20.3	100.0
1980	12.5	42.1	0.8	4.9	60.3	19.7	80.0	0.2	19.8	100.0
1990	15.5	37.3	1.0	5.7	59.5	17.2	76.7	0.2	23.1	100.0
1995	17.5	34.4	1.1	6.1	59.1	15.8	74.9	0.3	24.8	100.0

Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Population Census.
Note: 1) Married couple only, 2) Married couple & their child(ren), 3) Father & his child(ren), 4) Mother & her child(ren), 5) Other relatives households (Co-residence with parents).

Table 2.8. – Co-Residence with Parents of Newly-Married Couples, Percentage Distributions

Marriage Cohort	Co-residence			Neo-local	Total
	viri-	uxori-	Total		
1945-1949	-	-	59.2	40.8	100.0
1950-1954	-	-	56.5	43.5	100.0
1955-1959	-	-	42.9	57.1	100.0
1960-1964	36.4	4.7	41.0	56.0	100.0
1965-1969	31.3	5.2	36.5	60.7	100.0
1970-1974	26.5	4.9	31.4	66.4	100.0
1975-1979	27.6	4.6	32.1	66.0	100.0
1980-1984	-	-	31.4	65.8	100.0
After 1985	-	-	30.7	67.9	100.0

Source: Institute of Population Probrems, National Fertility Survey

Table 2.9. – Distribution and Mean Number of Children by Birth Cohorts of Married women

Birth Cohorts	Year of survey	Age	Distribution of number of children (%)					Mean number of children
			No child	1	2	3	4 and +	
Before 1890	1950	60+	11.8	6.8	6.6	8.0	66.8	4.96
1891-1895	1950	55-59	10.1	7.3	6.8	7.6	68.2	5.07
1896-00	1950	50-54	9.4	7.6	6.9	8.3	67.8	5.03
1901-05	1950	45-49	8.6	7.5	7.4	9.0	67.5	4.99
1911-15	1960	45-49	7.1	7.9	9.4	13.8	61.8	4.18
1921-25	1970	45-49	6.9	9.2	24.5	29.8	29.6	2.65
1928-32	1977	45-49	3.6	11.0	47.0	29.0	9.4	2.33
1933-37	1982	45-49	3.6	10.8	54.2	25.7	5.7	2.21
1938-42	1987	45-49	3.6	10.3	55.0	25.5	5.5	2.20
1943-47	1992	45-49	3.8	8.9	57.0	23.9	4.9	2.18
1948-52	1992	40-44	4.1	9.3	56.9	25.2	3.7	2.16

Source: Institute of Population Problems,The Japanese National Fertility Survey.

I here explore time use which clearly show behaviour differences. Japanese men do not shoulder equal burdens in terms of co-sharing of housekeeping and child care (see Tables 2.10 and 2.11). Although a society centering around companies is a negative factor for which husbands only are not to blame, there is a gap between women's consciousness and men's present situation. Therefore, women are forced to lower the level of role expectation or reverse the role expectation itself. As a result, working women are expected to perform housekeeping at home to the same extent as housewives. When they have children, they shoulder heavier burdens.

Table 2.10. – Time Use of a Married Couple with their Child(ren), in hours and minutes per day

	Usual economic activities of wife			
	1981		1991	
	Working	Not Working	Working	Not Working
Primary Activities	10.13	10.35	9.50	10.06
	(10.37)	(10.35)	(10.04)	(10.07)
- Sleep	7.23	7.35	7.04	7.14
- Personal care	0.58	1.00	1.08	1.06
- Meals	1.52	1.59	1.37	1.46
Secondary Activities	10.08	7.36	9.52	7.46
	(8.44)	(8.29)	(8.46)	(8.39)
- Commuting	0.23	0.01	0.26	0.00
- Work	5.28	0.16	4.48	0.03
- House keeping*	4.17	7.20	4.39	7.19
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.25)
Tertiary Activities	3.39	5.49	4.18	6.09
	(4.39)	(4.55)	(5.11)	(5.15)
- leisure at home**	2.37	3.39	2.52	3.46
- Active leisure***	0.27	1.05	0.36	1.00
- Social life	0.14	0.29	0.19	0.30
Other	0.21	0.35	0.32	0.54

( ) = Time Use of Husband.

*Housekeep, Nursing, Child care, Shopping; **Rest and Relaxation,Watching T.V., Reading Newspaper, etc; ***Sports, Social activities, etc.

Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities. 1981, 1991.

Table 2.11. – Husband's Housework Participation, in Hours and Minutes per Week and Ratio

	Japan		UK		USA		Netherlands		Denmark	
	hours	Ratio*	hours	Ratio*	hours	Ratio*	hours	Ratio*	hours	Ratio*

Cooking	0.14	2.2	3.16	32.2	2.41	32.2	3.23	39.2	2.27	27.3
Cleaning	0.21	4.1	1.38	18.0	3.09	18.0	1.10	17.4	1.45	26.3
Shopping	0.56	23.5	2.27	56.7	2.13	56.8	2.13	73.1	2.27	77.8
Childcare	0.28	12.1	1.38	35.0	1.24	35.0	1.03	47.4	1.17	32.4

*The ratio of husband housekeeping to wife housekeeping (percentage).
Source: Japan Broadcastig Coorperation,International Comparative Survey on Time Use.

Regarding leisure or spare hours, women's lifestyles are clearly different according to whether they are working or not, have children or not, and are married or not (see Tables 2.12 and 2.13).

Table 2.12 – Time Use by Marital Status (25-29 Years of Age), in hours and minutes per day.

	Male		Female	
	Married	Never married	Married	Never married
Primary Activities	10.00	9.48	10.14	10.33
Secondary Activities	8.53	8.39	8.51	7.46
- Work	7.29	7.14	1.56	5.40
- House keeping*	0.06	0.04	3.36	0.41
- Child care	0.10	0.00	2.22	0.02
Tertiary Activities	5.07	5.33	4.55	5.41
- Leisure at home**	3.10	3.08	3.11	3.05
- Active leisure***	0.51	1.06	0.35	1.04
- Social life	0.27	0.46	0.23	0.47

*Housekeep, Nursing, Child care, Shopping. **Rest and Relaxation, Watching T.V., Reading. ***Sports, Social activities, etc.

Table 2.13. – Wife's Child Care in Households with Related Members under 6 Years of Age, in hours and minutes per day, percentage.

Number of Children	Total	Working	Not working	Employment rate
Total	2.42	1.39	3.20	37.8
1 child	2.19	1.22	2.59	41.5
2 children	3.20	2.18	3.48	30.9
3 children more	4.18	3.20	4.46	26.5

Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities.1991.

Women's heavy role burdens can be expressed by the words 'double shift' as in the U.S. However, the extent of women's burdens is quite different in Japan. Women's lifestyles in Japan are bound by the burdens as 'double work' or 'double bind.' With women's better educational background and their increased opportunity costs including income opportunities, the problems in social systems certainly make it more difficult for women to marry and have children.

The rate of women's labour force participation in Japan is characterized by an M-shape with labour force withdrawal for marriage and childbirth (see Fig. 2.4). Recently this M-shape has been becoming flat and similar to the trapezoid-shape seen in the U.S. and European countries. The change in shape is often mentioned in connection with women's higher status. Is it really a sign of women's higher status? As for married women, the labour force participation rate of workers age 30 to 34 has not much changed in the last twenty years (see Fig. 2.5). I guess that the percentage was boosted up because the number of working single women increased due to a delay in marriage. It is difficult to say this change was the result of the compatibility of work with child care and housekeeping(see Tables 2.14 and 2.15). Social systems continue to force women to choose either marriage or work, and the problem becomes more serious in those social systems with larger women's opportunity costs.

Table 2.14. – Labour Force Withdrawal for Pregnancy and Childbirth, percentage

1960	1965	1970	1973	1974	1976	1978	1981	1985	1988	1991	1994
35.9	49.3	47.5	48.8	47.2	38.7	36.7	21.7	30.5	31.4	31.2	31.6

* Pregnant Woman = 100
Source: Ministry of Labour,Women Employment Basic Survey.

Table 2.15. – Labour Force Status of Mother by Youngest Child Age, percentage distributions

	Youngest child age						
	0-3	4-6	7-9	10-12	13-14	15-17	Total
Working	26.1	46.4	58.1	67.1	68.6	71.3	54.0
Employed	21.2	35.2	45.8	55.5	56.2	57.9	42.4
35 Hours or	9.7	16.7	21.3	25.8	29.8	29.7	23.8

Over*							
Under 35 Hours	11.5	18.5	24.5	29.7	25.6	28.2	18.6
Not Working	73.0	53.0	40.6	32.3	29.8	27.8	45.0
Applicant	38.2	33.9	23.9	19.4	14.0	12.4	20.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Per Week
Source: Management and Coordination Agency, Labour Force Survey.1996.

Figure 2.4 – Female labour force participations rates by age (total)



Source: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey.

Figure 2.5 – Female labour force participations rates by age (marriaged)



Source: Statistics Bureau, Management and Coordination Agency, Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey.

Figure 2.6 – Relation between housework cooperation of husbands and TFR



Source: (1) Japan Broadcasting Cooperation International Comparative Survey on Time Use, 1995. (The ratio of male housekeeping level to female housekeeping level).
(2) UN, Demographic Yearbook, 1995.

FUTURE

Lastly, I refer to work, childbirth, child care and its possibilities. In the future, the expansion of income opportunities will strengthen women's working intentions. The percentage of women who desire to work again even if they leave the labour force for marriage or childbirth will rise, and the number of working women is expected to increase regardless of marital status. The expected family size is not different whether women work or not. Therefore, it is suggested that the number of children is not always decided mainly by women's working status. In fact, however, having children restricts women's working considerably. On the other hand, women who wish to realize self-actualization in the market work are forced to have no children, which is the phenomenon underlying the growing trend to remain single. It is required to realize the role equalization referred to as the gender role revolution, and a new lifestyle needs to be realized for that purpose. Gender role revolution is never a negative factor for a higher birth rate.

In order to provide working wives, a majority at present, with an environment where they need not shoulder double heavy burdens of job and household labor, husbands should emphasize not only job but also home and should positively co-share housekeeping and child care. Therefore, systems should be reviewed including working conditions, laws and the taxation system. Only after the systems are changed, changes in women's resources, sense of values and consciousness will be reflected in cooperation between women and men.

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3

THE GENDERED IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICIES ON SECOND-BIRTH RATES: THE CASES OF SWEDEN AND HUNGARY

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In the developed world the concept of gender equality, its appearance in public policies and realisation in everyday life may be a crucial component of improving women's status. While gender equality facilitates a convergence of gender roles, the degree of conflict between employment and parenthood can be significantly reduced for both sexes. The increase of fathers' active involvement in the care for children may then have a positive effect not only on female labour market participation, which can be considered as an important aspect of women's status, but also on fertility.

This paper is an attempt to shed more light on the actual impact of indirectly pronatalist public policies such as the parental-leave program on childbearing and to show how gender operates in this process[1] in different social contexts. These policies promote/encourage a combination of labour market participation and parenthood for both women and men, promoting also gender equality. I study the transition from being a parent of a single child to becoming a parent of two children in the same union. I focus on Sweden and Hungary from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. Despite their disparate political and economic backgrounds, these countries were characterised by nearly equally high female labour-market participation and strong ideological emphasis on gender equality which became more and

[1] This study is partly an elaboration of my earlier paper where similar issues have been discussed in the Swedish context only (Oláh 1996).

more important in terms of policy development during this period. The approach of comparing childbearing behaviour of women and men is quite unique since empirical research on fertility mostly focuses on women and to a limited extent on men only (Rindfuss and Parnell, 1989; Corijn *et al.*, 1996). Women and men are analysed separately as are the Swedish and Hungarian samples.

Public policies in Sweden and Hungary

Since the late 1960s, the proportion of women in the labour force has increased significantly in Sweden. This process was facilitated through broadened opportunities for part-time work. In parallel, the main concept of the Swedish welfare state, the notion of equality, has gained a further objective : the ideal of gender equality[2] (Björnberg, 1992). Its policy implication can be seen in the introduction of individual taxation (1971) and parental leave (1974) as well as in the extension of highly subsidised childcare facilities (mostly from 1976 onwards). While the earlier system of joint taxation of married couples decreased the contribution of female earnings, separate taxation has stimulated married women's labour market participation by making women's earnings a higher proportion of after-tax earnings than of before-tax earnings in the family budget (Gustafsson, 1992). The maternity leave that existed during the 1960s and the parental-leave program in effect since 1974 facilitated the situation of working parents by allowing several months of leave of absence from work with cash benefits for employed parents. The day-care[3] system which dates back to the early 1960s but expanded rapidly in the mid-1970s has been one of the most important policy programs that has helped individuals to combine gainful employment and parenthood.

When it comes to the main issue of this paper, that is to study the impact of policy changes on fertility, we should focus on the stepwise development of the parental-leave program. Before 1974 only women were entitled to a leave of six months and income replacement of a maximum of 65 per cent of their previous earnings. In parallel with the increase of the proportion of working mothers, policy-makers realised that changes in female gender role per se are not enough to attain gender equality. Fathers should also have a chance to participate in active parenting (Haas, 1992). Thus in 1974 parents became free to decide about the division of a six-

[2] This structure is also known as the « Scandinavian state-feminism » (Hernes 1987), meaning that it became possible for women to widen their traditional gender role through welfare reforms embodied in public policies that aimed at the active participation of both men and women in the three main spheres of life: employment, family and politics.

[3] Public childcare, provided by the municipalities but financed mainly by large government subsidies and only to a minor part by parents' fees, is available for parents of pre-school children who study or have a job of at least twenty hours per week (Gustafsson and Stafford 1994). The day-care system involved 12 per cent of children below the age of seven in the early 1970s, but this proportion had increased to 57 per cent by the early 1990s (Thorsell 1992, SCB 1995). Private childcare outside the home (relatives, au-pair girls, private day-care centres) is much less common in Sweden than in other Western countries like the United States or even Norway.

month leave between themselves with 90 per cent income replacement. The leave was continuously extended: to nine months in 1978, to twelve months in 1980 and to fifteen months in 1989. Since 1980 the last three months have been compensated with a flat-rate benefit only. The program is highly flexible. Parents may use the benefits on a full-time or a part-time basis up to the eighth birthday of the child. The benefit is taxable and carries pension entitlement. The leave is with job security (for further details see Sundström 1991, 1995). Another important feature of the program is that it favours a closer spacing of children. Since 1980 parents of more than one child became entitled to benefits at least as high as for the previous child without returning to work[4] between births if the interval between the two births was 24 months at most. In 1986 this interval was extended to 30 months (Hoem 1993a). These changes have probably affected individuals' decisions concerning the timing and spacing of births.

In Hungary, the growth in female labour market participation was most intensive in the 1950s and 1960s connecting both to the economic policy[5] of the post-war period and to the socialist ideology (Ferge, 1985). A commitment to attain full employment and to equality, which was the ruling concept of socialism, resulted in the understanding of gender equality as limited to equal labour market participation of women and men. The low level of wages encouraged the establishment of dual-earner families (Clason, 1992), where even women have had full-time employment (Frey, 1993), in contrast to the Swedish development. However, such employment patterns would not have been possible to maintain in the long run without an extended network of childcare institutions[6] which was run partly by municipalities and partly by large firms. A personal income tax in the form of individual taxation was introduced in 1988 in Hungary as the first among socialist countries, in accordance with the dominant role of dual-earner families.

The combination of employment and parenthood was also facilitated by a generous parental leave policy, at least for mothers. In 1967 working mothers became entitled to a leave until the child was two and a half years old, if they took care of the child at home instead of using public day care. During the time at home they received a child-care allowance ("GYES"), a flat-rate benefit that was about 40 per cent of an average female wage with pension entitlement and job security. The leave was extended to the third birthday of a child in 1969. Fathers were not eligible for the leave until 1982,

[4] Prior to 1980 the parental benefit depended on earnings between births. This led to lower benefits at the birth of the second child for mothers, since they were the ones mainly utilising the leave and the benefit and they usually shifted to part-time work after the first birth.

[5] The rebuilding of the half-destroyed country after World War II and then the massive industrial development increased the demand for workers, both males and females.

[6] There were two types of childcare institutions in Hungary: day nurseries for the under 3s, and kindergarten for children aged 3-6 years. While the former covered at most 20 per cent of children, the latter provided care for the vast majority of children in the particular age group, i. e. nearly 90 per cent by the late 1980s. Parents' fees were rather low; the day-care system was financed mainly by state subsidies (Adamik 1991).

but even then only for children above age one. At that time a parent who used the leave for a child at least one-year old was allowed to take half-time employment, when still receiving the benefit (Sándorné Horváth, 1986). In 1985 another type of child-care leave was introduced for mothers, covered by an earnings-related benefit, "GYED", (75 or 65 per cent of the previous income depending on whether the parent had at least two years of employment prior to the birth) until the child was one year old. In 1986, the entitlement period was extended by a half year and fathers became eligible for children older than one year. Beginning in 1987 parents could use the benefit until the second birthday of the child. Job security and pension entitlement were attached also to the income-related benefit which was taxable beginning in 1988, but the parent was not allowed to take on employment, not even part time, during the child-care leave. While the nontaxable flat-rate benefit increased according to the number of children, the earnings-related benefit did not. The former was popular mostly among women with low wages, and the latter was considered as stimulating mainly well-educated parents (Adamik, 1991). The two kinds of benefits existed in parallel since 1985 in a unique system, which was, however, much less flexible than the Swedish parental-leave program.

Theoretical discussion

Economic theory suggests that individuals formulate a "lifetime plan" regarding decisions on education, employment and fertility, which all may be crucial for women's status in a society. Such plans affect the level of schooling that individuals strive to attain, the timing of their labour market activity as well as the timing and spacing of childbearing (Hill and Stafford, 1985). There is a circular cumulative causality between work plans, fertility plans, work behaviour and fertility behaviour, not to mention education (both plan and attainment), that is too complex to be studied in one model. Schooling plans are posited to affect work plans, and both to influence childbearing plans which in turn may have counter-effects on individual ambitions regarding education and employment. Such mutual influences may also characterize the educational, labor market and fertility behaviour of individuals. Further, plans and behaviour interact within a time dimension, plans influencing later behaviour and actual behaviour influencing further plans (Bernhardt, 1993). Such complex relationships should be analyzed by specific links of the causality chain. In this paper I study only the influence of education and employment on fertility.

It has been suggested in the literature that female employment and reproduction are in serious conflict[7]. Such claims, however, seem to ignore that the degree of conflict may vary from country to country depending on

[7] This seems to be a common assumption of the normative perspective arising from sociology, of the household-production perspective (time-use studies) deriving from economics, of the sex-role socialization perspective emerging from social psychology and the life-cycle perspective originated in social demography (Sweet 1981, Bernhardt 1993).

the specific gender structure of societies that involves social policies among other factors. For this reason a “feminist perspective” has been suggested (Bernhardt, 1993). This approach focuses on structural constraints that shape the relationship between employment and reproduction such as public policies, institutional frameworks and the sharing of childrearing responsibilities between mothers and fathers. Structural constraints are also relevant for the formulation of “lifetime plans” since such plans should match the options individuals face in their specific social situation. Public policies may be considered a litmus test of societies’ gender structure revealing much of women’s situation at both macro- and micro level. In order to study their impact on second-birth rates of women and men in Sweden and Hungary, I apply the feminist perspective.

Economic theory maintains that individuals seek to maximize their well-being and that fertility decisions are part of this optimization since individuals derive utility not only from consumption of goods and leisure but also from having children (Becker, 1991). On the other hand, the number of children (“quantity”) a couple has is limited by fertility costs and their preferred level of care and expenditures per child (“quality”). The fertility costs include forgone earnings during the period the parent has reduced hours of employment in order to take care of the child, and non-accumulation as well as depreciation of human capital such as forgone schooling and on-the-job training, plus deterioration of skills. The overall fertility cost varies across individuals according to market wages and amount of human capital accumulated. The loss both in earnings and human capital has been suggested to be greater for those highly educated. Thus, women with high education would be expected to have higher fertility costs and therefore lower fertility than less-educated women, ceteris paribus.

However, public policies such as parental leave and subsidized public childcare reduce the cost of having children. The parental leave program decreases forgone earnings through maternal and paternal benefits and public childcare enables parents to continue active labor market participation while the children are still young. These policies may even be more advantageous for those with a high level of schooling as concerns the income-related benefits during parental leave. Highly educated parents might also have easier access to public day care since they often have flexible working hours and more seldom work inconvenient hours. This indicates that for highly educated women employment may be less of an impediment to childbearing than it is for those with less schooling.

Men’s fertility decisions are generally assumed not to be affected by the costs of having children in the same way as women’s are. Traditionally, fathers were rarely involved in the direct care of children; therefore they did not have to take forgone earnings or depreciation of their human capital into account. We should expect men’s fertility decisions to be mainly influenced

by their own income, and that of the family. However, to the extent that fathers share the parental leave they may face similar costs as mothers do. Sundström and Stafford (1994) found that fathers who had taken parental leave experienced slower wage growth than fathers who had not taken leave. Thus a gender equal relationship between parents may affect men's fertility negatively, especially if they are highly educated. On the other hand, women in such relationships can rely on their partner's help and therefore have more children than they would have if all the responsibility of care-taking would have been theirs only.

Data and method

The data used in this study have been extracted from the Swedish Family and Working Life Survey of 1992, conducted by Statistics Sweden, and from the Hungarian Fertility and Family Survey of 1992, conducted by Statistics Hungary. These surveys connect to the European FFS-project called "Fertility and Family Surveys in Countries of the ECE Region" which makes cross-country comparison possible. The surveys contain full histories of marriage and cohabitation, childbearing, education and occupation of 4983 individuals in Sweden and 5487 individuals in Hungary, both women and men. Swedish respondents were selected by simple random sampling from eight strata of women born in 1949, 1954, 1959, 1964 or 1969, and men born in 1949, 1959 or 1964. The National Population Register was used as the sampling frame (Hoem, 1996). The Hungarian sample is nationally representative for the 18-41 year old female population and the 20-44 year old male population (Kamarás, 1996).

The data sets used in this study include respondents who had at least one biological child and were at risk of having a second child, which means that they were interviewed at least 9 months after their first birth. Individuals who had their first child before age nineteen were excluded since they had not had time to establish themselves in the labour market before they became parents; thus they did not qualify for the most important family policy benefits. Further, since the model to be estimated does not include a random term I try to make the samples as homogeneous as possible. Censoring occurs six years after the first birth, at nine months after separation from the partner with whom the respondent had the first child, or at interview, whichever came first. A total of 2543 individuals (1690 women and 853 men) have been included in the Swedish working sample and 2916 individuals (1934 women and 982 men) in the Hungarian one.

Intensity (hazard) regression[8] is used as the tool of analysis. This is a frequently applied method within event-history analysis and is suitable for data of continuous life-history records like the data used in this study. The

[8] For details see for example Hoem and Hoem (1989), Hoem (1993b).

method allows us to assess the effects of various covariates on the "risk" (hazard) that a certain event will happen, in our case that a first-time parent will have a second child. The analysis is based on a piecewise-constant proportional-hazard model. Exposure is measured as the number of months since first birth (duration) with intervals: 9-18, 19-24, 25-30, 31-36 and 37-72 months. Information for those who did not have a second child within the period of observation is also taken into account

The analysis includes fixed and time-varying covariates (Tables 3.2.A, 3.3.A, and 3.4.A, 3.5.A and 3.6.A, for Sweden and Hungary respectively, in the Annex) and the time variable, duration since the first birth. In an attempt to control for differences in individual characteristics I have used cohort, first-birth union order[9], religiosity, and marital status[10] at first birth as fixed covariates and a time-varying covariate, current marital status. The two marital status variables have been combined into a single factor[11] with three levels. The models presented in this paper include only the combined factor. For the Hungarian analysis, the negligible size of the group of cohabiting individuals and the consequent random variation reduce the reliability of findings for this factor to such an extent that I have chosen to present only the models without the marital status variable. More family-oriented individuals, being in the group of married and religiously active, are more likely to have a second child. Those who had the first child in a higher-order union may be expected to have a higher risk for a second birth, probably feeling more confident that they found the right partner than those who have the first child in their first union.

To assess the diversity of individual conditions in terms of human capital I have included age at first birth and education at first birth[12] as fixed factors and current employment status[13] as a time-varying covariate. There are conflicting hypotheses on the effect of parent's age at first birth. The purely demographic concept, "the later, the fewer", indicates a negative effect of age on the relative risk of second birth, focusing especially on women. On the other hand, income-related benefits during parental leave can result in postponement of births requiring labour-market establishment and sufficiently high earnings. As far as education is concerned, which can also be used as a proxy for income, we have two competing hypotheses as

[9] Only relationships involving at least three months of cohabitation were considered as "unions".

[10] Non-marital cohabitation is very common among couples in every age and socioeconomic group in Sweden (Hoem 1992). Further, most couples are still unmarried when they become parents for the first time (Hoem 1996).

[11] The new, combined factor refers to the respondent's marital status at first birth and to her/his marital status in each month between the two births.

[12] This variable refers to the highest level of education attained by the time of having the first child.

[13] Current employment status reveals the different working strategies individuals follow between births. The period, when this variable was allowed to vary, was ended seven months before the second birth to avoid changes in employment caused by the pregnancy. Unfortunately for the cross-country comparison, being on parental leave was not recorded as an option per se for Hungarian respondents, but as continuation of the previous employment status.

well, as was discussed in the theoretical section. For current employment status I expect work-oriented individuals such as full-time employees to have lower second-birth risk than those who are rather family-oriented, including short part-time workers and those doing own household work full time.

Finally, to account for the impact of public policies and of economic trends on second births, I have included a fixed factor, father took parental leave[14] in connection with the first birth for Sweden, and two fixed covariates, division of household work and division of childcare work (which have been combined into a single variable), for Hungary[15]. In addition, two time-varying covariates, current policy period[16] and current business-cycle period[17], were included for both countries. As mentioned previously, the sharing of parental leave may influence women's further childbearing positively while having a negative effect for men. Similarly for the Hungarian analysis, we expect to find a positive effect for women when their partner shares the responsibility of housework and childcare work with them, but a possible negative influence on men because of their increasing burden, meaning the total amount of daily work they carry out. For policy periods I expect the risk of a second birth to increase in the case of a more advantageous policy outcome, such as higher level of parental benefit or longer leave period as well as greater access to public childcare. With respect to both the Swedish and Hungarian family policies, this factor is likely to have a positive gradient. Business-cycle periods may account for the impact of economic trends on fertility. Thus we can find a negative effect during a recession and an increase of second-birth risk during economic upturns. The time variable, duration since first birth, may also reflect policy influences at least for Sweden. I expect the so-called speed-premium to result in shorter birth-intervals and thereby a higher risk of a second birth within 24 months in the first half of the 1980s and within 30 months after 1986.

Findings

The results show that public policies have indeed influenced the second-birth rate in both Sweden and Hungary. I started by fitting a model

[14] Fathers were not eligible for parental leave before 1974 in Sweden and there might be cases even later on when sharing the leave was not possible, therefore the level called "other" has also been included. Further, I have not distinguished here between one month or less use of parental leave by father and his longer leave-taking because the risk of a second birth is nearly the same for these categories as was shown in a preliminary analysis.

[15] These are anticipatory variables which are used as a proxy for the level of gender equality in the respondent's union. Unfortunately, the data did not include other information that could have been used as direct measurement.

[16] The levels of this factor refer to major changes in family policies including some time lags. The variable is also expected to measure childcare cost to a limited extent. The end date of the last level for both period factors refers to the last date of interviews in the surveys, which was different for Sweden and Hungary.

[17] The levels of this factor refer to a combination of information on economic growth, the unemployment rate, and the consumer price index. The complex nature of this variable requires some further work on the construction, which I plan to carry out later on.

(1) including only covariates that reflect individual characteristics. In Table 3.7, the relative risks of a second birth are seen to increase over cohorts for both Swedish women and men except for a decline for the 1969 female cohort. For first-birth union order, the further childbearing pattern of those who had their first child in their first or second (marital or non-marital) union for either sex are rather similar, while we see great differences for individuals in higher-order first-birth unions both compared to the other groups of the same sex and between women and men respectively. Because of the limited size of the « 3+ union »-groups the finding might be explained by random variation or it may be a selection effect. As for marital status, consequent cohabitors were the least likely to have a second child. The highest second-birth risk of the group "cohabitant at first birth but currently married" reveals probably the fact that these couples married because of the pregnancy with the second child. In any case, the result that marriage stimulates fertility as compared to cohabitation is in line with the expectations. Religiosity appears to be quite unimportant for Swedish individuals' second-childbearing, therefore it is omitted from the next models.

The Hungarian analysis (Table 3.8) shows gender differences both for cohorts and religiosity. While we see little variation in the second-birth risks of female cohorts with the exception of the youngest cohort, there is a clear pattern of an inverted u-shape for male cohorts. First-birth union order is far less important for Hungarian fertility than it is for Swedish, and since including this variable did not improve the fit of the model, it has been left out from the subsequent models. While religiosity has hardly any influence on first-time mothers' further childbearing, being religiously active increases men's second-birth risk significantly. Summing up the effects of individual characteristics, we find the pattern of female and male childbearing behaviour being remarkably similar for Sweden, but quite different for Hungary.

Table 3.7. – Relative risks of second birth for Swedish women and men. Models with individual characteristics (1) and human capital variables (2) [18]

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Women	men	women	men
Cohort:				
1949	0.655	0.634	0.618	0.635
1954	0.756		0.762	
1959	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}
1964	1.235	1.288	1.243	1.323
1969	0.936		1.079	
First-birth union order:				
1	1.^{b***}	1.^{b*}	1.^{b***}	1.^{b*}
2	0.949	1.107	0.915	1.066
3+	2.189	0.493	1.913	0.460
marital status:				
1st cohab./curr. cohab.	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}
1st cohab./curr. married	1.678	1.421	1.650	1.366
1st married/curr. married	1.488	1.346	1.414	1.325
Religiosity:				
Active	1.121	1.261		
not active	1.^{b}	1.^{b}		
Age at first birth:				
19-22			0.907	0.808
23-26			1.^{b}	1.^{b}
27-30			0.946	1.027
31+			0.949	0.800
Education at first birth:				
compulsory only			0.812	0.859
Gymnasium			1.^{b***}	1.^{b}
post-gymnasium			1.411	1.126
Other			0.713	0.918
Current employment status:				
full-time work			1.^{b***}	1.^{b}
long part-time work			1.030	
short part-time work			1.132	
on parental leave			3.079	
own household work			1.689	
Other			0.829	1.229
Log likelihood	-5151.4	-2546.3	-5080.8	-2541.3
No. of parameters	14	12	24	18

*** significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.

[18] For each variable risks are given relative to the baseline level (1.^{b}). The baseline intensity, duration (months since first birth), is not reported here although it is included in all models. The significance refers to entire variables, not only to the baseline level.

Table 3.8. – Relative risks of second birth for Hungarian women and men. Models with individual characteristics (1) and human-capital variables (2) [19]

	Model 1		Model 2	
	women	men	women	men
Cohort:				
1949-51		0.814		0.833
1952-56	1.069	0.933	1.056	0.946
1957-61	1.[b]	1.[b]	1.[b**]	1.[b]
1962-66	1.034	0.950	0.991	0.933
1967-70	0.813	0.713	0.716	0.660
first-birth union order:				
1	1.[b]	1.[b]		
2+	0.820	0.763		
Religiosity:				
Active	1.087	1.318	1.091	1.344
not active	1.[b]	1.[b**]	1.[b]	1.[b**]
no information	2.265	0.724	2.181	0.737
age at first birth:				
19-22			1.329	1.150
23-26			1.[b***]	1.[b*]
27+			0.942	0.882
education at first birth:				
vocational school			1.109	1.030
Gymnasium			1.[b]	1.[b]
post-gymnasium			1.130	1.116
Other			1.184	1.012
current employment status:				
full-time work			1.[b]	1.[b]
long part-time work			0.811	
short part-time work			1.018	1.224
Other			1.221	0.917
log likelihood	-5718.2	-3008.8	-5700.2	-3005.7
no. of parameters	11	12	18	18

*** significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.

[19] For each variable risks are given relative to the baseline level (1.[b]). The baseline intensity, duration (months since first birth), is not reported here although it is included in all models. The significance refers to entire variables, not only to the baseline level.

Next, the factors reflecting individual human capital were added to the model (2). The effect of previously presented covariates will be discussed only when it changes as we add further factors. For Sweden, the variation of relative risks according to age at first birth is only minimal for women, but shows an inverted u-shape for men, not being significant for either sex (Table 3.7) and therefore omitted from the next model. This finding, however, contradicts the "the later, the fewer" hypothesis for women, while somewhat surprisingly it seems to fit describing male fertility. Education at first birth shows a positive gradient for both sexes which is in line with previous findings (Hoem and Hoem, 1989) but contrary to Becker. This suggests that Swedish policies have been successful in reducing the fertility costs for well-educated individuals. As for current employment status, women on parental leave[20] and those doing own household work[21] have the highest second-birth risk, while the difference is rather small between short part-time employed and those working full-time or long part time. For men, the higher second-birth risk of non-full-time workers may be a selection effect representing relatively atypical male employment strategies but it also may be the result of much random variation within this category.

The inclusion of age at first birth into the model modified the cohort effect for Hungarian women (Table 3.8). Thus, second-birth risk decreases over female cohorts, while there is hardly any change for male cohorts. Age at first birth with a negative gradient for both sexes appears to be a very important factor for further childbearing of first-time parents in Hungary, especially for mothers, in contrast with the Swedish findings. As for education at first birth[22], there is hardly any difference in second-birth risk between educational levels, which probably reflects public-policy influence, like in Sweden. Since it did not improve the fit of the model, this variable was left out from the next model. For current employment status, the second-birth risk of full-time employed and short part-time working women is about the same, while it is somewhat lower for long part-time workers. The higher risk for short part-time working men is probably due to random variation or it may be a selection effect considering the overall dominance of full-time employment as a male work-strategy. In sum, while the gender differences in the effect of individual characteristics were negligible for Sweden, they appeared more clearly for human capital variables. This is just the opposite of the Hungarian results, where the gendered effects are more apparent for

[20] This refers probably to the stimulating effect of the so-called speed-premium.

[21] That housewives have higher second-birth risk than those currently employed is in line with earlier findings (Hoem and Hoem 1989). However, when current employment is combined with other variables measuring work experience, relative second-birth risk may change. For example, it has been found that women who have been housewives since their first birth do not have appreciably higher third-birth rates than employed mothers (Hoem 1993).

[22] The other category includes a substantial proportion of Hungarian respondents at the moment. The majority of them might have only compulsory education. I plan to reconstruct their educational histories and thus to find out their educational attainment at first birth. In the recent stage I have chosen not to interpret this category because of the possibly strong random variation in this group.

individual characteristics and small for factors that reflect differences in human capital.

In a third step, covariates intended to pick up the impact of public policies were added (model 3). For Sweden (Table 3.9) we see that when the father has used some of the leave, the second-birth risk was higher for both women and men than when he did not use parental leave. These results confirm our expectations for living in a more gender-equal relationship regarding women, but are quite surprising for men. We may take into account though that fathers who take parental leave are probably more family-oriented than other fathers and thus acting in accordance with their personal preferences counterbalances the negative impact of increased fertility cost. The effect of policy programs shows little variation for women's second-birth fertility until the mid-1980s. Then the introduction of the so-called speed-premium (1986) and the extension of parental leave (1989) possibly in combination with the increasing availability of public childcare greatly stimulated further childbearing of first-time mothers. Men's second-birth fertility increased moderately over the policy periods with the exception of the late 1970s, when fathers' entitlement to parental leave was newly introduced, and in the early 1990s when the leave was greatly extended. Yet, the reforms had greater impact on women's second-childbearing than on men's. While business-cycle period[23] has a negative gradient for both sexes, the effect is more apparent for women's second-birth risk as compared with men's.

For Hungary (Table 3.10) the inclusion of policy variables into the model levelled off the differences in second-birth risks between the older male cohorts, while keeping the negative gradient for the two youngest cohorts. As for the division of household work and childcare work between the partners in the relationship, we see that women are significantly less likely to have a second child if they did not receive any help from their partner in either of these activities. The effect is much less apparent for fathers, but it seems that the second-birth risk is highest for the most traditional and the most egalitarian (in terms of gender labour division) men[24]. The positive gradient for current policy periods connects to fathers entitlement to parental leave since 1982, and the introduction of income-related parental benefits in the mid-1980s, as well as the increasing availability of public childcare over time. Interestingly, the impact on male childbearing is more distinct than for female. For business-cycle periods[25]

[23] There is a possible identification problem caused by the closely similar period specifications for the current policy period and the business-cycle variables, therefore I plan to redefine them later on.

[24] We should, however, keep in mind that this is an anticipatory variable, and what we see may be an effect of reversed causation.

[25] The trend reveals a mixture of individuals' expectations and economical reality, since economic growth was actually highest prior to the mid-1970s, but the negative effect relating to the oil crises was not visible until the early 1980s because of important reforms in the spheres of both economics and politics.

the influence on second-birth risks is seen in an inverted u-shape for both sexes. Summing up the effect of policy factors in the completely multiplicative model, gender differences do appear for both countries.

Table 3.9.A. – Relative risks of second birth for Swedish women and men. Models with individual characteristics, human capital and policy variables[26].

	Model 3	
	women	men
Cohort:		
1949	0.619	0.585
1954	0.764	
1959	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}
1964	1.266	1.295
1969	1.077	
First-birth union order:		
1	1.^{b***}	1.^{b}
2	0.935	1.095
3+	1.939	0.513
Marital status:		
1st cohab./curr. cohab.	1.^{b***}	1.^{b***}
1st cohab./curr. married	1.628	1.383
1st married/curr. married	1.412	1.331
Education at first birth:		
compulsory only	0.797	0.864
Gymnasium	1.^{b***}	1.^{b}
post-gymnasium	1.422	1.159
Other	0.715	0.927
Current employment status:		
full-time work	1.^{b***}	1.^{b}
long part-time work	1.034	
short part-time work	1.139	
on parental leave	3.058	
own household work	1.682	
Other	0.839	1.216
Father took parental leave:		
Yes	1.^{b**}	1.^{b*}
No	0.842	0.775
Other	0.892	0.989
Current policy period:		
January 1968- December 1974	1.099	0.827
January 1975- December 1980	1.^{b*}	1.^{b}
January 1981- December 1986	0.966	0.859
January 1987- December 1989	1.458	0.863
January 1990- June 1993	1.760	1.012
Current business-cycle period:		
July 1968- June 1987	1.^{b***}	1.^{b}
July 1987- June 1991	0.631	0.947
July 1991- June 1993	0.466	0.841

[26] For each variable risks are given relative to the baseline level (1.^{b}). The baseline intensity, duration (months since first birth), is not reported here although it is included in all models. The significance refers to entire variables, not only to the baseline level.

Log likelihood	-5072.6	-2539.9
Number of parameters	29	23
*** significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.		

Table 3.10 – Relative risks of second birth for Hungarian women and men. Model (3) with individual characteristics and human-capital variables [27]

	Model 3	
	women	men
Cohort:		
1949-51		1.050
1952-56	1.054	1.079
1957-61	1.^{b**}	1.^{b}
1962-66	0.923	0.828
1967-70	0.600	0.554
Religiosity:		
Active	1.098	1.340
not active	1.^{b}	1.^{b*}
no information	1.929	0.791
Age at first birth:		
19-22	1.375	1.227
23-26	1.^{b***}	1.^{b**}
27+	0.904	0.787
Current employment status:		
full-time work	1.^{b*}	1.^{b}
long part-time work	0.818	
short part-time work	1.039	1.206
Other	1.244	0.917
Divison of household work and childcare:		
Household and childcare equally shared	1.^{b**}	1.^{b}
Household and/or childcare mainly SHE	1.028	0.906
Household and childcare only SHE	0.684	1.051
Household equally, childcare other/childcare equally, household other	1.497	0.959
Household and childcare other or mainly HE	1.049	0.685
Current policy period:		
January 1968-December 1982	1.^{b**}	1.^{b}
January 1983-December 1987	1.100	1.335
January 1988-December 1993	1.427	1.602
Current business-cycle period:		
January 1968-June 1974	1.^{b}	1.^{b}
July 1974-June 1983	1.207	1.241
July 1983-December 1993	0.987	1.080
Log likelihood	**-5693.7**	**-3000.9**
Number of parameters	**23**	**23**

[27] For each variable risks are given relative to the baseline level (1.^{b}). The baseline intensity, duration (months since first birth), is not reported here although it is included in all models. The significance refers to entire variables, not only to the baseline level.

*** significant at the 1%-level, ** at 5%, * at 10%.



Figure 3.1. – Second-birth risk of Swedish women by current employment and duration.

Finally, I have tested for possible effects of the speed-premium on the next birth by running interactions between duration since first birth and current employment for Sweden as compared to Hungary, where there was no such policy reform. As we see in Figure 3.1, Swedish women on parental leave[28] have speeded up their second birth, while full-time employed, long part-time workers and those who are engaged in own housework only have not. The lack of effect on the birth spacing of short part-time workers is, however, surprising, since they would certainly gain by having shorter birth intervals and thus higher parental benefits unless they have also worked short part-time prior to the first birth. Full-time employed men have similar spacing as women working full-time and this is true also for Hungary. In sum, the interactions strengthen our conclusion that there is a gendered effect of policy variables on the second birth in both Sweden and Hungary.

CONCLUSION

In this paper I have analysed further childbearing of first-time mothers and fathers in contemporary Sweden and Hungary. Interestingly, no gender pattern was seen in the effect of individual characteristics for Sweden, but the gender differences were quite apparent for Hungary. Sex differences for Sweden appeared first with the introduction of human capital variables into the model, while their effect was rather similar for Hungarian women and men. As for policy factors, we saw a distinctive gender pattern for both countries.

The finding that age at first birth has hardly any influence on Swedish women's second-childbearing suggests policy influence, both in terms of promoting postponement of parenthood and of allowing "late" career-interruption by making it possible to combine employment and parenthood through the parental-leave program and access to public childcare. These policy programs, existing in both countries, have also reduced fertility cost for highly-educated individuals, mothers as well as fathers, in both Sweden and Hungary. Focusing on current employment, we have seen Swedish women using a wide variation of work strategies between births, while the vast majority of men are full-time employed. In Hungary, full-time employment is dominant among both mothers and fathers. In both countries, such work strategies are closely connected to the parental-leave program and to public day-care as well as to individual income taxation, promoting dual-earner families. The higher second-birth risk of Swedish women and men when the father had taken parental leave compared to other groups, as well as the increase in periods of advantageous policies and stimulating

[28] Having a longer birth interval than 30 months would significantly reduce the parental benefit, unless new entitlement is built up through return to work or working in parallel with the parental leave.

reforms for both countries and both sexes provide further evidence of policy effects. While these findings, perhaps indirectly through the policy effects, also underline the importance of gender equality in the family, a similar but more direct indication can be seen in the result that Hungarian women, who had to take on the responsibilities of both the household and the care for the child without any help from their partner, are much less likely to have a second child than other women.

In short, the results of this study reveal a possible interaction between the concept of gender equality as embodied in public policies and thus promoting the combination of employment and parenthood for both sexes and the consequent transition of traditional gender roles in a way of approaching each other, which further strengthens gender equality. Concerning women's status, such a development appears to be advantageous at both the macro- and micro-level.

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ANNEX

Table 3.1.A. – Number of respondents excluded from the analysis of second births in Sweden and Hungary

Reason for exclusion of respondents	Sweden	Hungary
No recorded biological child	1 562	1 602
Interviewed within 8 months after the first birth	123	104
Had the first child before age 19	123	378
Single (neither married nor cohabiting) at first birth	308	263
Multiple first birth	18	32
The first and/or second child was adopted	45	107
First child died before the second was conceived	13	28
Grew up in a non-Nordic country	248	-
Belong to a too old/too young cohort (defined according to comparability with the Swedish sample)	-	57
Total	2 440	2 571

Table 3.2.A. – Distributions of Swedish respondents at the various levels of fixed covariates (One-child parents in intact union)

	Women		men	
	Number	%	Number	%
Cohort:				
1949	422	25.0	437	51.2
1954	448	26.5		
1959	431	25.5	212	24.9
1964	294	17.4	204	23.9
1969	95	5.6		
First-birth union order:				
1	1 403	83.1	712	83.5
2	249	14.7	117	13.7
3+	38	2.2	24	2.8
Religiosity:				
Active	155	9.2	57	6.7
not active	1 535	90.8	796	93.3
Marital status at first birth:				
Cohabiting	1 001	59.2	516	60.5
Married	689	40.8	337	39.5
Age at first birth:				
19-22	616	36.4	155	18.2
23-26	603	35.7	384	45.0
27-30	328	19.4	217	25.4
31+	143	8.5	97	11.4
Education at first birth:				
compulsory only	268	15.9	177	20.8
Gymnasium	1 110	65.6	513	60.1
post-gymnasium	248	14.7	120	14.1
Other	64	3.8	43	5.0
Father took parental leave:				
Yes	943	55.8	499	58.5
No	470	27.8	194	22.7
Other	277	16.4	160	18.8
Total	1 690	100.0	853	100.0

Table 3.3.A. – Distributions of Hungarian respondents at the various levels of fixed covariates (One-child parents in intact union)

	Women		Men	
	Number	%	Number	%
Cohort:				
1949-51			174	17.7
1952-56	762	39.4	315	32.1
1957-61	519	26.8	243	24.7
1962-66	418	21.6	181	18.4
1967-70	235	12.2	69	7.1
First-birth union order:				
1	1 862	96.3	935	95.2
2+	72	3.7	47	4.8
Religiosity:				
Active	278	14.4	97	9.9
Not active	1 649	85.2	851	86.7
No information	7	0.4	34	3.4
Marital status at first birth:				
Cohabiting	23	1.2	11	1.1
Married	1 911	98.8	971	98.9
Age at first birth:				
19-22	1 171	60.5	245	24.9
23-26	572	29.6	477	48.6
27-30	149	7.7	207	21.1
31+	42	2.2	53	5.4
Education at first birth:				
Vocational school	493	25.5	466	47.4
Gymnasium	818	42.3	286	29.1
Post-gymnasium	258	13.3	122	12.4
Other	365	18.9	108	11.1
Division of household work:				
Equally shared	313	16.2	210	21.4
Mainly SHE	1 196	61.9	610	62.1
Mainly HE	12	0.6	20	2.0
Only SHE	70	3.6	14	1.4
Other	343	17.7	128	13.1
Division of childcare work:				
Equally shared	496	25.6	292	29.8
Mainly SHE	839	43.4	333	33.9
Mainly HE	7	0.4	7	0.7
Only SHE	114	5.9	26	2.6
Other	478	24.7	324	33.0
Total	1 934	100.0	982	100.0

Table 3.4.A. – Exposure time (in months) at different levels of time-varying covariates and of the duration variable for Swedish respondents

	Women		Men	
	Exposure time	%	Exposure time	%
Current marital status:				
Cohabiting	20 489	43.8	10 554	43.5
Married	26 270	56.2	13 700	56.5
Marital status:				
1st cohab./curr. cohab.	20 489	43.8	10 554	43.5
1st cohab./curr. married	6 865	14.7	3 865	15.9
1st married/curr. married	19 405	41.5	9 835	40.6
Current policy period:				
January 1968- December 1974	5 063	10.9	3 087	12.7
January 1975- December 1980	13 516	28.9	7 977	32.9
January 1981- December 1986	13 970	29.9	5 712	23.6
January 1987- December 1989	7 127	15.2	3 222	13.3
January 1990- June 1993	7 083	15.1	4 256	17.5
Current business-cycle period:				
January 1968- June 1974	4 175	8.9	2 493	10.3
July 1974- June 1981	15 552	33.3	9 092	37.5
July 1981- June 1987	13 972	29.9	5 628	23.2
July 1987- June 1991	9 577	20.5	4 886	20.1
July 1991- June 1993	3 483	7.4	2 155	8.9
Current employment status:				
Full-time work	12 451	26.6	22 379	92.3
Long part-time work	10 380	22.2	351	1.4
Short part-time work	8 493	18.2	129	0.5
On parental leave	6 774	14.5	135	0.6
Own household work	5 314	11.4	36	0.2
Other	3 347	7.1	1 224	5.0
Duration (in months):				
9-18	16 013	34.2	8 107	33.4
19-24	7 856	16.8	3 991	16.5
25-30	6 088	13.1	3 072	12.7
31-36	4 610	9.9	2 401	9.9
37-72	12 192	26.0	6 683	27.5
Total	46 759	100.0	24 254	100.0

Table 3.5.A. – Exposure time (in months) at different levels of time-varying covariates, of the combined factor (division of household and childcare work) and of the duration variable for Hungarian respondents.

	Women		Men	
	Exposure time	%	Exposure time	%
Current marital status:				
Cohabiting	826	1.3	232	0.7
Married	62 848	98.7	32 644	99.3
Marital status:				
1st cohab./curr. cohab.	526	0.8	171	0.5
1st cohab./curr. married	300	0.5	61	0.2
1st married/curr. married	62 848	98.7	32 644	99.3
Division of hhold and ccare work:				
Hhold and ccare equally shared	5 206	8.2	2 747	8.4
Hhold and/or ccare mainly SHE	47 707	74.9	22 044	67.0
Hhold and ccare only SHE	1 078	1.7	1 262	3.8
Hhold equally, ccare other/ ccare equally, hhold other	2 157	3.4	2 721	8.3
Hhold and ccare other or mainly HE	7 526	11.8	4 102	12.5
Current policy period:				
January 1968 - December 1982	25 384	39.9	12 423	37.8
January 1983 - December 1987	19 429	30.5	9 739	29.6
January 1988 - December 1993	18 861	29.6	10 714	32.6
Current business-cycle period:				
January 1968 - June 1974	911	1.4	793	2.4
July 1974 - June 1983	26 473	41.6	12 685	38.6
July 1983 - December 1993	36 290	57.0	19 398	59.0
Current employment status:				
Full-time work	52 806	82.9	28 944	88.0
Long part-time work	2 318	3.6	125	0.4
Short part-time work	2 548	4.0	2 600	7.9
Unemployed	1 118	1.8	-	-
Own household work	75	0.1	93	0.3
Student	380	0.6	104	0.3
Other	4 429	7.0	1 010	3.1
Duration (in months):				
9-18	18 213	28.6	9 262	28.2
19-24	9 212	14.5	4 744	14.4
25-30	7 851	12.3	4 095	12.5
31-36	6 478	10.2	3 367	10.2
37-72	21 920	34.4	11 408	34.7
Total	63 674	100.0	32 876	100.0

Table 3.6.A. – Exposure time (in months) at all levels of the combined factor[#], division of household work and of childcare work, for Hungarian respondents (One-child parents in intact union)

Division of hhold and ccare work	women		men	
	Exposure time	%	Exposure time	%
Hhold and ccare equally shared	5 206	8.2	2 747	8.5
Hhold equally, ccare mainly SHE	3 744	5.9	1 519	4.6
Hhold equally, ccare mainly HE	53	0.1	66	0.2
Hhold equally, ccare only SHE	249	0.4	96	0.3
Hhold equally, ccare other	1 524	2.4	2 224	6.8
Hhold mainly SHE, ccare equally	9 349	14.7	5 744	17.5
Hhold and ccare mainly SHE	21 172	33.2	8 564	26.0
Hhold mainly SHE, ccare mainly HE	110	0.2	141	0.4
Hhold mainly SHE, ccare only SHE	2 842	4.5	575	1.7
Hhold mainly SHE, ccare other	6 356	10.0	5 503	16.7
Hhold mainly HE, ccare equally	232	0.3	204	0.6
Hhold mainly HE, ccare mainly SHE	23	0.0	218	0.8
Hhold and ccare mainly HE	44	0.1	10	0.0
Hhold mainly HE, ccare other	143	0.2	143	0.4
Hhold only SHE, ccare equally	232	0.3	27	0.1
Hhold only SHE, ccare mainly SHE	882	1.4	302	0.9
Hhold and ccare only SHE	1 078	1.7	32	0.1
Hhold only SHE, ccare other	405	0.6	161	0.5
Hhold other, ccare equally	633	1.0	497	1.5
Hhold other, ccare mainly SHE	2 161	3.4	714	2.2
Hhold other, ccare only SHE	315	0.5	69	0.2
Hhold and ccare other	6 921	10.9	3320	10.1
Total	63 674	100.0	32 876	100.0

[#] Here, exposure time refers to the original, uncollapsed levels of the combined factor presented in Table 3.5.A.

4

AN OVERVIEW OF WOMEN'S STATUS AND FERTILITY IN TURKEY

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The relationship between women's status and fertility has been the subject of a large number of studies and it is still prominent on the world agenda. Two decades ago it was stated in paragraph 32 of the World Population Plan of Action that one important way to moderate fertility was through 'the full integration of women in the development process, particularly by means of their greater participation in educational, social, economic and political opportunities, and especially by means of the removal of obstacles to their employment in the nonagricultural sector wherever possible' (United Nations, 1975). Today, the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994, calls for gender equity and equality to enable women to realize their full potential. It was stated that the empowerment of women and improvement of their status are important ends in themselves and are essential for the achievement of sustainable development (United Nations, 1995). One of the numerous linkages put forward for empowering women states that ensuring women's ability to control their own fertility has a strong impact in improving their status at political, social, economic and health levels.

Thus, women's role and status in the family and society greatly affects the degree of control she has over her own fertility. The possibility to decide when and whether to conceive children is a crucial element in being able to choose the kind of life a woman wants to live.

Especially in societies that experience a transformation from traditional to modern, changing status of women in the society and in the

family usually results in an increase in the undesirability of pregnancy. The rise in the educational level of women, their work outside the home and development of extra-familial activities lead women to prefer a limited number of children and at the same time create the possibility for women to have greater say in the number and timing of children. These are some of the factors which determine the status of women to a large extent and which in turn affect their fertility behaviour.

Also in Turkey, the status of women plays a very important role in the demographic transition of the country. The rapid social and economic change that Turkish society has undergone brought about changes at the demographic level. For instance, in Turkey a fertility transition has been experienced in the last two decades. During the period between 1978 and 1993, the total fertility rate in Turkey has declined by 37 percent from 4.3 to 2.7. The onset of the decline is associated with the change in governmental policy in 1965 from a pronatalist one to one favouring a limited population growth. This was followed by the further liberalization obtained in 1983 by legalizing voluntary surgical contraception and induced abortions up to the tenth week of pregnancy. In the meantime, in addition to these liberalizations, the society as a whole went through social and economic transformations. In accordance with these transformations women's status in the society has changed as well, which in turn has affected demographic behaviour, notably fertility behaviour.

On the other hand, despite the successful modernization process, the social life of the society in Turkey is mainly characterized by patriarchy which finds its reflection in the position of women. Therefore women in Turkey live in a highly heterogeneous social and cultural structure where “modern” and “traditional” exist together.

In view of these considerations, the present study seeks to identify the possible impact of women's status on marital fertility behaviour in Turkey and tries to find out whether the fertility behaviour of women in Turkey has been modified by their status. The Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS), besides its full demographic nature which focuses primarily on issues like fertility, family planning, and maternal and child health, also makes it possible to study the status of women, mainly at a descriptive level. The first point in the study that is referred to is the socioeconomic, cultural and legal milieu within which the status of women is established. Secondly, the status of women in Turkey is studied at a descriptive level and finally the study concentrates on an analysis which determines the effective factors in fertility behaviour related to women’s status.

FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

Data Source

In this study, 1993 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) data have been used. The TDHS was conducted in 1993 as part of the worldwide Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program. The TDHS had a nationally representative sample of 8,619 households and 6,519 ever-married women younger than 50 years of age. A weighted, multistage, stratified cluster sampling approach was used in the selection of the TDHS sample. The TDHS provided information on fertility and childhood mortality, family planning awareness, approval and use, and basic indicators of maternal and child health. The survey was designed so that a variety of characteristics would be analyzed for various domains like Turkey as a whole, urban and rural areas (each as a separate domain) and for each of the five major regions of the country.

Two main types of questionnaires were used to collect the TDHS data: the Household Questionnaire and the Individual Questionnaire for ever-married women of reproductive ages. Besides these questionnaires, a Cluster Questionnaire was also used with the aim of collecting information on the general economic and social environment of each cluster of the TDHS sample.

The study is based on ever-married women aged 15-49 years at the time of the survey in August and September of 1993. It thus covers women born between 1944 and 1978, implying a relatively high fertility period for the older cohorts compared to the younger ones.

Analyses have been done employing data from the Individual Questionnaire. Data on background characteristics, nuptiality, fertility and country-specific questions on decision making and women's opinion of themselves have been taken from the Individual Questionnaire. Information about some housing characteristics like sanitation facilities and availability of durable consumer goods is obtained from the Household Questionnaire.

Conceptual Approach

The concept of *women's status* is widely used and has been central to many social, economic and demographic studies. Concern with “status” has a venerable intellectual history in the social sciences. A term which was once a term of “legal or general condition” has become an operational term

in its conventional modern use (Williams, 1976). With its use in the social sciences, “status” has to be a more precise and measurable term. Especially when it is used for the “status of women”, then, a more complex nature is attained.

Women have significant economic and social responsibilities both for the family and for the society. In performing these responsibilities a woman has many roles and holds a configuration of statuses associated with the roles which in the end can infer to a single status (Oppong and Abu, 1986). Since status is not a unidimensional concept and since it is difficult to bring it to a single item index, women's status has to be regarded as a multiple or complex array of different components which changes from one society to another.

No single indicator can capture the multiple dimensions of the position of women. Therefore the measurement of women's status is recognized to be a highly complex issue and the indicators that are used to define the status of women are usually proxies. Typically variables such as educational attainment and labor force participation are used as proxies for evaluating women's position in the family and in the economy (Safilios-Rothschild, 1986 and 1990). However these indicators are usually considered to be inadequate measures of women's status as they do not fully involve all the dimensions of women's roles and as these variables are a reflection of a number of underlying factors which do not represent the social institutions of gender (Mason, 1994).

Since the study relies on standardized demographic survey data, the available variables within this kind of data are used as proxies for the status of women despite all their drawbacks. Respondent's education is one of the preferred variables as a status variable, and it is thought to have the most pervasive impact on fertility. The relationship between education and fertility has been examined by a large number of studies and it has been confirmed that women's education tends to have a negative relationship with fertility especially in more urbanized countries (Cochrane, 1979 and 1983). A recent study where the relationship between women's education and fertility was examined with data from the Demographic and Health Surveys for 26 countries also confirmed that higher education is consistently associated with lower fertility (Martin, 1995). However, there are also views which cast some doubt as to the negative influence of education on fertility. For instance, Cochrane (1979) observed that the expected inverse relation was not found in several developing countries and instead an inverted u-shaped relationship existed.

Education is considered as essential in improving women's status since it provides real and lasting improvements in women's lives. Generally more educated women have better health, living conditions and life

opportunities than their less educated counterparts. Education, by providing the possibility of gainful employment, puts women in a relatively better position both economically and socially. Education, besides making women more open to new and modern ideas, also gives the possibility of establishing an egalitarian status within the marital relationship. Moreover, educated women are expected to control their fertility more safely and effectively.

Therefore in this study, education has been taken as a proxy for measuring women's status. It has been taken in terms of years of schooling which has been turned into a categorical variable by making five educational groups: none, 1-4 years, 5-7 years, 8-10 years and 11 or more years.

Besides education, women's labour force participation is also considered as one of the significant indicators of women's status. In spite of the fact that type of employment and amount of control over their own earnings are important factors in determining the status of women, to be on the economically productive side is thought to have some positive effects upon women's lives. Earning their own money and being exposed to broader knowledge of the outside world gives women a certain kind of liberty and improves the self-image which they have of themselves. In this study, women's participation in the labour force has been taken as whether the respondent is currently working in a paid job or not. In addition to this, existence of direct social security has been taken into account in order to guarantee that a woman works for cash.

A woman's working status before marriage on the one hand largely determines the age at her first marriage which in turn is supposed to affect her marital fertility, and on the other hand gives the opportunity for being exposed to the world outside home. In view of those effects, “pre-marital work status” has been considered as a separate variable.

Interspousal age difference and educational gap, type of arrangement of marriage, participation in the marriage decision, existence of civil marriage, involvement in domestic decision making and opinion of women about themselves has also been used as status related variables. Birth cohorts, marital status and survival status of children are taken as control variables. Further variables like availability of durable consumer goods and sanitary condition of the house have been utilized for the assessment of the socioeconomic status of the household.

Taking the diverse geographical, climatic, cultural, social and economic differentiation in different parts of the country into account, region and urban/rural residence are used as background variables wherever

necessary. The country is conventionally divided into five regions. The regions, namely Western, Southern, Central, Northern and Eastern reflect, to some extent, different socioeconomic levels and demographic conditions. For instance, the Western region is the most densely settled, the most industrialized and socioeconomically the most advanced region of the country, whereas the Eastern region is the least developed part of the country with poor industrial production, limited potential for agriculture and animal husbandry as the main means of subsistence.

For purposes of this study, fertility will be measured in terms of mean number of children ever born considering the changing fertility by age group of mother. A woman who has reached reproductive age will have borne a certain number (perhaps zero) of children at any given time; these numbers are referred to as children ever born (Pressat, 1988).

A MACRO LEVEL OVERVIEW OF THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN TURKEY

Legislation

The commitment towards achieving and maintaining women's rights is supposed to be reflected in the legal system of a country. Naturally, it is a necessity of social justice to bring some regulations and exceptions to the legislation in order to prevent biological differences from being transformed into injustice and inequity.

In this context, when the Constitution, the Civil Code, the Criminal Code, the Labour Law and the Turkish Citizenship Law are examined it is seen that the principle of “equality” finds its most reliable and highest support in the Constitution. According to Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, citizens cannot be discriminated against on the basis of their gender. Furthermore, Article 12 of the Constitution states that all individuals have personal, inviolable, untransferable vested basic rights and liberties.

Despite the solid legal foundation for equality between the sexes, there are articles in the individual laws in contradiction with this principle. Actually, in the Civil Code, although there is no differentiation between the rights and responsibilities of unmarried men and women - except for the marriage age which is not a legal difference but an evaluation of physiological development - this equality changes with marriage to the disadvantage of married women, bringing women down to a secondary

position. For example, according to article 152 paragraph 1 of the Civil Code, the husband is the head of the marital union, and the 2nd paragraph of the same article gives the choice of residence to the husband. The first sentence of article 154 states that the marital union is represented by the husband, and the woman has the right to represent the union only for the permanent needs of the house. Nevertheless, the Draft Amendment of the Civil Code has been submitted to the parliament and if the draft is ratified a number of problems will be eliminated.

On the other hand, there are two types of regulations with regard to women in Turkish labour legislation. The first set of regulations prevents women from undertaking dangerous work, while the second set relates to protective measures tied to the maternal functions of women.

National Mechanisms

There has been a broad change in the organizational approach to women's affairs in the last decade. Since 1985, issues related to women's status have been integrated into the components of social development that take place in the Five Year Development Plans. In 1985 a 'Women's Sector' was also incorporated into the activities of the State Planning Organization which determines national targets for education, teaching, employment and health and formulates strategies, measures and policies in accordance with these targets (UNFPA, 1995).

In 1990, in conformity with both international resolutions and the targets and policies of the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan, as a national mechanism for the enhancement of women's status, the General Directorate on the Status and Problems of Women was established. In 1991, the General Directorate became attached to the Office of the Prime Minister and continued its functions within the Ministry of State responsible for Women's Affairs and Social Services. Finally, in 1993 it became incorporated into the newly created Undersecretariat for Women's Affairs and Social Services, which consists of two General Directorates: General Directorate of Family and Social Research and General Directorate of Social Services and Protection of Children (UNFPA, 1995).

Furthermore, the “Social Structure and Women's Statistics” Department of the State Institute of Statistics was established in 1993 with the purpose of generating and making available gender differentiated statistics.

There are also volunteer women's organizations which are specifically women oriented and sensitive to women's issues. Also, universities have opened centres and programs to contribute to the enhancement of women's status through scientific study.

Participation in Political Decision Making

Equality between the sexes was introduced in the legal structure through the reforms realized following the declaration of the Republic, and opportunities were provided for effective participation of women in public life. One of the most important steps in this respect was to recognize the right to vote and to be elected at a rather early stage, in 1934 (Govern. of Turkey - UNICEF, 1991). In spite of this relatively early access to participation in political decision making mechanisms, women in Turkey have had limited political involvement in terms of representation in the Parliament. The percent of women parliamentarians has never exceeded 4.6 percent since the extension of the franchise to women. However, women participate at all levels of elections as an electorate, even though their participation is less than that of men (Govern. of Turkey - UNICEF, 1991). When participation in the public administration is considered it is seen that it contains a highly qualified group of women since public administration offers the major employment opportunity for women with higher education. Between 1938 and 1990, the number of female civil servants increased approximately 26.5 times whereas this ratio is 6.3 for men.

Education

Since the foundation of the Republic in 1923, the basic principles in education have been the universality of services and equality of opportunities. Among the principles of national education cited by the National Education Primary Code, besides universality, equality, and equality of opportunities, there are also principles like co-education and the right to education by all. Primary education, which lasts five years, is compulsory for every Turkish child who completes his 5th year of age and is offered free of charge at public schools. In spite of these principles, the statistics show that women still lag behind men in literacy and level of education. The most significant indicator of gender inequality in Turkey is the disparity between the literacy rates of males and females. According to the 1990 Census 11.2 percent of males and 28 percent of females at age six and above were illiterate indicating a literacy differential of 17 percentage points. The disparity between the literacy rates is even more striking in rural and urban settlements. The literacy rate for women living in urban settlements was 78.7 percent and it was 62.6 percent for their counterparts

living in rural settlements. On the other hand, the difference between the literacy rates of males and females was 13.8 percentage points in urban settlements whereas it was 20.4 percentage points in rural ones.

Primary school enrollment figures reflect a somewhat more egalitarian situation and nearly all boys and girls attend primary education. For example, the enrollment rate in 1994-95 was 91 percent for boys and 87.1 percent for girls. After primary school, the gender gap begins to manifest itself. Although the number of drop-outs at every level of the education system is very high, the figures are especially striking for girls. For instance, in the 1994-95 academic year, only 53.1 percent of girls continued on to secondary school after completing their primary school education, whereas this rate was 77.6 percent for boys. Women's participation in higher education has shown an increase over time, but there is still great disparity between the proportions of males and females. In the 1990-91 academic year the percentage of women in higher education was 33.1 percent.

Economic Participation

The level of economic activity of women is rather low in Turkey and a disparity between the economic activity levels of the two sexes has always existed. In general, the proportion of women in the labour force has always been far behind the proportion of men due to the gap in the level of education and training as well as cultural constraints. As of April 1994, 33.4 percent of women above the age of 15 were in the labour force. Generally speaking, the number of women who are in the work force is about half the number of men who work in Turkey. Women are intensively employed in the agricultural sector and 73.8 percent of working women work in agriculture, while 10.3 percent of the total working women are employed in the industrial sector (DPT, 1995).

During the past four decades, with rural to urban migration, women who are economically active in the agricultural sector have been withdrawn from the labour market. The low contribution of women to economic activities other than agriculture is due to their relatively low level of education which is not appropriate for the employment opportunities of urban areas. On the other hand, the participation of women in the urban economy is not reflected in labour statistics, since these women, many of whom are unskilled, usually work as domestic workers or do piece work at their homes without the protection of social security. Women in Turkey are generally in the position of family worker. Of the total employed women in the country, two thirds are unpaid family workers and 19.6 percent are wage and salary earners (DPT, 1995).

In the urban settlements the highest participation in the labour force is in the age group 15-34, whereas in the rural settlements it is the 15-54 age group with the highest concentration in the labour force. Although the proportion of economically active women is very low in the urban areas, parallel to the increasing level of education, women's participation in the urban labour force increases. For instance, in 1992, while 7.2 percent of illiterate women were participating in the labour force (52.2 percent of which consisted of men), the gap between the two sexes was closer for women with university education: 83.3 percent of women and 89.1 percent of men with university education were taking part in the work force. On the other hand, in the urban settlements, half of the divorced women were economically active in the urban settlements (DIE, 1994).

DESCRIPTION CHARACTERISTICS

Educational Attainment

Overall, ever-married women in Turkey aged 15-49 have a mean of 4.4 years of education, which is lower than the compulsory period of five years in primary education (Table 4.1). Significant features of educational attainment are its variation on the basis of women's age as well as region and place of residence. As can be expected, women in the oldest age groups (40-44 and 45-49) have the lowest mean years of education. What is noteworthy is the low mean for the youngest age group, indicating an involvement in marriage at an early age with a low level of education. A regional difference in education is very much marked between the Western and Eastern regions, with three years to the disadvantage of women in the Eastern region. Women living in the Western region have the highest mean years of education whereas those living in the Eastern region have the lowest mean compared to the other regions. The remaining three regions have similar means. Also, there is a pronounced difference between the mean years of schooling of women living in urban and rural areas. Women living in rural areas are two years less educated compared to their counterparts living in urban areas.

Table 4.1. – Mean Years of Education for Ever-Married Women by Selected Background Characteristcs

	Mean (Year)	Number of Women
Age		
15-19	4.6	332
20-24	5.1	1,040
25-29	5.1	1,211
30-34	4.8	1,283
35-39	4.0	1,073
40-44	3.4	901
45-49	3.1	679
Region		
West	5.3	2,325
South	4.3	998
Central	4.6	1,520
North	4.0	612
East	2.5	1,064
Place of residence		
Urban	5.1	4,181
Rural	3.1	2,338
Total	4.4	6,519

The depressing effect of education on fertility can be observed by examining the completed fertility of women which involves women at ages 40-49. Overall, women who are at the end of their reproductive years completed their fertility with 4.7 children. The variation in the mean numbers of children ever born manifests itself at every level of educational attainment. When the two extreme categories of education are considered it is seen that women with 11 and more years of education have completed their fertility with almost 4 children less than that of women with no education. The difference between the completed fertility levels of women with no education and those with 1-4 years of education is not very pronounced. The main drop (1.6 children) is observed in the following group with 5-7 years of education. The decline in the mean numbers of children ever born continued with increasing years of education. Women with 5-7 years of education have completed their fertility with 3.7 children, whereas women with 8-10 years of education have completed their fertility with one child less.

Current Work Status

One of the widely accepted indicators of women's status is their involvement in the economic sector (Safilios-Rothschild, 1990). Employment has some “transformational effects” on women, like providing direct access and control over financial resources, enabling them to function in the non-domestic sphere and in this way having access to the world outside the home, and having autonomy and control inside the home (Kishor, 1995). The TDHS provides information mainly on women's current work situation, but there is also a question which investigates the premarital employment of women. In this study, both pieces of information have been utilized, taking into account that not only is the current work status assumed to have an impact on the fertility of women but also the premarital work experience of women would have some impact on their fertility behaviour, such as through age at first marriage and the opportunity of being exposed to the outer world.

Table 4.2 presents the work pattern of women by combining the past and current work history. However, this is not a full work history since the questionnaire is designed to get only the current employment at the time of the survey but not the lifetime work history. Therefore, the grouping has been made by combining the information on whether the woman has worked before marriage or not with information on work at the time of the survey.

According to this grouping, more than half of the ever-married women are not working and had not worked before they got married. Only one in eight women has both the premarital and present work history. Among women with the highest level of education, the proportion of women who did not work before marriage and who were not working at the time of the survey is 36.2 percent; however, this proportion rises to above 50 percent in the less educated groups. What draws attention is the one fifth of women with higher levels of education (8-10 and 11+) who have premarital work experience but who were not working currently (at the time of the survey).

Table 4.2. – Percent Distribution of Ever-Married Women by Years of Education and Working Pattern

Worked before marriage Currently working	No No	No Yes	Yes Yes	Yes No	Total	Number of Women
Education in completed years						
0	60.6	20.9	11.0	7.5	100.0	1779
1-4	52.9	24.6	13.5	8.9	100.0	417
5-7	56.9	19.6	12.2	11.2	100.0	3342
8-10	56.2	11.4	12.8	19.7	100.0	319
11 +	36.2	33.2	12.0	18.6	100.0	661
Total	55.5	21.3	12.0	11.2	100.0	6519

In examining current work status women have been put into three categories: not currently working, currently working with social security, and the final group, working without social security. The social security criterion has been utilized to guarantee more accurate information on paid work, since a proper job necessitates the payment of social security. Moreover, having social security makes an individual less vulnerable both socially and economically, which in a way affects the woman's position.

Table 4.3 shows that 65.9 percent of ever-married women were not working at the time of the survey. It is also seen in the table that only 7 percent of women work and have social security at the same time. The remaining 27.1 percent of women work without social security, indicating the type of job for which social security is not paid. This group involves people such as dressmakers and sewers working at home, maids, etc., as well as unpaid family workers. Working women tend to be concentrated in the older age groups. More than two thirds of women in the younger age groups do not work. Especially, the proportion of younger women working with social security is very small.

With regard to marital status of women, married women usually do not take part in the work force. Generally, widowed and divorced women are more inclined to work. From one point of view, the major reason for working may be the financial anxiety of these women; from another viewpoint it may be the social and economic guarantee of women working with social security which enables these women to take the decision for divorce more readily. As seen in Table 4.3, more than one fifth of the divorced women work with social security, a two-fold higher proportion in comparison to widows and a three-fold higher proportion in comparison to married women. As expected, there is a pronounced difference in the work status of women according to their level of educational attainment. However, the rise in the percentage of women working with social security becomes apparent after 8 years of

education. In particular, almost half of women with 11 and more years of education work, and for the most part they work in the jobs with social security (42.2 percent). On the other hand, it is striking that half of the women with the highest level of education do not work.

Table 4.3. – Percent Distribution of Ever-Married Women by Current Work Status and SelectedCharacteristics

	Currently not working	Working without social security	Working with social security	Total	Number of women
Age					
15-19	77.2	22.2	0.6	100.0	332
20-24	75.1	22.0	3.0	100.0	1,039
25-29	67.7	26.7	5.6	100.0	1,210
30-34	62.2	27.9	9.9	100.0	1,283
35-39	60.9	28.4	10.6	100.0	1,070
40-44	62.0	30.0	8.1	100.0	899
45-49	63.6	30.4	6.0	100.0	676
Marital status					
Married	66.6	26.7	6.7	100.0	6,261
Widowed	52.8	36.4	10.8	100.0	148
Divorced/Separ.	44.0	34.0	22.0	100.0	100
Education (years completed)					
0	66.9	31.1	2.0	100.0	1,773
1-4	61.3	36.5	2.2	100.0	417
5-7	67.6	29.7	2.7	100.0	3,341
8-10	75.1	12.0	12.9	100.0	319
11 +	53.1	4.6	42.2	100.0	660
Region					
West	66.7	23.4	9.9	100.0	2,324
South	69.6	24.7	5.8	100.0	998
Central	61.8	31.8	6.4	100.0	1,517
North	43.8	49.4	6.8	100.0	612
East	79.6	17.8	2.5	100.0	1,060
Place of residence					
Urban	78.1	12.4	9.4	100.0	4,176
Rural	44.2	53.3	2.5	100.0	2,334
Has children under 5					
Yes	62.4	28.7	8.9	100.0	3,506
No	70.1	25.1	4.8	100.0	3,004
Total	65.9	27.1	7.0	100.0	6,510

With respect to regional variation, the Western region has the highest percentage of women who work with social security, whereas the Eastern region has the lowest. In the Northern region, more than half of the women are working, yet a rather small proportion of these women has social security in the jobs in which they work. There is a substantial residential difference in the work status of women. A large majority of urban women do not work. In the rural areas, the proportion of working women is much higher than that of urban areas, however, half of the rural women work without social security. As presented in Table 4.3, very few women with children less than age five work at jobs that have social security and one quarter of women work without any social security.

Child care is an important obstacle in women's participation in the labour force. As illustrated in Table 4.4, overall, the main pattern of child minding is either by the mother or other relatives. The share of institutional care is very small and it is mostly utilized by women working with social security. The table also reflects the intrafamily solidarity in child minding as relatives constitute a substantial proportion of those involved in taking care of children.

Table 4.4. – Percent Distribution of Child Minder for Currently Working Mothers

	Working without Social Security	Working with Social Security	Total
Respondent	45.8	6.9	38.5
Husband/partner	0.5	2.1	0.8
Older children	11.5	3.4	10.0
Other relatives	40.0	48.1	41.5
Neighb./friends	2.0	4.6	2.5
Servants/hired pers.	-	18.9	3.5
Institutional care	0.1	16.0	3.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of Women	628	144	772

Marriage Arrangement

As a norm of the society, women in Turkey are expected to get married not later than their late 20s and ultimately, except for a few, virtually all women marry. According to the survey results, among women at ages

30-34, 96 percent have already been married and furthermore by the end of the reproductive years, those who have never married constitute only 1 percent of women (Akadli Ergöçmen, 1994). Since divorce is not common, marital dissolution is mostly through widowhood.

Since remarriage is not very common in Turkey, for 97.4 percent of ever-married women the last marriage refers to their first marriage.

One of the specific features of marriage in Turkey is the type of marital union. According to the Civil Code of Turkey, civil marriage is the only type of legitimate marital union. The Civil Code explicitly prohibits the practice of religious-only unions, but allows a religious marriage provided that a civil marriage is fulfilled first. Despite the fact that it is forbidden by law, however, religious-only unions are commonly practised all through the country. In particular, it is more common in the rural areas and among less educated women. According to the TDHS results, 7.5 percent of the ever-married women are in religious-only unions and 3.2 percent are in civil-only unions. The common pattern for marital unions in Turkey is to have a civil marriage with an additional religious ceremony (89 percent).

Since religious-only marriages are not recognized by the law and are considered to be illegitimate, women in religious-only unions are in a disadvantaged position. They don't benefit from the legal rights which they could have had if they were in a civil marriage. On the other hand, being in a religious-only union is, even by definition, a conservative way of behaviour where the rules of religion are predominant on social life. Thus, women in religious-only marital unions are wrapped up in a low status both in their marital and social life.

Choice of spouse, which signifies independent decision of their own, is another specification of marriage in relation to the status of women. As to the survey results, one fourth of the marriages of ever-married women are marriages that are arranged by the couples themselves. However, arrangement of marriage by the family, be it through seeking the consent of the woman or not, is very common in Turkey. Although the consent of the woman is sought in most of these family arranged marriages (53.6 percent), a marriage arranged by the family is an indication of a conservative setting which gives little or no initiative to the woman. This lack of initiative at the very beginning of her marital life prepares a basis of low status for the woman in her subsequent family life.

Another feature of the marriage arrangement in Turkey is the abduction of the woman by the man. There are different reasons for this traditional type of behaviour. Couples sometimes resort to this type of

arrangement when they do not succeed in obtaining the consent of the family. Sometimes it is the case where use of force is involved when the woman seems reluctant for that marriage. In other instances, it is exercised in order to avoid the bride price and finally it is sometimes regarded as a cultural necessity by the society. In some of the cases the woman has full involvement in the event, but in some others it is only a coercive way of behaviour in which the woman is regarded as a commodity rather than a human being. There isn't any detailed information in the survey data that will help to discriminate between the types of involvement of the woman. Therefore, abduction has not been taken as a category in the marriage arrangement variable.

Women's level of education affects the likelihood that she will have more initiative in making her decision regarding a marriage partner. It is clearly seen from the table that arrangement of marriage by the family appears to be decreasing with the increase in level of education whereas arrangement of marriage by the couple seems to be rising with increasing educational level. In other words the more educated the woman is, the lower the probability of entering a family arranged marital union (Table 4.5).

Payment of a bride price is another common traditional practice in Turkey. A certain amount of bride wealth, either in cash or kind, is paid to the family of the bride. It is considered as a symbol of chastity and as an economic compensation in exchange for the loss of the labour of the girl. Apparently, payment of bride wealth is the reflection of a patriarchal system that treats the woman as a commodity that can be purchased, and in this way ascribes an inferior position to her.

Table 4.5. – Percent Distribution of Ever-Married Women by Marriage Related Specifications and Years of Education

	Years of Education					
	0	1-4	5-7	8-10	11+	Mean
Marital Status						
Currently marr.	95.6	96.3	96.6	96.2	95.6	4.4
Widowed	3.4	2.4	2.0	1.1	1.3	3.3
Divorced/separ.	0.9	1.3	1.5	2.7	3.2	6.0
Marriage Type						
Civil-only	1.9	3.3	2.7	2.5	10.0	6.7
Civil & relig.	82.1	90.3	92.2	94.9	89.7	4.5
Religious-only	16.0	6.4	5.1	2.6	0.4	2.1
Marriage Arrangement						
Couple arranged	13.4	13.8	24.5	50.5	62.8	6.4
Fam. with consent	53.2	59.8	58.6	37.2	34.1	4.0

Fam. w/o consent	26.8	19.7	10.5	3.8	0.8	2.3
Bride wealth						
Paid	54.7	43.4	20.5	5.8	2.	2.3
Not paid	45.3	56.6	79.5	94.2	97.6	5.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Number of Women	1,779	417	3,342	319	661	6,519

Results of the TDHS show that bride wealth was paid in 28.6 percent of the marriages. Despite the fact that payment of bride wealth is inversely related to the woman's level of education, there are still 2.4 percent of women with 11 and more years of education for whom bride wealth was paid.

Decision Making and Women's Views on Gender Attributes

A woman's decision making power in the family is assumed to be reflective of her position in the household. In patriarchal societies it is usually the male who decides on important family matters. The likelihood of making joint decisions is mostly associated with some features of women such as her high education, her working for wage, living in urban areas, etc. (Nawar *et al*., 1995). The ability to decide independently and/or make joint decisions, which suggests negotiation, are important dimensions in shaping the status of women. As a measure of the decision making power of the woman the question on 'who decides in the family to take the sick child to a doctor' has been utilized. This question is assumed to reflect the woman's decision making on a very important issue where the health and life of her child is in question.

According to a study by Kagitçibasi (1982) in which the "value of children" was studied, communication between the husband and wife and women's participation in the decision making process are rather low in Turkey. The study has shown that, among other countries, Turkey emerges as the one where the phenomenon of decision making by the males is the highest. TDHS results also show the male dominance in decision making. Unfortunately, only one fourth of women participate in the decision to take a sick child to a doctor (Table 4.6). As expected, younger and older women are less powerful in participating in the decision. Highly educated women and women working for a wage with social security are more empowered in participating in the decision to obtain medical care for the child. However, even among the women with 11 and more years of education, the proportion of women who participate in the decision is only 58 percent. Due to the fact that having social security provides health security for their dependents,

women working with social security appear to have more say and they act more independently. Women living in the Eastern region and in rural areas are in a very backward position in decision making. A majority of mothers in these places does not have any say on the health care of their children which may ultimately influence the life of the child.

Women's perceptions about gender attributes are important in establishing an egalitarian relationship in the household and in preventing them from being in a subordinate position. Three statements were selected as a measure of how women perceive males, which also indirectly implies how they evaluate themselves. These statements are: "Men are usually wiser than women"; "A man can beat up his wife in case of disobedience"; "A woman should not argue with her husband if she does not share the same views with him".

The results illustrated in Table 4.7 imply that in general half of the ever-married women regard themselves as inferior to males. They accept that men are wiser than women; they think that a woman should not argue with her husband if she has a different view from him; and they think that it is the right of man to beat up his wife if she does not "obey". Not much variation is observed across the age of women in perceiving the gender attributes. Naturally, women in older ages are found to be more inclined to agree with the statements. However, the results are not in the expected direction for younger women who are assumed to have relatively more modern ideas and are more sensitive for their status.

Table 4.6. – Percent Distribution of Ever-Married Women by Decision Making Attributes

	Participate in Decision**		Number of Women
	Yes	No	
Age			
15-19	13.9	86.1	143
20-24	20.6	79.4	810
25-29	27.9	72.1	912
30-34	29.8	70.2	628
35-39	28.6	71.4	282
40-44	18.3	81.7	115
45-49	*	*	24
Education			
0	10.7	89.3	765
1-4	27.4	72.6	145
5-7	23.3	76.7	1 534
8-10	48.7	51.3	151
11 +	58.0	42.0	319
Work status			

Not working	25.7	74.3	2 092
Working w/o social security	15.3	84.7	674
Working with social security	66.3	33.7	143
Region			
West	39.4	69.6	879
South	27.6	72.4	476
Central	20.6	79.4	652
North	23.6	76.4	274
East	9.6	90.4	634
Place of residence			
Urban	34.1	65.9	1 839
Rural	10.2	89.8	1 075
Total	25.3	74.7	2 914

* Less than 25 cases
** Decision in the family to take a sick child to the doctor

Table 4.7. – Percent Distribution of Ever-Married Women by Perception about Gender

	Men wiser		Women should not argue		Men can beat		Number of women
	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree	
Age							
15-19	43.0	57.0	49.6	50.4	48.3	51.7	332
20-24	42.8	57.2	50.0	50.0	46.7	53.1	1 039
25-29	42.4	57.6	46.3	53.7	47.0	53.0	1 211
30-34	43.9	56.1	46.3	53.7	47.1	52.9	1 283
35-39	44.6	55.4	52.4	47.6	51.3	48.7	1 073
40-44	52.8	47.2	56.0	44.0	55.5	44.5	901
45-49	54.4	45.6	57.8	42.2	58.4	41.6	677
Education							
0	63.3	36.7	67.2	32.8	73.2	26.8	1 779
1-4	65.0	35.0	65.8	34.2	69.1	30.9	417
5-7	44.9	55.1	50.5	49.5	47.9	52.1	3 340
8-10	14.0	86.0	22.6	77.4	11.3	88.7	319
11 +	6.9	93.1	10.0	90.0	6.0	94.0	661
Work status							
Not working	43.3	56.7	48.3	51.7	46.0	54.0	4 291
Working w/o soc.sec.	59.4	40.6	64.2	35.8	68.5	31.5	1 762
Working with soc.sec.	16.7	83.3	18.4	81.6	17.5	82.5	455
Region							
West	38.0	62.0	44.7	55.3	39.8	60.2	2 324
South	42.8	57.2	47.5	52.5	51.4	48.6	998
Central	51.8	48.2	54.2	45.8	57.5	42.5	1 520
North	52.8	47.2	59.2	40.8	56.8	43.2	612
East	53.2	46.8	56.2	43.8	57.3	42.7	1 064
Place of residence							
Urban	36.5	63.5	42.8	57.2	38.2	61.8	4 179
Rural	62.6	37.4	64.6	35.4	71.4	28.6	2 338

Total	45.8	54.2	50.6	49.4	50.1	49.9	6 518

Striking differences in women's views are mainly obtained with the rise in educational attainment, in particular, after having at least 8 years of schooling. It is clearly seen that low levels of education do not contribute much to establishing contemporary views on gender issues. It is also worrying to see that even among women with 11 and more years of education there are those who still agree that a man can beat up a woman or regard men as wiser than women.

With regard to work status, views of women working with social security clearly are differentiated from the others in the sense that more than 80 percent of women working with social security disagree with the statements. Actually, women working with social security are usually the women who have better education and better qualifications. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that compared to women who do not work, more women who work in jobs without having social security agree with the statements.

On the regional basis, except for the Western and Southern regions, more than half of the women in the remaining regions accept the dominance of men and consider themselves as subordinate to them, as do the majority of women in rural areas.

A multivariate approach to women's status and fertility

The relationship between women's status and fertility has been analyzed by using ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis. Five separate models are constructed with different sets of variables. The dependent variable for the multivariate analysis is the number of children ever born which represents cumulative fertility. The independent variables are grouped as demographic, background, status and socioeconomic variables.

Table 4.8. – Selected Indicators for Women (N=6519)

Age (median)	32.5
Interspousal age difference* (years)	4.4
Education (mean years completed)	4.4
Husband's education (mean years completed)	6.4

Interspousal educational difference (years)	2.0
Marriage type (% with civil marriage)	92.2
Marriage arrangement (% having primary control)	5.9
Age at first marriage (women at ages 30-34) (mean)	19.0
Marital duration (gross) (mean years)	13.5
Age at first birth (women at ages 30-34) (mean)	20.1
Completed fertility** (CEB for women at ages 45-49)	5.0
Living children** (mean number for women at ages 45-49)	4.1

* Interspousal age difference equals to the husband's age minus the wife's age
** Currently married women

Demographic variables: In the first place, years since first marriage has been taken as one of the demographic variables. It is the gross years since first marriage for which the mean has been estimated as 13.5 years (Table 4.8). Dummies have been defined for four birth cohorts, namely cohorts 40, 50, 60, and 70. Cohort 60 has been used as the reference category. Dummies have also been made for being currently married and for having no deceased children.

Background variables: Dummies have been defined for the five regions of the country: Western, Southern, Central, Northern and Eastern regions. The Western region is used as the reference region. For residence rural has been taken as the reference category.

Socioeconomic variables: Since TDHS does not involve income data, socioeconomic status has been measured by an index (named asset) based on the durable consumer goods[19] owned by the household. The index has been calculated by assigning a different point value (between 1 to 4) to each good. The index ranges between 0 to 28 for the 11 included items. In addition to this asset index, by using the household's source of water and toilet facility another dummy has been constructed, in which the existence of piped water together with a flush toilet is considered to be indicative of good sanitation.

Status variables: Dummies have been established for education with five categories on the basis of years of schooling: no education, 1-4 years, 5-7 years, 8-10 years, and 11+ years of education. Educational difference between husband and wife has been taken as a separate variable for the status of women, for which the mean difference has been calculated as 2 years (Table 4.8). Dummies are constructed for the variables of work with social security and work without social security. Variables that consider the

[19] The durable goods included are telephone, radio, television, video recorder, music set, oven, vacuum cleaner, washing machine, dishwasher, refrigerator and car.

participation (marriage arranged by the couple) and consent (family sought consent) of the woman in the marriage arrangement have been built as separate variables. Age at first marriage and age difference between the spouses are two other variables for the status of woman. In the light of the findings of the previous section, opinion variables for the gender attributes have been made as two separate variables, one variable for the disagreement with all three statements and one for disagreement with either one or two statements.

Variables that consider only a limited number of women, such as 'decision making for taking the sick child to a doctor' which involves only women with children less than age five, and 'work before marriage' which decreases the total number because of missing cases, have been omitted from the model.

Results

The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 4.9 under five models. Variable sets are considered in separate models in order to be able to differentiate the effect of explanatory variables for women's status independently of the influence of other related predictors. Model 1 involves selected demographic variables which are thought to have an effect on the fertility indicator due to its demographic nature. These variables indicate control over children ever born since CEB shows variation on the dimension of these variables. However, the magnitude of their coefficients falls when other variables are introduced into the model. The only exception to this is the birth cohort of 70, for which the estimated coefficient increases even after controlling for other variables. Actually, on the basis of birth cohort of women, there are marked differences. Not to have a deceased child has a negative relationship with cumulative fertility. Marital duration and being in a marital union have positive relationships with children ever born. In all, demographic variables explain 58 percent of the variation in the number of children ever born.

With the introduction of background variables in Model 2, the R^2 changes by only 0.05 percent and the inclusion of socioeconomic status variables (Model 3) makes a rather small increase in the R^2 with an additional 0.12. In Models 2 and 3, except for urban residence, the remaining variables have significant contributions. Looking at the other models for urban residence, it can be predicted that place of residence is not an important contributor to cumulative fertility. This may partly be explained with the high rates of rural to urban migration where rural characteristics are carried to urban areas. Women in the Eastern region are substantially different from those in other regions in terms of their cumulative fertility. In

particular, living in the Eastern region contributes more to cumulative fertility than living in the Western region. Socioeconomic indicators are also significant predictors of cumulative fertility. However, their coefficients decline when the status variables are taken into account (Model 5). Women living in houses with good sanitary conditions, namely in houses with a flush toilet and piped water, tend to have fewer children than women living in poor sanitary conditions.

When it is taken from the point of strength of linear association between the dependent and independent variables, Model 4 gives a rather high value by explaining 63 percent of the variation in cumulative fertility. To have low levels of education, and in particular, not to have any education has a significant positive relationship with the number of children ever born. However, higher levels of education, which is assumed to depress fertility, appear to be insignificant. Still, looking at Model 4 it can be said that an important reduction in fertility starts after five years of education, namely after primary school.

Difference in the years of education between the spouses is inversely related to the number of children ever born, but its effect is rather low. Actually, as seen in Table 4.8, interspousal educational difference is only two years on average. Work with social security is negatively associated with cumulative fertility. Working without social security also has a negative coefficient but a rather small one. Marriage arrangement indicators are also significant predictors even after controlling for other model factors. A woman's age at first marriage is found to have a small negative coefficient. Age difference between spouses and women's views on gender attributes are not significant. Although the variables that indicate women's opinion on gender attributes show substantial bivariate associations with fertility indicators, after controlling for the other factors their coefficients have become insignificant. Finally, when the influence of all the variables is considered in Model 5, the explained variance in cumulative fertility is 65 percent.

Table 4.9. – Regression Coefficients for Impact of Selected Characteristics of Ever-Married Women on Children Ever Born

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Demographic Variables					
Marital duration	.167*	.157*	.155*	.116*	.128*
Currently married	.845*	.715*	.784*	.723*	.687*
No deceased child	-2.171*	-1.959*	-1.867*	-1.905*	-1.785*
Cohort 40	-1.272*	-1.004*	-.905*	-.664*	-.652*
Cohort 50	-.414*	-.256*	-.194**	(-.064)	(-.046)
Cohort 70	-.159***	-.359*	-.439*	-.536*	-.595*
Background Variables					
Urban		-.381*	(-.046)		-.100
South		.575*	.502*		.433*

Central		.369*	.332*		.324*
North		.373*	.364*		.331*
East		1.422*	1.271*		1.039*
Socio-econ. Variables					
Asset			-.042*		-.023*
Sanitary condition			-.208*		-.186**
Status Variables					
No education				1.378*	.806*
Education 1-4				.850*	.472*
Education 5-7				.193***	(.021)
Education 8-10				(-.021)	(-.013)
Educational diff.				-.047*	-.037*
Work w social security				-.315*	-.260**
Work w/o social security				(-.050)	-.167**
Marr.arr.by couple				-.249*	-.174**
Fam. seek consent				-.195*	-.123**
Age at marriage				-.034*	-.021***
Intersp. age diff.				(-.007)	(.001)
Disagree with 3				(-.040)	(.043)
Disagree with 1 or 2				(.024)	(-.042)
Constant	1.943	1.802	2.120	2.85	2.710
R^2	.577	.626	.638	.625	.653

* $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.05$

Note: Figures in parentheses are estimated to be insignificant.

In general, the regression analysis showed that most of the variables under consideration have statistically significant effects on cumulative fertility, except for interspousal age difference, opinion of women on gender attributes and higher levels of educational attainment. The analysis confirms that status variables influence fertility. Education above five years of schooling, working with social security, and having initiative in marriage arrangements are all key factors in reducing fertility. It is also important to note that the size of the coefficients of the status variables is considerably reduced after applying controls, indicating that there is a relevant mediation effect of demographic, background and socioeconomic factors considered.

Conclusion and discussion

The deep-rooted historical and cultural values of the country have prepared the base for the status of women in Turkey. In accordance with the patriarchal structure of the society, males have a dominant role both in the family and in society. The findings of this study also imply a subordinate

position for women in Turkey. In the first place, prevailing marriage patterns, namely existence of religious-only marriages where women do not have any legal and institutional right, the payment of bridewealth which treats women like a commodity, and the prevalence of family arranged marriages with less individual control over selection of husband are some of the major specifications related to marital life that generate the low position of women. Secondly, the way women perceive themselves, in other words their willingness to accept a lower place for themselves, such as being less wise than men, stimulates the dominance of husbands over wives. Finally and most notably, it is the women's low levels of education coupled with their low levels of wage earning employment which put them in a comparatively lower status.

Education is very important as an indicator of status because it has a pervasive impact on fertility, and because it interacts with other socioeconomic, cultural and demographic factors as it impacts on fertility. In Turkey, women's educational level is generally low. Overall, the mean years of education is even lower than the compulsory years of education. There is remarkable variation in the level of education across the dimensions of age, region, and urban and rural residence. The results of the study reveal that less education is associated with higher fertility. Besides education, women's participation in the formal sector is very low which is very much tied to women's low levels of education. To be gainfully employed reduces women's dependence on other family members, and provides social security which on the one hand equips her with a more sound position in the family life and on the other hand inhibits her from seeing only marriage and children as her social security. Decision making in the family, views on gender attributes as well as fertility have shown variation across education and work status of women.

According to the results of this analysis, not all indicators of women's status are significant determinants of fertility. However, to have education above five years, to have a job with social security, to have initiative in the marriage arrangement and increased age at marriage are found to be the factors that reduce fertility.

The co-existence of "modern" and traditional attitudes and behaviour is the prevalent pattern in the social and cultural life of the country. The findings of this analysis supported the heterogeneity of social and cultural life with reference to women's status and fertility. There are substantial differences in the indicators of women's status by region, the focus being on the two most different regions, namely the Western and Eastern regions. The West is the most socioeconomically developed region, representing a relative "modernity", and the East is the least developed as well as

representing the least "modern". Also, there exists notable differentiation between urban and rural settlements.

The major policy implication of this study has been the importance of female education and employment to improve women's status which will finally have an impact on the fertility behaviour. The results of the analysis confirm the importance of education and women's economic power for raising their status. However, programs inclined to raise the status of women should recognise the fact that there still exist important differentials in social, economic and cultural backgrounds of different regions and settlements in the country.

Finally, to study women's status from a standardized large scale demographic survey is considered to have some shortcomings, since the structure of these types of surveys is considered to be irrelevant for measuring the multidimensional nature of women's status. However, these additional questions of the TDHS have been useful in highlighting the mechanisms through which women's status has influenced fertility. Thus, it can be concluded that incorporating relevant questions in-between the already existing standard questions of the survey and having a supplementary sub-module covering various aspects of women's status brings insight to the understanding of demographic phenomena.

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5

SOME NOTES ON THE FAMILY AS A MECHANISM OF SOCIAL PROTECTION IN BRAZIL

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The current stage of capitalist development is characterised by new forms of social exclusion for which some old solutions are not applicable. In the affluent Western societies, an increasing part of their constituency is losing the access it used to have to the benefits of the Welfare State. High levels of productivity of labour and living standards, and a very diversified and sophisticated pattern of consumption are applicable to decreasing numbers of the population. Technological unemployment, the narrowing of opportunities due to a reduced number of working positions, shrinking of the public mechanisms of social protection and reduction of the population covered by such mechanisms, all those trends present new challenges to society as a whole. Some social critics talk of a process of radical transformation in the western pattern of civilisation, in which labour is ceasing to be the basic concept for the structuring of social life (Castel, 1991 and 1994; Forrester, 1996).

In the context of the most developed countries, the so called "distribution conflicts" are intensified as a result of the pressure from immigrants coming from a variety of less developed countries. Despite the differences among them, all countries which are currently exporting part of their population have their origin in the long historical process of self-determination experienced by the old European colonial possessions. Some of them -- as is the case of Latin American countries -- have been involved for a long time in relationships of dependency towards their more developed partners, despite their political independence. Restrictions and all sorts of prejudice are confronting various national and ethnic groups with increasing

difficulties for their integration, impairing their capacity to benefit from the life opportunities in the metropolis of the affluent capitalist societies.

In the less developed countries, the neo-liberal paradigm tends also to be the framework for looking for solutions to the challenges of a global world. The changes already under way in these societies have been abbreviated by the speed and depth of the reorganisation of economic relationships on a world scale. Structural adjustment policies have been adopted by a large number of countries, in an effort to find a niche in the new international order. The political agenda revolves basically around the size of the State, which means a discussion over the services the State is willing to offer to the population. In the neo-liberal paradigm, the civil society is called to play roles which used to be considered a public responsibility. Social policies are the main source of political conflict. The low efficacy and efficiency of public operations offer the argument for a radical reduction of state services. Both formal and informal social organisations and networks are called to fulfil the functions no longer assumed by the various levels of government. The family is one among them. Surprisingly enough, nobody seems to be aware of the changes that the family itself is going through. Also, no questions are being raised about the capacity and limitations that contemporary families have to cope with a multiplicity of demands for which they used to receive some kind of public support.

It is well known that the family is a basic mechanism of solidarity. As a domestic arrangement or as a network of relationships, the family has been described as the traditional way to mobilise resources for a living, for social mobility, for getting jobs and power positions, depending on the type of society where we place our focus (Bott, 1964; Fortes, 1969). Structural adjustment policies in Brazil call into question policies which, for many decades, have helped the family to cope with the challenges of life, either extending social security benefits to all segments of the population or providing access to medical care. The issue this paper addresses is whether changes that have occurred in the Brazilian family have influenced its ability to absorb the social consequences of a reduction in services provided by the State as a result of the neo-liberal political agenda. The argument developed in this paper is that the family in Brazil has reduced its capacity to deal with the increasing demands placed upon its members. The propositions for reformulating social policies face a much changed family structure, which presents new challenges to the solution of old problems. The central question is what are the conditions that have to be considered by policy makers in order to anticipate an expanded contribution of the Brazilian family in offering social protection to the population, in the context of the redefinition of the social role of the State in Brazil.

A changing Brazilian family

One of the most striking changes in Brazil in the last few decades is the fast and sharp decrease in fertility. We now know that reproductive behaviour in Brazil probably started to alter at some point near the end of the Nineteen Century, at least among the elite (Souza, 1996). However, a massive shift in patterns of reproductive behaviour is a more recent phenomenon, dating from the second part of the 1960's. Along with the improvement of demographic data in the country, demographers became aware of the fact that fertility experienced a steep decline during the early 70's, continued to decrease at a slightly lower pace in the years that followed, and recovered the strong downward tendency towards the end of the 1980's. Considering the country as a whole, the Total Fertility Rate has fallen from 6.00 children per woman in 1960-65 to 2.48 in 1990-95, which means a more than 50% decline in thirty years. The crucial transition occurred in the 70's, involving a decrease of 27.48% in ten years (Camarano, 1996; Bercovich *et al.*, 1993; Simões and Oliveira, 1986; Martine, 1996). Although these measures reflect the experience of different cohorts, it is clear that the family in Brazil tends to be smaller than it used to be, both in the urban and in the rural areas.

Demographic indicators are expressions of societal changes. The question is to know what happened with the family in Brazil such that it rapidly altered its mode of behaviour. Maybe more important than this is to ask about the consequences of such a radical move towards small families. A discussion of the latter will make part of the third section of this paper. Let us first focus on the determinants of change. The usual and easier answer to the first question is that Brazilian society went through a very rapid process of modernisation, caused by a wave of industrialisation since the 50's, and accompanied by a very rapid process of urbanisation. This is true, but the most important contents and implications of these processes are not exactly the ones most emphasised in the literature on fertility transition. The idea that economic progress causes changes in fertility behaviour, because people tend to concentrate their energies on social mobility, does not seem to correspond to the experience of the Brazilian demographic transition. Also, the argument that a diffusion process of westernised family models has captured the minds of the population overshadows some important transformations under way in Brazilian society from the 60's on.

In my view, a combination of factors acted together to produce such a rapid decrease in fertility. There is a complex set of causes for such a decline. First is the transformation in the social conditions of living of a large part of the population, caused by the increased prevalence of salaried labour in almost all parts of the territory. This has been a major change even in the most developed parts of the country such as is the case in the State of São

Paulo. Individualised and salaried labour contracts have been substituted for labour arrangements that combined a salary with direct forms of family production for a living in the countryside. Very definite modifications in the daily environment of the worker's family have been brought about by the fact that workers and their families lost the control they used to have over the labour process. This is particularly true for married women. For them, the possibility of combining productive labour in commercial crops with domestic tasks in quite a favourable way has vanished. Women have been very rapidly transformed into individual workers, ceasing to be able to accommodate reproductive tasks with income earning work, as they used to do in labour arrangements centred in the family as the basic working unit (Oliveira, 1989).

Second, rapid urbanisation of the population also played an important role. Brazil used to be a rural country in the 50's and 60's. In 30 years, it has experienced a very dramatic process of transferring a substantial part of its population to the cities.[20] The first challenge that life in the urban milieu poses is housing. Housing deficits, as well as public sanitation, have been long considered the main problems faced by local governments in the large cities of Brazil. Housing shortage might be seen as a constraint to reproductive behaviour, although not much research has been conducted on this issue so far.

Perhaps a more relevant aspect of urbanisation in the context of the present discussion is the opening of job opportunities for women in the urban setting. The transfer of massive numbers of the population to the cities has meant a widening of work possibilities for both single and married women in industry, commercial activities, and services in general. As compared with the countryside, women find more opportunities to work independently of a male family member in the cities. The implication is that independent female employment tends to sustain projects of personal development and autonomy for women. What I am saying is not so much that women have substituted income for babies, but that female identities have been amplified to include an independent occupation and careers (Oliveira, 1982).

Third, while working opportunities for women have increased -- and actually maintain their upward trend up to the present decade -- sexual division of labour at home continues to attribute to women the burden of domestic chores. Under the conditions of a very asymmetric gender system, the changes in the labour market mean that heavy pressures are placed upon women.

[20] In 1960, only 44% of the Brazilian population lived in towns of 20,000 inhabitants or more. This proportion reached 67% in 1980 and 75% in 1991. If we consider the concentration of the rural population in some specific regions, these data conceal the fact that some regions and provinces have around 90% of their population living in towns.

Some other structural changes in Brazilian society may have also played an important role. As a matter of fact, all of the following changes were articulated into a project of conservative modernisation under military regimes for two decades between the 60's and the 80's. Faria (1989) calls attention to three main governmental policies of the period which may have had the unanticipated effect of augmenting the demand for fertility regulation. First, communication investment policies, which resulted in the integration of the most faraway places of the country into a very large and complex system of communication. This meant that information could rapidly reach most of the population through radio and television. Together with information, rural and small town dwellers began to be exposed to new values and codes of behaviour, which might have had an impact on family patterns.

The second is the policy of personal credit. During this period, there was an increasing integration of the population into the consumer market. Despite the very skewed income distribution in Brazil, credit policies popularised the acquisition of all sorts of goods, especially consumer durables. Consumption expectations placed increasing constraints on family budgets, and may have had an impact on the demand for fertility regulation.

The third is welfare policy, specifically social security and health policies. Along with the changes in labour regimes, there occurred in Brazil an expansion of both old age security through pensions for retired workers, and of public health services, mainly for urban workers. As a matter of fact, mass medicine in Brazil involves a very complex articulation of public health and a strongly subsidised private network of health care. Despite the usually low quality of care, the fact that some medical procedures and prescriptions were universalised may have had an impact on the access of the population to modern contraceptive technologies. Also, income security in old age may have helped to redefine reproductive behaviour, since the family would have the support of the State in providing for the elderly.

Family change in Brazil is not restricted to changes in family size. In recent decades there has been an impressive growth of alternative domestic arrangements to the nuclear family. Although conjugal families continue to be the dominant domestic unit in the country, some other arrangements show a very clear increase. The two more important emergent domestic arrangements are families headed by women without a male partner and people living alone (Berquó *et al.*, n.d; Berquó *et al*. 1990).

Estimates are that in the early 90's, some 20% of families in Brazil are headed by women with children. By contrast, near the end of the 60's the corresponding figure was only 11%. Although the proportion of widowers

among these female heads is high, there has been an increase in young and young adult mothers as family heads. This may be a result of early childbearing, since there has been an increase in fertility rates among women less than 20 years old. Also, divorce rates in Brazil, although lower than in the United States or in some European countries like France, are growing fast. After separation or divorce, Brazilian women keep the custody of their children in 90% of the cases (Berquó and Oliveira, 1992).

Once more, the explanation for such an increase in female headed families should be found in the changes in women's conditions in Brazilian society. I have mentioned the more important ones above. To them, there should be added the visualisation by women of possibilities for supporting themselves without a husband. This is an important aspect of labour market trends in a society where gender asymmetry has perpetuated a double pattern of private morality. According to this pattern, men were allowed to have as many lovers as they wish, without facing any threat of being left by their wives. The same does not hold true for women. The prospect of earning an independent income may help women to decide to break up heir marriages, although perhaps facing a reduction of living standards. I will come back to some implications of these moves later on.

A second important aspect of changing living arrangements is the fact that single households have begun to show an increase (Berquó *et al.*, n.d). The proportion for the general population is still very small. But the indications are that they have become an alternative for very young males and old females. Data for 1989 show that among the elderly (aged 65 and more), only 34% of the women live with their husbands, while 75% of the men live with their wives. Also, while 28% of older females (and 8% of males) live with any of their children, respectively 16% and 14% (6% and 8% for males) are heads of monoparental homes or live alone (Berquó, 1996). These figures tell us that while family bonds continue to be very important for organizing living arrangements for the elderly, older women more than older men have to confront the possibility of living by themselves.

This picture is a result of the new demographic pattern of the Brazilian population. Decreasing fertility produces a change in the age structure, increasing the weight of the aged groups. In Brazil, growth rates of the aged groups are higher than for the total population. Also, differential mortality by sex affects life expectancy of men and women, benefiting the latter (Berquó, 1996). These factors, together with higher chances for widowers than for widows to remarry, explain why elderly women are more constrained in organizing their living arrangements.

An inquiry into the social implications of family change

The above discussed changes in the Brazilian family have many social implications, if we think that private mechanisms of social protection are likely to gain importance in the context of shrinking public ones. I should consider first the implications of decreasing family sizes, specifically due to a reduction of the progeny. The argument for explaining high fertility in developing countries focusing on the demand for children, given the low levels of income, is well known (Cleland and Wilson, 1987). I have argued elsewhere that the reverse argument may be more plausible as a description of life situations confronted by the poor in our countries (Oliveira, 1993). My contention was that by having large families, low income groups might take the chance of putting children to work, thus increasing the pool of resources available to support the family. The same type of argument may be applied in the context of decreasing family sizes, independently of the family income level, although perhaps with more acute implications for the poor.

Small families have possibly less ability to cope with multiple or increased demands upon their members. In other words, members of small families are likely to be under greater pressure to meet their family duties in situations of unemployment, illness or death, than members of larger families. Since a small family has fewer people to rely on, the load has to be distributed among fewer available kin.

This is particularly relevant in the context of recent changes in the age structure. The increasing weight of elderly groups in the Brazilian population and the growing life expectancy, especially for women, make it likely that families will have to deal with caring for their grandmothers for more years. To be old in Brazil today means to reach age levels seldom hoped for by previous generations. Since families have grown smaller nowadays, what would be the prospects for ageing parents to be taken care of by their children?

The neo-liberal scenario poses even new questions. The existing social security system is said to be bankrupt and unable to provide retirement benefits to a relatively increasing ageing group. Technological improvements responsible for prolonging life make health care for the elderly highly expensive. Low public investment in health care requires even greater savings efforts on the part of families, to be able to afford the cost of caring for their old kin. Brazilian society has substituted the risk of being old for the risk of being too young, without the help of a new neo-Malthusian theory!

Another important implication of recent changes in the Brazilian family has to do with the importance of marriage. Latin American populations

have been characterised by universal marriage and a very low prevalence of celibacy (Lazo, 1991; Quilodrán, 1998). In fact, marriage in Brazil is a key mechanism for resource accumulation and transfer (Bittencourt, 1961). Marriage as a mechanism of resource transfer has increased as a consequence of the expansion of salaried employment. For the large majority of salaried groups, social security benefits and medical assistance are extended to spouses and offspring through the marriage bond. As a matter of fact, labour laws pioneered the legal recognition of *de facto* marriage as a qualifying status for the benefits of social protection for the spouse on the basis of the labour contract of the male partner. A whole set of legal arguments was built to justify the extension to the de facto wife the benefits guaranteed by a legal marriage (Bittencourt, 1961).

It is fair to say that social laws in Brazil are built on the basis of two main assumptions. First, that marriage is for life, and divorce is an exception. Second, that male employment is stable and permanent, while female employment is flexible and temporary, and mostly non-formal. Divorce places an increasing number of women outside of the prevailing system of social protection. This is true not only among the poor, but maybe more importantly for the middle classes. Although aggregate data is not available, it is possible to argue that marriage disruption is increasing among middle class groups. If the tradition of illegitimacy among the lower classes still holds true, then the rates of divorce increase because the middle class, which used to get legally married, is now divorcing.

Middle-class women are increasingly joining the labour force. Although many of them may do so as highly qualified professional women, a large proportion of them are domestic workers or self-employed in a variety of job situations. This is particularly relevant among mature women (Bruschini, 1994a; Bruschini, 1994b; Bruschini and Lombardi, 1996). Middle aged and older women tend to be less educated and to have less work experience as compared to younger women. Since the expansion of female education is a relatively recent phenomenon in Brazil, mature and older females tend to be less educated than males of their generation. The implication is that a growing number of women face difficulties in finding alternatives of social protection. It would be important to investigate the role played by kinship and non-kinship networks in providing for support and help for these women.

Male unemployment and the increase of various kinds of self-employment, as a result of adjustment policies under way in Brazil, constitute an additional challenge to the family's ability to assure social protection. A strategy which seems to be increasingly more common is for middle-class couples to try to find a stable and formal job for either the man or the woman, changing conversely the domestic responsibilities, so as to

be taken care of by the one with a temporary and/or unstable and/or non-formal work. Could it be that the traditional sexual division of labour would perversely become more flexible as a result of the new challenges posed by structural adjustment policies in developing countries?

These are relevant topics for a research agenda on contemporary Brazil. Family solidarity is an important and key issue to consider in discussing the transformations under way. Crucial challenges at each stage of the life course should be evaluated, taking into account class, gender and race. The shortage of public subsidies makes it important to identify vulnerable and/or over-pressured groups, where they are, how many are involved and what provisions should be made in the effort to design a strategy for the future.

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FAMILY, FERTILITY AND MIGRATORY CAREERS OF POLISH FEMALES

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In demography there are many traditions and many approaches to the study of family and of the family life cycle. One of the approaches is to study the family life cycle via individual life cycle, including different paths of family events. The path can be traditional (classical) or modern (very often called radical). Changes in the family life cycle, the path of transition, are related to the theory of The Second Demographic Transition (Van de Kaa, 1987).

Poland, like many Central and Eastern European countries, has been experiencing changes typical of the last phase of the *First Demographic Transition*, with noticeable signs that can be classified as changes typical of the *Second Demographic Transition*. The most striking features of Poland at the turning of the 1980s and 1990s are: a decrease in the number of marriages, downward divorce trend, negative changes in fertility levels (since 1989 the TFR has remained below the replacement level), still high level of mortality (especially among men of working age), and significant increase in international migration. The intensity of these changes is accelerated by the changes connected with the socio-economic transformation after 1990.

In our paper the studies of the process of family formation and dissolution, and fertility careers of Polish women concern the period before the socio-economic transformation. Signs of changes observed in the period directly preceding the transformation processes in Poland have been presented in A.C. Liefbroer, E. Fratczak (Liefbroer A.C., E. Fratczak, 1995). In this paper an evaluation has been made using the semi-parametric analysis and life table method of changes in the process of family formation in Poland, changes in fertility careers by cohorts and interaction between family and migratory careers.

BASIC SOURCE OF INFORMATION

The Polish Retrospective Survey "Life Course - (Family, Occupational and Migratory Biography)" was realised in Poland in 1988 by the Institute of Statistics and Demography of the Warsaw School of Economics in co-operation with the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw. The basic objectives of the survey were:
- reconstruction of the family, occupational and migratory life histories of the surveyed persons, and
- identification of current and socio-economic situation of the surveyed person.

The sample was 5,104 persons aged 45 and over – 2,904 females and 2,200 males. It was assumed that the survey would cover the considerable blank in the field of studies of an individual life cycle (indirectly also of the family life cycle), in connection with the population ageing process.

The survey unit was a person aged 45 or over. It was assumed that for the survey universe (aged 45 or over) a considerable number of careers (family, occupational and migratory) constituting an individual life cycle had been completed, or almost completed. Moreover, the surveyed universe of persons aged 45 and over comprised two subpopulations - persons aged 60 years and over, and the somewhat younger (aged 45-59). It should be added that the adopted age limits are conventional nature; nevertheless, they are frequently adopted to be used in studies in population ageing.

It was the first extensive retrospective survey in Poland which reconstructed four careers (educational, occupational, migratory, and family, with the last one including fertility careers) for each of the respondents.[21] Data from this survey formed the basis for the application of different type methods in the analysis, among them methods of the event history analysis (compare, for example: Fratczak E., 1991 and Fratczak E., 1992).

The family biography of an individual began with marriage that was declared to be the event originating the family career of an individual. Data from the survey concern histories of all marital unions in the formal and legal sense of the expression, for all the persons inquired. Histories of first marriages were reconstructed for 4900 from the total number of 5104

[21] It is worth noting in passing that the Institute of Statistics and Demography in association with UNFPA conducted in 1991 as part of an international project 'Family and Fertility Survey' co-ordinated by the Population Activities Unit, DEAP, ECE, in Geneva another retrospective study which embraced 8544 persons aged 18-49. Like the 1988 study, it contained elements of both cross-section and retrospective surveys. In the retrospective part, as in the 1988 study, the life histories of four careers were reconstructed. The subjects in the 1988 retrospective study were persons aged 45 and over; the 1991 study, persons aged 18-49. Thanks to these two contd. studies Poland has become one of the countries conducting wide-ranging retrospective studies in the field of demography. Unique empirical material has been collected which can be used for theoretical and practical application of case history analysis methods.

persons, second marriages for 307 persons, third marriages for 10, and fourth marriages for two persons. Our analysis will only relate to the history of the first marriage, the most frequent. We know that 4% of first marriages ended with a divorce, 22% with the death of spouse, 74% of first marriages last. In other words the stability rate of first marriages is high, in Poland, for the older cohort, that can be considered as a traditional family life cycle model.

From the analysis employing the marital status life table model related to the female cohorts and based on the results of Polish Retrospective Survey 1988 (Fratczak E., 1991), we can conclude that:
- time of staying as single shortens,
- time of staying as married extends,
- minimum increase in time of staying as widowed tends to stabilize,
- time of staying as divorced explicitly increases although its share in the total structure is not high.

As regards fertility careers of females the data collected in the survey included: number of children, date of birth of each child, type of union the child comes from (marriage - by order of union, free union, adoption), date of leaving parental home, the reason for leaving parental home, etc.

Our analysis is divided into three parts:
- Semi-parametric analysis of the process of family formation and family dissolution, both for males and females.
- Fertility careers of Polish females based on the life table of the staging process.
- An examination of family and migration career correlation with application of semi-parametric analysis methods.

FAMILY FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION - A SEMI-PARAMETRIC APPROACH

To study the family formation and dissolution processes we introduce two limitations based on the previous analysis:
- the model of family formation and dissolution is limited to changes in the marital status (such approach can be found in the literature),
- the process under study is based on the history of first marriages only.

The diagram of the status transition can be described as:



The main analysis concentrated on Transition No. 1, i.e., from being single to married. Next we took into consideration Transition No. 3, that is, from being married to widowed. We did not consider Transition No. 2 (from being married to divorced) not only because the number of events was relatively small, but also because we could not treat a divorce and death of spouse as situation of competing risk to the process of family dissolution, as they have completely different distribution and intensity from the point of view of marriage duration.

Family formation

Model specification and covariates

To study the process of family formation we apply the log-linear models. The model applied in our analysis is the picewice constant hazard intensity model. Model fitting was performed by LOGLIN[22] and includes both constant and time varying covariates. The time variable is age at entering into a marriage expressed in months aggregated into years. Observation was started month by month from 15 years till 40 years of the respondent age. The descriptive information on covariates used in the analysis is presented in Table 6.1.

Five of them are fixed: cohort, sex, place of birth, level of education and social background. The next two, i.e. occupational activity and the number of migrations after 15 years of age, are time varying (covariates changed along with the individual life history of the respondent).

[22] The LOGLIN program was developed by Professors: N. Laird, D. Oliver and J.M. Hoem (cp.: User's Guide to LOGLIN with Pre- and Postprocessors, Demography Unit, Stockholm University 1989). Many very useful support programs to the LOGLIN have been developed at the Demography Unit, Stockholm University, led by Professor Jan M. Hoem.

Table 6.1. – Descriptive information on variables used in the analysis of the model of family formation

Variables	Categories	Structure in %
Cohort	1909-1918 1919-1923 1924-1928 1929-1933 1934-1938 1939-1943	13.0 13.1 18.7 19.9 18.9 16.4
Sex	Male Female	44.0 56.0
Place of birth	Urban Rural	45.8 54.2
Level of education (number of years of completed education)	0-7 8+	59.4 40.8
Social background (socio-occupational category of father)	managers, specialists, clerical workers Workers Farmers	8.7 32.2 59.1
Occupational activity[a]	Non-active Active	63.1 36.9
Number of migration after 15 years of age[a]	0 migration 1+ migration	81.3 18.7
Time variable - (age at the entry into a marriage in months aggregated into years[a])	15-19 20-24 25-29 30+	47.1 31.8 12.7 8.4
a) frequencies in exposure months		

Results of model estimations

The basic results of the model that gives a satisfying fit of estimations are presented in Table 6.2. The relative risk for the selected variables in Table 6.2 can be interpreted in the following way:

- There are six birth cohorts in our model, starting with the oldest one. Among these six cohorts the oldest one, i.e. cohort 1909-1918 (ten years interval), was treated as the baseline level. Based on this level it is observed that the risk of entering into the first marriage is growing with the move along the cohorts from the younger to the oldest. The highest risk can be observed for the youngest cohort 1939-1943. It means that its representatives had by approx. 55% higher rate of entry into the first marriage than those born between 1909-1918.

- The rates of entering into the first union differ strongly by gender. The relative risk of entering into the first marriage is by 72% higher for females than for males. But for sexes the entry into the first marriage is strongly age-dependent. In the case of cohort we can expect the interaction between age and cohort to be significant.

- The place of birth does not vary the relative risk of entering into a marriage.

- The social background of the respondent that represents the environment of the person's family home (measured by the socio-occupational category of the respondent's father) varies the rate of entry into the first marriage. Respondents from working men's families presented relative risk of entering into a marriage by 21% higher, and these from farmers' families by approximately 10% higher, compared with respondents in families of managers, specialists and office workers. This means that the lower standard of the family environment, the higher risk of entry into a marriage.

- The relative risk of entry into the first marriage by respondents with level of education higher than primary is by about 26% lower compared with those with primary or below primary education. This is the well known delaying impact of education on the timing of the first marriage (compare: Hoem B. 1988; Liefbroer A.C. 1991; Liefbroer A.C., M. Corijn, J. de Jong Gieneld, 1993).

- Being employed or unemployed has a very strong impact on family formation. In our case occupationally active respondents presented the relative marriage entering risk by 96% higher compared with the non-active ones.

- Those respondents who experienced migration after 15 years of age exhibited the relative risk by about 31% higher compared with those who did not take part in the migration process. Our previous studies (Fratczak E., B. Paszek, 1992) indicated strong and changing over the time relationships between events in the family and migratory careers. It is worth stressing that the process of family formation in the population under study, from the oldest cohort (1909-1918) to the youngest one (1939-1943), occurred in the periods: before, during and after the Second World War. These three periods were characterised by high migration, as well as industrialisation of Polish society with both negative and positive effects.

Within our analysis many models that included interaction effects were estimated. One significant interaction was that between the age and sex of the respondent. For both males and females the rate of entry into a marriage is the lowest in the age group 15-19 years, and it increases thereafter. However, the gender patterns differ strongly by age (compare Table 6.3).

At the age of 15-19 years males are about 7 to 8 times less likely to enter into the first marriage than females. At older age the differences are smaller. Another interesting conclusion that can be derived from Table 3 is that the rate of males entering into the first union grows from one age group to another up to the group of 25-29 years, but for females the same rate decreases after the age group of 20-24 years.

Table 6.2. – Relative intensities estimated from a hazard model with variables as indicated (model of family formation - transition from being single to married)

Variables	Level	Relative risk
Cohort	1909-1918	1.00[a]
	1919-1923	1.53
	1924-1928	1.36
	1929-1933	1.39
	1934-1938	1.49
	1939-1943	1.55
Sex	male	1.00[a]
	female	1.72
Place of birth	urban	1.00[a]
	rural	0.98
Level of education (number of years of completed education)	0-7	1.00[a]
	8+	0.74
Social background (socio-occupational category of respondent's father)	managers, specialists, clerical workers	1.00[a]
	workers	1.21
	farmers	1.10
Occupational activity[a]	non-active	1.00[a]
	active	1.96
Number of migration after 15 years of age[a]	0 migration	1.00[a]
	1+ migration	1.31
Time variable - age at entry into the first marriage (months aggregated into years): 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30+		

a) baseline category

Table 6.3. – Relative risk of joint effects between age and sex - different arrangements

Sexe	Age			
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
males	0.15	1.41	2.95	2.49
females	1.00	3.11	2.85	1.48
females	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
males	0.13	0.45	0.95	1.15

1.00 baseline category

When we look at the interaction separately for each group the result is as follows: the biggest differences can be found in the youngest age groups, the smallest in the age group of 25-29 years.

Table 6.4. – Relative risk of joint effects between the cohort and age

Cohort	Age			
	15-19	20-24	25-29	30+
1909-1918	1.00	2.92	3.34	3.26
1919-1923	0.96	2.86	5.96	3.07
1924-1928	0.88	4.39	5.67	3.40
1929-1933	1.26	4.24	5.39	3.34
1934-1938	1.14	4.48	6.17	4.26
1939-1943	1.21	4.59	7.17	3.35

1.00 baseline category

The second interesting interaction is that between the age and cohort (compare data in Table 6.4). The older cohort the higher the age of entering into a marriage, and conversely, the younger cohort the lower the average age of entering into a marriage. In fact, we can observe changes in the relative risk. For most cohorts, except the oldest ones, the relative risk of entering into a marriage grows until the age group of 25-29 years and then declines (a more detailed information characterising the intensity of first marriages according to the age of entry are presented in works Fratczak E,. 1996a; Fratczak E,. 1996b).

The tested interaction between the cohort and social background of the respondent, and the interaction between the cohort and level of education, were not significant. This phenomenon can be interpreted in the following way:
- generally, the population under study includes old and very old cohorts, with typically low level of education, so there are no big changes in the period in question,
- there were no big changes in the level of social category of the respondent's father among the cohort.

The fact that the interactions analysed are not significant though it might seem that they should be is known in the literature of studies of this type. For example, in the studies of the process of family formation conducted by H.P. Blossfeld and J. Huinink (Blossfeld H.P., J. Huinink, 1991) on the basis of data derived from the German Life History Survey with three cohorts: 1929-1931, 1939-1941 and 1949-1951, the authors included in the models effects of the interaction between the cohort membership, the level of education and level of career resources. No interaction effect was significant.

Family dissolution due to the death of spouse

Model specification and covariates

As it was mentioned earlier the process of family formation in Poland for the cohorts under studies follows the traditional path, which was manifested by Transition No. 1 in the diagram, i.e., the transition from being single to married. The marriage ended mainly with the death of spouse, very seldom with a divorce. The last type of events dissolving a marriage will be much more probable for the younger generation if the selected patterns of behaviour in Poland follow patterns of The Second Demographic Transitions.

Table 6.5. – Descriptive information on variables used in the analysis of the family dissolution model (by the death of spouse)

Variables	Categories	Structure in %
Cohort	1909-1918	32.3
	1919-1923	20.3
	1924-1928	21.3
	1929-1933	13.3
	1934-1938	9.0
	1939-1943	3.8
Sex	male	15.5
	female	84.5
Place of birth	urban	58.9
	rural	41.1
Level of education (number of years of completed education)	0-7	69.1
	8+	30.9
Age of marriage	15-19	15.1
	20-24	48.7
	25-29	21.8
	30+	14.4
Occupational activity	non-active	14.4
	active	85.6
Time variable (duration of marriage in months aggregated into years)	below 19	61.4
	20-29	23.7
	30-39	12.0
	40+	2.9

a) frequencies in exposure months

The general idea of the model applied in the analysis is the one mentioned in point 3.1, i.e. the model is a picewice constant intensity model. Descriptive information on covariates used in the models is presented in

Table 6.5. There are five fixed variables: cohort, sex, place of residence and age at marriage, and one time varying covariate: occupational activity. The time variable was duration of marriage in months aggregated into years.

Results of model estimation

Results of the best fitted model estimated with LOGLIN are presented in table 6.6. Among the interesting findings, sex deserves our close attention. There is a five times higher risk for women than men that their marriage will ended with the death of spouse. This is undoubtedly also a result of the more than average mortality among males which should be regarded as a very adverse characteristic of Poland found in both cross-section and cohort analyses.

Table 6.6. – Relative intensities estimated from a hazard model with variables as indicated (model of family dissolution-transition from being married to widowed)

Variables	Level	Relative risk
Cohort	1909-1918	1.00[a]
	1919-1923	0.82
	1924-1928	0.72
	1929-1933	0.57
	1934-1938	0.60
	1939-1943	0.41
Sex	male	1.00[a]
	female	4.72
Place of birth	urban	1.00[a]
	rural	0.81
Age of marriage	15-19	1.00[a]
	20-24	1.11
	25-29	1.27
	30+	1.63
Occupational activity[a]	non-active	1.00[a]
	active	1.13
Time variable – marriage duration (months grouped into years): below 19, 20-29, 30-39, 40+		
a) baseline category		

The age at marriage is another factor differentiating the marriage termination pattern. For example, the aforementioned risk for persons who married at the age of 30 or over is by 63% higher than for persons who married before the age of 20. It might therefore be concluded that the older the age at marriage the greater the risk that the union will end with the death

of spouse.

For respondents belonging to the rural population the risk of marriage dissolution by the death of spouse is by 19% lower than for urban dwellers. Also for persons who are economically active the risk is greater (13%) than for persons without gainful employment.

One of the significant interactions in the model is the interaction between the cohort and marriage duration. Like the process of family formation, the process of family dissolution can be regarded as traditional for the cohorts surveyed. Empirical analysis reveals that the intensity of divorces in individual cohorts is growing, but their percentage share in the structure of marriage dissolution by causes is still relatively small. One of the explanations of this phenomenon might be Catholicism declared by the majority of Polish population, but also by the general social and economic situation, particularly unfavourable in the housing market (shortages and high prices).

Again, although the process of marriage dissolution by the death of spouse is also significantly determined by the demographic and socio-economic variables, it should be borne in mind that the decisive factors are changes in mortality rates and cultivation of traditional family values.

FERTILITY CAREERS - A LIFE TABLE APPROACH

Female related data were used for the selected six cohorts. For each cohort two distributions were constructed, i.e., a distribution of females by age and parity (the distribution of exposures in person years), and distribution of births by age of the mother and order (distributions of events - occurrences). On the basis of the two distributions, the distribution of occurrence exposure rates was calculated. The occurrence exposure rates served as input data for estimating parameters of the fertility life table. The estimation of the life table was made by LIFELINE, the program worked out by Prof. F. Willekens. We do not intend to present a general theory of the fertility life table models, the reader can find it in individual works, for example: Chiang C.L., Bea J. Van Berg., 1982; Willekens F., 1994). The LIFELINE software produces numbers of very useful parameters such as average numbers of events and rates, stage probabilities, parameters describing the process in n-th occurrence, intervals between events approximation using Ryder method, the interval between n-th and (n-1) occurrence, the probability of n-th occurrence before duration, the probability that an event in (0,x) interval is an n-th event, the probability that an event in (x-1,x) interval is an n-th event, waiting time to/from event (i.e. measures of retrospective and prospective careers). In our estimation of fertility life tables the mortality is assumed to be absent. It is impossible to include all

estimated parameters.

Table 6.7 includes: average numbers of events, rates and stage probabilities (probabilities by parity). The highest value of TFR belongs to the cohort 1924-1928 (the cohort of mothers in the first baby boom in Poland after World War II) - 2.8 children per a female, the lowest to the youngest cohort 1939-1943 - 2.39 children. This means that a female had on average from two to three children during her reproductive life time (between 15 and 49 years of age). After the cohort 1924-1928 the value of TFR has systematically declined. Not all females had children: from 14.4% (cohort 1909-1918) to 6.2% (cohort 1939-1943) of females remained childless. The share of childless females has steadily decreased. Childbearing is generally completed in the age group 40-44.

In the first three cohorts the highest value of the partial fertility rate belongs to the age group 25-29 years, but for the last three cohorts to females aged 20-24 years. We can generally observe an increase in the value of stage probabilities for the first and second child, and a declining value of stage probabilities in the higher order of births. From the life table estimates for the oldest cohort 1909-1918 we can conclude that 18.8% of women had one child, 24.4% - two children, 20.9% - three children, and 21.5% - four or more children. The proportion of females with six children and more was the highest (4.3%) in the cohort 1924-1928. In the youngest cohort 1939-1943, 19.7% had one child, 38.5% two children, 21.6% three children, and 14% four or more children.

Data in Table 6.8 present information on the mean age at birth of the first child, and the average birth interval for female cohorts. Generally, the average age of a female at her first delivery ranged from 18 to 22 years. Observation of values of this measure for the cohorts shows that there is some average tendency to lower age, as in the case of age at marriage (the latter was arrived at by estimation of marital status life tables). The birth intervals between deliveries of the first and second child are rather stable among cohorts, but differences are growing for the next birth orders. The changes in fertility careers of Polish females had rather evolutionary character which can be characterised by:

- a decrease in fertility,
- an increase in the proportion of females with children,
- a decline in the value of stage probabilities for the higher birth order, which results in a reduction of large families,
- a decrease in the age at birth of the first child and the stable birth interval between the first and second child among cohorts.

Table 6.7. – Fertility Life Table: events, rates and stage probabilities by parity for selected female cohorts

Age	Average		Probabilities by parity						
	events	rate	0	1	2	3	4	5	6+
Cohort 1909-1918									
15-19	0.11	2.28	90.89	7.56	1.55	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	0.71	12.00	56.61	26.08	13.72	3.17	0.42	0.00	0.00
25-29	1.42	14.17	32.00	26.08	27.36	10.32	3.12	0.97	0.17
30-34	2.00	11.46	23.41	18.75	28.89	16.58	7.39	3.32	1.66
35-39	2.43	8.60	16.11	20.31	24.64	19.49	9.09	6.00	4.36
40-44	2.57	2.80	14.67	18.84	24.40	20.85	9.49	5.70	6.05
45+	2.58	0.34	14.43	18.82	24.40	20.86	9.75	5.70	6.04
Cohort 1919-1923									
15-19	0.15	2.91	88.87	8.79	2.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	0.69	10.89	57.61	25.57	13.40	2.99	0.43	0.00	0.00
25-29	1.59	18.07	24.27	30.03	27.33	13.42	3.93	0.93	0.11
30-34	2.23	12.65	14.29	20.17	30.66	21.11	9.25	3.43	1.09
35-39	2.51	5.75	12.06	17.87	27.44	22.80	11.98	4.58	3.27
40-44	2.59	1.49	11.23	18.15	26.80	22.10	12.90	4.94	3.87
45-49	2.59	0.04	11.23	18.15	26.80	22.10	12.90	4.72	4.09
Cohort 1924-1928									
15-19	0.11	2.27	90.44	8.33	1.23	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	1.03	18.40	40.60	32.73	20.70	5.14	0.83	0.00	0.00
25-29	2.03	19.90	16.91	22.20	32.92	18.37	7.86	1.31	0.42
30-34	258	10.96	10.56	15.04	31.70	23.44	12.30	5.06	1.90
35-39	2.76	3.62	8.67	14.68	30.13	23.36	13.31	6.34	3.34
40-44	2.80	0.87	8.48	14.24	30.34	22.54	14.38	5.90	4.11
45-49	2.80	0.05	8.48	14.24	30.34	22.54	14.38	5.75	4.27
Cohort 1929-1933									
15-19	0.20	3.91	85.60	10.89	3.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	1.11	18.26	37.44	33.25	22.08	6.20	0.92	0.12	0.00
25-29	1.93	16.39	18.69	22.12	33.76	17.82	5.62	1.46	0.54
30-34	2.34	8.29	12.54	17.11	33.00	24.36	8.11	2.80	2.08
35-39	2.56	4.45	10.21	14.78	32.57	24.43	10.72	3.99	3.30
40-44	2.63	1.21	9.49	14.49	32.77	24.10	10.77	4.79	3.58
45-49	2.63	0.08	9.49	14.28	32.97	24.10	10.77	4.79	3.58
Cohort 1934-1938									
15-19	0.16	3.29	88.25	8.58	3.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	1.09	18.46	36.42	35.00	22.53	5.27	0.77	0.00	0.00
25-29	1.84	15.13	14.99	28.03	35.30	15.88	4.86	0.78	0.17
30-34	2.25	8.02	8.46	22.93	37.47	19.44	7.47	3.02	1.22
35-39	2.43	3.80	6.39	19.94	38.16	20.46	9.30	3.65	2.10
40-44	2.48	0.87	5.76	19.71	38.13	20.95	9.15	3.72	2.59
45-49	2.48	0.04	5.76	19.49	38.34	20.95	9.15	3.72	2.59
Cohort 1939-1943									
15-19	0.16	3.30	86.89	10.75	2.36	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	1.05	17.80	35.29	38.54	20.46	4.94	0.67	0.09	0.00
25-29	1.78	14.60	12.90	29.98	39.39	13.22	3.46	0.97	0.09
30-34	2.18	7.98	7.93	21.91	41.63	18.36	6.77	2.01	1.39
35-39	2.37	3.67	6.23	19.74	39.00	21.59	8.68	2.85	1.92
40-44	2.39	0.48	6.23	19.74	38.51	21.60	8.94	2.46	2.51

Table 6.8. – Mean age at delivery of the first child and average birth interval for selected female cohorts

Age	Birth Order				
	1	2	3	4	5
Cohort 1909-1918					
15-19	17.37	1.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	20.80	2.34	1.58	0.96	0.00
25-29	22.13	3.52	2.68	2.09	1.57
30-34	22.40	4.29	3.80	3.12	2.53
35-39	22.72	4.52	4.59	3.87	3.51
40-44	22.74	4.71	4.93	4.11	3.81
45-49	22.75	4.73	4.97	4.18	3.81
Cohort 1919-1923					
15-19	17.34	1.49	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	20.48	2.48	1.81	1.06	0.00
25-29	22.26	3.58	2.84	1.98	1.50
30-34	22.51	4.35	3.80	3.07	2.56
35-39	22.51	4.53	4.39	3.89	3.46
40-44	22.55	4.55	4.50	4.27	3.82
45-49	22.55	4.55	4.50	4.27	3.80
Cohort 1924-1928					
15-19	17.39	1.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	20.99	2.18	1.35	0.84	0.00
25-29	21.77	3.33	2.60	1.97	1.48
30-34	21.85	3.81	3.44	2.99	2.78
35-39	21.90	3.91	3.74	3.54	3.58
40-44	21.89	3.95	3.78	3.83	3.63
45-49	21.89	3.95	3.78	3.83	3.62
Cohort 1929-1933					
15-19	17.31	1.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	20.48	2.37	1.72	1.02	0.67
25-29	21.12	3.57	2.88	2.17	1.64
30-34	21.25	4.00	3.79	3.01	2.68
35-39	21.29	4.27	4.28	3.98	3.52
40-44	21.31	4.34	4.38	4.27	4.05
45-49	21.31	4.37	4.38	4.27	4.05
Cohort 1934-1938					
15-19	17.31	1.48	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	20.74	2.24	1.66	0.99	0.00
25-29	21.52	3.38	2.89	2.20	1.72
30-34	21.70	3.97	3.73	3.31	3.04
35-39	21.75	4.31	4.24	4.07	3.67
40-44	21.77	4.39	4.40	4.19	4.03
45-49	21.77	4.42	4.40	4.19	4.03
Cohort 1939-1943					
15-19	17.35	1.50	0.00	0.00	0.00
20-24	20.73	2.33	1.57	0.95	0.63
25-29	21.58	3.61	2.66	2.18	1.76
30-34	21.70	4.29	3.73	3.34	2.82
35-39	21.73	4.54	4.55	4.09	3.48
40-44	21.73	4.54	4.63	4.26	3.60

AN EXAMINATION OF FAMILY AND MIGRATORY CAREERS CORRELATION - A SEMI-PARAMETRIC APPROACH

For the studies of interaction between events from two careers: family and migratory we applied both non-parametric and semiparametric models. From non-parametric methods of analysis we used: method of standardisation and model of competing risks (for more detailed compare works: Fratczak E., B. Paszek, 1988; Fratczak E.,J. Joywiak, B. Paszek, 1996). The phenomena under study , with semi-parametric approach, are intensity of migration after the marriage. The main goal of the analysis was to explain precisely the intensity of transition between states:
- married with 0 migration to married with 1 migration,
- married with 1 migration to married with 2 migrations.

The space of transition is presented in diagram. Of course the population under study, i.e. population exposed to the risk of migration after marriage is different for different sets of models, i.e. model sets I and II.



Results of models estimation

The results of estimation for selected models are presented in table 6.9 for I-st set of models and in table 11 for II-nd set of models (compare Diagram). Among the many models presented in Table 6.9 our attention was concentrated on the models 6 and 6A. Model 6 in fact is essentially a linear regression in the logarithm of intensity of the fitted parameters, the values of which describe the relative impact of variables used on migration rate. The hazard rate is a picewise constant, i.e. the hazard is assumed to be constant within the described time intervals of marriage duration and varies between these intervals.

The risk of migration lowers as we move along the cohorts. The lowest risk is observed in the cohort 1929-1933, with a 34% lower rate for first migration after marriage than those who were born during 1909-1918. The hazard rate of first migration after marriage differs strongly according to place of birth. The relative risk for migration is higher for females who were born in rural areas by about 41% compared with those who were born in urban areas.

The age at marriage is a significant variable which influences the first migration after marriage. Generally, the higher the age at marriage, the lower the relative risk of migration. The risk of the first migration after marriage is about 21% lower for females who were married at the age 25 and over compared with those who were married between 15 and 19 years of age.

Those individuals who, at the time of marriage, worked in the agricultural sector of the economy had a relative risk of migration about 34% lower compared with those who had income from work in non-agricultural, public or private enterprise.

Finally, in model 6, parity is the variable which significantly influences the propensity to first migration. The relative risk of migration after marriage for women with one or more children is about 23% lower compared with those who had no children.

During the first year of marriage, the relative risk of migration for joint effects is higher for parity 0 than for parity 1 and over (Table 6.10). Then between the 3rd and 5th year of marriage the situation is reversed. After ten years of marriage the relative risk of migration is the same as in the first years of marriage.

Table 6.9. – Relative intensities estimated from a hazard model

Variables	Level	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 6A
1. Cohort	1909-1918	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]
	1919-1923	0.80	0.80	0.81	0.80	0.82	0.83	0.84	0.83
	1924-1928	0.74	0.74	0.73	0.72	0.72	0.74	0.74	0.74
	1929-1933	0.66	0.66	0.64	0.63	0.62	0.64	0.64	0.64
	1934-1938	0.80	0.80	0.77	0.75	0.73	0.75	0.76	0.75
	1939-1943	0.76	0.76	0.74	0.71	0.69	0.72	0.72	0.71
2. Place of birth	urban		1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]
	rural		1.21	1.21	1.25	1.40	1.41	1.41	1.41
3. Age of marriage	15-19			1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]
	20-24			1.04	1.03	1.02	1.02	1.02	0.98
	25+			0.84	0.82	0.81	0.79	0.79	0.80
4. Level of education	0-7 years				1.00[a]				
	8+				0.89				
5. Source of income	from work in non-agricultural enterprise					1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]
at marriage	from work in agriculture					0.66	0.66	0.65	0.66
	not coming from employment					1.02	0.98	1.02	0.98
6. Parity	0 child						1.00[a]	1.00[a]	1.00[a]
	1+ children						0.77	0.78	0.77
7. Occupational activity	non-active							1.00[a]	
	active							0.80	
Likelihood statistics		1478.48	1473.53	1467.76	1467.14	1449.78	1444.47	1441.5	1431.62
Partial log-likelihood		7081.52	7076.57	7071.82	7070.18	7052.82	7047.51	7044.6	7034.66

a) baseline category

Table 6.10. – The relative risk for joint effects between parity and marriage duration (data from model 6A, model set I)

Marriage duration in years:	1	2	3-5	6-10	11-15
Parity:					
0	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
1+	0.46	0.68	1.08	0.57	0.53

1.00 - baseline category

From the application of the log-linear model to the study of propensity to first migration after marriage we can state:

- birth cohorts and age at marriage influence the propensity to migrate,
- from non-demographic covariates, significant influence on the propensity to migrate comes from place of birth and source of income at marriage, and
- level of education and status of occupational activity do not significantly improve the fit of the model.

Table 6.11 presents selected results of the estimation of model set II, which describe transition from the state married with first migration to married with second migration. On the basis of the results of this model we can state:
- demographic variables such as birth cohorts, age at marriage and parity influence the propensity for a second migration after marriage,
- from non-demographic covariates significant influence on the propensity to engage in a second migration is exerted by place of birth, level of education and source of income at the marriage, and
- occupational activity does not significantly improve the fit of the model.

The influence of variables on the propensity to migrate changes with marriage duration and order of migration. For example, level of education did not significantly improve the fit of the model for the first migration, but significantly influenced the propensity to for a second migration. Individuals who have higher than a primary level of education have a relative risk of a second migration about 63% higher in comparison with those who have only primary or below level of education.

Table 6.11. – Relative intensities estimated from hazard models with variables as indicated for model set II (intensity of the second migration after marriage, selected model)

Variables	Level	Selected model
1. Cohort	1909-1918	1.00[a]

	1919-1923	0.87
	1924-1928	0.70
	1929-1933	0.63
	1934-1938	0.51
	1939-1943	0.35
2. Place of birth	urban	1.00[a]
	rural	0.84
3. Age of marriage	15-19	1.00[a]
	20-24	0.79
	25+	0.53
4. Level of education	0-7 years	1.00[a]
	8+	1.63
5. Source of income	from work in non-agricultural enterprise	1.00[a]
at marriage	from work in agriculture	0.58
	not coming from employment	0.98
6. Parity	0 child	1.00[a]
	1+ children	0.79
7. Occupational activity	non-active	1.00[a]
	active	1.20
Time variable – marriage duration in months grouped into years (1, 2, 3-5, 6-10, 11-15)		
Likelihood statistics	906.75	
Partial log-likelihood	3166.25	

a) baseline category

The next example of covariates is place of birth. For the model of first migration, women who were born in rural areas have about a 41% higher relative risk in comparison to those who were born in urban areas. For the second migration, individuals who were born in rural areas had about a 16% lower risk of migration in comparison to those who were born in urban areas.

Results of estimation of semi-parametric models highlight out that migration after marriage had a selective character and depended not only on events from the family career but also on other variables which describe the individuals' demographic as well as socioeconomic characteristics.

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7

WOMEN AND FAMILY: HEADSHIP STATUS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS OF BRAZIL

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One of the most remarkable aspects of the change in the structure of family[23] arrangements in Brazil is the increase in the proportion of female-headed families, especially those consisting of a woman without spouse living with her own children. The proportion of these female-headed households practically doubled over the last three decades, from 10.7 to 20.0 percent of total households between 1960 and 1989. An analysis of household head marital status reveals a predominance of widows, followed by single women then separated or divorced women. Recently, however, households headed by single, separated or divorced women have increased more than those headed by widows. The accelerated growth of female-headed families in recent years has been concentrated mostly in urban areas and accompanied by an increase in poverty. In 1980 one out of every two female-headed families was living at or below the poverty line, as compared with one out of every four in 1960 (Goldani, 1989, 1991).

Using 1991 Brazilian Census Data, this paper examines the living arrangements of a specific group of women: mothers with no spouse whose youngest child is under 18 years old. Then, the paper analyzes the socioeconomic and demographic correlates of headship probability.

An underlying assumption of the design of this study is that a woman who faces the prospect of establishing a living arrangement different from the predominate, nuclear type (whether by circumstances against her will, or by choice) is constrained or influenced by basically three factors: her preferences, her resources, and the options available to her (Sweet,

[23] In this paper we use *family* as well as *household* as equivalent terms to refer to a domestic unit where at least one member is related (by blood or marriage) to the head of the household.

1972:144). These factors, in turn, are strongly associated with characteristics such as marital status, age, socioeconomic status, kinship networks, and the number and age of children. The preferences, resources and options available to a middle aged widow with several children are quite different than those of a single teen mother of one child.

Therefore, in order to learn more about the female-headed household phenomenon, it is necessary to perform disaggregated analyzes so as to capture the variety of situations lived by specific subgroups of women. Among these, the subgroup, mothers with no spouse whose youngest child is under 18 years old, is of special interest. The presence of dependent children implies specific housing needs and other constraints that childless women and women with adult children may not face. For instance, women with dependent children may suffer greater psychological and economic costs and have more difficulty sharing a household with relatives or non-relatives than women without dependent children.

Instead of delineating the profile of female household heads, as most of the Brazilian literature usually does, the principal objective of this paper is to investigate the determining factors of the likehood of being a household head among women without a spouse who have dependent children. Thus, this paper addresses three main questions: (1) to what extent does the status of a woman as a mother (number and age of her children) influence her living arrangements? (2) to what extent does a woman's marital status, by its inherent characteristics, determine her living arrangements? (3) what are the net effects of socioeconomic factors on the probability of a woman with a given number and age of children and of a certain marital status being a head of household?

BACKGROUND

Since the sixties female household headship has been a constant topic of research interest especially among social scientists investigating family matters such as nuptiality patterns, household structure and composition, and family typologies. The growth of female-headed households has been a concern for a variety of reasons. First of all, since women's income is usually lower than men's (because of gender inequalities in society), households headed by women, specially mothers alone with own children, have shown a greater tendency to be at or below the poverty line. Thus, a growing proportion of female-headed households may imply extra costs for the state in countries with a welfare system. Further interest in female-headed households has been concerned with the rupture of the nuclear family, the ideal family in Western, urban society. Various studies dealing with type of household headship, in the early seventies, were doomsday declarations of the breakdown of the family (Rainwater, Yancy,

1967; Farley, Hermalin, 1971). The 'new family pattern' became a problem for policy makers and social welfare planners. Consistent findings of the relationship between female-headed households and poverty were also a main theme of discussion among academics and feminists who used research findings to show the unequal status of women in job positions, education and earnings.

Early studies of women in Brazil (Barroso, 1978; Merrick, Shimink, 1982) confirmed most of findings of researchers in USA and in some underdeveloped countries. Although poverty was a reality in most of the households headed by women, researchers' emphasis on the 'culture of poverty' obscured other relevant aspects of female-headed households which were not well addressed in the literature at large.

The increase in female headship detected in the first wave of studies was rarely approached from a historical perspective which might have shown that female-headed households were actually not a recent trend in women's history. Barroso, for example, comparing the Brazilian case to those of 74 other developing countries, analyzed by Buvinic and Youssef (1978), concluded that an increase in families headed by women was the recent result of the intersection of poverty and development:

Rapidly women are being called upon to fulfill a new role in a way that is frequently traumatic. Paradoxically, it is in societies that, until recently, firmly maintained a tradition of stable family systems headed by men that development in a context of poverty stimulates and expands families headed by women. (Barroso, 1978: 470, our translation*).*

However, within Brazilian society, most of the historical works on family patterns have shown quite a high proportion of consensual unions and single-mother households throughout history (Ramos, 1978; Dias, 1983; Leite, 1984; Silva, 1984; Castro, 1989). Some anthropologists have explained these types of family as having their roots in the colonial period. For Stolke:

Legal marriage as the dominant ideal regulating reciprocal rights between spouses is endowed with social-prestige. In practice it is the appropriate form for color-class equals who have family status to preserve and transmit. Mating between color-class unequals continues to take the form of temporary or sporadic sexual unions which often result in single mothers living in households without a resident male and lacking socially recognized patrilateral bonds of the offspring. (Stolcke,1991:139)

Consensual unions were thought to be a pattern common only among poor people. By the early eighties, however, evidence showed an ever growing rate of consensual unions among middle and upper social classes. For some authors studying family patterns in the country, this evidence indicated that the consensual union was not a provisional arrangement between the sexes but a matter of choice among couples of different backgrounds and social economic statuses (Berquó and Loyola, 1984).

As Goldani (1989) notes, the phenomenon of female-headed households seems to have been historically concealed in function of cultural ideals and the political/ideological interests of groups or institutions such as the Church and the State. As consensual unions were unacceptable, they may not have been reflected in official statistics. Therefore, one may wonder to what extent the recent proportions of female-headed households have resulted from new tendencies or perhaps only reflect greater acceptance of the phenomenon thus increasing their registration in official statistics. Goldani believes that both aspects are occurring in the Brazilian case making it difficult to separate these processes and to determine the real causes for increasing numbers of families headed by women.

Another problem of the early studies emphasizing poverty is that they provided the misleading supposition that impoverishment is a characteristic of households in which only women and children are present. According to Garcia, the most critical result of this emphasis on the "feminization of poverty' framework in family studies is that it impeded, for a long time, a broader class-gender perspective of the changing headship status from men to women. Studies often categorized women as 'abandoned' by the partner instead of examining the pervasive gender inequalities and social changes which may lead women to assume headship status. For Garcia, the increasing rate of families headed by women since the sixties is not an isolated issue because, concomitantly, women have also acquired more education, entered into urban labor markets, and became more conscious of their own identity as women, as workers, and as producers - not just as wives. Moreover, the factual assumption of poverty accompanying the headship status diffused the idea of homogeneity within this group of women. In fact, there are different reasons and paths which led women to become family heads revealing heterogeneity within the group (Garcia,1992).

Rapid urbanization and modernization have also been understood as pivotal in producing changes in the 'normal' pattern of the nuclear family. The diminishing emphasis on the conjugal family type was seen as a function of the changes brought about by a new sexual division of labor required in urban-industrial settings. Thus, other forms of living arrangements prevalent in the sixties, including female-headed households, could be seen as an adaptation process to macro changes (Durham, 1982). In a highly mobile population, such as Brazil, migration could also have played a role in the increase of female-headed households, especially in urban areas of the country which might have experienced a heavy immigration of single mothers (Goldani, 1983).

More important than migration, recent trends in mortality, nuptiality, and fertility resulted in population composition by sex, age and marital status that is extremely favorable for female headship. There has been a growth in

the proportion of women living in a consensual unions[24] and of women having children prior to or outside of marriage. There has been a decrease in lifelong singleness and a major increase in divorce and separation (Goldani, 1989).

Differentials in demographic factors can account for much of the difference in female headship rates between some subgroups. For instance, the greater proportion of headship among Black and *pardo* women than among white women, might be explained by the high proportion of never-married women and consensual unions, as well the greatest rate of marital disruption, and the lowest rate of remarriage among the non-white group. However, socioeconomic factors that might also be responsible for differences among subgroups have not been adequately studied.

DATA

The study is based on the most recent Brazilian Census Data collected in 1991. It focuses on Brazilian metropolitan areas[25] taken as a whole. In 1991 these areas accounted for 31 percent of all Brazilian households and 29 percent of the country's population.

The population under analysis included all women aged 15 to 69 years, without a spouse, living with one or more of their own children under 18 years of age. This sample includes, therefore, women in three different marital statuses: separated/divorced, widowed, and single. As stated earlier, this sample was chosen mainly because women with young children may have special housing needs as well constraints on establishing their own independent living arrangement in comparison to childless women or those with only adult children. The type of residence criterion (metropolitan) was introduced because rural and urban living arrangements have their own specificities. Thus, they must be analyzed separately**.** Moreover, as female-headed households are an increasingly urban phenomenon, the study of metropolitan areas is especially interesting. The age criteria was introduced because few women over 69 have children of their own under 18 years old.

The sample consists of 121,720 women; among whom 63,255 are divorced or separated, 22,663 are widowers and 35,802 are single mothers.

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[24] The importance of consensual unions comes form the fact that they show a great rate of marital disruption and a significant number of women who have left a consensual union tend to report themselves as being single (Silva, 1979). The proportion of this kind of union has been steadily increasing, particularly among younger women (Berquó, Loyola, 1984; Henriques, 1980).

[25] There are nine metropolitan areas in Brazil. Belém, Fortaleza, Recife, Salvador, Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Curitiba and Porto Alegre. In 1991 they accounted for 31 percent of all Brazilian households and 29 percent of the country's population.

RESULTS

An overview of headship status in metropolitan Brazil

According to 1991 Census Data, there were 10.8 million households in metropolitan areas in Brazil, 22.6 percent of them headed by a women. However, this figure conceals great differences: only 2 percent of married women but 29 percent of women without a male partner were heading the households in which they lived.

Table 7.1 presents data on the relationship to household head of the women without spouse disaggregated into categories determined by the presence and age of the women's children.

Table 7.1.– Living arrangements of women aged 15-69 years currently without spouse by presence and age of own children, Metropolitan Areas, Brazil,1991

Group of women	Living arrangements (%)						Total	
	Head	Daughter of head[1]	Parent of head[2]	Other relative	Non relative	Total	Number[3]	%
with children aged 18 or +	68.8	1.7	27.6	1.5	0.4	100.0	669.2	11.1
no children at home	66.3	6.8	0.6	9.8	16.5	100.0	314.7	5.2
with children under age 18	59.3	28.9	2.2	7.1	2.5	100.0	1 206.7	20.0
childless	9.1	68.2	0.0	14.2	8.5	100.0	3 838.5	63.7
Total	29.0	49.5	3.5	11.1	6.8	100.0	6 029.1	100.0

Source : Brazilian Census 1991.
Note: [1] Includes daughter-in-law; [2] Includes parent-in-law; [3] Population in thousands.

The highest proportions of household heads were found among women[26] whose children were all 18 years or older and among women who, although having children under age 18, were not living with any of them. More than a quarter of the mothers of older children who were not heads were living in a house of a son or a daughter. In contrast, the second most

[26] Hereafter 'women' and 'mother' refer only to women without a spouse.

common living arrangement of women with no children at home was living with non-relatives.

In the group delimited for this study - mothers with at least one child under age 18 at home - 59.1 percent of women were heads of the households in which they lived. Of the 40.9 percent of women who were not heads of household, three fourths were living with their parents or parents-in-law and most of the remainder were living in households headed by other relatives. Women living in households headed by non-relatives accounted for only 2.5 percent.

Women who have never had a child were mostly living with their parents (68 percent) and, secondarily, with other relatives. Most of these childless women, who account for 63.7 percent of women without a spouse, were young and single which explains the figures for their living arrangements.

Living arrangements of mothers without a spouse with children under age 18 by age and number of children

An analysis of the distribution of mothers by their relationship to the household head according to the number and age of their children (Table 7.2) reveals that both number and age of children greatly influenced the type of living arrangements adopted. There is a strong positive association between age of the youngest child and a woman's headship status: while only 32.1 percent of mothers whose youngest child was under three years of age were heads, 81.3 percent of mothers whose youngest child was older than 11 years were in the same position. On the other hand, regardless of the age of youngest child, the greater the number of children the greater the proportion of household heads and the number of children was more influential for women with younger children. Among women whose youngest child was under the age of three, 19.1 percent with one child but 64.1 percent with three or more children were heads. In contrast, among mothers whose youngest child was over the age of 11, the proportion of household heads varied between 71.4 percent and 88.6 percent, for those with only one child and those with three or more children, respectively. Women who were not heads of household most frequently resided with their parents. The proportion of this living arrangement was greater for women who had smaller numbers of children and younger children. The proportion of women living with their parents reached 60 percent among those with only one child under the age of three, but was less than 3 percent among mothers with 3 or more children and whose youngest child was over the age of 11. Finally, other kinds of living arrangements were uncommon but also associated with the age and the number of children. The highest proportions of women living in households headed by 'other relatives' (at most 14.4 percent) or non-relatives (at most 6.3 percent) were found among mothers with a small number of very young children (0-2 years and 3-5 years). The proportion of

women who were mothers of the household head reached a high of 7.5 percent among mothers whose youngest child was 12-17 years old. In sum, only two positions - head or daughter of the head, accounted for almost 90 percent of the living arrangements of all these women and the relative importance of these two positions depended on the age and number of a women's children.

Table 7.2. – Distribution of women aged 15-69 years, without spouse, who live with one or more children under age 18, by relationship to head of household and by age and number of children, Metropolitan Areas, Brazil,1991

Age of youngest child	Number of children	Living arrangements (%)						Sample size
		Head	Daughter of head[1]	Parent of head[2]	Other relative	Non relative	Total	
0-2	Total	32.1	51.5	0.3	11.9	4.2	100.0	29 186
	1	19.1	60.1	0.1	14.4	6.3	100.0	16 698
	2	38.7	48.5	0.3	10.6	1.8	100.0	6 680
	3 or +	64.1	28.8	0.7	5.8	0.7	100.0	5 808
3-5	Total	48.9	39.1	0.6	8.6	2.8	100.0	23 636
	1	32.8	51.1	0.2	11.2	4.8	100.0	11 751
	2	54.4	36.1	0.4	7.8	1.4	100.0	6 022
	3 or +	76.5	17.6	1.7	3.9	0.3	100.0	5 863
6-11	Total	68.1	22.2	1.9	5.8	2.0	100.0	38 608
	1	49.9	35.7	0.7	9.5	4.3	100.0	14 470
	2	72.7	19.7	1.6	4.9	1.0	100.0	11 169
	3 or +	85.2	8.7	3.6	2.3	0.2	100.0	12 969
12-17	Total	81.3	8.7	5.4	3.3	1.3	100.0	30 290
	1	71.4	16.3	2.9	6.2	3.2	100.0	10 005
	2	83.8	7.4	5.7	2.6	0.5	100.0	9 378
	3 or +	88.6	2.7	7.5	1.1	0.1	100.0	10 907
Total		59.3	28.9	2.2	7.1	2.5	100.0	121 720

Source: Brazilian Census 1991.
Note: Percentages are based on weighted data. Sample size is unweighted.
[1] Includes daughter-in-law; [2] Includes parent-in-law.

There are several possible explanations for these findings[27]. The first is that mothers of older children are less constrained than mothers of younger children by the need to arrange for care of their children. Thus, they are more likely to work to maintain her own dwelling place. Second, mothers of older children are older themselves. Therefore, they are more likely to have some conditions which give them the possibility of maintaining an independent living arrangement. They may have had a longer period of time

[27] Some of these explanations have been suggested by Sweet (1972) and Oliveira (1992).

to make a more permanent economic adjustment to their status of 'single mother' or they may have been working outside home for many years already. Third, mothers of older children are more likely to have many children and thus may have more difficulty doubling up with relatives.

Mothers of younger children, on the other hand, are more likely to have entered their current position (with children but no spouse) quite recently and therefore may be in a period of economic and psychological transition. Furthermore, mothers of younger children may be younger themselves and therefore have a greater chance of having living parents. It may be more difficult for women with small children to reconcile the demands of caring for the children and working outside the home which is usually necessary for maintaining one's own household. Considering that many of these possible explanations may also be linked to women's marital status, the following section examines the data on living arrangements for each marital status separately.

Living arrangements by marital status and age of youngest child

Table 7.3 compares the distribution of relationship to head of household by marital statuses and age of youngest child.

Table 7.3. – Distribution of women aged 15-69 years, without spouse living with children under 18 years of age, related to the household head, marital status and age of last child, Metropolitan areas, Brazil, 1991.

Age of youngest child	Living arrangements (%)						Sample size
	Head	Daughter of head[1]	Parent of head[2]	Other relative	Non relative	Total	
Single							
0-2	18.7	62.0	0.0	13.6	5.7	100.0	14 970
3-5	29.1	55.1	0.2	11.1	4.5	100.0	8 480
6-11	44.0	40.2	0.5	10.7	4.5	100.0	8 288
12-17	63.3	21.3	2.1	8.4	5.0	100.0	4 046
Total	32.3	50.5	0.4	11.7	5.1	100.0	35 784
Separated/Divorced							
0-2	43.5	42.9	0.4	10.2	3.0	100.0	12 380
3-5	57.3	32.8	0.4	7.4	2.0	100.0	12 626
6-11	71.4	20.4	1.7	5.0	1.5	100.0	22 641
12-17	81.9	9.5	4.7	3.0	0.9	100.0	15 608
Total	66.0	24.4	1.9	6.0	1.7	100.0	63 255
Widowed							
0-2	66.0	23.0	1.1	9.1	0.8	100.0	1 836
3-5	73.0	16.8	3.1	6.2	0.9	100.0	2 530
6-11	84.5	7.7	4.2	2.8	0.7	100.0	7 679
12-17	87.5	2.7	7.8	1.6	0.4	100.0	10 618
Total	83.2	7.5	5.5	3.1	0.6	100.0	22 663

Source: Brazilian 1991 Census.
Note: Percentages are based on weighted data. Sample size is unweighted.
[1] Includes daughter-in-law; [2] Includes parent-in-law.

Overall, 83 percent of the widows were heads of household; whereas 66 percent of the divorced/separated women and only 32 percent of single women were in the headship position. The differences in headship rates among marital statuses persists regardless of the age of the youngest child although narrowing with the increase of the age of children.

The higher headship rates among widows and, secondarily, separated/divorced women suggest that previous conjugal experience increases the possibility of an independent living arrangement. However, conjugal experience is not a sufficient condition for continued independent living as indicated by the relatively high proportions of separated/divorced women and widows with young children who returned to their parent's house. One may also guess that widows are generally more likely to be head because they might be in a better socioeconomic position than divorced/separated women, at least because they are not faced with the division of goods and property by the disruption of marriage.

It is worth noting that 62 percent of single women with children under age 3 were living with their parents. With the increasing rates of adolescent pregnancy one may assume that these women belong to the group of teenage mothers who do not have psychological or financial conditions to maintain an independent living arrangement. This figure also indicates that these (probably) young mothers are receiving great support from their family, in spite of social objections to pregnancy out of wedlock.

Socioeconomic differentials in headship rates

The differences in the proportions of head by marital status persist in every category of all variables considered. This represents further evidence that marital status is related to headship by its inherent characteristics such as experience of living away from the family of origin or financial and psychological autonomy. Women's education, measured through years of schooling, shows a negative association with the headship rate. Overall, 72 percent of women with no schooling but 56.2 percent of those with 8 or more years of education were heading the households in which they lived. Years of schooling made a greater difference among single mothers than among separated/divorced mothers and widows. This is an unexpected result if we think of education as an indicator of women's autonomy or as a proxy of socioeconomic status. However, the figures on headship rates by the following variables suggest that education might be capturing a complex set of compositional effects difficult to interpret.

There is a clear positive relationship between headship and income, measured as total household income, as well as a woman's earnings from

her main occupation, if she worked the previous year. For every income level, the headship rates by these two variables are quite similar. This may be a coincidence, but it reveals that a woman of higher economic conditions (by her own income, by non-earned income, or by income of other household members) is more likely to be household head. Further examination shows that, for 88 percent of women who worked last year (72 percent of all women), the total household income equals the woman's income. This suggests that women have a relevant role in the family's total income or that the household total income was misreported. As expected, the headship rates were considerably higher for working than for non-working mothers, except in the widowed group which shows similar rates. The greater differences in the rates for non-working mothers in different marital statuses indicates that a previous marriage may allow a women to maintain an independent living arrangement, possibly through some source of non-earned income.

There were only slight differences between the headship rates of white and non-white mothers. Considering the above results on education and income, one could argue that this finding may be due to racial inequalities with respect to these variables. Being that non-white women are poorer and less educated than white women, and being that headship is positively associated with income but negatively associated with education, the effect of these two variables might be canceling out the racial differences in headship.

Not unexpectedly, women who were migrants to their current metropolitan area present a higher probability of being in household command than native women, in all marital statuses. This corroborates the idea that access to relatives and close friends with which one may live is an important determinant of headship. However, to get a further confirmation of this hypothesis it would be necessary to consider the time of residence in that metropolitan as well the type of migratory movement (by herself or with her family).

All the above results leave no doubt that marital status and characteristics of women as mothers as well as socioeconomic factors are strongly associated with the headship status. However, these variables are strongly correlated among themselves. Thus, it is impossible to establish through bivariate analyses their real influence and also their relative importance in the determination of the probability of a woman heading her household. Women of older children are, for example, older, more likely to be widows or separated/divorced, more likely to be wealthier and to have lived longer in current place of residence. All these conditions are associated with a greater chance of being a household head. Therefore, the next section presents a multivariate analysis of the probability of being a head of household.

Table 7.4. – Headship rates among women aged 15-69 years, without spouse living with children under 18 years of age related to selected characteristics, Metropolitan areas, Brazil, 1991

Characteristics	Headship rates (%)				size
	single	separated/ divorced	widowed	all	
Education in years					
none	44.8	75.5	84.4	71.9	13,865
0-3	34.5	70.1	86.2	64.6	18,343
4-7	28.7	63.5	82.8	55.7	44,509
8 +	32.7	64.5	80.0	56.2	44,916
Household total income (in minimum wage - MW)					
0None/non-declared	12.0	38.0	62.3	29.6	24,824
Up to ½ (MW	30.2	64.7	82.6	59.4	18,491
More than ½ up to 1 MW	34.9	66.3	85.1	61.0	23,176
More than 1 up to 2 MW	39.7	70.6	86.0	65.3	26,343
More than 2 up to 5 MW	52.5	76.1	87.8	72.8	19,711
More than 5 up to 10 MW	68.8	86.3	94.2	84.5	6,105
More than 10 MW	79.1	93.0	94.4	91.7	3,070
Income from main occupation (women working)					
None/non-declared	26.8	58.9	76.7	51.7	1,096
Up to ½ (MW	29.4	65.6	84.8	57.2	6,593
More than ½ up to 1 MW	30.2	64.7	83.2	56.2	18,750
More than 1 up to 2 MW	35.2	67.2	82.9	59.5	25,571
More than 2 up to 5 MW	46.1	72.9	84.0	66.8	19,807
More than 5 up to 10 MW	60.9	81.6	90.7	78.4	6,167
More than 10 MW	77.3	90.6	93.1	88.8	2,969
Occupation					
Work	38.1	70.3	84.1	62.7	78,851
Not working	21.4	55.5	82.4	52.5	42,869
Race					
Non-white	34.2	67.4	83.4	61.5	61,655
White	30.8	64.4	83.0	56.7	59,708
Migratory status					
Native	25.6	57.5	78.7	48.4	56,826
Non native	40.5	73.1	85.7	67.6	64,894

Source: Brazilian Census.
Note: Percentages are based on weighted data. Sample size is unweighted.

Multivariate analysis of the probability of heading a household

A logit model is used to evaluate the effect of selected variables on the probability of heading a household. The dependent variable is HEAD, coded 1, for the woman who heads her own household or 0, otherwise. The covariates include continuous variables for a woman's age (AGE), age of youngest children (AGEYOUN), a woman's education (EDUC), number of children (NCHILDR), income from the woman's main occupation (INCOME)[28] and dummy variables for marital status (MARST - single is the reference group), RACE (white is the reference group), migratory status (NATIVE - woman that lives in the same place she was born is the reference group). We included a term for education by income interaction, given the high correlation between these variables.

The model was fitted twice. First, all above covariates were entered in a simple step. Then, to get a further understanding of the relative significance of each variable for the model, it was fitted again by a forward stepwise selection method. Removal testing was based on the probability of the likehood-ratio statistic based on the maximum-likehood estimates[29]. Table 7.5 presents the final results of both procedures.

Looking at the results of Model 1, all variables selected for analysis, except RACE, are important and significant predictors of household headship. After controlling for all other characteristics, the lack of significance on the estimated parameter of RACE indicates that there is no difference between non-white and white women in the probability of being a head. Thus, the high proportion of non-white women among household heads is due to the composition of this group by other characteristics, such a high rate of marital disruption or a high rate of pregnancy out-of-wedlock.

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[28] Women's earnings was chosen instead of total household income because of indicators related to personal attributes are of special concern. It was chosen also because the variable total income may be misreported, as indicated earlier. Therefore, multivariate analysis refers to the subset of women who worked in the last year, which includes 78.851 women.

[29] The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS for Windows v. 6.1) was used. The estimated probabilities reproduce the probabilities observed in 76% of the cases in the final model.

Table 7.5. – Logistic model estimate for the probability of being a household head among single women, separated/divorced and windows, ages 15-69 years old, with last child under 18 years, for Metropolitan Areas, Brazilian, 1991

Variables	Model 1				Model 2			
	β	SE (β)	p-value	Odds Ratio	β	SE (β)	p-value	Odds Ratio
Age	.0815	.0015	.0000	1.0849	.0814	.0015	.0000	1.0849
MARST= sep/divor	.8047	.0200	.0000	2.2360	.8005	.0200	.0000	2.2266
MARST= widowed	.9934	.0339	.0000	2.7004	.9931	.0338	.0000	2.6996
N Childr	.4550	.0098	.0000	1.5762	.4568	.0098	.0000	1.5791
Ageyoun	.0336	.0025	.0000	1.0342	.0336	.0025	.0000	1.0341
Native=no	.4943	.0182	.0000	1.6394	.4937	.0182	.0000	1.6384
Race=nonwhite	.0258	.0188	.1700	1.0261				
Income	.0559	.0071	.0000	1.0575	.0550	.0070	.0000	1.0566
Educ	-.0885	.0060	.0000	.9153	-.0883	.0060	.0000	.9155
Educ income	.0017	.0008	.0000	1.0118	.0116	.0008	.0000	1.0117
Constant	-4.5118	.0660	.0000		-4.4910	.0639	.0000	
Source: Brazilian Census 1991								

From the final model of the stepwise regression (Model 2 of Table 7.5), looking at parameters and odds ratios, results can be interpreted as follows.

The variables AGE, MARST, NCHILDR, AGEYOUN and NATIVE confirm the conclusions drawn in the previous sections. The woman's age has significant net positive effects: for each year the woman gets older, her probability of heading a household increases by 8 percent. Even when other variables are held constant, the marital status has the strongest net effect: widows and separated/divorced women are, respectively, 170 percent and 123 percent more likely than single mothers to be in a household headship position. The number of children is another important predictor of headship. The odds of heading a household increase almost 60 percent for each additional child the woman has living with her. Child's age, on the other hand, raises the probability of heading by 3 percent for each year the child is older. These findings confirm the idea that it is more difficult to share a house if one has many children or youngest children. The migratory status differentials are also strongly pronounced. Women not living in their place of birth are 64 percent more likely to head a household than native women. This figure supports the idea that less access to parents may be an important determinant of female headship.

The interpretation of the influence of income and EDUC must be done jointly given the interaction term between them[30]. As these variables have

[30] The 'odds ratio' for variables included in the interaction term was estimated by exponentiation of the logit difference of models where different combinations of variables included in the interaction term were considered (as suggested by Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989:102-103).

many categories, the estimated odds ratio for each of them, controlled by the other, are discussed at their extreme levels only. The influence of education, controlled for income is given by the following odds ratio. For women of the lowest level of income (less than ¼ MW), the odds ratio for EDUC equals 0.93. In the highest level of income (more than 20 MW), its value reaches 1.07. Thus, as level of income increases, the net influence of educ changes direction, becoming positive. For the first level of income, each year of schooling diminishes by 7% the probability of a woman being a head of household; whereas in the highest level of income, each year of education increases by 7% the probability of a women being in this position. Remembering that income refers to woman's earnings from main occupation, this result seems to indicate that the chance of being compelled to maintain a household is greater among women in a very precarious socioeconomic conditions, e.g., low income and little education.

Controlling for the variable EDUC, the result of headship by income is given according to the following odds ratios: 1.07, when a woman has one year of education, and 1.29, when a woman has 17 or more years of study. This is also a highly elucidating result, indicating that the influence of income in the probability of headship augments with the increase of education. Thus, the likehood of being head is also higher among women in a privileged socioeconomic condition.

CONCLUSION

This analysis showed that overall 60 percent of all mothers without a spouse and living with dependent children were household heads. Daughter of head was the second most common position, accounting for 29 percent. The analysis showed significant differentials in the rate of headship according to several characteristics of the women such as marital status, number and age of children, education, income, migratory status and labor force participation. These characteristics, except for education, are associated with a higher headship rate.

The multivariate analysis demonstrated that, even when controlled by several other characteristics, marital status and woman's age remain important determinants of a headship position. It also indicated that the influence of education depends upon the income level. If income is low, any increase in education diminishes the headship probability. Whereas for higher income levels, education increases headship probability. The influence of income is always positive. However, this influence is greater the higher the level of education. Race does not have any influence on headship probability.

Obviously, female-headship is a complex phenomenon determined by factors beyond the scope of any quantitative analysis. Thus, the demographic and socioeconomic factors considered have limited explanatory power. However, the type of analysis employed in this study may be very useful for understanding the increase in female-headed households if replicated for other subgroups of women and different times.

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8

GENDER AND HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN CUBA TODAY: DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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As a consequence of the social activity of gender, important transformations in women's identity are taking place on an international scale. These have brought about a change in the traditional notions about what is acknowledged and socially accepted as feminine. Today, being a male does not entail the exclusive idea of being productive, just as being a woman cannot be identified only with being reproductive. Technological advances have left behind the paramount need for physical strength and the number of women involved in the production of marketable goods and services has increased. However, household and work are still organized, in a general sense, as if there had been no change in the traditional division of functions among genders.

Cuba is no exception. Centuries-old patriarchal relationships that have traditionally assumed a male power controlling sexuality, material resources, labor force and participation in decision-making processes and governmental institutions have characterized its society. This has been the basis for a subordination of women in the public and private spheres that is beginning to undergo important transformations.

Even when the forms of organization of domestic life have essentially remained unaltered, the contents of family relationships is undergoing

changes. A critical factor to understand these transformations is the dynamizing role played by women within the household. Cuban women have become leading actors in the social tasks of the country and have advanced to spaces that had always been denied to them in work, culture and science. The new role women are playing did not emerge spontaneously, but was the result of the thrust of a set of conditioning factors derived from the social project.

Social policies designed to raise in a systematic fashion the educational and cultural levels of the population of which women are a part have allowed 43% of the scientific technicians and 41.7% of the scientific researchers in the country to be women (FMC, 1995). As to jobs, spaces for women's massive participation in the labor force were opened through technical and professional up-grading and cultural development. The following table shows the occupational structure of Cuba's women workers and percentage female by occupation in the period of 1985-95.

Table 8.1. – Women's participation in economic activity in Cuba, percentages

	1985	1993	1995
Structure of working women by occupational groups:			
Manual workers	24.7	25.0	25.5
Technicians	29.8	36.2	35.4
Clerical workers	17.5	12.4	10.7
Service workers	22.5	21.2	22.5
Managerial workers	5.4	5.1	5.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Percentage of women in several occupational groups:			
Manual workers	18.3	20.9	18.8
Technicians	55.8	61.9	64.6
Clerical workers	83.9	86.2	85.0
Service workers	62.2	60.3	53.6
Managerial workers	25.4	28.6	28.8

Source: FMC, 1993; 1995; 1996

In 1985 women accounted for 37.5% of the labor force, while the figure for 1993 was 40.6%. However, the exceptional economic crisis the country has been undergoing since 1990, which was more acute in the first five years, has had an impact, inter alia, in the job market and the work force has decreased. As a result, in 1995 women workers accounted for only 31.5% of the total labor force (FMC, 1996, p. 4). In spite of this temporal circumstance, the qualitative increase of women's participation is ratified by a growth in the number of women in technical jobs, for example, and by a slight increase in those in managerial positions.

Also, the country's policies in the area of health are designed to offer not only a healthy and full life to the population, but they guarantee the thorough implementation of family planning and of the reproductive rights of the couple. All these actions, and others that benefit women, have stimulated important transformations in the development of women's consciousness and in the gender division of work in a social and domestic scale for the achievement of greater equity. Changes took place in the gender division of work, on the one hand, in the form where the domestic reponsibilities are assigned to men and women and, on the other, in changes in social awareness as to the ideological notion (stereotypes) of what are the adequate occupations for each sex. This has permitted a reassessment of women's work in the labor market that contributes a visible income to the family budget, and also of the traditionally considered invisible income. These transformations to a great extent have conditioned the redefinition of the roles that men and women play in their relations as couples and in the household environment, and women have increasingly become the leading element in the household.

One of the demographic characteristics of Cuba, a country with a population of 10,998,532 inhabitants in 1995, is its slow population growth as compared with other nations in Latin America. In the first five years of this decade, it had an annual population average growth of 0.7%. In 1995 its total fertility rate was a very low *1.49 children per woman*, with a low mortality rate reflected in a 74.7 year expectation of life at birth for both sexes, an infant mortality rate of 9.4 per thousand life births and a 74.5 urbanization rate (ONE, 1996). This outline places the country in a very advanced stage of population transition, with a population in full ageing process, where persons less than 15 years old account for 22.7% of the population and persons aged 60 years and over account for 12.2%.

An important change is the decrease in the mean size of households,[31] from 4.1 in 1981 (4.01 in urban areas and 4.39 in rural areas) to an average of 3.34 in 1995 (3.38 in urban areas and 3.22 in rural areas). Apart from the already mentioned population factors - specifically the systematic and important fertility diminution - this decrease was due to a certain deceleration in the pace of establishment of households because of problems in the building of houses, a situation that has not yet been totally solved in the country.

The last population and housing census in Cuba dates from 1981. The serious economic difficulties prevailing in the country since 1990 have precluded a new survey of this type, rendering it impossible to know and assess thoroughly the social and demographic changes that the population and households have undergone in the last 15 years. However, the National Survey on Internal Migration taken in 1995 is the best source to study, from

[31] Census homestead or nucleus: Person or group of persons belonging or not to the same family who share a common budget, cook their meals together and customarily lived together in a house or in a part of it (CEE, 1984, p. XXXVII).

a population point of view, the present women heads of households[32] and to consider the changes that they have undergone in this period.

First of all, the data confirm an increase in the fraction of women who were household heads. In 1981, 28% of the households were ruled by women, but in 1995 the figure was 36%. That is, in Cuba at least 1 of every 3 households has a woman at its head. In terms of the age structure, 13% of the heads of households are less than 30 years old, 50% between 30 and 54 years, 15% between 55 and 64 years and 22% are 65 years or more. More specifically, among women heads of households aged 15 to 64 years, 15% are less than 30 years old, 65% are between 30 and 54 years, and 20% between 55 and 64 years old.

On the other hand, it is verified that of the total of women in each five-year of age group, the proportion of those who are heads varies from 40.1% among women 55-59 years, and 1.6% for those of 15-19 years old. While the women population between 15 and 64 years old grew in that period at a 15.1‰ average annual rate, women heads of households in that age group increased at a 39.1‰ average annual rate, a rate 2.6 times higher.

Households governed by women are considered economically disadvantaged with respect to those directed by men, so that the international institutions suggest that governments will be paying special attention to these households. In Cuba, the meaning of the increase in the proportion of households directed by women is different, since it is an expression of the changes that women have experienced in the society, and within the family (Cuba, 1994, p. 36). In the following pages we analyze the qualitative and quantitative character of the increase in the economic participation of women as heads of households in Cuba.

Table 8.2 shows that between 1981 and 1995 the ratio of women heads of households with a stable marital link increased to (47.4%), and this may be considered an expression of a greater appreciation of their role within the household. This valuation is confirmed by the fact that in 24% of the households where both members of the couple are present, a woman is the head of the household.

There has also been a slight increase in divorced heads of households, a process that is due to the increase in the divorce rate during those years. In 1981 the gross divorce rate was 2.9 per thousand; in 1995 it was estimated at 3.7‰ (CEE, 1994, Table V.1; ONE, 1996, Table V.1).

The highest ratio of women heads of households between 15 and 44 years of age are in union (legar or not), ranging from 70.2% for those 25-29 years and 46.8% for those 15-19 years. Specifically, the highest ratio of women heads of household living in consensual union are in 15-19 years

[32] For a head of household it was understood to the resident person in the housing unit that he or she would be considered as such by the other members of the family, the person who generally provides the lion's share of the economic resources of the household, or has the greatest responsibility in household decision-making.

(28%) and 25-29 years (38.6%). Also, most women household heads in the 45-59 age group have severed their marital link, with ratios of 43.2% for those 45-49 years and 38.6% for those 55-60 years. It is in the 60-64 age group that women heads of households are mainly widows (36.8%).

Table 8.2. – Marital status of women heads of households in Cuba between 15 and 64 years age, percentage, 1981-1995

Marital Status	1981	1995
Single	5.2	7.1
Married	22.9	26.1
Consensual union	19.4	21.3
Divorced	22.6	23.5
Separated	15.8	11.8
Widowed	14.1	10.1

Source: CEE, 1984, Table 9; CEDEM-IPF-ONE, 1995.

Another important characteristic is educational level. Women household heads who finished elementary school and high school are similar in number, with 30.5 and 30.9%, respectively. College graduates are in third place with 26.8%, and university graduates account for 8.6% of the total women heads of households. Those who do not have any education are only 3.2%. As to age groups, 53% of women household heads 15-19 years old have finished high school. Women 35-49 years old are in a similar situation, with percentages ranging between 33% and 37.4%. On the other hand, those from 20 to 34 years old are mostly college graduates with percentage values ranging from 40.9% and 44.1%. Women heads of households more than 50 years old are basically grouped in an elementary school level with percentage figures moving around 42.1 and 63%.

As regards economic activity, 35% of workers aged 15 to 64 are women, which account for a 38.7% female employment rate. The data on the work situation of women heads of households show that 45.9% of them are employed, 1.9% are seeking work (either looking for their first job or having been previously employed), 39.4% do housework, and 12.8% do not work.

The National Survey on Internal Migration disclosed that women doing housework prevail in the groups of 15-29 and more than 55 years of age in ratios ranging from 38.6 to 68%. However, most of the women heads of households between 30 and 54 years old work, with percentages ranging from 47.2% to 52.3%. It may be an unexpected finding that in the 15-19 and 20-29 age groups, the main activity of adolescent heads of households is housework, since in spite of their responsibilities at the head of the household, a larger presence as workers or even students could be anticipated, given the very low levels and early structure of fertility in the country. A little more than 1 of every 3 women household heads works in services and at least 1 of every 4 is a professional or a technician (Table

8.3). Most significant is that 60% of the working women aged 15-19 years who are household heads are employed in services. Those between 20 and 34 years are mostly professionals and technicians and their percentages range between 32.8 and 44.9%. Also, from age 35 onwards it is again in the services that most women heads of households work, with ratios ranging between 33 and 53.3%.

Table 8.3. – Working women heads of households between 15 ans 64 years of age, by occupational group, percentage

Occupational Groups	percentage
Professionals and technicians	28.7
Clerical workers	13.5
Managers	5.8
Agricultural workers	6.1
Non-agricultural workers	8.6
Services	37.3
Total	100.0

Source: CEDEM-IPF-ONE, 1995, *op. cit.*

On the other hand, if the typology of households in 1995 is considered, it is observed that 11% of female-headed households are one-person households, 47% of female-headed households qualified as basic, in 37% of the cases the households are considered like an extended household and, in the last 5% like a composed one[33]. This distribution does not differ substantially from that for households directed by men, where the corresponding figures are 10.5%, 53%, 28.5% and 8%, respectively.

In the population aged 15 to 64 there is a systematic increase of female headship. During the period considered the rates moved from 17.1% to 24.4%, for an increase of 42.7%. The growth was especially high among rural female household heads, whose rate increased by 86% during the 14-year span considered.

By color of the skin, black women account for the highest headship rate (30.7%), followed by mulatto (25.5%) and white women (23.3%). As was found in 1981, the National Survey on Internal Migration data show that the highest ratio of divorced and separated women is among black women (Catasús, 1991): 17.4% of black women are without marital link, while the figures for mulatto and white women are 15.4% and 14.5%, respectively.

[33] The basic household was defined as: a marriage without children; a marriage with one or more single children; the father with one or more single children ; the mother with one or more single children. The extended household was considered formed by a basic family and other relations; or two or more related persons who mutually do not form a basic family. The composed household was understood as those constituted by one or more basic families, more other relations and other not relations; two or more related basic families mutually, with or without another person; two or more related persons who mutually do not form a basic family, more other persons not related; persons not related mutually.

Table 8.4. – Heads of household rates by gender, age selected according to living areas, 1981 and 1995, percentage

Year/Sex	15 years and over			15 to 64 years		
	Urban	Rural	Total	Urban	Rural	Total
1981						
Men	46.8	55.9	49.7	43.0	52.5	46.0
Women	22.9	10.7	19.7	20.1	9.4	17.1
Both genders	34.6	35.1	34.7	31.3	32.3	31.9
1995						
Men	45.6	60.2	49.5	41.1	55.3	44.8
Women	29.7	19.2	27.3	26.6	17.5	24.4
Both genders	37.5	41.0	38.3	33.7	37.3	34.6

Source: CEE, 1984, p. CXXXVIII and Table 8; CEDEM-IPF-ONE, 1995.

In terms of occupational groups, the highest household rate is found among women in managerial positions (37.1%), followed by service workers (34.3%), non-agricultural workers (31.6%) and clerical workers (29.8%). Technicians and professionals (24.3%) and agricultural workers (23.6%) show lower rates. Apart from fulfilling their social requirements as workers in various positions, 46% of women play a far-reaching role as heads of their households and families. This role is becoming increasingly active in the decisions having to do with themselves and with their households, from the reproductive, educational and economic points of view.

Research carried out in urban households by the Center of Psychological and Sociological Research of the former Cuban Academy of Sciences shows, among other findings, that the involvement of women in work activities contributes in a greater degree to a differentiation in the establishment of models for the distribution of housework in the family than its social and class insertion. For example, the study of couples showed that among working class couples where most of the women are housewives men were more frequently identified as heads of the households than among intellectuals (39.68% and 30.84%, respectively). In this type of family, both members of the couple are more often considered as the head (Alvarez *et al.*, 1993b, p. 30).

Also, women's work activities have a significant impact on the responsibility of the family with the housework: couples where both spouses work share daily house chores to a greater extent. However, this was not the case in all couples, but depends on the place they occupy in the class structure of society. In families where women work there was a higher ratio of budget planning: 51% in the case of workers and 44% in the case of non-workers. Also, women workers show a higher ratio of adequate organization of household consumption (37%), while non-workers account for 25% (Alvarez *et al.*, 1993a, p. 29). In most of the manual workers' households,

the study showed that the distribution of housework between men and women is markedly unequal. Housework is equitably distributed in only 12% of these couples, while in the case of intellectual workers the percentage is 20% (Caño, 1993, p. 34). In the study of household relationships it is important to note that even when household members generally tend to acknowledge household authority in men, data from the research show that, with great frequency, the most important decisions in the household are taken jointly by men and women. For example, in 75% of the households in the study, the couple makes basic decisions together; 66% control expenses together; 52% decide together how they will share housework; 77% decide together the way they will spend their leisure time and 85% decide together the actions to take when children misbehave. (Caño, 1993, p. 35).

However, the influence of the patriarchal relations existing in our society on men and women is still an important obstacle to the equitable performance of women. These unequal structural relations are determinants in the contradictions shaping the social situation of Cuban women, because they impede the free exercise of their potential and the adequate acknowledgement by men in agreement with the social position women have achieved in these last decades. But in spite of these subjective obstacles, the existence of a set of alterations in household performance as a consequence of the qualitative changes that have taken place within it through the activity or women is undeniable. Some of these alterations are:

- a decrease in the average size of the household as a result of the marked decrease in fertility brought about by a qualitative rise in the involvement of women in social life and the conscious action of the couple in family planning.
- a change in the power relationship towards lesser subordination and submission of women, together with greater equity in the performance of household roles.
- an increase in the exchange of ideas and of joint decision-making as an expression of more fluid communication among the members of the couple and the rest of the household.
- a greater awareness of the need for autonomy of the members of the couple and of the household as individuals.
- a greater social and family respect and appreciation for women's potential to guide the life of the household members.

Undoubtedly, Cuban women have made great strides in the social scene of the country and with their work they contribute to shifting away from the subordinate role they traditionally have played in the household, thus strengthening their situation as social subjects and co-leaders in the Cuban social project. Therefore, as social scientists researching households from various viewpoints, we must strive to deepen our future research on the possible factors conditioning the diverse trends and characteristics of the present heads of households to help them develop their potential to fulfil their important functions for their members and for society as a whole.

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9

THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION FROM A GENDER PERSPECTIVE: THE CASE OF CATALONIA

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The term "Second Demographic Transition" was introduced by Van de Kaa (1988) and Lesthaeghe (1994) to explain demographic trends in Western countries from the 1950s to the present[34]. Some demographers, like Cliquet (1991), don't agree with the idea of talking about a "second" demographic transition, arguing that demographic changes experienced during the last decades are only a lineal continuation of changes that gave sense to a well known Demographic Transition initiated in Europe following the industrial revolution.

The Demographic Transition, as defined in Ansley Coale's works (1973), should be seen as the change from a traditional society with high natality and mortality rates to an industrialised society in which natality and mortality are stabilized at low levels. In the explanatory framework developed by Notestein (1953) this change is a consequence of a modernisation process of society, that consists in a deeply social and economic change, promoted by the industrial revolution. Since then, studies on demographic trends use as independent variables macro social factors in order to measure the degree of modernisation of a specific society. From this point of view, the mortality and natality transition are explained by factors such as urbanisation, education levels, productive structure, secularisation, etc.

[34] Dirk Van de Kaa and Ron Lesthaeghe include in the *Second Demographic Transition* recent trends in mortality and mobility, but I will only refer to family dynamics.

As it has been pointed out recently in a critical review of the construction of demographic knowledge done by the demographer Susan Cotts Watkins (1993)[35], it's important to note that in the context of the "first" Demographic Transition, the same factors that are relevant to explain women's reproductive behaviour also appear in mortality and mobility studies. In fact, demographic studies on reproductive behaviour changes do not take into account in which context of gender relations fertility decisions are taken. The Theory of Demographic Transition says nothing about sexuality (fertility is the result of an immaculate conception), gender roles and gender relations (couples appear as monolithic unions without conflicts). Since then other fertility theories have been developed (Value of Children by Arnold, New Home Economics by Gary Becker or Wealth Flows by John Caldwell), in which the economic value of children is underlined, but in all of them the couple appears as a harmonic unit, without interests in conflict. In short, power relations that influence fertility decisions and are so relevant to explaining different reproductive behaviour are left out in such frameworks.

On the contrary, the Second Demographic Transition, in its explanatory framework, considers openly changes in gender relations. For that reason, I think is useful to speak about a *second* demographic transition in order to underline the importance of changes in relations between men and women related to demographic and family changes. Behind any decision of having or not having children, of getting or not getting married, exists a negotiation process in which personal expectations and bargaining power are very important. It seems clear to me, then, that women's emancipation has changed the negotiation capability of women in these processes, becoming the crucial factor of the process of deinstitutionalisation of the family[36]. That process is expressed in a search of an own field of experimentation of new family arrangements outside of the patriarchal family[37]. In this context, fertility decline and changes in family forms are demographic changes that can be understood in terms of the new women's roles, built on the base of more autonomy and less dependence on men.

[35] Susan Cotts Watkins and Ansley Coale have broadly studied the regional geography of the fertility transition in Europe in the context of the Princeton study (see Coale & Watkins, 1986).
[36] Usually in sociological literature the term "deinstitutionalization" of the family is used to refer to the process of privatization of family decisions and individualization of its members.
[37] The term "patriarchal family" is used here as a synonym for the modern family (as it was defined by Talcot Parsons (1955): with a clear division of gender roles of partners, he as a breadwinner and she as a housewife) to emphasise the hierarchic dimension in gender relations.

GENERAL FEATURES OF THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

According to Lesthaeghe we can distinguish three phases in the *Second Demographic Transition* as it takes place in many Northern and Central European countries. During the initial phase, roughly between 1955 and 1970, there were three major components. Firstly, there was a considerable acceleration in the already upward divorce trend. Secondly, the baby boom came to an end. Fertility at all ages and marriage durations declined simultaneously. This coincided with the contraceptive revolution based on new hormonal contraceptives and the rediscovery of the IUD. Thirdly, the decline in ages at marriage, that had started between 1880 and 1920 in most Western countries, stopped. Instead, proportions marrying prior to the age of 25 dropped considerably. In the late 60s several countries also experienced a temporary increase in shotgun marriages: premarital sex had been on the increase throughout the 1960s, and contraceptive protection in such relations was not yet efficient enough. In most countries this feature disappeared during the early 1970s. In others, a problem of teenage pregnancy persisted.

During a second phase, roughly between 1970 and 1985, premarital cohabitation spread from Nordic countries to many others. In Europe, proportions cohabiting largely compensate for declining proportions marrying. Thereafter, procreation also starts within consensual unions, and these unions drift away from being a period of courtship to becoming more a "paperless marriage". Procreation in consensual unions results in a larger share of extramarital births among all births. But, this does not entail a rise in fertility prior to the age of 25. The opposite still holds.

A third phase has occurred from the mid-1980s onward. It is characterized by a plateau in divorce rates in countries that had reached high levels. However, it should be stressed that remarriage probabilities, both for divorcees and widowed people, had declined throughout the period since the 1960s. Post-marital cohabitation and LAT-relations[38] emerge as new features and they replace remarriage to some extent. Moreover, there is a recuperation effect of fertility after the age of 30. In some countries the decline in fertility at young ages has stopped, largely because it reached very low levels or because of the persistent teenage fertility problem. As a consequence, the recuperation after the age of 30 pushes the period fertility rates to slightly higher levels. Not all Western nations have, however, reached this third stage. In Europe, the leads and the lags essentially follow a North-South axis, with the mediterranean countries still being in the second phase[39].

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[38] L.A.T. (living apart together) refers to a stable sentimental relation keeping independent households of residence.

[39] For a more detail description and explanation of the Second Demographic Transition se D. Van de Kaa (1988) and R. Lesthaeghe (1994).

REGIONAL PATTERNS

In an attempt to show the regional diversity of the demographic frame, the French demographer Louis Roussel (1992) analysed the process of deinstitutionalization of the family in Europe. Roussel presents a typology based on the following indexes in 1988 for sixteen countries. Taking as a starting point he considered: average number of children per woman or total fertility rate, divorce rate, percentage of cohabitants and percentage of births outside marriage. As a result he distinguishes four great regions: 1) The Southern Region (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain): low fertility, divorce, cohabitation and birth outside marriage; 2) The Northern Region (Denmark and Sweden): high level of fertility, divorce and cohabitation and high or middle level of percentage of birth outside marriage; 3) The Western Region (France, Norway, Holland and the United Kingdom): low fertility, low level of cohabitation and high divorce and high percentage of births outside marriage; and 4) The Central region (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland): high divorce, medium cohabitation, scarcity of births ouside marriage and weak fertility.

This typology in our case is useful only to situate Spain in the context of Mediterranean areas. The decline of fertility and nuptiality marking the beginning of the *Second Demographic Transition* in Western and Northern European countries took place later in the mediterranean countries (during the seventies and the eighties) and faster because of political, economical and cultural factors actting at that specific time. Just to mention one in Spain, during Franco's era, divorce, contraception and abortion were illegal. In democracy normative legalization comes very slowly: contraception in 1978, divorce in 1981 and abortion, only in three restricted situations in 1985 (rape, risk for mothers' health and congenital malformation).

In Catalonia, like in the rest of Mediterranean Europe, all the features that define the *Second Demographic Transition* are more noticeable than in other Spanish regions: fertility is lower, and percentage of out of wedlock births, divorce and cohabitation higher. As a consequence one-parent families, one-person households and reconstructed families are more frequent, especially in the Metropolitan Area and Barcelona City. I will argue that these trends are associated with a higher degree of women's autonomy and independence and with a weaker degree of patriarchal relations.

In Catalonia, the fertility and nuptiality decline began around 1975. At the beginning of the eighties the fertility decline was so accelerated that nowadays this area (Spain, Italy and Portugal) registers the lowest fertility levels in the world: Catalonia, the Basque country, Galizia and some other regions in the North of Italy (Emilia-Romanga and Liguria) are the regions with the lowest number of children per woman. Simultaneously the age at first union and the age at first birth increased (Table 9.1).

Table 9.1. – Basic demographic indicators

Indicators:	Spain		Catalonia		Barcelona (city)	
	1980	1990	1980	1990	1980/81	1990/91
Fertility						
* Total Fertility Rate (Children per Woman)	2.21	1.36	1.88	1.24	1.6	1.14
* Average Age at Motherhood	28.2	28.8	27.9	29.4	28.5	30.3
* Average Age at First Child	25.05	27.18	-	27.86	-	-
Births out of wedlock						
* % of Births Out of Wedlock	3.9	9.6	6	11.1	9.9	14.1
* % of Births Out of Wedlock where the Father is Unknown	60.8	17.4	43.3	13.3	47.9	15.6
Nuptiality and divorce						
* Age at first marriage: Men	25.4	27.5	25.4	27.1	26.2	29
* Age at first marriage: Women	23.4	25.3	23	24.9	24.1	27
* Civil Marriages as a % of the Total Number of Marriages	4.5	19.3	4.7	25.9	1.15	34
*Initiated cases of Separations and Divorces	16,363**	59,463	4,014**	13,049	-	-
* Separations & Divorces per 100 Marriages	8.1**	27	15**	40	-	-
Cohabitation						
* % of Cohabitants per Unions Formed between:						
1980-85	4.0		-		-	
1986-90	7.8		-		-	
1991-95	-		-		-	
* % of Cohabitants Out of the Total Number of Couples		1.6***		2.8***		4.6***

** 1981 ***1991

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística: Censos, Movimiento Natural de la Población & Encuesta Socio-demogràfica (1991); Enquestes Metropolitanes de Barcelona (1990 & 1995)

We can also appreciate an important change in the kind of marriage celebration, which is a good indicator of the deinstitutionalisation of the family. At the beginning of the eighties in Catalonia only a very few couples got married outside the traditional Catholic ritual, but at the beginning of the nineties one of every four marriages was celebrated by the civil law (only). The average in Barcelona City is one out of three and in Spain one out of every five marriages. During the eighties the number of legal divorces and separations tripled and birth outside marriage doubled. The ratio between the dissolution of old couples and the number of new married couples has been increasing.

At the beginning of the nineties, for every ten marriages celebrated in Catalonia, 1.5 legal separations or divorce actions were initiated; ten years later this relation was 10 to 4. Currently the incidence of divorce is higher in

Catalonia than in Spain as a whole, but in relation to European patterns these figures are still very low. From the experience of central and northern European countries we know that the divorce rate became stable when cohabitation is broadly spread. That is to say, when cohabitation is normatively seen as a type of marriage it could also finish in a pre-marital disruption (sometimes the term "divorce of cohabitants" is used). This contributes to a reduction in the number of divorces and separations that follow a legal course. It also has an influence on fertility in lowering its rates given the losses of the reproductive period caused by the lags between the pre-marital disruption and future relationships the woman may engage in. Statistics from the census show a lower number of separated and divorced males than separated and divorced females (in 1991 in Spain the relation was 7 to 10). These figures reflect the higher propensity of men to remarry after a broken union. The reasons for this difference could be multiple. On the one hand, the incapability of men to take care of themselves increases their predisposition to begin a new union. On the other hand, often, after a divorce or a separation fathers keep virtually free of family burdens, or better to say, with less daily responsibilities than mothers, and for that reason they are in a better situation to initiate a new life in a couple with another person. Finally, men more frequently than women ask for a separation when they already have initiated in practice a new relationship.

Data from marriage registers confirm the above assumption showing a higher propensity of men to be in their second unions, especially with previously single women. On the contrary, second marriages between divorced women and single men are not frequent at all. The incidence of marriage with at least one of the partners divorced is higher in Catalonia than in the rest of the Spain, and they are concentrated in Barcelona City.

Cohabitation, including pre-marital type also, but especially after dissolution of a first marriage increased substantially in Catalonia during the eighties. Births outside marriage have increased in parallel with births of not married women where the father is known. This confirms the higher incidence of cohabiting couples. Also in this case, Catalonia and Barcelona are distinctly different from all of Spain, as shown by the high values of both indicators.

In cohabitation we can distinguish at least two different functions: one, as a pre-marital function, or as a "trial marriage", especially for young couples; and on the other hand, as an alternative frame to redefine gender relations in couples, frequently adults, who have experienced a former union or marriage that has ended up in a separation or divorce. In Catalonia, this second group is very important and the profile of cohabitants suggests a relational frame less conventional than marriage. The occupational category and the level of education is higher than the average of the population; in relation to married couples, to find a women older or better educated than

her partner is more frequent[40], and the number of children per couple is lower (see Flaquer and Solsona, 1995).

Pre-marital cohabitation and living apart together, although with a relatively low incidence in the European context, are consistently more frequent among young adults. In fact, living apart together relations could play the same role as the "old courtship", as a waiting time, until the partners became economically independent. In that sense, is possible to suggest that the "independence thesis", formulated in Gary Becker's theory of marriage doesn't work in our country. Becker states that "the gain from marriage is reduced by a rise in the earnings and labour force participation of women because a sexual division of labour becomes less advantageous". That is to say, greater women's independence will substantially increase the proportion who never marry. Nevertheless, in Spain, on the contrary, self-realisation of women, and men as well, is not an obstacle, but a pre-condition to initiate a process of family constitution[41]. In that sense, the great difficulties for young women to get a job, and the existence of a welfare state that does not make emancipation from the parental home easy, neither to combine work and family, explain in a great part, such low nuptiality and fertility levels in Catalonia and in Spain.

HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

Recent trends in nuptiality, divorce and in part in fertility and mortality caused important changes in family structures and in the style of family life. As a consequence of developments of the *Second Demographic Transition* life cycle transitions for individuals become more frequent, less strictly patterned and more complex. There is an observable decline in categories of more traditional households, meanwhile other different kinds of families become more visible: one parent families, mostly headed by women, are increasing, as well as one person households and reconstructed families. In that sense, the monolithic identity that in the past protected the family institution disappeared, and women did a lot in this direction. For that reason, some authors talk about the death of the family and the birth of the families.

[40] Mead Cain (1994) has studied the relation between patriarchal society and demographic change in diferent contemporaneous societies. One of the most important results is that a positive relation exists among the age difference between partners, the number of children and the strength of the patriarchal regime.

[41] Valerie K. Oppenheimer and V. Lew (1995) criticize the microeconomic theory formulated by Gary Becker, demonstrating that in the United States during the eighties, women with higher education level, a better position in the labour market and higher income have a higher propensity to get married.

SOME NOTES ABOUT THE AVAILABILITY OF EUROPEAN STATISTICS ON FAMILY STRUCTURES

Statistics, such as population censuses, which are not designed to gather information about family situation, show the changes in the constitution of the family late and in a fragmented way. So, it is very difficult to know if out of wedlock births correspond to a one parent family or cohabiting partners. The same problem occurs with the reconstructed families, that means, small siblings living in a family created by a second marriage.

The information about family composition in Europe is limited although I must note the work done by Eurostat gathering data given by governments from their population censuses. For the moment, Eurostat has published two documents with results from population censuses: *The European Union and the Family,* Social Europe 1-1994 and *Ménages et Familles dans l'Espace Economique Européen,* Statistiques en bref, Population et Conditions Sociales, 1995-5.[42]

To compare household structures in 1991 among European countries we will distinguish between: one person households, one parent families, one nucleus families, two or more nucleus families and non-family households of two or more people. Data is not completely comparable, because many statistical institutes don't follow United Nations recommendations to tabulate family data. For instance, some countries limit the age of children to consider them as members of a family nucleus (such as Denmark, Luxembourg, Finland or Sweden, where they fix the maximum age at 18, 25, 18 and 18 respectively) while the majority of the countries don't do it.

On the other hand, the definition of the family nucleus, based on partners or affiliation relations, also has more than one exception. In the Portuguese case, for instance, as a consequence of migratory movements abroad, households composed of grandparents and grandchildren are frequent and also considered as nuclear families. In Denmark, Luxembourg and Great Britain, these households have the same treatment.

Another issue that doesn't receive homogeneous consideration is cohabitation. While in some countries cohabitation is seen as similar to a marriage type, in others cohabitants are considered unrelated people, so that in the case of having children they are tabulated as one parent families, and if not, they are included in the category of non family household with two or more people.

Finally, just to say that data from 1991 correspond almost entirely with Europe of 15, even though sometimes Eurostat also gives information about

[42] Readers who want to clarify any statistic, figure or matter referring to census definitions of basic concepts of household and family, that are the base for tabulations on living arrangements, please consult the two references above.

Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein, in which case it refers to European Economic Space.

FAMILY STRUCTURES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NINETIES IN EUROPE

At the beginning of the nineties, more than 2 out of 3 European households (70%) were composed of one or more family groups. The more common case is the strict nuclear family -63%, close to 66% in 1981- even the weight of different kinds of households has changed during the eighties, reducing couples with children and increasing one parent families. Extended nuclear families have decreased (4% in 1991 versus 6.5% in 1981). One person households in 1991 represented 27% compared with 23% in 1981.

In terms of the population it is still evident that the most common experience for individuals is to live in a family, since 86% of the population resident in the European Economic Space lives in a family household. Nevertheless, the eighties trends confirm the development of new family arrangements related to the changes of the Second Demographic Transition. They are expressed by an increase in one parent families, one person households and reconstructed families, even though trends and evolution of the last can not be measured with precision. In fact, one of every 10 European people lives alone, one of every 10 lives in a one parent family, but 1 of 5 lives in a traditional family composed of a couple with children and only 3% of people live in nonfamily households with 2 or more people. Thus, it does not seem adequate to talk about the end of the family, instead we may explore the new diversity of family forms, that also shows great diversity of family forms in the European space. From the distribution of households per country by type shown in Figures 9.1 and 9.2 it is easy to confirm that we are comparing different realities.

The one person households are very frequent (30% of the total) in the Northern countries and Germany whilst in the Mediterranean countries this percentage is close to 20% and Spain has the lowest percentage with only 13%. In the rest of the countries this percentage ranges from 25% to 30%. In Northern countries women and men have the same experience of living alone. In Sweden, for instance, 18.5% of the population lives alone (8.4% are men and 10.2% are women). A similar situation could be found in the rest of the Northern countries. Nevertheless, in Germany, in the Mediterranean and Central European countries, the percentage of women living alone doubles or triples that of men.

In the information published by Eurostat (1995) households without nucleus with more than one person are included in the category of nonfamily households, but in some cases they are formed by related people who do not constitute a nucleus. The three countries that show the highest percentage of this type of household are the Netherlands, Finland and

Ireland, every one in a different stage of the *Second Demographic Transition*, indeed.

Figure 9.1. – Household structure in Europe, 1981.



FIGURE 9.2. – HOUSEHOLD STRUCTURE IN EUROPE, 1991.



One parent households have been increasing in all European countries during the eighties, but regional differences are difficult to explain because there are not common criteria about the maximum age of children that are used to define them. In some cases these families are a result of a decomposition of a nuclear family, and in other cases it could be an old parent, for instance a widowed mother, who goes to live with one of the children already adult and economically independent.

In fact, among the countries that show the higher percentage of this kind of household, only Norway has established a limit on the age of children. Ireland registers the highest percentage (10.68%) followed very close by Iceland (10%). Belgium, Great Britain, Spain, Austria and Norway have percentages higher than 8%.

Even though it is clear that one parent households have been increasing in all European countries during the eighties, it's difficult to establish the genesis of this kind of household, partly because definitions in the censuses differ among countries. Sometimes the factor which originated the above type of household is the ageing process of the population and family regrouping process of elderly people with oldest relatives. In other cases it is just an expression of the fact that the nuclear family has lost the monopoly of reproduction. Therefore, it may be difficult to make generalisations about the process.

If we take into account only one parent families with at least one child less than 16 years old, then the regional typology is clearer. Denmark, Great Britain and Germany show the highest percentage (20.8%. 16% and 15.4% of the total households, respectively). Greece, Italy and Spain are the lowest (5.7%, 6.4% and 7.9%, respectively). In relation to the presence of lone fathers and lone mothers, as well as ten years before, we can speak about the feminization of single parenthood, since the frequency of lone fathers is very low in all countries. The Norwegian demographer An-Magritt Jensen (1995) refers to the effects of single parenthood in childhood: the feminization of single parenthood brings a process of feminization of childhood, which means that children tend to keep closer to their mothers, and the contrary happens with fathers. Mothers have more responsibilities in relation to their children and a greater amount of reproductive work than before the disruption. On the other hand, single parenthood is related to a reduction in family income for the salary missing that leads to a feminization of poverty as well.

Denmark is the country with the highest presence of one parent families with minor children. That can be explained, in part, because it is one of the countries where equal opportunity policies were developed earlier. These policies guarantee economic autonomy for women, as well as for men, which allow decisions-making in relation to family arrangements to be taken more freely. The cases of Great Britain and Germany can not be understood without taking into account the availability of their public policies.

These policies acted in another direction and from a more patriarchal ideology, in the sense that they tried not to call in question the legitimacy of the traditional/patriarchal nuclear family based on asymmetric and hierarchical sexual division of labour.

In Great Britain, for instance, the State during the sixties wanted to protect lone single mothers, because from a conservative point of view it was a disgraceful situation. As such the state would "help" them economically. Now, the State has problems to give the provision to all lone mothers who have the right to receive it. In fact, as a result of the gender blind economic policy that considers women's work just as a help, every day there are more mothers who do not reach the minimum salary needed to raise their children.

In Germany, the protectionist policy of the State could be seen from an optimistic perspective since it allowed women to not be dependent on an individual patriarch, her partner, even though lone mothers become dependent on government welfare payments. In many countries, as for instance Spain, where the State does not give any kind of provision in such a situation, women without resources are forced to live with their partners although their relationship has fallen apart, because they can not economically support their children and themselves. In this sense, the German policy has a good consideration by lone mothers who perceive economic provisions from the State, as has been shown by Madje & Neussuss (1994) in their study on West Berlin, ahead of the more pessimistic assumption that emphasizes the strong relation between lone motherhood and feminization of poverty.

The simple and extended nuclear households (considered together because disaggregated data have not been published yet) show a north-south regional typology that is quite clear: maximum presence in the Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Greece, and Spain with more than 70% of total households) and minimum in Norway (less than 50%). In Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Austria we find percentages close to Norway (from 50% to 60%). Italy and France keep very close to their Mediterranean neighbours (from 60% to 70%), as do Ireland, Great Britain, Iceland and .

Observing simple nuclear households, we are in fact referring to living arrangements with the same composition. However, we should point out that in Mediterranean countries as well as in Ireland, households with a couple without children are less frequent, relative to the rest of the European countries. Nevertheless, it's important to mention that gender and inter-generational relations in families with couple and children, may be quite different depending on the economic and personal autonomy of their members. I should by now clarify what I have been calling a traditional or patriarchal type of household. I defined them as such based upon a division of labour as follows: he's the breadwinner and she's a housewife. But, when the wife or one of the children enjoy economic independence, patriarchal

relations are weakened. The same comment is valid to refer to a household which is composed only of a couple without children. In such a case, gender relations are defined on the basis of the relative autonomy of their members.

In concluding with the European geography's frame of household composition, we should mention that curiously Norway shows the higher percentage of households with two or more nuclei. This is very difficult to be explained, but we assume that it is related to census definitions (maybe with the maximum age of children to belong to a nuclear family).

NEW FAMILY FORMS AND GENDER RELATIONS. AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK

The explanatory framework of the *Second Demographic Transition* developed by Van de Kaa (1988) considers social processes in three dimensions: structure (which refers to modernisation, development of post-industrial society and the Welfare State), culture (expressed by the so-called "silent revolution") and technology (which includes the second contraceptive revolution and the spread of television information). From my point of view, the second dimension, referring to culture, is very important because it includes the weakening of gender inequalities and women's dependence. The author underlines in this dimension: the increasing contest between the sexes, changes in balance of power between sexes, increased emphasis on self-actualisation, conflict of roles in different spheres of life, female life course more independent, search for personal life style, etc. All these processes promote the development of new living arrangements.

Women's emancipation became a key factor in the acceleration of these changes, but at the same time, as a consequence of the redefinition of sex roles, relations between men and women were modified and masculine gender identity began a de-construction/reconstruction process, with preliminary effects on marriage and reproductive behaviour. To study gender relations changes and demographic changes it is absolutely necessary to include the male half of the population in our studies, to recognise that to get married and to have children is at least a matter involving two people.

Some authors have included men in the study of economic policy on fertility decisions, getting very interesting results. The economist Nancy Folbre (1993), for instance, has argued that the weakening of patriarchal society is express by a reduction in the exercise of men's power in decisions on the number of children. That happens when the economic value of children is decreasing for an imbalance between intergenerational economic flows and then women can exercise control of their own bodies, and get more decision and bargaining power. On the other hand, there is a negative effect on the number of children desired from the co-responsibility of fathers

of the reproductive work. That is to say, when fathers became aware of the meaning of *love's work*, to use the term of Hilary Rose (1987)[43], the mythical image of a great family sitting at the table around the patriarch on a holiday disappears.

Gender relation analysis is necessary to understand what a union's break-up really means and the constitution of a one-parent family. Some years ago Cristine Delphy (1982), in a paper on the sociological meaning of marriage and divorce, pointed out that divorce marks the end of a marriage but it does not mean at all the end of the marriage as an institution. Her paper "Marriage and divorce: the double predicament" focuses only on the economic aspects. Her hypothesis is that marriage is the institution that permits extraction of free work from a category of the population, the wives-women. She argues broadly that divorce reveals some institutional features of marriage that before were kept in a latent situation. Delphy affirms the follow paradox:

> *"On the one hand, for women marriage is the institutional place of their exploitation and, on the other hand, as a consequence of that exploitation their potential situation (for all women, not only for married women) is so bad that, economically speaking, marriage becomes still the best career for them"* (Delphy, 1982, p. 68).

Nevertheless, this statement has many exceptions, since many women reject going back to a situation of patriarchal dependence. In fact, other authors have pointed out that in many countries as a consequence of the development of the Welfare State, as for instance the case of Germany, the risk situation for people who experienced a change in the way of life could become an opportunity, if there is a social and political infrastructure that gives alternatives to women who are in that situation (Madje & Neususs, 1994).

One conclusion that could be exposed easily is that the development of the Welfare State is a key factor for the development of new attitudes concerning marriage and reproduction and based on a higher level of individual autonomy. When Roussel (1992) wondered why changes in living arrangements began in the Northern Region, he concluded that it was precisely in Denmark and Sweden where the debate began on the new women's image, their integration into working life, the autonomy of couples and the reconsideration of gender roles. Of course, in order to change gender roles it is necessary to modify gender relations.

In Spain, even though the legal reforms introduced after the Democratic Transition affect the entire state, which without any doubt made the democratisation of family life easier, currently we may find different regions in different stages of the Second Demographic Transition. The

[43] For Hilary rose *love's work* is a combination of servant work, often for long hours, repetitive and boring domestic tasks and complex emotional work with children, husbands and incapacitated elderly people.

consequences of such reforms are interfering with the gender identities constructed in the past in every region. My hypothesis is that in Catalonia these processes are quite developed, especially in Barcelona City. This has been occurring not as a consequence of a broad development of the Welfare State, even though in that area important improvements have been taking place during the tenure of the left wing government of the city, neither because of the massive integration of women in the labour market (women's unemployment rates are very important); but due to a weakening of patriarchal relations shaped throughout the century.

Women's emancipation in Catalonia is in an advanced phase because the compatibility between family and salaried work has more legitimacy there than in other Spanish regions (Solsona, 1994). On the other hand, the social debate to reach the responsibility of men and women in the private sphere is more vigorous. Several factors have favoured this advantaged situation of Catalonia: historical reasons, economic, political and cultural as well. In fact, from the beginning of the industrial revolution, women in Catalonia have been needed as a labour force in textile industries. Even the conservative wave of the Catalonian nationalist movement at the beginning of the century, that aimed to give education to women to become better partners and to raise healthier children, gave greater importance to preparing girls and young women to earn a living in new professions in better conditions. The Cultural Institute founded by Francesca Bonmaison, which is one of the expressions of the force of this contradictory conservative feminism, developed at the beginning of the century (1909-1926). It tried to train modern women in the religious values making a better housewife and a better partner, and also to promote its presence in the public space, and promoting a solidarity among women of different social classes (Macià, 1988). During this period, the first experience in Spain in coeducational schools took place in Catalonia with the "Escola Moderna de Ferrer Guardia" (1901-1906), and during the Second Republic (1931-38) only in Catalonia was coeducation widely implemented (Cortada, 1988).

During the Second Republic the most progressive legislation in Spain was implemented by the Catalonian government to guarantee civil rights and social integration of women; that legislation was comparable to that of the most advanced countries of that time. For instance, Catalonia was the second country in the world (after the Soviet Union) where abortion was legal; contraceptive information was widespread; the Spanish divorce law was amplified and the legal regime of separate property of partners gave married women more autonomy and independence (Oranich, 1978).

Even during Franco's dictatorship, the Catalonian civil law, based on the old Roman law, was more advanced and less discriminatory toward women than the Napoleonic Civil Code introduced after the Civil War (in 1939) in the major part of Spain. That means, for instance, that during Franco's regime, a Catalonian woman who married a Catalonian man kept economic patrimonial independence within the marriage even though she

didn't have legal standing in the eye of the courts (but if she married a non-Catalonian man the head of the family imposed its regionality). During Franco's era equality and autonomy of partners wasn't guaranteed. At that time, married women needed permission from their husband to work outside the household but in Catalonia marriage didn't presume, as often as in the other Spanish regions, an interruption of salaried activity (Solsona, 1994).

At the beginning of the redemocratisation period (1976), the first public debate on radical or left feminism, after 40 years of silence during the dictatorship, took place in Barcelona. During this period, feminist movements were given assistance in aspects such as family planning, abortion, separation, etc., before the young democracy addressed these issues. The first Family Planning Centre was created in Catalonia. Subsequently, that assistance work was transferred to suitable public institutions (Women's Institute, Health Services and Welfare Assistance).

As a consequence of all that, currently in Catalonia the deinstitutionalisation of the family is a fact. The family biography is not the only possibility for women, their life cycle has become more independent from the family cycle. The separation between sexuality and reproduction, an old vindication of the feminist movement, is now clear. Marriage is not the only frame for sentimental and sexual relations and it has lost the monopoly on reproduction. The right age to get married and to have children is questioned. Marriage takes place later or doesn't take place at all. Women have children later or they don't have children. Cohabitants and couples without children have begun to be easily accepted. Gay and lesbian collectives are present in public life and claim the right to educate and adopt children. The percentage of children born outside marriage is higher in Catalonia than in all of Spain, and the transition from cohabitation to marriage when children are born is not so frequent as in other European countries. One person households are more frequent in Catalonia, and are concentrated in some neighbourhoods of Barcelona City where dwelling prices are cheaper. More women can face up to a divorce or a separation, even though social provisions for them are almost non-existent[44]. One-parent families are increasing and have higher social acceptance.

In fact, currently, regional differences in Spain in the degree of women's emancipation and social integration are quite important. The percentage of women aged 20-24 years old enrolled in University Studies in Catalonia is almost double that in Andalusia, and on the contrary in this age group the percentage of those in Andalusia who declare themselves as housewives is twice that in Catalonia. The percentage of married women with nonagrarian salaried jobs is higher in Catalonia than in any other region, so, dual career nuclear families are more frequent. The percentage of minor children who attend school every day is also higher. The

[44] In Catalonia as well as in other Spanish Autonomous Governments there is a minimum salary called PIRMI (Programa Interdepartamental de la Renda Mínima d'Inserció) of about 37,000 pesetas plus 6,000 pesetas per child, but very few single mothers can receive it.

percentage of primary schools with a 9 to 5 schedule including dining hall, organised not by the State but by Parents associations, and making working activities easier for parents, is higher in Catalonia than in other regions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Recent trends in the process of constitution, maintenance and dissolution of unions and families in Catalonia have common features with the rest of the European Community countries. Nuptiality and fertility are declining and occur at a later age, cohabitation and births outside marriage are increasing, as well as instability of unions, etc. But household composition doesn't seem to follow the northern trends. In our country, for instance, households composed of unrelated people aren't frequent, emancipation and constitution of new households by young people is strongly related to a family constitution, and in the case of divorce or separation the family plays an important supportive role. In other words, in spite of the deinstitutionalisation of the family, living arrangements and mutual help are still based on family relations. There are three main reasons that explain such differences. First I should mention the insuficient development of the welfare state in terms of care provision and financial help to people who are not economically independent. Second, the incapability of the labour market to supply enough jobs in order to ensure people their economic autonomy is relevant here as well. Finally, cultural factors related to the family orientation of society explain the persistence of more complex kinds of households. This family orientation goes together with increasing individualisation, and in fact, family support lets individuals choose their way with more freedom. Here there is an interesting paradox: family help reinforces the development of the individualisation process in our country, a fact which calls into question most of the assumptions made by family sociologists who studied Western societies in the sixties and seventies.

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10

EVOLUTION OF THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF FAMILIES IN ROMANIA DURING THE LAST FEW DECADES

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The analysis of structural changes in households and families is interesting since the household and the family, the basic nuclei of society, play an important role in human, economic and social changes. The household and the family fill important functions in contemporary society: an economic function (production of goods and services, consumption unit), the reproduction of the population and of social groups and the socialisation and education of the younger generations.

These functions concern all the members of the family, whatever their sex or age. In such a context the determining role of women within the family and society must not be forgotten. This research takes such considerations into account and will present the role and the position of women within households and families in a context of changing structures of cohabitation.

EVOLUTION OF FAMILY STRUCTURES

Changes in the number and composition of households and families in Romania can be studied using post-war population censuses and especially those of 1966, 1977 and 1992. During the second half of this century the number of households increased faster than the total population of the country, and the average size of households was reduced because of demographic factors. During the period from 1948 to 1996 there was an increase of nearly 3.4 million households (80%) whereas population increased by 41%.

The number of households increased more rapidly during the period from 1948 to 1966, with an average annual growth rate of 1.8%, than for the period from 1977 to 1996 during which the annual growth rate was only one third as large. The average size of households went from 3.75 people in 1948 to 3.25 people in 1966, 3.21 in 1977 and only 2.93 at the beginning of 1996.

The reasons behind the reduction in the size of households were socio-economic and demographic. This reduction can be perceived as a consequence of diminished cohabitation, of a marked fall in fertility (especially during the last decade) and a substantial increase in the number of households with only one person because of population ageing.

Table 10.1 – Number and structure of households according to the type of household in the censuses of 1966, 1977 and 1992

	1966		1977		1992	
Types of households	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
Family households:	5 044	86.2	5 634	84.5	5 922	81.2
- with 1 family nucleus	4 693	80.2	5 269	79.0	5 471	75.1
- with 2 family nuclei	342	5.8	354	5.3	432	5.9
- with 3 family nuclei or more	9	0.2	11	0.2	19	0.3
Non-family households:	808	13.8	1 033	15.5	1 367	18.8
- with one person	741	12.7	930	13.9	1 247	17.1
- with more than one person	67	1.1	103	1.6	120	1.6
Total	5 852	100.0	6 667	100.0	7 289	100.0

The structure of households according to type of household reveals a high proportion (almost 6/7 of the total) of family households (families with one nucleus or extended families), despite the fact that during the last quarter century their weight in the total number of households dropped to about 4/5 following the rapid growth of non-family households (with no family nucleus) including for the most part only one person. Despite this reduction in their relative importance, family households have increased by 17%, or approximately 880,000 households from 1966 to 1992.

In 1966, 80% of households, compared with 75% in 1992, were made up of only one family nucleus, with or without other related people. The number of these households has increased during the last 25 years by 780,000, with a slight reduction in their weight in the total number of family households. This reduction is due to a slightly higher growth in the number of households with multiple nuclei compared with those with only one nucleus. This tends to show that the phenomenon of reduced cohabitation is not caused by family households.

But one must not forget to study non-family households in Romanian society, especially households including only one person. These households have increased by 70% during the last 25 years, their weight in the total number of households reaching 17.1% in 1992 (compared with 12.7% in

1966). Two thirds of these households are composed of single women and especially elderly widows. During the period studied the number of non-family households with multiple members also greatly increased, but their proportion among all households remained very low (1.6%). Most of these households are composed of people who are related but do not have a family nucleus.

Differences in the structure of family households according to place of residence are observed. Family households in urban areas as well as rural areas represent 4/5 of all households in 1992. In urban areas their weight has remained the same (82%) for the period from 1966 to 1992; however, in rural areas their weight fell, mainly because of the increase in the number of households with only one person.

Households with only one family nucleus increased by 60% in urban areas and diminished by 15% in rural areas. So there are relatively more households with only one nucleus in urban areas than in rural areas. At the same time households with several nuclei have increased, especially in urban areas: in 1992 households with several nuclei were twice as common in urban areas as in rural areas.

Table 10.2 – Percentage distribution of households by size, 1948-1996

Size of household	Year				
	1948	1966	1977	1992	1996*
1 person	8.5	12.7	13.9	17.1	17.3
2 people	2.6	23.8	24.7	25.8	27.1
3 people	21.6	23.9	22.0	21.0	22.2
4 people	18.6	20.2	19.6	19.1	18.8
5 people	13.4	10.8	10.6	8.9	8.7
6 people	9.2	5.0	6.0	4.6	4.3
7 people or more	8.1	3.6	3.2	3.5	3.5
Population (thousands)	15,798	19,010	21,421	22,386	22,233
Average number of people per household	3.75	3.25	3.21	3.07	2.93

* At the beginning of the year; estimate
Sources: censuses

The structural changes in households are reflected as well in their size. Beginning in 1950, there was an increase in the proportion of households with 1 or 2 people and a corresponding reduction in households of 5 persons or more. The proportion of households with one person doubled between 1948 and 1996, whereas the share of households with 6 persons or more was reduced by 50% during the same period. The percentage of households with 3 or 4 people remained the same, at about 40% of all households. Although the total number of households increased by 80% during the second half of this century, the number of households with 6 people or more dropped by about 20%. In 1948, households with

between 1 and 4 people represented almost half the population of the country, while in 1996 these households included nearly 70% of all people (excluding institutional households).

Analysis of the structure of households according to their type, their size and the number of generations provides interesting information. More than one family household in two includes two generations, almost 40% of households have one generation and only 8% have 3 generations or more. As a rule, one-generation households, like those with two generations, do not include people from outside the nuclear family. The number of complex family households including, in addition to the married couple with or without children, other people related or not related has declined substantially. One-generation households (in most cases a married couple without children) represent ¼ of family households, ¾ of family households including at least 2 generations.

Table 10.3 – Households according to type and number of generations, 1992 (in thousands)

Size of household	Family households			Non-family households			Total
	1 generation	2 generations or more	Sub-total	1 generation	2 generations or more	Sub-total	
1 person	-	-	-	1,247	-	1,247	1,247
2 persons	1,463	318	1,781	78	23	101	1,882
3 persons or more	53	4,088	4,141	19	-	19	4,160
Total number of households	1,516	4,406	5,922	1,344	23	1,367	7,289
Number of people	3,106	17,768	20,874	1,466	46	1,512	22,386
Average number of people/household	2.05	4.03	3.52	1.09	2.00	1.11	3.7

CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE AND SIZE

Providing information on the number and structure of families (family nuclei) is an important part of the analysis of family households, despite the fact that households with only one nucleus (a single family) represent over 90% of the total number of family households. The study of the structure of family nuclei is very important in determining the role and the status of women in the family. During the last quarter century the number of families has increased by approximately 1 million or 20%, reaching 6.4 million families in 1992 (families made up of a married couple with or without

children or of one single parent with children) (Table 10.4). The increase in the number of families almost followed the national population increase, but was greater than that of family households because there was an increase in the number of households with several nuclei (Table 10.1).

Table 10.4 – Family typology in the censuses of 1966, 1977 and 1992

Type of family	1966		1977		1992		1992-66
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	%
Married couple without children	1,657.7	30.7	1,874.0	31.2	2,065.3	32.3	124.6
Married couple with children	3,327.4	61.6	3,673.4	61.1	3,637.5	56.9	109.3
One parent with children	419.0	7.7	464.2	7.7	690.3	10.8	164.7
Total number of families	5,404.1	100.0	6,011.6	100.0	6,393.1	100.0	118.3

More than one family out of two is made up of a married couple with children. Married couples without children represent a third of families and one-parent families a little over 10%. During the period from 1966 to 1992, the greatest increase was in the number of one-parent families (nearly 65%), and the lowest increase recorded (10%) was for families made up of a married couple with children. Married couples without children have increased by 25%. Overall, the weight of families with children is decreasing slightly.

However, differences according to place of residence are apparent. In urban areas two-parent families with children represent approximately 2/3 of the total number of families, compared with 50% in rural areas. Families without children represent 25% of the total number of families in urban areas compared with 40% in rural areas. However, there are more one-parent families in urban areas than in rural areas. Changes in the structure of families were also observed. During the last 25 years the average size of families has slightly decreased, from 3.20 persons per family in 1966 to 3.15 in 1992 (Table 10.5).

However, a slight increase in the size of families with children as well as one-parent families was observed. The difference between the size of two-parent families with children (3.9 people) and of one-parent families (2.5 people) has remained unchanged (Table 10.6).

Table 10.5 – Distribution of families according to the number of people for 1966, 1977 and 1992

	1966		1977		1992	
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
2 people	1,946.5	36.0	2,196.5	36.5	2,528.6	39.6
3 people	1,661.0	30.7	1,625.3	27.0	1,719.2	26.9
4 people	1,096.6	20.3	1,307.5	21.8	1,374.6	21.5
5 people or more	700.0	13.0	882.3	14.7	770.7	12.0
Total number of families	5,404.1	100.0	6,011.6	100.0	6,393.1	100.0
Total number of people in families	17,300.9	-	19,506.5	-	20,111.5	-
Average number of people per family	3.20	-	3.24	-	3.15	-

The increase in the weight of families made up of two people (currently 40% of the total number of families) is due to the rapid growth of one-parent families with one child and of families without children (couples and elderly people). Families made up of four people or more have maintained their share (a third of the total number of families), with an increase in numbers of approximately 20%.

Although the number of families with children increased during the period from 1966 to 1992 by 15.5%, their share of the total number of families dropped from 69.3% to 67.7%. This is explained by the more rapid increase in the number of families without children. In 1992, 84% of the total number of families with children are families with married couples, and 16% are one-parent families. The proportion of one-child families decreased, both for married couples and for one-parent families, whereas the share of families with 2 children tended to increase for all types of families. The percentage of families with 4 children or more decreased. More than 40% of families with married couples and children have only one child, compared with more than two thirds in the case of one-parent families.

Table 10.6 – Percentage distribution of families with children by number of children and type of family, 1966, 1977 and 1992

Number of children	Families with children			Married couples with children			One parent with children		
	1966	1977	1992	1966	1977	1992	1966	1977	1992
1	49.7	44.8	46.9	47.3	41.6	43.1	68.9	69.5	67.1
2	30.9	33.2	34.2	32.2	34.8	36.5	21.0	20.6	22.1
3	11.0	12.8	11.1	11.6	13.6	11.9	6.4	6.3	6.8
4	4.7	6.2	4.6	5.0	6.7	4.9	2.3	2.4	2.6
5 or more	3.7	3.0	3.2	3.9	3.3	3.6	1.4	1.2	1.4
Average number of children per family	1.84	1.92	1.85	1.89	1.98	1.91	1.47	1.46	1.50

The average number of children per family diminished slightly between 1977 and 1992 (1.9 children per family), but the average number of children in one-parent families has increased slightly (1.5 children in 1992).

In 1996 there were 3.2 million families with dependent children under the age of 18, not employed or single, and among these families 11% were one-parent families. These families had 5.78 million dependent children or an average of 1.8 children under age 18 per family. From the total number of these families 45% had only one dependent child and almost 40% had two dependent children. Only 12% of families with children had more than 2 dependent children under age 18. The great majority of families having several dependent children (more than 9/10) were married couples with children.

DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS HAVING DETERMINED CHANGES IN FAMILY STRUCTURE: THEIR FORMATION AND DISSOLUTION

The change in the number of families was determined by a series of social or behavioural factors and by demographic factors such as marriage rates, divorce rates and widowhood. Family structures are also greatly influenced by certain demographic phenomena, among which fertility takes precedence. That is why a lot of importance is attached to phenomena concerning the formation and stability of the family, which in turn influence the status and the role of women within the family.

In recent years, Romania has gone through a transition period, and although the number of marriages has fallen slightly it has remained high and stable compared with other European countries. The marriage rate has fallen: it was 9 marriages per 1000 inhabitants twenty years ago, 8.3 per 1000 in 1990, and 6.8 in 1994-95. The number of legal marriages fell by 20% between 1990 and 1995. As far as consensual unions are concerned, they are not yet an important form of cohabitation and family formation: more than 80% of unions are first marriages (86% in 1995).

Mean age at marriage increased by approximately 1 year between 1990 and 1995. In 1995 mean age at family formation was 28 for men and 24.5 for women, whereas mean age at marriage was 26 for men and 22.8 for women. In the great majority of cases (more than 80%) marriages took place before age 30. There are 90 married men aged 20-29 per 100 married women aged 15-24. Changes in family formation are reflected in the structure of the population according to civil registration figures. In 1992 almost 70% of people of marriageable age were married. The trend has been towards an increase in the number of married people during the last twenty years, which can be explained by a favourable age structure.

First marriages represent 91% of the total number of marriages. The vast majority of women (95.5%) enter a first marriage before the age of 30, which results in a mean age at marriage of 20.7 years. Contracting a first marriage at a young age (6 women out of 7 get married before the age of 25) has an influence on the duration of the marriage. Thus, married couples having contracted only one marriage have a mean duration of marriage of 21.9 years, which confirms the relatively high degree of stability of families in Romanian society. Almost half the women in first marriages were married before the age of 20. Only 1% of these women were married after the age of 40, which obviously affects the duration of their marriage and their marital fertility.

Observed trends in divorce and widowhood rates have influenced family stability. The divorce rate remains relatively low (1.6 divorces per 1000 inhabitants in 1991 and 1.54 per 1000 in 1995), thus confirming the stable character of the Romanian family. However, in one divorce out of two there are minor children, which explains the increase in the number of one-parent families with a mother and dependent children. Between 1990 and 1995, higher precocity of divorce rates was observed, especially for people under age 20. The average age at divorce is decreasing.

Mortality also affects changes in the family. Through widowhood it reduces the number of married couples. In 1995 there were 9.8 widows or widowers per 1000 married people and 13.8 widows per 1000 married women. Women have a rate of widowhood 2.4 times greater than that of men. The remarriage rate of widowers is 2.4 times higher than that of widows, which explains why in the population there are 4.8 times as many widows than widowers. To conclude, we observe that for 100 new marriages, there are 90 marriages that end in divorce or widowhood, which means that only 10% of the new couples formed contribute to the increase in the number of families.

Changes in legitimate fertility rates also influence family structure. The fertility decrease observed in recent years has continued. The period total fertility rate has fallen to less than 2 children per woman since 1990. This rate was at 1.83 children per woman in 1990 and only 1.34 in 1995. Despite the early onset of childbearing in Romania, the period total fertility rate for women under age 30 falls to 1.12 children in 1995. However, there has been an increase in the proportion of children born out of wedlock. Thus, in 1995 one child out of five was born out of wedlock (the percentages were 15% in 1992 and 19.8% in 1995). An increase in childbearing by mothers under the age of 20 (17.3% of the total number of births in 1995) has led to a series of social problems, such as children being put into orphanages, abandoning of children, or poverty, which greatly influences changes in the status of women within the family.

Lastly, following the legalisation of abortions in 1990 (via repeal of the law forbidding abortion), the abortion rate in Romania has remained very high: 290 abortions for 100 live births in 1990, and 213 abortions for 100 live

births in 1995. A study on reproductive health carried out in 1993 showed that one woman in two had had at least one unwanted pregnancy. Even in 1995, the abortion rate remained very high: at an average of 3 abortions per woman during reproductive life (a higher level having been observed among women under 30). As a result of complications of childbirth and abortion, maternal mortality was very high. In the 1980s, maternal mortality was 150 deaths per 100,000 live births. This rate decreased to only 47.8 maternal deaths for 100,000 live births in 1995, which still represents one of the highest rates in Europe.

It is a fact that the general state of health of women has an impact on changes in family structures. This subject therefore deserves further consideration.

THE STATUS AND ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE FAMILY

Along with changes in family structure and responsibilities within the family, the status and the role of women has changed. New economic, social, demographic and educational conditions are beginning to affect the family. These conditions have a great influence on the relations existing between family members. Changes in family structure determine and influence women's activities and status within the family and society. This is the case, for example, with changes due to decreasing fertility and changes in mother/child relations. Other factors also determine family dynamics, with resulting changes in the responsibilities of women within the family.

THE WOMAN AS A REFERENCE PERSON IN THE FAMILY: RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WOMAN AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY

In 1996 (mid-year) there were 11.53 million women in Romania, representing 51% of the total population. There were 9.33 million women aged 15 and over, representing 40% of the total population. According to the population census of 1992, 11.4 million women were living in households of which almost 1 million (8.6%) were non-family households. More than 4/5 (830,000) were households with only one person, 11,000 people were girls under age 15, and 73,000 were heads of non-family households. Only 72,000 adult women were part of non-family households made up of several people without being the head of the household.

Out of the total female population 9/10 belonged to family households. Nearly a quarter of these women (23.9%) were under age 15, 60% were between ages 15 and 59 and more than 14% were aged 60 and over.

Table 10.7 – Female population by status in the household and age group, 1992 (in thousands)

Relationship to head of household	Type of household			Age group			Total
	Family	Non-family (other than single person)	Single person	under 15 years	15-59 years	60 years or over	
Head	704	73	830	*	755	852	1,607
Wife	5,046	-	-	*	4,113	933	5,046
Daughter	3,488	-	-	2,105	1,378	5	3,488
Daughter-in-law	341	2	-	*	342	1	343
Niece	430	19	-	368	81	*	449
Mother\ mother-in-law	296	2	-	-	32	266	298
Other relative	99	30	-	24	58	47	129
Not related	47	30	-	10	56	11	77
Total Population	10,451	156	830	2,507	6,815	2,115	11,437

- only 704,000 women over the age of 15 were heads of family households. In 9 out of 10 of these cases they were the heads of one-parent households, representing 8.8% of the total number of women over the age of 15. Only 483,000 adult women were heads of households (7.4%).

- 5.05 million women, or about half the women, were married to the head of the household. Among adult women, nearly 2/3 are spouses. We also observe that less than one fifth (18.5%) of spouses were elderly.

- 3.5 million females (a third of the total number) were the daughters of the heads of the households, but the majority of them (3/5) were under the age of 15.

- more than 1.2 million females (approximately 11%) had another relationship to the head of the household, in most cases that of niece, daughter-in-law, mother, mother-in-law, sister, aunt, sister-in-law, grandmother. A relatively unsignificant number had no kinship.

Among women over age 60 (less than 1.5 million), 2/3 were spouses of the head of the household and around 20% mothers or mothers-in-law. Only 221,000 were elderly women heads of households (with more than one person), about a sixth of the total number of people aged over 60. However, their proportion was 2 times greater than that of adult women.

The proportion of women heads of households was 20.6% in 1966, only 16.5% in 1977 and 22.1% in 1992. The increase in the number of households headed by women was higher than that of the total number of households for the period between 1966 and 1992 (an increase of one third), but especially

during the period from 1977 to 1992 (an increase of nearly 50%). Between 1966 and 1992, changes in the status of women heads of households were as follows (Table 10.8):

Table 10.8 – Women heads of households, by age group in 1966, 1977 and 1992 (in thousands)

		Age group			Total
		under 5 years	15-65 years	65 years and over	
1966	Total	12	908	285	1,205
1977	Total	5	722	376	1,103
	Women alone	5	312	294	611
1992	Total	*	953	655	1,608
	Women alone	*	361	469	830

The number of female heads of households has increased by 45.7% during the last 15 years (504,000 women), while the number of male heads of households has increased by only 2.1%. In 1977 and 1992 women alone (i.e., in one-person households) represented more than half of the total number of female heads of households. Ageing of female heads of households is evident (especially for women alone).

Over the last 25 years the number of female heads of households living in urban areas has increased by more than 80%, while in rural areas their number has remained stable. Currently, more than 40% of them are women over age 60. They have greatly increased in number, and there are 2.5 times as many of them as was the case 30 years ago.

Among women aged 65 and over who are heads of households, 75% are living alone. They have increased by more than 65% during the last 30 years. Out of the total of 1.6 million female heads of households in 1992, almost 67% are widows, approximately 17% are divorced women, and married and single women represent only 16% of the total. If one looks at the total of elderly female heads of households, 4/5 of them are widows. Currently 70% of women living alone are elderly and the great majority of them are widows. In recent decades the importance of women in the total of one-person households has increased.

To conclude, there are noticeable differences in family structure according to whether the head of the household is a man or a woman. In households headed by women, more than 50% are one-person households, whereas in the case of households headed by men there are only one-seventh as many. In households headed by men more than 9/10 were family households, almost entirely made up of married couples. Among households headed by women, however, family households represented only 40% of the total, or less than half as much as for male-headed households.

Among family households, one-parent households are much more common among women (more than a third of family households) than among men (less than 3% of family households). The average size of households headed by women is much smaller -- 2.04 people/household -- than of households headed by men (3.36 people/household). In fact, family households with more than 3 people per household constitute 45.8% of households headed by men compared with approximately 33% for households headed by women. When women are the head of the household 40% of these households do not include elderly people and 40% are made up of only elderly people. The most numerous households are those that include elderly people and are headed by women.

Table 10.9 – Households headed by women, according to size and type, 1992 (in thousands)

Type of household	Household size (number of people)					Total
	1	2	3	4	5 or more	
Couple without children	-	34.4	2.9	0.3	0.1	37.7
Couple with children	-	-	27.4	20.3	12.5	60.2
One parent with children	-	252.0	152.3	81.3	79.9	565.6
Households with multiple families	-	-	-	9.4	30.8	40.2
Family households	-	286.3	182.6	111.4	123.3	703.7
One-person households	830.2	-	-	-	-	830.2
Non-family households	-	62.1	8.6	2.0	1.0	73.7
Total	830.2	348.5	191.2	113.3	124.3	1607.6

THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE FAMILY: PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES, LEVEL OF EDUCATION, RELATIONS WITH CHILDREN

Another important aspect of the role played by women in the family is that of their economic activity. Although a lot of women's work is within the household, bringing up and educating the children and caring for and helping other people (especially elderly people), they also are becoming increasingly active in the economy. They therefore have activities outside the family. Among the 9 million women over age 15 (1992), 4.68 million were active in the production of goods and services. In 1992 labour force participation rate of women aged 15 and over was 51.6%. Hence, almost one woman in two over age 15 was not economically active. Even in the case of women who are still able to work (under the age of 55), only 75% of them were in the labour force.

More than 90% of women in the labour force, or 4.3 million women, were employed, and approximately 8% were unemployed. Of the total number of women in the labour force, 71% were salaried and 20% were self-employed or family workers, especially in the agricultural sector. One third of economically active women were under the age of 30, and nearly two thirds were between 30 and 60 years old. It should also be noted that three quarters of active women were married, of which 75% were between the ages of 30 and 60 and 20% under the age of 30. Least numerous were elderly married women who were economically active.

The activity rate among married women was 60% compared with only 36.3% in the case of adult single women. The unemployment rate for married women was only 4.4%, whereas for single, widowed and divorced women, the unemployment rate was 4 times higher (17.9%), notably because of young single women under age 30 looking for a first job.

The Employment Survey of 1996 revealed that the important changes which occurred in the Romanian economy during the transition period led to an increase in women's participation in economic activity. The need to ensure a supplementary source of income for the family followed the drop in real incomes of households as a consequence of inflation as well as the increase in the share of poor families. In 1996, the activity rate of adult women was at 65.8%, still lower than that of adult men. There were 5.3 million active adult and elderly women, representing 46% of the total working population. The activity rate of adult women was 57%. The proportion of elderly women among the female labor force was increasing (14.3%) in 1996. The average unemployment rate for women was 7.3%, higher than that of men, and 67% of unemployed females were young women under the age of 30. One third of the total number of women aged 15 and over were economically inactive. Nearly one inactive woman in two was retired or was receiving welfare benefits. Approximately 25% of inactive women were at home and nearly 20% were at school or university (pupils or students).

As a general rule, the workload of women is increasing both within the family and in society. Highlighting the special role played by economically active women in the family, notably concerning the impact of children, available data show a strong correlation between women's participation in economic activity and the number of dependent children.

The activity rates of married women are higher than those of single women between the ages of 20 and 50. Married women under 30 and without children have a higher activity rate than single women. The highest activity rates are those of married women with one child. Then as the number of children increases the activity rate decreases. This means that there is a strong inverse correlation between the number of children born or brought up by the family and the extent of women's participation in economic activity.

During the transition period other trends have been apparent. A number of salaried married women stay at home to look after their children during all or

part of the children's early childhood. Once this period is over the women go back to work. But recently, in spite of welfare measures (allowances given by the State) to help women bring up their children during the first year, women have been going back to work soon after the birth of their child because they are worried about unemployment and staff reductions. This situation has repercussions on the health of the mother and the child, and it affects the woman's role in the education of the young children.

Table 10.10 – Complete families according to the number of children and the economic situation of the spouses, 1992 (in thousands)

Family type and number of children	Economic situation of the spouses				
	Both spouses active	Husband active, wife inactive	Husband inactive, wife active	Both spouses inactive	Total
Couples without children	601.0	271.2	209.2	983.9	2065.3
Couples with children					
1 child	987.0	261.7	107.5	210.3	1566.5
2 children	987.6	233.0	51.5	56.1	1328.2
3 children	275.4	120.4	17.3	19.1	432.2
4 children	102.4	61.2	6.8	8.4	178.8
5 children or more	64.7	54.1	4.7	8.3	131.8
Couples with children - Total	2417.1	730.4	187.8	302.2	3637.5
Total number of families	3018.1	1001.6	397.0	1286.1	5702.8
Children per family	1.89	2.25	1.69	1.53	1.91

The link between a woman's economic situation and her role in the family – especially regarding the number of children -- can be seen with the data below, both for complete families (married couples) as well as for one-parent families. In the case of complete families, three fifths of married women (more than 3.4 million) were economically active, and one in nine of these women had an inactive husband. However, out of nearly 2.3 million inactive wives, about one million (44%) had an economically active husband.

In 1992, among complete families without children, nearly 40% of the women were active. Many of them were young women. In complete families with children there were proportionately 1.8 times more active women (more than 70%). Among economically active wives with children, only 7% had an inactive husband, while 71% of inactive wives with children had an active husband. The number of children per family differed according to the economic situation of the wife. Families where the husband was active and the wife inactive had the highest number of children, 2.25; on the other hand, the lowest average number of children per family was reported in families with both spouses inactive (1.53 children). Among families where the wife stayed at home and the husband was active, those with one child were relatively infrequent (only one third) while families with 3 children or more were relatively numerous. The most frequent situation is that of the complete family with children and both spouses active (two fifths of the total). Eighty-two percent of these families had

one or two children, and only one family in 14 of this type had at least 4 children. The average number of children was 1.9 per family.

The total number of children from complete families was 7 million, of which nearly 4.9 million had an economically active mother; 30% of the children had an inactive mother. Nearly one million children were in one-parent families, or nearly 11% of the total number of families (Table 10.4). One-parent families represented 16% of families with children. Nearly 17% of one-parent families were made up of a father with one or more children. Families made up of mothers with one or more children represented 8.9% of the total number of families in 1992, and have tended to increase during recent years. Some one-parent families present social and economic problems and need welfare support. Their structure is shown in Table 10.11.

Table 10.11 – One-parent families - mothers with children according to number of children and mothers economic activity, 1992

Number of children	Active mothers		Inactive mothers		Total	
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
1	193.6	59.2	188.6	77.4	382.2	67.0
2	90.3	27.6	35.9	14.8	126.2	22.1
3	27.4	8.4	11.3	4.6	38.7	6.8
4 or more	15.5	4.8	7.8	3.2	23.3	4.1
Average number of children per family	1.61	-	1.36	-	1.50	-
Total number of families	326.8	100.0	243.6	100.0	570.4	100.0

A little under 60% of mothers in one-parent families were economically active (and about 90% of them were salaried). More than 40% of these one-parent mothers with children were inactive, more than two thirds of whom were retired. Among one-parent mothers with children, 2/3 had only one child and one in nine had three children or more. In the case of economically active one-parent mothers with children, not quite 60% had only one child. For inactive one-parent mothers with children, more than 77% had one child and nearly 8% had 3 children or more. In one-parent families where the head is a woman the average number of children was 1.6 when the mother was active compared with 1.4 children per family when the mother was inactive. It is obvious that the role of the woman in the family is different according to whether or not there are any children, and notably dependent children[1]. Family status and the woman's participation in economic activity also changes according to the age of the children.

[1] "Dependent" children are children under 18 years old, bachelors and without any economic activity, economically dependent on their parents or other relatives of the family they belong to.

Table 10.12 – Families with children according to the number of dependent children and the number of parents, 1992

Number of dependent children	Complete families		One-parent families		Total	
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
None	792.8	21.8	337.2	48.9	1130.0	26.1
1	1239.5	34.1	207.0	30.0	1446.5	33.4
2	1117.0	30.7	114.2	16.5	1231.2	28.5
3 or more	488.2	13.4	31.9	4.6	520.1	12.0
Total	3637.5	100.0	690.3	100.0	4327.8	100.0
Average number of children per family with dependent children	1.84	-	1.51	-	1.81	-

At the beginning of 1992, almost ¾ of families with children included one or more dependent children. Among complete families, only 22% did not have dependent children, compared with 49% in one-parent families. Nearly two thirds of the women with children belonged to complete families with dependent children, compared with 50% among one-parent families. On average, there were 1.5 dependent children per one-parent family compared with more than 1.8 among complete families.

To conclude we will examine the level of education of the woman compared with that of the husband. The degree of literacy of women aged 15 and over is 95.4%, and two thirds of illiterate women are over age 60. In the case of complete families, 98% of the men are literate. Among the spouses of heads of families, 72.1% have attained either secondary or university studies (compared with 78.2% among the husbands), 22.8% have only finished elementary education, and 5% have received no schooling. Women having secondary education or having been to university are more common among complete families with children (82.4%) than among families without children (54%) or among one-parent families (67%), but this situation is also influenced by the age structure. In 58.4% of complete families, the husband has the same level of education as the wife, among about one third of complete families (31.9%), the level of education of the wife is lower than the husband's, and in only about one tenth of these families, the wife has a higher level of education than the husband. The situation is different among complete families without children: husbands with the same level of education are a bit less common than among complete families with children (where nearly 60% of the spouses have the same level of education).

Table 10.13 – Complete families according to the level of education of the spouses, 1992 (percentages)

Level of education of the wife compared with that of the husband		Level of education				
		University	Upper secondary	Lower secondary	Primary	no schooling
Level of education	Husband	8.2	43.3	26.7	19.6	2.2
	Wife	4.9	32.8	34.4	22.8	5.1
Complete families	Lower	51.8	39.6	29.5	13.4	-
	The same	48.2	58.3	58.3	63.1	56.1
	Higher	-	2.1	12.2	23.5	43.9
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Complete families with children	Lower	48.8	37.9	21.2	9.6	-
	The same	51.2	60.1	63.5	59.2	51.9
	Higher	-	2.0	15.3	31.2	48.1
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In recent years it has been noted that the number of children per family is higher among women who have finished elementary school, whereas women with a higher level of education have a lower fertility rate. Women having been to university have a fertility rate which is reduced by approximately half. These differences in fertility according to the woman's level of education affect to a certain degree the role played by women in the education of the children, without omitting the importance of the education system.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND FAMILY DYNAMICS

Among the wide range of problems concerning the status and role of women in the family, we have only dealt with part of a complex subject requiring in-depth discussion. For example, we could mention the impact of changes in the family responsibilities of women in the context of the transformation of the family, remaining disparities between the privileges of women and men, aspects concerning the relations and reciprocal

responsibilities among the young, adult and elderly generations, and changes having affected family structures which in turn opened up new perspectives for women and have influenced their activity both within the family and outside the family. This presentation is not intended to be an exhaustive analysis of the evolution of the role and status of women in social and economic life, such as certain aspects concerning disparities between the sexes, the empowerment of women in society or the level of human development of the female population. However, we would like to conclude by referring to certain trends in Romania, especially since the beginning of the transition in 1990.

The great majority of women are married or living with a partner and belong to complete families. However, there has been an increase in the number of one-parent families consisting of mothers with children. Due to demographic trends, women remain married for less time than previously and dedicate less time to their function as a mother. The remaining life expectancy of women at first marriage is approximately 50 years. Given that the average age of a widow at her husband's death is approximately 60, the duration of widowhood for women is nearly 13 years. In this situation many of these women are no longer part of a family and they form isolated households. There are more and more women living alone who cannot depend on other family members to ensure their livelihood, since descendant generations form separate families.

Conjugal couples have fewer children than in the past, due to changes in reproductive behaviour. These children, as adults, are less likely to live with their parents, constituting instead separate families with a single nucleus. More and more one-parent families are emerging, usually made up of mothers with one or more children. Women in conjugal couples, usually with children, are obliged, apart from their domestic duties (housekeeping and education of the children), to develop economic activities since their partner and other members of the family do not have enough income to ensure a decent living for the family. Another noticeable fact is the decrease in the number of households with several nuclei, which is partly linked to the gradual decrease in the number of extended families including several generations.

The reduction in cohabitation of couples is taking away the security that marriage used to provide mothers thanks to the support children gave to elderly parents. Generally, family cohesion and solidarity has been reduced, and replaced by other support and welfare systems provided by civil society and the State. The proportion of family households headed by women is increasing, and their structure is different from that of households headed by men. However, recent changes confirm the high level of stability of the family as an institution in Romanian society, as well as the increasingly important role played by women within the family.

11

WOMEN IN ONE-PARENT FAMILIES IN RUSSIA

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My paper presents results from the scientific project, "One-parent families in Russia"[1], which analyses changes in family structure, the different problems of one-parent families, and ways of improving their position, in a context of a low level of government financial assistance to such families in Russia. This project will be finished by July, 1997. In this paper I present intermediate results and estimates.

Sex as a biological characteristic is an important variable in demographic analysis, but in modern society gender also becomes significant. Population and reproduction analysis should be based on gender. Socio-cultural analysis[2] permits us to understand demographic behaviour including family structure, health, fertility, nuptiality and divorce, relations between generations and, in general, quality of life for men and women. High status of women[3] and equal access to educational, professional, political and informational structures give greater possibilities in the choice of living arrangements.

Fertility dynamics and women's status are interconnected with each other, and changes of family structure depend on significant changes in female status. In analysing family structure change, we are interested in the growth of one-parent families, in their characteristics and problems, realities and perspectives. There is a hypothesis that dynamics, problems and

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[1] This project is supported by the Russian Human Scientific Fund N 96-02-02203.

[2] Levels of this analysis are original context (relationships, links, conflicts in households) and gender relations in macrosociety (stereotypes, relations, policies).

[3] High status of women entails a legal and a real right to equality in educational, social, political, professional, economic and family spheres, structures and relations.

perspectives of these families are connected with improvements in women's (gender) status.

ONE-PARENT FAMILIES IN RUSSIA

One-parent families (OPFs) are families with one parent and one or more unmarried children (and other relatives). In Russia OPFs constitute 13.4% (1994) of all families. 94% of OPFs are headed by women. The typology of OPFs is presented by number of children under 18 and residence with relatives in Table 11.1. Among children under age 18 every seventh child belongs to a single-parent family. OPFs with only children under age 18 are more than 3/4 of all OPFs.

Table 11.1 – One-parent families according to the number of children under age 18 (Russia, micro-census 1994)[4]

Type of OPS: number of children under age 18	(%)
1	69
2	25
3 or more	6
Total	100

Causes of OPFs formation are divorce, father's (or mother's) death, and childbearing outside of marriage. Divorce rates have tended to increase and marriage rates to decrease (Figure 11.1). Peaks of divorces "waves" were in 1980 and 1994. Moreover, in 1994, the ratio divorce/marriage exceeded one half, being 51 divorces to 100 marriages. Divorce rates increased mainly among couples with children. From 1988 to 1994, the number of divorces of couples with children increased by 28%.

A maximum of divorces is observed at 20-29 years, when in general one child has already been born (Figure 11.2). The peak of divorces is seen at 1-4 years of marriage duration.

In Russia a pattern of early fertility is evident. The mean age at marriage decreased since 1960; in 1995, it was 22.6 years for women and 24.8 for men. The mean age of childbearing was 24.7 years in 1993. Fertility rates of young mothers (ages 15-19) are superior to those of mothers aged

[4] Since 1994, year of micro-census in Russia, the basic unit is the household. With the difference of the family, the household could be composed of only one nonrelated person, or several people (nurses, etc.) in so far they take part in the household budget.

30 and over. The share of fertility of age groups in total fertility rate is presented in Table 11.2.

Table 11.2. – The share of fertility of age groups in total fertility rates (Russia, 1960-1995)

Age groups	1960	1980	1990	1993	1994	1995
<20	3.1	7.4	10.7	17.6	17.8	16.9
20-24	29.1	42.2	42.2	43.3	43	42.2
25-29	31.2	28.4	26.5	23.5	24	25
30-34	23.5	16.3	15.2	10.6	10.6	11
35>	13.1	5.7	5.3	4.9	4.7	4.8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Population of Russia in 1995. INF, 1996 and 1997.

The decrease in the mean age of mothers has been combined with a decrease of total fertility. We have "young and low" fertility (in contrast, most Western countries have an "old and low" pattern). It is very difficult to explain it. There was a pronatalist demographic policy during the 80's, which changed the terms of fertility and age distribution of fertility rates. At that time there was another socio-cultural environment and history of family development (Soviet female full-employment model, social child care, etc.).

The second factor, the level of male mortality rates, is very high in Russia nowadays. It has increased catastrophically. All death indexes (age-specific death rates, life expectancy) demonstrate male disadvantage (Figure 11.3). We can see that the ratio of male/female age-specific death rates is particularly large among those aged 20-34. The main causes of the growth in male death rates are external causes and cardio-vascular ones. With respect to the first causes (suicide, homicide) the gender factor plays a significant role. The old paternal governmental system was destroyed. The "new" breadwinner family model has become very popular now. Men have to find work, and often have to work in a non-supporting environment, sometimes in criminal conditions. Another external cause (poison) links with alcohol, but we should stress more the decreasing quality of alcohol (and food) than increasing quantity of alcohol consumption.



Figure 11.1 – Marriage and divorce rates (Russia, 1960-1995)



Figure 11.2. – Number of divorces, by age and gender (Russia, 1994)



Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. GKS. M., 1996.

Figure 11.3. – Ratio of male/female age-specific death rates (Russia, 1994-1995)



Source: The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. GKS. M., 1996.

Figure 11.4. – Out-of-wedlock fertility (Russia, 1980-1995)

The third factor in OPFs is the proportion of children born outside of marriage. This index doubled from 1980 to 1995 (Figure 11.4). Moreover, in the context of decreasing total fertility, "out of wedlock" fertility has fallen more slowly than marital fertility. For example, from 1987 to 1991, marital fertility fell by 31% and "out of wedlock" fertility fell by 9.3%. We can conclude that there is not a crisis of family, but rather there are changes in family structures and types, including increases in cohabitation and refusal of official marriage. Some estimates (micro census 1994) confirm this. The share of men (age 16 and over) living in cohabitation is 47%, and the corresponding share of women is 39%.

We can see that all the factors contributing to a growing number of OPFs are significant in some degree. They act in a similar direction, increasing the share of OPFs in Russia.

PROBLEMS

The main problems of such families are decreasing living standards, disruption of father-child relations and time conflict due to the double task of childrearing and obtaining income.

Social and economic changes in Russia led to a deterioration in the standard of living of a majority of families. According to data from surveys in different regions in Russia OPFs have the worst material conditions. Some characteristics are worse than those of families with three and more children and families of elderly people. Depth of poverty of OPFs (a measure relating income to the minimum cost of consumer goods) is higher than those of many other types of families. The proportion of OPFs with inadequate income in some regions is higher than that of couples with 1-2 children, although the proportion of OPFs in the number of families is lower that of couples with 1-2 children (Annex Table 11.1.A).

An important proportion of OPFs are "poor" and "dependent" families. The family is classified as poor if its income per person is less than the cost of the regional consumer basket (Table 11.3). "Dependent" families are families where more than 25% of family income consists of social benefits (the level of these benefits is from $10 per child in type 2 to $20 per child in type 1). We should underline that this dependence is not similar to social dependence in Western countries because in our case it is characteristic of extreme poverty. If the family budget depends on such very small benefits, its material position is very low.

Table 11.3. – Proportion of "poor" and "dependent" families among various types of families, percentage (distribution in Russian regions)

Type of families:	Share of "poor" families	Share of "dependent" families
One-parent families	min: 25.9 - max: 80.2 mean: 60.9	mean: 18.9
Couple with 1-2 children	min: 19.3 - max: 73.6 mean: 40.8	mean: 4.7
Couple with 3 or more children	min: 45.7 - max: 95.6 mean: 66.8	mean: 16.0
Nuclear families		mean: 3.7
Lone elderly people	min: 24.1 - max: 81.6 mean: 46.5	
Source: Survey of standard living and potentials of Russian population. MSS, 1996.		

The main problems confronting one-parent families are[4]:
- shortage of time to engage in paid work (or to do paid full-time work);
- low earnings and other barriers of the labour market;
- shortage of time to engage in childrearing;
- shortage of day care organisations and services;
- low level of father's participation in childrearing.

The origin of these problems is that women have an inferior position in the labour market, while men provide limited assistance in the family. Such indexes as official unemployment, work conditions, gap in wages, employment at high levels of responsibility and career ladders are much worse for women than men. For men, inequalities exist in the household sphere. For example, only a few years ago "maternal leave" was tranformed into "parental leave" and some social benefits for the father were made available. But these measures are only proclamations, because men do not interrupt their work because (in particular) of the gender gap in wages. Moreover, children from one-parent families practically always have only limited contacts with their fathers.

OPFs are characterised by factors such as economic "squeezing" and time shortage. The general characteristics of OPFs also are divided into two groups:

- Economic ones:

- high risk to have the status of a low-income family;

[4] We suppose that this classification and characteristics are similar for OPFs from all countries.

- mother's earnings are a barrier to exiting low-income status due to gender differentiation mechanisms in the labour market;
- improvement of material status may be attained not only by labour (qualities and potentials), but also by marriage (or existing sexual partner's support inside/outside of marriage);
- relatively higher material status could be achieved with household support or stronger family policy.

- Time-shortage ones:

- double responsibilities conflict is connected with tasks of obtaining income and childrearing;
- this conflict could be solved by a strong family policy or by household support (by grandmother or great-grandmother).

It is obvious that economic and time-shortage characteristics are linked with each other. Structural factors are significant ones. Mothers from one-parent families, nuclear families or families with elder generations will make professional re-entry in different ways. Lone mothers and mothers with child care support from a grandmother will return to the work place earlier than mothers from a nuclear family. In Russia, as a rule, mothers from OPFs use support of their mothers and grandmothers (second and third generations of parents could constitute the household unit due to problems with separate housing). Most often this support is in the form of baby-sitting rather than as financial assistance[5]. Another cause of OPF differences (at the regional level) is the type of family policy. If social and family policies provide a sufficient level of income by social payments, the material and time-shortage problems in OPFs will not be so acute.

According to expert estimates (ISEPP, MSS), in modern Russia approximately 70% of women from two-parent families (nuclear families) and 85% of lone mothers are working, with 15% of women from two-parent families and 15-23% of lone mothers having a second job. Very often a second job is the only way to reach middle and high levels of income for OPFs. The high level of female labour force participation is explained as a consequence of the Soviet "full employment" pattern, in which it was impossible to survive only with husband's earnings. The weak social support to OPFs is the cause of the higher labour force participation of lone mothers.

In general, the Russian pattern of female labour force participation is changing now. The level of economic activity is practically the same (51%). Labour force participation rates have decreased among older women (women going out of work) after 50 years. There are changes across generations: working children support their parents because they have more opportunity to find high earnings. During the Soviet period, parents obtained a pension, worked and supported their children. Moreover, there are structural changes in female employment, with a decrease of female

[5] Consequently, women - heads of OPFs - have at minimum two dependent persons: child and mother (because the level of pensions in Russia is low).

participation in modern advantaged branches (for example, the financial sector) (GKS, 1996b).

PERSPECTIVES OF FAMILY POLICY

What are the priorities for family policies? To improve the position of such impoverished families, there is a need to increase women's employment status, to redistribute responsibility for childrearing between mother and father and to develop "father-child" contacts, to spread social child care support. We say nothing about financial support of one-parent families because it is not significant to change the negative consequences of single-parent status. Moreover, the size of family benefits in Russia is very small. They have only a symbolic character now - approximately $20. Establishment of equal opportunities for women and men (that is for the lone mother and her former husband) to fulfill themselves in the parental and employment spheres is the significant challenge for policy-makers. It is necessary to reanalyse the division of labour in the family to improve women's social status and to reinforce the father's position.

REALITIES

What does happen with realisation of main principles of family policy in relation to OPFs - creation of a self-supporting system and increase of father support? Is it possible to do it?

In the transition period in Russia, a new "positive pattern" of family was formed: men had only work, women had only home work. Mass media propaganda, government laws (for example, prolongation of maternity leave to 3 years), and listlessness among hard-working women led to a "post-socialist patriarchy renaissance". Moreover, official and hidden unemployment involves substantial numbers of women withdrawing from the labour market[6]. The new economic situation in Russia has harmed economic status of women. Unemployment growth, the gender gap in wages, and occupational segregation all influence the competitiveness of lone mothers. The decline of social infrastructure (services and day care organisations) reinforces their positions. We should recognise that

[6] However, most men could not adapt to the new role of "breadwinner" under conditions of redistribution of property, deterioration of the environment, decreasing of living standards and loss of the old social security system. Consequences of such tendencies are increasing criminal activity, nervous disruption, etc.

development of women's position is a hard task now due to this deterioration.

Moreover, adaptive ways of improving the family's material position in our economy are secondary employment or work in the private sector. These ways demand more time and, consequently, are not well-suited to lone mothers.

Preliminary results of interviews concerning the self-support potential of lone mothers affirm our concerns. Lone mothers prefer to get higher benefits, but they do not want to improve their positions by themselves because in the modern Russian economy it is very hard for women to achieve, especially lone mothers. Due to time-shortage conflict, these families have less chances to become self-supporting. To facilitate this, it is necessary to create a system of privileges in credits, in day care for children, and in flexible work time.

On the contrary, new economic activities in Russia give us additional opportunities to increase "father-child" contacts in one-parent families. First, ways of providing material support have expanded: new models of inheritance involving real estate, share income, etc. Second, the sphere of applications has widened. One of the ways in which this participation has been manifested is direct payment for child care, education and health.

During the Soviet period, the former husband could have financial contact with the mother only by paying some sum of money as alimony. He could not control this sum. In the new conditions he can minimise contact with his former wife and expand contact with his children. Consequently, we should develop the system of father support to improve father-child contact because the environment enabling it is developing.

Another question is the mother's willingness to accept child care support from her former husband, on the one hand, and the father's willingness to provide it. The changes in legislation of father-child support should change the relation of men to it. But in our time we have "inheritance" of old pattern of relations between father and child in lone-mother families: only alimony payments. Moreover, due to the "invisibility" of much income (people do not make labour contracts and do not pay official taxes) the alimonies are calculated and paid only on a small part of income. Preliminary results of interviews show that lone mothers are not highly favorable to accepting physical child care support from their former husbands. They would like to have higher and more stable (more securable) financial assistance, but not help for child care. The only exception to this tendency is in the case where men were initiators of divorce, but women were initiators of divorce in more than 90% of all divorces. After divorce women do not like to trust in the husband, especially for child care.

The father also has low potential for this care if previous relations between the divorced couple excluded men from "father-child" relations. It is

necessary to create a policy environment with "father-child" contact advantages to change the stereotype and settings in future.

We should emphasise that changes in women's status and changes in family structure interconnect with each other. On the one hand, growth of one-parent families is followed by women's status improvement. On the other hand, such social strata will obstruct development of a "housewife family" pattern. First, the increase of this type of families leads to the necessity to maintain active female participation in the labour market. Second, the negative experience of such mothers who are not working will influence the strategies and preferences of other women.

Improved economic status of women could come from the following processes:
- Increased female labour force participation due to male losses during wars and catastrophes or in case of extensive economic development (Soviet period). Female labour force participation needs for the economy developed in an extensive way (Soviet economy). Support of family policy measures (leaves, child care) permits women to not interrupt their work.
- Narrowing of the gender gap in wages and improving of female occupational characteristics (equal exit in various sectors of the labour market, reduce occupational segregation, enhance educational and career possibilities, etc.) or, in general, facilitating the process of changes of gender roles and relations.
- Growth of economic well-being for all citizens in the economy.

Stability in the social position of lone mothers is based on changes of settings in reproductive, sexual and procreative behaviour, and changes of gender stereotypes. In modern Russia the main cause of growth of OPF's is changes in sexual and procreative behaviour, stereotypes and settings. An indirect indicator of this process is the growth of "out-of-wedlock" fertility and divorce. Neither growth of female employment, nor decreasing of gender differences, nor improvement of the standard of living in society are operative now in Russia.

CONCLUSION

The gender factor in demographic analysis is a significant one. Changing women's status has influences on family dynamics (fertility, nuptiality, divorce, etc.), and particularly on changes in family structure. Gender status improvement needs the elimination of gender stereotypes and of gender inequalities in household and outside. The dynamics, problems and perspectives of one-parent families are connected with improvements in women's (gender) status.

The main problems of such families are a decreasing living standard, rupture of "father-child" relations and time conflict due to the double task of childrearing and obtaining income. OPFs have characteristics of "poor" and "dependent" families. Family support and family policy could improve OPFs positions.

On the one hand, growth of one-parent families is followed by women's status improvement. On the other hand, such social strata will obstruct development of a "housewife family" pattern.

The perspectives of family policy are included as a way to increase women's employment status, promote redistribution of responsibility for childrearing between mother and father and development of father-child contacts, and encourage expansion of social child care support.

Single mothers have low potential for self-support in the present economic environment. It is necessary to create privileges for OPFs to include them in a self-supporting system.

Recent changes in legislation improved the conditions to develop father-child contact in OPFs. But many measures have only a "proclaimed" character and they are not used by people. Fathers have low potential for this care due to inertia of the old alimony system and stereotypes of gender relations. Lone mothers do not wish to accept physical child care support from their former husbands. They would like to have only higher and more stable (more securable) financial assistance, but not help for child care, except in the case where men were initiators of divorce.

Abbreviations

OPFs - One-parent families.
INF - Institute of National Forecasts.
ISEPP - Institute of Social and Economic Problems of Population.
MSS - Ministry of Social Security.

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- *Population of Russia in 1995*, INF, 1996.
- *Population of Russia in 1995*, INF, 1997.
- *Micro census data*, Goskomstat of Russia, (GKS), Moscow, 1994.
- *The Demographic Yearbook of Russia*, GKS, Moscow, 1995.
- *The Demographic Yearbook of Russia*, GKS, Moscow, 1996.
- *Family in Russia*, GKS, Moscow, 1996b.

ANNEX

Table 11.1.A. – Distribution of families with inadequate income (depth of poverty), for selected family types and by region

Type of family:	Region**						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
OPFs	9.7	24.2	37	15.4	34.7	26	15.7
Couple with 1-2 children	40.8	27.7	32.3	47.1	28.3	21.4	44.5
Total*	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Share of OPFs in region	11.5	13.6	16.4	12.5	11.7	12.7	14.4

* - sum is not equal 100% because we do not include other types of families in our table.
** - Regions: 1-Voroneg, 2-Magnitogorsk, 3-Moscow, 4-Orel, 5-Tver, 6-Chuvashya, 7-Astrakhan.
Source: Survey of standard living and potentials of Russian population, MSS, 1996.

Table 11.2.A. – Share of families with earnings from second job or independent incomes, percentage, Tver region, 1994

Type of family	Low income*	Middle income	High income	All families
Nuclear families with 1-2 children	3	19	32.4	14.6
Nuclear families with 3 and more children	13	27.8	100	18.9
One-parent families	11.4	26.5	50	15.3
All families with children	7.9	20.6	36.6	15.2

*poor families.
Source: Survey of standard living and potentials of Russian population, MSS, 1996.

12

THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND THE WELCOMING OF FAMILY MEMBERS FROM OUTSIDE THE NUCLEAR FAMILY IN AFRICA: THE CASES OF CAMEROON, COTE D'IVOIRE AND SENEGAL[1]

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The lineage family in Africa is generally presented as a patriarchal structure particularly oppressive for the African woman, which tends to promote her submission and exploitation for the benefit of men. The Western type of nuclear family is presented and perceived as an ideal model which can ensure her greater freedom and happiness. Certain evolutionary sociologists such as T. Parsons (1955) and W. Goode (1963) have even seen this model as one towards which all family models are bound to converge under the effect of "modernisation", a process of which women's emancipation is a part.

Moreover, the emergence of women as household heads in Africa is being talked about more and more (Tichit, 1994). And this access of women to the status of household head is to a greater or lesser degree seen as a sign of increased autonomy and independence from the extended family (Pilon, 1994). As a consequence there is reason to wonder what is the behavior of female heads of households with regard to welcoming members of the extended family within the nuclear family, notably as their socio-economic status improves. Do they continue to conform to traditional values concerning the welcoming of other members of the extended family or do they take this opportunity to "emotionally and economically nuclearise their families" (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987)? The objective of this study is to

[1] This study is part of research on family structures in sub-Saharan Africa focused on Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, being carried out at IFORD with the financial support of the French Ministry of Cooperation and of the *Agence Francophone Pour l'Enseignement de la Recherche (AUPELF-UREF)*.

answer these questions while attempting to compare the behavior of these women with that of their male counterparts.

SOME METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS

The study will deal with three African countries: Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. It will analyse household structure and more precisely family households[3]. Family households correspond to households where the head of the household has a family nucleus (complete or incomplete). Nuclearisation will therefore be studied by looking at the nuclear family of the head of the household and the household will be considered as extended if it includes at least one member from outside this nucleus.

The data used will be those from the most recent censuses carried out in Cameroon (RGPH-1987), Côte d'Ivoire (RGPH-1988) and Senegal (RGPH-1988), of which we have 10% samples. The study will thus include 135,997 family households in Cameroon, 126,330 in Côte d'Ivoire and 66,433 in Senegal, of which, 17,142 (13%), 15,643 (12%) and 7,997 (12%), respectively, are households headed by women.

The structure of the households will be analysed through the frequency and the intensity of the welcoming of people from outside the family nucleus, measured by the proportion of extended households and the proportion of family members from outside the family nucleus, respectively. The following indicators of socio-economic status will be used: education, employment, standard of living, occupancy status of the home and living space (i.e. the number of rooms). The socio-economic environment will also be taken into account through the degree of urbanisation.

Certain of these characteristics deserve more detailed explanations. To take into account the socio-economic environment or the degree of urbanisation, we have distinguished: (1) four strata for Cameroon: the two capitals (Yaoundé, the political capital; Douala, the economic capital), for which the socio-economic development is almost identical in both cases, but where populations often behave very differently; "Other Urban" (all the other towns in the country) and Rural; (2) and three strata for Côte d'Ivoire (Abidjan, "Other Urban" and Rural) and Senegal (Dakar, "Other Urban" and Rural).

Occupation includes 9 categories ranging from senior executives to middle management to workers and to farmers. However, to facilitate classification according to socio-economic status, these 9 categories have been grouped into three classes: "Upper Class" including senior executives, "Middle Class", including all the middle management (administrative and technical staff, Army, Police and Civil Defence personnel); "Working Class"

[3]The African family is certainly distinct from the household; however, we presume that family nuclearisation, if it occurs, does so through the nuclearisation of the households which make up the family.

(sellers and petty traders, hotel/restaurant/service staff, workers/labourers and farmers/livestock farmers/fishermen).

Given the available data, the standard of living index was established from: (1) the characteristics of the dwelling (building materials of walls, floor, lighting, water supply, facilities and energy used for cooking) for Cameroon; (2) characteristics of the dwelling and the possession of modern appliances (radio, television, refrigerator) for Côte d'Ivoire. For Senegal the index was constructed differently according to whether dwellings were in rural or urban areas: in urban areas, the number of radios, televisions, refrigerators, telephones and cookers owned by the household was used; and in rural areas the number of ploughs, carts and draught animals (horses and oxen) was added.

VARIATION BY SEX ACCORDING TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS

Among the three countries considered, Senegal is the one where the proportion of extended families is by far the highest (68%); followed by Côte d'Ivoire (57%). Most households in Cameroon are nuclear families, extended families representing only 45% of households; moreover, the proportion of members from outside of the nuclear family is only 17% in Cameroon compared with 28% in Côte d'Ivoire and 35% in Senegal. This situation is the same regardless of the sex of the household head. However, curiously, as we had already observed in a previous study on Cameroon (Wakam & Kuépié, 1996), in these three countries, it is among female-headed households that: (1) there is a higher proportion of extended families: 49% compared with 45% among male-headed households in Cameroon, 60% compared with 57% in Côte d'Ivoire, 69% compared with 68% in Senegal; and (2) the welcoming of outsiders within the family nucleus is of greater intensity: 25% compared with 17% in Cameroon, 37% compared with 27% in Côte d'Ivoire and 42% compared with 35% in Senegal.

Tables 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3 show the variations in the frequency and intensity of the welcoming of household members from outside the family nucleus (measured respectively by the proportion of extended households and the proportion of members from outside the family nucleus) according to socio-economic characteristics (urbanisation, the level of education of the head of the household, and his or her socio-professional category, the household's standard of living, the status of occupancy of their home and the number of rooms available) and the sex of the head of the household (HH).

Urbanisation

On the whole and for both sexes, the frequency and intensity of the welcoming of household members from outside the family nucleus are mostly positively associated with urbanisation in Cameroon and reach a peak in Yaounde (Table 12.1). The proportion of extended households thus went from 41% in rural areas to 51% in secondary cities, 53% in Douala and

61% in Yaounde, whereas the proportion of people from outside the family nucleus varied from 16% in rural areas to 20% in Douala and secondary cities and 24% in Yaounde. But whatever the socio-economic environment, women household heads proportionally welcome more people from outside the family nucleus than do men: 25% compared with 19% in Douala, 31% compared with 23% in Yaounde, 27% compared with 19% in "Other Urban Areas" and 23% compared with 15% in rural areas.

The effect of urbanisation in Côte d'Ivoire is different from that in Cameroon. On the whole urbanisation tends to favour family nuclearisation of households by reducing the proportion of outsiders to the family nucleus. This proportion goes from 30% in rural areas to 24% in Abidjan (Table 12.2). But its effect varies according to sex: whereas urbanisation tends to decrease the welcoming of outsiders by men, it tends to favour it among women, notably when comparing rural areas with secondary cities (36% compared with 41% for the proportion of outsiders to the family nucleus).

In Senegal nuclearisation tends to grow with the degree of urbanisation for households in general and for households headed by men (Table 12.3). The proportion of extended households thus goes from 69% in rural areas down to 64% in Dakar and the intensity from 37% to 31%. However, among households headed by women, nuclearisation is much more pronounced in rural areas than urban areas: 64% of rural households compared with 72% of households in Dakar headed by women include at least one person external to the family nucleus and the proportion of outsiders to the family nucleus rises from 39% in rural areas to 44% in Dakar.

Education of the Household Head

In Cameroon, education was measured according to the schooling level reached (Table 12.1) and the highest degree obtained. These two variables are positively correlated with the proportion of extended households as well as with that of outsiders to the family nucleus. This is the case for all household heads as well as for each sex. However, whatever the degree obtained and whatever the level of education, women welcome more outsiders than men. For the degree, for example (results are not presented in the table), this proportion is 23% compared with 17% among people "having no degree", 28% compared with 22% among people having a "BEPC or general school certificate", 35% compared with 24% among people having passed the "Baccalauréat or end of secondary exam" and 42% compared with 27% among people having a "university degree".

We observed a similar although less pronounced trend in Côte d'Ivoire: it was among the more educated heads of households (upper

secondary and university graduate levels) that the frequency and intensity of welcoming of people from outside the family nucleus is highest. Thus, 75 to 76% of households headed by people having been to upper-level secondary school or university are extended compared with 68% among the "lower-level secondary", 56% among the "primary" and 54% of households where the head had "no schooling". The proportion of residents from outside the family nucleus is 35%, 29%, 26% and 28%, respectively. The tendancy is practically the same for men and women. But whatever the level of education observed, women definitely welcome outsiders more than men (Table 12.2).

Contrary to Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire, education tends to be negatively associated with the welcoming of those from outside the family nucleus in Senegal. The relation is, however, somewhat variable: among women, but not among men, education tends to increase the frequency of extended families, which goes from 69% among the category with "no schooling" to 73% among the "upper-level secondary and university" category (Table 12.3). Moreover, as in Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, whatever the level of education, households headed by men are less likely to include outsiders than those headed by women.

Occupation

Occupation is negatively associated with family nuclearisation of households in Cameroon on the whole and whatever the sex of the head. The situation is almost identical in Côte d'Ivoire, but quite different in Senegal. However, in almost all the socio-professional categories studied, men welcome outsiders much less than women do. In Cameroon, for example, intensity (the percentage of household members not from the nuclear family) is 15% in male-headed households compared with 24% in female-headed households in the "lower class", 20% compared with 31% in the "middle class" and 23% compared with 30% in the "upper class".

Table 12.1. – Percentage of extended households and of persons from outside the family nucleus according to the sex of the head of the household (HH) and certain socio-economic characteristics in Cameroon ("Family" Households)

Socioeconomic Characteristics	% of extended households			% of persons from outside the family nucleus		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
Urbanisation:						
1. Yaoundé	61	61	61	23	31	24
2. Douala	53	53	53	19	25	20
3. Other cities	51	53	51	19	27	20
4. Rural	41	44	41	15	23	16
Educational level of the HH:						
1. University	67	83	67	26	41	27
2. Secondary (upper)	64	69	64	24	31	24
3. Secondary (lower)	56	55	56	21	27	21
4. Primary	48	50	49	18	23	19
5. No education or kindergarten only	38	46	39	14	24	15
Socio-professional category of HH (occupation):						
1. Management, scientists, professionals, and related	62	69	63	23	34	24
2. Legislative, executive and management	64	81	64	24	36	24
3. Business managers and entrepreneurs	55	51	54	20	25	21
4. Administrative and technical personnel	60	64	61	21	31	22
5. Armed forces, Police & Civil Defence	54	78	54	18	31	18
6. Salesmen and tradesmen	50	50	50	18	25	19
7. Hotel/restaurant/services	45	49	46	16	26	17
8. Non-agricultural workers and laborers	48	50	48	18	24	18
9. Farmers and fishermen	40	45	40	15	23	15
10. Others	48	49	49	22	25	23
Standard of living of household:						
1. Very high	63	75	64	25	34	26
2. High	66	66	66	23	30	24
3. Average	57	57	57	21	27	21
4. Low	54	52	53	19	26	20
5. Very low	44	48	45	17	25	18
Home occupancy status:						
1. Owner with deed	60	63	61	21	30	23
2. Owner with no deed	43	48	44	16	24	17
3. Tenant (renters)	47	47	47	18	22	19
4. Housed by employer	49	49	49	18	23	18
5. Free accommodation (other)	39	40	39	16	19	16
Number of rooms:						
1. 1 Room	16	24	17	07	12	08
2. 2 Rooms	26	34	27	10	16	10
3. 3 Rooms	37	43	38	13	20	14
4. 4 Rooms	47	53	47	16	24	17
5. 5 Rooms	54	60	55	18	28	19
6. 6 or 7 rooms	57	63	58	20	31	21
7. 8 rooms and over	63	67	63	21	33	22
Total	45	49	45	17	25	17

Source: RGPH-1987 (Census).

Table 12.2. – Percentage of extended households and of persons from outside the family nucleus according to the sex of the head of the household (HH) and certain socioeconomic characteristics in Cote d'Ivoire ("Family" households)

Socioeconomic Characteristics	% of extended households			% of persons from outside the family nucleus		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
Urbanisation:						
1. Abidjan	54	64	56	23	37	24
2. Other cities	57	64	58	27	41	29
4. Rural	57	58	57	29	36	30
Educational level of the HH:						
1. University	74	82	75	34	45	35
2. Secondary technical	77	85	78	32	46	34
3. Secondary (upper)	75	84	76	33	45	33
4. Secondary (lower)	67	73	68	28	40	29
5. Primary	56	58	56	26	34	26
6. Can read and write	57	58	57	26	34	26
7. Koranic school	47	59	48	25	35	25
8. Cannot read or write	54	59	54	27	37	28
Socio-professional category of HH (occupation):						
1. Management, scientists, professionals and related	78	87	79	32	47	32
2. Legislative, executive and management	73	80	73	32	36	33
3. Business managers and entrepreneurs	62	79	63	29	39	29
4. Administrative and technical personnel	69	85	71	27	44	29
5. Armed forces, Police & Civil Defence	84	10	84	32	82	32
6. Salesmen and tradesmen	46	58	49	23	36	26
7. Hotel/restaurant/services	34	36	34	15	25	15
8. Non-agricultural workers and labourers	49	64	49	22	35	22
9. Farmers and fishermen	56	57	56	29	35	29
Standard of living of household:						
1. Very high	79	85	80	34	46	35
2. High	78	87	79	31	48	33
3. Average	64	78	65	28	45	30
4. Low	50	60	51	25	38	26
5. Very low	54	55	54	27	34	28
Home occupancy status:						
1. Owner	60	63	61	30	40	31
2. Tenant (renter)	48	53	48	20	31	21
3. Housing provided by employer	61	77	62	26	42	27
4. Other	46	55	47	24	35	26
Number of rooms:						
1. 1 Room	24	37	27	12	21	14
2. 2 Rooms	39	56	41	15	30	17
3. 3 Rooms	60	75	62	23	40	25
4. 4 Rooms	70	81	71	28	44	29
5. 5 Rooms	76	84	77	32	49	33
6. 6 or 7 rooms	82	89	82	36	54	38
7. 8 rooms and over	91	92	91	46	58	46
Total:	57	60	57	27	37	28

Source: RGPH-1988 (Census).

Table 12.3. – Percentage of extended households and of persons from outside the family nucleus according to the sex of the head of the household (HH) and certain socioeconomic characteristics in Senegal ("Family" households)

Socioeconomic Characteristics	% of extended households			% of persons from outside the family nucleus		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
Urbanisation:						
1. Dakar	61	72	64	29	44	31
2. Other cities	66	71	67	32	44	34
4. Rural	70	64	69	37	39	37
Educational level of the HH:						
1. University	66	73	66	28	40	28
2. Secondary (upper)	67	73	68	30	37	30
3. Secondary (lower)	65	68	65	29	34	29
4. Primary	68	70	68	32	36	32
5. No education	68	69	68	36	44	36
Socio-professional category of HH:						
1. Management, scientists, professionals and related	64	68	64	27	50	28
2. Legislative, executive and management	70	100	70	27	52	27
3. Business managers and entrepreneurs	65	72	66	29	35	30
4. Administrative and technical personnel	67	90	68	26	37	26
5. Armed forces, Police & Civil Defence	61	100	61	25	33	25
6. Salesmen and tradesmen	59	71	63	30	43	33
7. Hotel/restaurant/services	57	71	58	24	37	24
8. Non-agricultural workers and labourers	64	65	64	29	39	29
9. Farmers and fishermen	69	62	69	36	38	36
Standard of living of household:						
1. Very high	85	87	85	48	60	49
2. High	84	84	84	42	54	43
3. Average	75	80	76	37	48	38
4. Low	64	71	65	30	42	32
5. Very low	53	57	53	25	32	26
Home occupancy status:						
1. Owner	72	73	72	37	45	37
2. Co-owner	50	56	51	22	30	23
3. Tenant (renter)	51	58	52	22	32	23
4. Sub-tenant (sub-renter)	54	65	55	24	30	25
5. Housed by employer	60	76	61	24	40	25
4. Housed by family	61	63	61	31	38	31
Number of rooms:						
1. 1 Room	24	36	27	9	19	11
2. 2 Rooms	49	60	51	18	29	20
3. 3 Rooms	66	74	67	26	38	27
4. 4 Rooms	76	85	77	32	49	33
5. 5 Rooms	83	87	84	37	52	38
6. 6 or 7 rooms	89	93	89	43	59	44
7. 8 rooms and over	93	94	93	54	67	55
Total:	68	69	68	35	42	35

Sources: RGPH-1988 (Census).

Standard of Living

The proportion of extended households, as with the proportion of "outsiders", is positively correlated with the standard of living in Senegal, in general and for both sexes (Table 12.3). Overall, it goes from 53% among households whose standard of living is "very low" to 76% among those whose standard of living is "average" and 85% among those whose standard of living is "very high".

The pattern observed in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire is almost identical. The proportion of extended households in Cameroon (Table 12.1) goes from 45% among the poorest category ("very low" standard of living) to 57% among the households whose standard of living is "average" and 64% among the wealthiest ("very high" standard of living). In Côte d'Ivoire (Table 12.2) it varies from 54% to 65% and to 80%, respectively, for these 3 categories.

The study of the variation according to sex of the household head shows that the structure is almost identical for men and for women. But in practically all cases it is among women that nuclear families are less frequent and the welcoming of "outsiders" more intense (Tables 12.1, 12.2 and 12.3).

Home Occupancy Status

The 1987 census in Cameroon distinguished 5 categories of home occupancy status: "owner with deed", "owner without deed", "renter", "accommodation provided by employer" and "free accommodation not provided by employer". As Table 12.1 shows, the heads of households who are owners of their homes "with a deed" are the ones who include outsiders most with 61% being extended households and 23% with outsiders not from the family nucleus compared with 47% and 19% respectively among renters, and 39% and 16% respectively who have free housing not from an employer. But in all cases the greatest number of outsiders not from the family nucleus were welcomed by female heads of households.

The situation is quite comparable in Côte d'Ivoire: the heads of households who own their homes or live in accommodations provided by their employers welcome more outsiders, with 61% and 62% having extended households, respectively, compared with 48% among renters on the one hand, and on the other with 31% and 27% being "outsiders" compared with 21% among people living in rented accommodations. A higher standard of living, as indicated by the status of home-owner or of a person whose lodging is provided by his/her employer, tends to favour the

welcoming of outsiders, both in frequency and in intensity, among both men and women (Table 12.2). Moreover, whatever the occupancy status, women household heads are more welcoming than men.

In Senegal, the proportion of extended households and outsiders not from the family nucleus is highest among home-owners (72% and 37%, respectively); followed by those housed by the family (61% and 31%) or by the employer (61% and 25%). This is the case irrespective of sex; however, the frequency and intensity of welcoming of outsiders is higher in every case among women than among men (Table 12.3).

Available Space

In the three countries, the number of rooms available is very strongly and positively correlated with the welcoming of outsiders not from the family nucleus as much in frequency as in intensity: the proportion of extended households in Cameroon goes from 17% for households living in one room to 63% for households living in 8 rooms or more; in Côte d'Ivoire from 27% to 91%; and in Senegal from 27% to 93%. The proportion of "outsiders" goes from 8% to 22% in Cameroon, from 14% to 46% in Côte d'Ivoire and from 11% to 55% in Senegal. This relation is the same for both sexes; however, in all cases, women household heads include outsiders more.

To sum up, it would appear that among women, as well as men, economic power, seen in terms of standard of living, occupancy status and living space (number of rooms), is very positively associated with the extension of family households in the three countries studied in the survey. The same applies for level of education and employment in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire, as opposed to Senegal where the situation remains quite different. As for urbanisation, it tends to be positively associated with the welcoming of outsiders among female heads of households in the three countries, whereas among men this is only the case in Cameroon and tends rather to be negatively associated in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. However, on the whole, as well as in almost all the social categories observed, it is paradoxically the women who welcome outsiders both more frequently and to a higher degree.

AN ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY FACTORS EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MALE AND FEMALE HEADS OF HOUSEHOLDS IN WELCOMING PERSONS NOT FROM THE FAMILY NUCLEUS

The previous analyses show that not only is the welcoming of "outsiders" rather positively associated with socio-economic status among

both men and women, but that it is also more frequent and of greater intensity among women heads of households. This result was unexpected since there is reason to believe a priori that if such a difference did exist it would be in favour of men. On the one hand, men are expected to have greater resources, which would allow them to provide for the needs of the nuclear family and possibly take on persons from outside their family nucleus. On the other hand, if one follows, for instance, the reasoning of feminist theoreticians, with greater autonomy, independence and authority through acceeding to the status of head of the family, women, who are traditionally supposed to be oppressed and exploited by the large patriarchal African family, will be able to decide themselves what their family life is to be like and therefore will not hesitate to "emotionally and economically nuclearise their family" (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987). This point therefore deserves further study. That is why we wished to know which among the socio-economic, socio-demographic and cultural characteristics contributed most to explaining the reasons for this difference in favour of women when it came to welcoming persons not from the family nucleus.

To answer this question we used multiple classification analysis (MCA). The dependent variable here is the proportion of outsiders not from the family nucleus. The indicators selected to represent socio-economic status are: economic environment (or degree of urbanisation), educational level of the head of the household, standard of living and the number of rooms. These variables, as well as cultural and ideological background, as indicated by ethnic origin in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal and by place of birth in Cameroon[4], will serve as control variables. This will also be the case for marital status[5], the type of family (conjugal/single-parent/parental)[6] and the age of the head of the household.

The successive inclusion (as control variables) of these different variables in models using two variables, one of which is sex, makes it possible to obtain the "gross" (unadjusted) effect of each of these variables on the variation in the proportion of outsiders not from the family. The results were: (1) all the socio-economic variables tend rather to increase this difference or at least to maintain it: in other words, if the women had a level of socio-economic development comparable to that of the men (whose level is, on average, higher), the women would welcome outsiders even more; (2) the age of the head of the household and the size of the household also tend to increase the difference, whereas marital status, the type of family

[4] Ethnic origin and religion were not included in the data gathered in Cameroon.

[5] In which "polygamous" will be used to describe a man with two wives or more, or a woman whose husband is polygamous.

[6] (1) "conjugal" household: a household including a head of the household and his spouse or spouses and possibly other people, without the head's children; (2) "single-parent" household: a household including the head of the household, his/her children and possibly other people, without a spouse; (3) "parental" household: a household including the head of the household, the spouse or spouses, the head's children and possibly other people.

(conjugal/single-parent/parental) and the cultural or ideological background (ethnic origin or place of birth of the head of the household) tend rather to reduce it.

Tables 12.1.A, 12.2.A and 12.3.A, in the Appendix, present the results of the multivariate analysis obtained by the successive and cumulative introduction of all of the different control variables in the initial model using one variable: the sex of the head of the household[7]. The variables for which the "gross" effect tends to increase the difference were introduced first, followed by others. The results were the following :

– The difference between the two sexes is maintained even after all the control variables are included.

– The difference in favour of women increases by 1% in Cameroon, 4% in Côte d'Ivoire and 5% in Senegal after including socio-economic variables (model M4), going from 8% (gross) to 9% in Cameroon, from 10% to 14% in Côte d'Ivoire and from 8% to 13% in Senegal. It grows further by 1, 3 and 2 points, respectively, with the inclusion of the size of the household (model M5), and brings the (adjusted) difference to 10% in Cameroon, 17% in Côte d'Ivoire and 15% in Senegal, in favour of women. The β statistic then goes from 0.12 to 0.15 for Cameroon, from 0.11 to 0.20 for Côte d'Ivoire and from 0.08 to 0.16 for Senegal.

– The introduction of other socio-demographic and cultural variables (place of birth or ethnic group, marital status and type of family), does not only narrow the gap, but also tends to cancel out or even reverse the situation. Thus, controlling for marital status and the variables mentioned above (model M7) narrows the gap down to 5% in Cameroon, to 8% in Côte d'Ivoire and to 13% in Senegal. Including the type of family (conjugal/single-parent/parental) eliminates the difference between the sexes in Senegal and leads to a difference of 1 point in Cameroon and of 3 points in Côte d'Ivoire, but in this case the difference is in favour of men.

Marital status of the head of the household and especially the type of family (conjugal, single-parent or parental) definitely appear as crucial variables in determining the observed difference in the welcoming of outsiders not from the family nucleus. This may be easier to understand if one refers to the structure of each of the two sexes according to marital status and the type of family. In Cameroon, for example, whereas 97% of male heads of households are married, monogamous (75%) or polygamous (22%), only 32% of women household heads are married (21% to monogamous men and 11% to polygamous men). By contrast, 68% of

[7]It should be noted that this involves an analysis weighted by size; but on the whole the results point in the same direction as those obtained without weighting, level of significance included. Actually, almost all the results of the unweighted analysis were very significant (1 per thousand). However, we did weighted analyses with the aim of obtaining proportions identical to those obtained previously in the descriptive analysis (Tables 12.1 to 12.3).

women heads of households are either single (15%), widowed (43%) or divorced (10%) compared with only 1% of men in each of these three categories. But households headed by non-married men or women (single/widowed/divorced) tend to be less nuclear than those headed by married persons. At the same time, however, it should also be noted that it is precisely among married heads of households that women welcome outsiders more than men[8].

As far as the structure according to the type of family is concerned, in Cameroon, for example, more than 92% of family households headed by women are single-parent households compared with 4% among men, for whom most households are mainly of the parental type (79% compared with 6% among women). However, in the three countries, the parental type households are the ones which welcome outsiders the least (Tables 12.1.A, 12.2.A and 12.3.A). It should also be noted, though, that among the parental type households, those with women heads also welcome outsiders more. In fact, as Table 12.4 below shows, in households where the couple cohabits (conjugal and parental households), the women heads of households welcome outsiders more than their male counterparts: + 7% and + 3% in Cameroon, + 13% and + 8% in Côte d'Ivoire and + 1% and + 6% in Senegal, for conjugal and parental type households, respectively. On the other hand, in single-parent households, women tend to welcome outsiders as much (the case in Cameroon) or less than men (the case in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal with - 7%). The situation is practically the same regarding frequency in welcoming outsiders (proportion of extended families), except in Cameroon, where the difference remains in favour of women even among single-parent households (Table 12.4). Analysis according to place of residence, sex and type of family, in the case of Cameroon, also points to the fact that although single-parent households headed by men tend to welcome outsiders more than those headed by women in Yaounde and Douala (the two largest cities in the country), the opposite is true in the smaller cities and towns ("Other Urban Areas") and in rural areas. Similarly, for households in which the couple cohabits (conjugal and parental households), women heads welcome outsiders more frequently and to a greater extent whatever the place of residence.

[8]In Cameroon, for example, the proportion of persons from outside the family nucleus in households headed by women is 21% compared with 18% among households headed by men for monogamous heads and 23% compared with 14%, respectively, among polygamous heads.

Table 12.4. – Percentages of extended households and of outsiders not from the family nucleus according to the sex of the Head of the Household and the type of family nucleus in Cameroon (1987) in Côte d'Ivoire (1988) and in Senegal (1988) (Family households)

Country and type of household	% of extended households			% of outsiders not from the family nucleus		
	Male head (1)	Female head (2)	Difference (2)-(1)	Male head (1)	Female head (2)	Difference (2)-(1)
CAMEROON						
1. Conjugal	41	50	+ 9	30	37	+ 7
2. Single-parent	46	49	+ 3	25	25	0
3. Parental	46	51	+ 5	15	18	+ 3
COTE D'IVOIRE						
1. Conjugal	50	62	+12	43	56	+13
2. Single-parent	64	60	- 4	44	37	- 7
3. Parental	57	77	+20	26	34	+ 8
SENEGAL						
1. Conjugal	76	84	+ 8	68	69	+ 1
2. Single-parent	71	69	- 2	50	43	- 7
3. Parental	67	74	+ 7	32	38	+ 6

Source: Censuses of the different countries.

These results raise several questions. Although it is understandable that single-parent households headed by women, with less purchasing power, tend to welcome outsiders less than or as much as those headed by men, who usually support extended families, there is reason to wonder why conjugal or parental households (i.e., with cohabiting couples) headed by women welcome outsiders not from the family nucleus more than those headed by men. It should also be noted that this difference in favour of women is maintained in the three countries even when one applies the different multivariate models mentioned above only to the households where the couples cohabit (conjugal and parental households). A multivariate analysis by place of residence also reveals, in the case of Abidjan, a difference in favour of women which remains for all the different types of family households, i.e., single-parent, parental and conjugal households together. Could it be that women heads of households who are married and cohabit with their husbands take advantage of their decision-making power and sharing of decisions with their husbands concerning the management of the household, leading to the presence of a greater number of outsiders not from the family nucleus? This is likely, especially for the members of their lineage family. But who are these women who head households in which the husbands live?

Table 12.5. – Some results obtained from the Multiple Classification Analysis (MCA) of the proportion of outsiders not from the family nucleus in households headed by women in Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal (Family households)

Independent Variables	Cameroon			Côte d'Ivoire			Senegal		
	M1	M4	M9	M1	M4	M9	M1	M4	M9
	A,B, ..., H	A to D	A to H #	A,B, ..., H	A to D	A to H #	A,B, ..., H	A to D	A to H #
A. *Urbanisation:*									
Relation with the dependent variable	+	+	+	+	-	-	+	+	-
(n) and (ß) statistics	.10	.09	.04	.08	.0	.02	.07	.08	.02
B. *Level of education of HH:*									
Relation with the dependent variable	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-
(n) and (ß) statistics	.08	.07	.09	.08	.06	.08	.10	.14	.05
C. *Standard of living:*									
Relation with the dependent variable	+	+	+	+	+	+-	+	+	+
(n) and (ß) statistics	.10	.03	.01	.16	.09	.02	.26	.09	.05
D. *Living space:*									
Relation with the dependent variable	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
(n) and (ß) statistics	.26	.26	.08	.43	.42	.10	.47	.43	.17
E. *Size of household:*									
Relation with the dependent variable	+		+	+		+	+		+
(n) and (ß) statistics	.43		.45	.61		.53	.57		.47
F. *Place of birth of HH:*									
(n) and (ß) statistics	.17		.07	.25		.07	.08		.06
G. *Marital status of HH:*									
(n) and (ß) statistics	.11		.10	.24		.11	.20		.09
H. *Type of household:*									
(n) and (ß) statistics	.10		.20	.06		.13	.10		.18
R^2 Statistic (%)		9 %	30 %		20 %	47 %		24 %	46 %

#: With the age of the head of the household as a covariate.
M1, M4, M9: Model with 1, 4 and 9 independent variables, respectively.
+, -, +- : positive, negative, curvilinear relationship (respectively) between the dependent variable and the explanatory variable being considered.
Level of significance: all results have a level of significance of at least 1%.
Source: in Cameroon: Census-1987, in Côte d'Ivoire: Census -1988 and in Senegal: Census -1988.

Undoubtedly, other studies will be needed to get a better understanding of the situation. Meanwhile, to conclude we will note that the results in Tables 12.1.A, 12.2.A and 12.3.A (in the Appendix) also show that socio-economic development is far from leading to a nuclearisation of the family in Africa, as evolutionary sociologists such as Talcott Parsons (1955) and William Goode (1963)[9] had predicted in the 50s and 60s. On the contrary, economic power tends rather to be positively and very significantly

[9] For in-depth studies on this question, see Wakam (1995, 1996) and Wakam *et al*. (1996).

associated with the welcoming of persons from outside the family nucleus, especially in female-headed households, as shown in the results in Table 12.5.

SUMMARY AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The objective of this study was to evaluate the impact of the socio-economic status of female heads of households on their behavior concerning the welcoming of people from outside the family nucleus, in relation to that of their male counterparts. It concerns family households (households including at least one family nucleus) drawn from 10% samples from censuses in Cameroon (1987), Côte d'Ivoire (1988) and Senegal (1988). Socio-economic status is measured by the level of education and the socio-professional (occupational) category of the head of the household, the standard of living of the household, the number of rooms and occupancy status. The welcoming of outsiders not from the family nucleus is measured by the proportion of extended households (frequency) and the proportion of household members who are outsiders (intensity). The study involved two types of analysis: (1) a descriptive analysis aimed at revealing the differences and the similarities between the behavior of heads of households of both sexes concerning family nuclearisation as well as the variations occurring with improved socio-economic status; (2) a multivariate analysis to try to identify the factors explaining the differences observed between male and female heads of households regarding the welcoming of outsiders not from the family nucleus. The results show the following:

– Among both men and women, socio-economic status (or power), as can be evaluated through the standard of living and the living space especially, tends to be positively associated with the extension of family households in the three countries. In short, nuclearisation tends to occur more at the lower end of the social scale and the poorest households tend to be more often nuclearised, whether headed by men or women.

– Households headed by women tend to welcome more outsiders not from the family nucleus (in frequency and intensity) than those headed by men. And in households having more or less identical socio-economic status (or levels of modernisation), this difference between the sexes concerning the welcoming of outsiders tends to increase in favour of women. In other words, female heads of households would welcome outsiders even more, compared with their male counterparts, if they enjoyed the same socio-economic status.

– This difference in favour of women is strongly linked to the differential structure by sex with respect to the type of family (conjugal, single-parent and parental). However, although for single-parent households analysis by

type of family tends to cancel out the difference (the case of Cameroon) or to reverse it in favour of men (the case of Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal), this is not the case for households where the spouses cohabit (conjugal or parental households), because the difference in favour of women is maintained even in the case of the most complete multivariate models. Further studies will certainly be needed in order to gain a better understanding of this.

But meanwhile it would seem that the possible autonomy or authority linked to women gaining access to the status of head of the household does not necessarily imply a rejection of family traditions, and does not seem to dispense them from the obligation of solidarity towards other members of the extended family. On the contrary, access to improved economic status enables them, as is the case with men, to welcome more outsiders not from the family nucleus. This fact must be taken into account and promotion of the status of women should not be based on the hope for a hypothetical emergence of the nuclear family. Surely it would be better to try and identify what African family concepts and practices have best to offer (in human and social terms) and use these positive aspects to promote mutually supportive human development.

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APPENDIX

Table 12.1.A. – Multiple classification analysis of the proportion of outsiders not from the family nucleus in Cameroon (Family households)

Independent variables	N	Deviations from the overall average =0.18#									
		Gross	Net in relation to the independent variables considered and the "age of the head of the household (HH)" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov+ A to I
	135 997	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
A. *Sex of the HH:*											
1. Male	118 855	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	.00	.00
2. Female	17 142	.07	07	.07	.07	.08	.09	.08	.04	-.01	-.01
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.12)	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)	(.13)	(.15)	(.13)	(.07)	(.02)	(.02)
Level of signif.		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
B. *Socio-economic environment:*											
1. Yaoundé	7 513	.07	.06	.03	.03	.04	.03	.03	.02	.02	.02
2. Douala	10 993	.03	.02	.00	-.01	.01	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01
3. Other cities	30 072	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01
4. Rural	87 419	-.02	-.02	-.01	.00	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.12)	(.11)	(.06)	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Level of signif.		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
C. *Level of education of HH:*											
1. University	2 470	.09		.08	.07	.06	.07	.05	.04	.05	.05
2. Secondary (upper)	5 564	.07		.06	.05	.06	.06	.04	.03	.04	.04
3. Secondary (lower)	2 720	.04		.03	.03	.03	.03	.01	.00	.01	.01
4. Primary	44 647	.01		.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
5. No education	70 101	-.02		-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.01	.00	-.01	-.01
6. Other	495	.04		.04	.04	.03	.02	.01	.01	.00	.00
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.14)		(.13)	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)	(.06)	(.05)	(.06)	(.05)
Level of signif.		***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
D. *Level of comfort in the home:*											
1. Very high	1 699	.08			.03	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
2. High	6 152	.07			.03	.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
3. Average	6 459	.04			.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
4. Low	22 354	.03			.01	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
5. Very low	50 261	.00			.01	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
6. Other	49 072	-.03			-.02	-.01	-.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.14)			(.07)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.01)	(.01)
Level of signif.		***			***	***	***	***	***	***	***

Table 12.1.A. (continued)

Independent variables	N	Deviations from the overall average =0.18#									
		Gross	Net in relation to the independent variables considered and the "age of the head of the household (HH)" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov+ A to I
	135 997	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
E. *Living space:*											
1. 1 Room	8 348	-.10				-.10	-.05	-.05	-.06	-.04	-.04
2. 2 Rooms	21 204	-.07				-.07	-.04	-.04	-.05	-.03	-.03
3. 3 Rooms	24 102	-.04				-.03	-.02	-.01	-.03	-.02	-.02
4. 4 Rooms	23 659	-.01				-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
5. 5 Rooms	18 909	.02				.01	.01	.01	.01	.00	.00
6. 6 or 7 Rooms	21 025	.03				.03	.02	.02	.02	.01	.01
7. 8 Rooms or more	17 656	.04				.05	.02	.02	.04	.03	.04
8. Other	1 094	.00				.00	.00	-.01	-.01	.00	.00
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.20)				(.20)	(.11)	(.10)	(.14)	(.11)	(.11)
Level of signif.		***				***	***	***	***	***	***
F. *Household size:*											
1. 2 people	15 717	-.17					-.15	-.16	-.18	-.46	-.46
2. 3 people	17 730	-.08					-.06	-.06	-.08	-.17	-.17
3. 4 people	18 262	-.04					-.03	-.03	-.05	-.08	-.08
4. 5 people	17 409	-.02					-.02	-.02	-.03	-.04	-.04
5. 6 people	15 719	-.01					-.01	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.01
6. 7 people	13 376	.00					.00	.00	-.01	.01	.01
7. 8-9 people	17 985	.02					.01	.01	.01	.04	.04
8. 10 people or more	19 799	.05					.04	.04	.07	.10	.10
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.25)					(.21)	(.21)	(.29)	(.57)	(.57)
Level of signif.		***					***	***	***	***	***
G. *Place of birth of HH:*											
1. Yaoundé	1 421	.06						.05	.04	.03	.03
2. Douala	1 780	.05						.04	.03	.02	.02
3. Adamaoua	6 338	-.03						.00	.01	.00	.00
4. Centre	15 778	.06						.05	.04	.03	.03
5. East	6 176	.01						.03	.02	.02	.02
6. Far North	29 590	-.04						-.02	-.02	-.01	-.01
7. Coast	6 588	.04						.02	.01	.00	.00
8. North	9 334	-.03						-.01	.00	.00	.00
9. North-West	16 320	.00						-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
10. West	25 652	.00						-.03	-.02	-.01	-.01
11. South	5 305	.07						.08	.07	.05	.05
12. South-West	6 776	.02						.00	.00	.00	.00
13 Foreigner	4 939	-.04						-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.19)						(.15)	(.12)	(.08)	(.09)
Level of signif.		***						***	***	***	***

Table 12.1.A. (continued)

Independent variables	N	Deviations from the overall average =0.18#									
		Gros s	Net in relation to the independent variables considered and the "age of the head of the household (HH)" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov+ A to I
	135 997	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
H. Marital status of HH:											
1. Single	3493	.06							.09	.07	.07
2. Monogamous	92940	.00							.03	.03	.03
3. Polygamous	28082	-.02							-.07	-.07	-.07
4. Widowed	8495	.06							.08	.05	.05
5. Divorced	2987	.01							.08	.05	.05
(n) and (ß) statistics		(.10) ***							(.25) ***	(.23) ***	(.23) ***
Level of significance											
I. Type of household:											
2. Conjugal	22186	.04								.33	.33
3. Single-parent	20448	.04								.10	.10
4. Parental	93363	-.02								-.05	-.05
(n) and (ß) statistics		(.15) ***								(.53) ***	(.53) ***
Level of significance											
Statistics R^2 (%)			2.6	3.9	4.2	8.2	11.6	13.4	17.3	39.9	39.9
Increase (%)			-	1.3	0.3	4.0	3.4	1.8	3.9	22.6	0.0

#: Average weighted by size.
Level of significance: * .05; ** .01; *** .001
Source: Census –1987

Table 12.2.A. – Multiple classification analysis of the proportion of outsiders not from the family nucleus in Côte d'Ivoire (Family households)

Independent variables	N	Deviations in relation to the overall average =.28 #									
		Gross	Net in relation to the independent considered and in relation to the "age of the head of the household" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov + A to I
	126 330	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
A. *Sex of HH:*											
1. Male	110 687	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.01	.00	.00
2. Female	15 643	.09	.09	.09	.09	.13	.15	.14	.07	-.03	-.02
(n) and (ß) stat.		(.11)	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.17)	(.20)	(.18)	(.09)	(.03)	(.03)
Level of signif.		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
B. *Socioeconomic environment:*											
1. Abidjan	25 435	-.04	-.04	-.06	-.09	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
2. Other cities	25 134	.00	.00	.00	-.03	-.02	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
3. Rural	75 761	.01	.01	.02	.04	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
(n) and (ß) stat.:		(.08)	(.08)	(.11)	(.20)	(.05)	(.06)	(.03)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Level of signif.		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
C. *Level of education of HH*:											
1. University	3 113	.06		.10	.03	.04	.07	.06	.04	.03	.04
2. Secondary technical	2 555	.05		.08	.03	.04	.05	.03	.02	.02	.02
3. Secondary (upper)	3 516	.05		.07	.03	.05	.07	.04	.03	.03	.03
4. Secondary (lower)	9 497	.01		.03	.00	.03	.03	.01	.00	.01	.01
5. Primary	13 716	-.02		-.01	-.01	.00	.01	.00	-.01	.00	.00
6. Can read and write	5 682	-.02		-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.01	-.01	-.01
7. Koranic	5 044	-.04		-.02	-.02	-.03	-.03	-.01	.00	.00	.00
school	83 206	.00		-.01	.00	-.01	-.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
8. Illiterate	1	.43		.50	.53	.58	.56	.59	.48	.15	.13
9. Other		(.07)		(.10)	(.04)	(.07)	(.09)	(.06)	(.04)	(.03)	(.04)
(n) and (ß)stat.		***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
Level of signif.											
D. *Level of comfort in the home:*											
1. Very high	5 085	.06			.12	.03	.02	.02	.01	.01	.01
2. High	8 746	.04			.10	.03	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00
3. Average	9 789	.01			.06	.01	.00	-.01	.00	.00	.00
4. Low	27 500	-.02			.00	-.01	.00	-.01	.00	.00	.00
5. Very low	72 233	.00			-.03	-.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
6. Other	2 977	-.01			-.01	.07	.03	.03	.03	.02	.02
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.09)			(.19)	(.07)	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Level of signif.		***			***	***	***	***	***	***	***

Table 12.2.A. (continued)

Independent variables	N	Deviations in relation to the overall average =.28 #									
		Gross	Net in relation to the independent considered and in relation to the "age of the head of the household" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov + A to I
	126 330	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
E. *Living space:*											
1. 1 Room	20 878	-.14				-.16	-.08	-.07	-.07	-.06	-.06
2. 2 Rooms	31 250	-.12				-.11	-.06	-.05	-.06	-.05	-.05
3. 3 Rooms	25 693	-.04				-.04	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.03
4. 4 Rooms	19 818	.01				.00	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
5. 5 Rooms	10 597	.05				.05	.02	.01	.02	.01	.01
6. 6 or 7 rooms	9 969	.09				.10	.05	.05	.05	.05	.05
7. 8 rooms or more	8 125	.18				.19	.13	.12	.14	.13	.13
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.40)				(.42)	(.25)	(.23)	(.26)	(.24)	(.24)
Level of signif.		***				***	***	***	***	***	***
F. *Household size:*											
1. 2 people	9 768	-.28					-.25	-.24	-.28	-.53	-.53
2. 3 people	13 916	-.19					-.15	-.15	-.18	-.24	-.24
3. 4 people	15 666	-.15					-.11	-.11	-.13	-.16	-.16
4. 5 people	15 144	-.11					-.08	-.08	-.11	-.11	-.11
5. 6 people	13 641	-.08					-.05	-.05	-.07	-.07	-.07
6. 7 people	12 821	-.05					-.03	-.03	-.05	-.04	-.04
7. 8-9 people	16 389	-.01					.00	.00	-.01	.01	.01
8. 10 people or more	28 985	.11					.08	.08	.10	.12	.12
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.43)					(.33)	(.32)	(.40)	(.53)	(.53)
Level of signif.		***					***	***	***	***	***
G. *Ethnic group of HH:*											
1. Akan	35327	.07						.04	.02	.02	.02
2. Krou	13322	.04						.03	.03	.02	.02
3. Mandé from the North	12326	.03						.00	.01	.01	.01
4. Mandé from the South	9731	.01						.01	.01	.01	.01
5. From Volta	15409	-.04						-.03	-.02	-.02	-.02
6. Other from Côte d'Ivoire	382	.00						-.05	-.04	-.03	-.03
7. Not from Côte d'Ivoire	39833	-.09						-.04	-.03	-.03	-.03
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.25)						(.14)	(.10)	(.08)	(.08)
Level of signif.		***						***	***	***	***

Table 12.2.A. (continued)

Independent variables	N	Deviations in relation to the overall average =.28 #									
		Gross	Net in relation to the independent considered and in relation to the "age of the head of the household" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov + A to I
	126 330	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
H. *Marital Status of HH:*											
1. Single	3 850	.09							.11	.08	.08
2. Monogamous	88 738	-.01							.04	.04	.04
3. Polygamous	26 727	-.02							-.10	-.09	-.09
4. Widowed	2 631	.13							.13	.06	.06
5. Divorced	4 384	.20							.15	.09	.09
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.17)							(.29)	(.24)	(.24)
Level of signif.		***							***	***	***
I. *Type of household:*											
1. Conjugal	13 484	.15								.33	.33
2. Single-parent	20 800	.11								.14	.14
3. Parental	92 046	-.03								-.04	-.04
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.23)								(.40)	(.40)
Level of signif.		***								***	***
Statistic R^2 (%)			1.9	2.9	4.4	20.2	27.3	28.9	34.5	44.5	44.5
Increase (%)			-	1	1.5	15.8	7.1	1.6	5.6	10	0

#: average weighted by size.
Level of significance: * .05; ** .01; *** .001.
Source: Census - 1988.

Table 12.3.A. – Multiple classification analysis of the proportion of outsiders not from the family nucleus in Senegal (Family households)

Independent variables	N	Deviations from the overall average =.35 #									
		Gross	Net relation to the independent variables taken into account and the "age of the HH" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov + A to I
	66 435	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
A. *Sex of HH:*											
1. Male	58 436	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	.00	.00
2. Female	7 997	.07	.09	.08	.10	.12	.14	.14	.12	.00	.01
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.08)	(.10)	(.09)	(.11)	(.14)	(.16)	(.16)	(.14)	(.00)	(.01)
Level of signif.		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***		***
B. *Socio-economic environment:*											
1. Dakar	7 085	-.04	-.05	-.04	-.03	.01	.00	.00	-.01	-.01	-.01
2. Other cities	20 222	-.02	-.02	-.02	.01	.00	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01	-.01
4. Rural	39 126	.01	.02	.01	.00	.00	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.07)	(.09)	(.07)	(.04)	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Level of signif.		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
C. *Level of education of HH:*											
1. University	1 623	-.07		-.04	-.11	-.05	-.01	-.02	-.04	-.02	-.01
2. Secondary (upper)	1 717	-.05		-.03	-.07	-.03	-.01	-.01	-.03	-.02	-.01
3. Secondary (lower)	2 841	-.06		-.04	-.06	-.03	-.03	-.03	-.04	-.03	-.02
4. Primary	5 757	-.03		-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.03	-.02	-.02
5. No education	52 138	.01		.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.00
6. Other	2 357	-.02		-.01	-.03	-.04	-.04	-.03	-.02	-.02	-.02
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.08)		(.05)	(.09)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.04)	(.03)
Level of signif.		***		***	***	***	***	***	***	***	***
D. *Level of comfort in the home:*											
1. Very high	3 221	.13			.15	.03	.02	.03	.04	.03	.03
2. High	7 802	.08			.08	.02	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
3. Average	12 122	.02			.03	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
4. Low	29 484	-.04			-.04	-.01	.00	.00	-.01	-.01	-.01
5. Very low	12 345	-.10			-.11	-.03	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02
6. Other	1 459	.02			.01	.02	.02	.01	.02	.02	.02
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.24)			(.27)	(.06)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)
Level of signif.		***			***	***	***	***	***	***	***

Table 12.3.A. (continued)

Independent variables	N	Deviations from the overall average =.35 #									
		Gross	Net relation to the independent variables taken into account and the "age of the HH" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov + A to I
	66 435	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
E. *Living space:*											
1. 1 Room	6 507	-.24				-.24	-.14	-.14	-.15	-.13	-.12
2. 2 Rooms	12 507	-.16				-.15	-.09	-.09	-.11	-.10	-.09
3. 3 Rooms	14 147	-.08				-.08	-.05	-.05	-.06	-.06	-.06
4. 4 Rooms	10 836	-.02				-.02	-.03	-.02	-.03	-.03	-.03
5. 5 Rooms	7 996	.02				.02	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
6. 6 or 7 rooms	7 823	.08				.08	.05	.05	.06	.05	.05
7. 8 rooms or	5 110	.19				.19	.15	.15	.17	.16	.15
more	1 507	-.02				-.03	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02	-.02
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.44)				(.43)	(.29)	(.29)	(.34)	(.31)	(.29)
Level of signif.		***				***	***	***	***	***	***
F. H*ousehold size:*											
1. 2 people	1 997	-.35					-.28	-.28	-.30	-.57	-.57
2. 3 people	3 591	-.25					-.17	-.17	-.20	-.29	-.29
3. 4 people	4 908	-.21					-.14	-.14	-.17	-.21	-.20
4. 5 people	6 005	-.17					-.11	-.11	-.14	-.16	-.15
5. 6 people	6 600	-.14					-.09	-.09	-.11	-.12	-.12
6. 7 people	7 021	-.14					-.09	-.09	-.11	-.11	-.11
7. 8-9 people	0 120	-.08					-.04	-.04	-.06	-.05	-.05
8. 10 people or											
more	6 190	.08					.05	.05	.06	.07	.07
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.41)					(.26)	(.26)	(.32)	(.39)	(.39)
Level of signif.		***					***	***	***	***	***
G. *Ethnic group of HH:*											
1. Wolof	25 570	.00						-.02	-.01	-.01	-.01
2. Sérére	9 697	.01						.02	.01	.01	.01
3. Toucouleur	7 526	-.01						.00	-.01	-.01	-.02
4. Dioula	4 218	-.02						.01	.00	.00	.00
5. Peul	8 491	.00						.02	.01	.01	.01
6. Bamabara	893	-.02						-.02	-.03	-.03	-.03
7. Manding	2 396	.05						.03	.03	.03	.03
8. Lébou	488	.00						-.01	-.01	.00	.00
9. Manjaag	704	.02						.03	.03	.02	.03
10. Sononké	826	.08						.03	.04	.03	.03
11. Other ethnic											
groups	3 697	-.02						.02	.01	.01	.01
12. Other											
Africans	1 650	-.12						.00	.00	.00	.00
13. Other											
foreigners	277	-.15						.01	-.01	-.01	-.02
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.09)						(.07)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Level of signif.		***						***	***	***	***

Table 12.3.A. (continued)

Independent variables	N	Deviations from the overall average =.35 #									
		Gross	Net relation to the independent variables taken into account and the "age of the HH" covariate for the last model								
			A to B	A to C	A to D	A to E	A to F	A to G	A to H	A to I	Cov + A to I
	66 435	M0	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
H. *Marital Status of HH:*											
1. Single	381	.10							.18	.11	.12
2. Monogamous	36 034	-.01							.07	.06	.07
3. Polygamous	25 671	-.01							-.07	-.06	-.06
4. Widowed	3 200	.14							.09	.05	.04
5. Divorced	916	.06							.11	.05	.04
(n) and (ß)stat.	231	.06							.06	.03	.03
Level of signif.		(.11) ***							(.27) ***	(.23) ***	(.23) ***
I. *Type of household:*											
1. Conjugal	5 317	.33								.37	.35
2. Single-parent	8 996	.08								.17	.17
3. Parental	52 120	-.03								-.04	-.04
(n) and (ß)stat.		(.32) ***								(.40) ***	(.39) ***
Statistic R^2 (%)			1.4	1.6	8.1	21.9	26.0	26.4	32.3	44.1	44.6
Increase (%)			-	0.2	6.5	13.8	4.1	0.4	5.9	11.8	0.5

#: average weighted by size.
Level of significance: *: .05; **: .01; ***: .001.
Source: Census-1988.

13

WOMEN'S ECONOMIC ROLES IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT POLICIES IN JORDAN: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S STATUS

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In the demographic literature, it is often assumed that one of the ways in which education affects demographic outcomes is through its association with participation in higher status, higher paying work. Furthermore, both education and employment are thought to affect demographic outcomes at least in part because they lead to an improvement in women's status; they offer women the means to reduce the influence of institutions of gender stratification in their lives. An extension of this thinking suggests that government policies that reduce education or employment opportunities for women may also lead to a deterioration in women's economic and social status. With few options open to them, women may choose to invest their time and energy in child bearing and rearing (Palmer, 1991:4).

In this paper I examine the relationship between women's employment and increased power in the home, in the context of one of the Arab Middle Eastern countries, Jordan. The Arab Middle East is a particularly intriguing case from a demographic point of view, because despite high levels of female education over the past couple of decades, rates of female labor force participation have remained low (women's share of the adult labor force was 11% in 1994) and fertility rates high (total fertility rate of 5.6 in 1992) (UNDP, 1995). Many discussions of the subject stress cultural and religious factors as determinants of the low rates of labor force participation, leaving little hope that policy could change the status of women in any way. However, Moghadam (1993) argues forcefully that policy plays a role: that it is the overall development strategy of a country that constrains

women's labor force participation because appropriate jobs just aren't available. An overview of trends in women's labor force participation in Jordan over the past couple of decades supports Moghadam's view. When the government proactively sought women's participation, mainly in the public sector, labor force participation increased, reaching 14% by 1991 (World Bank, 1993). Since the regional economic crisis of the late eighties, however, government interest in attracting women workers has waned and unemployment rates for women have risen faster than their employment rates.

The economic adjustment policies of the late eighties and nineties have not improved the unemployment crisis and have furthered social inequalities. Adjustment involves decreasing and shifting public expenditures in order to enhance the country's ability to repay its debts, to decrease consumption and to support its export potential; the latter depends on maintaining a comparative advantage by suppressing wages. The change in the real wage in Jordan in 1988 and 1989 was negative, leading Anani (1990) to conclude that "the onus of inflation fell more preponderantly on the shoulders of the middle and low-income groups" (p.6).

In this paper, I use the results of a series of focus-group discussions carried out in Jordan from mid-July to mid-August 1996, to explore the circumstances under which individual decisions about and attitudes towards economic roles reduce the constraints imposed on women by institutionalized gender systems such as the family and the labor market. Focus groups are discussion groups facilitated by a moderator, brought together to share views on a particular subject. Topics and questions are chosen in advance (i.e. the interviews are focused), but there is flexibility.

To ascertain whether and how employment meets strategic gender needs in the Jordanian context, this study analyzes focus group participants' responses to several scenarios representing conflict between traditional gender norms and the aspirations and new economic realities faced by Jordanian women today. The issue of who does the housework and child care when mothers work for pay is the theme of one of the focus group scenarios. In the gender literature, housework has been used to illustrate conflicts that occur within the household between members with different material interests; issues include who does the housework and how, according to whose standards, and more broadly, should women work for wages outside the home or for men inside the home (Hartmann, 1981)? A second scenario asks participants to reflect on these same dynamics but in extended-family households; many young couples spend the early years of their marriage living with the husband's parents until they can afford a place of their own. There is some indication that this kind of living arrangement may be on the increase because of the tight economic times.

A third scenario depicts another situation in which the old and the new come into conflict: when young women consider a job offer in a distant city or in another country. In Jordanian society, young people, both men and

women, are expected to live in their parents' house until they are married. In recent decades however, many young men have taken jobs abroad due to the lack of employment in Jordan. It is still uncommon for young, single women to do so.

Focus groups are thought to be particularly well-suited to topics like these in which context and social interaction are seen as critical to an understanding of the issues. Although they do not provide definitive answers about population trends or causal relationships, focus groups do provide insights into how people form opinions and how these motivate behavior. The study concludes with a consideration of whether the kinds of jobs available to women under economic adjustment are likely to be ones that will give women autonomy and expand their choice set. One of the rationales for economic adjustment is that the market will fill the gap as the state withdraws from certain activities. Thus resources are encouraged to shift out of the non-tradeables, i.e., goods and services produced that are not traded internationally, or that are produced within the household for its own consumption, towards tradeables, i.e., exportable products or products for domestic consumption that are internationally competitive. It may be more difficult for married women and women in general to make the shift because of their child rearing and home maintenance responsibilities and the lack of adequate daycare. In addition, the type of jobs available to women with reproductive responsibilities tend to be low-paying and involve long hours.

THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIPS

The conceptual framework elaborated by Moser (1993) provides a way of differentiating the empowerment dimension of employment from the basic needs dimension. It is based on the distinction first coined by Maxine Molyneux (1985) between practical and strategic gender needs. Practical gender needs arise from the concrete conditions of women's positioning within the gender division of labor and within the class structure whereas strategic gender needs refer to the means of overcoming the constraints imposed on women by institutionalized gender systems (Molyneux, 1985; Moser, 1993). Presumably, paid work always constitutes a practical gender need. As the ones primarily responsible for their household's daily welfare, women are often motivated to take on paid work out of economic necessity; the number of women in this position is likely to increase during times of economic adjustment. The extent to which in meeting practical gender needs work also meets strategic gender needs depends on the type of work. Some employment is more likely than others to lead to a renegotiation in the sexual division of labor, either at the household or community level, and to reduce the influences of institutionalized gender systems in general.

Traditional attitudes which view women as the primary caregivers for children and men as the breadwinners, as well as time-consuming household maintenance tasks, make it difficult for many women to enter formal sector jobs. Ingrid Palmer sees women's unpaid work in family maintenance and reproduction as a 'tax' they must pay before engaging in income-generating activity (Palmer, 1991). When they do take on paid work, women tend to concentrate in low-paid occupations that are predominantly female, often occupations that are an extension of women's work in the home: teaching, caring for the ill and disabled, sewing, cleaning... Often they continue to meet all their household maintenance responsibilities despite the fact that they work for pay outside the home; some even continue to be the primary caregivers for their children. Thus income-generating work per se may do little to enhance women's sense of control over their lives, particularly women of the lower classes (Desai and Jain, 1994; Oppong, 1983). While paid work under these circumstances no doubt meets practical gender needs, it clearly has little potential for meeting strategic gender needs.

One way to meet strategic gender needs through individual-level actions is for women to enter occupations dominated by men. When enough women pursue this strategy, this expands access to economic assets and broadens the set of choices for all women. Even within jobs traditionally open to women, however, there are variations relevant to women's status. Work-related autonomy arises from a variety of job characteristics.

Location of the work seems to make some difference: women who work outside the home are thought to have greater leverage because they cannot combine household maintenance and child care responsibilities with paid work and therefore must negotiate alternate arrangements. If women have some degree of control over the scheduling and pace of their work, they may be more willing and able to assert their interests in renegotiating the division of labor at home. The job's position within the economy may also make a difference; women in jobs that increase the family's access to valued resources, including prestige, may be in a better position to negotiate (Dixon-Mueller, 1993:124). In addition, employment may be more likely to meet strategic gender needs when it provides an alternative source of social identity. The social interaction literature suggests that labor force participation may affect women's status by changing the characteristics of their social networks and therefore the content of information available to them (Bongaarts and Watkins, 1996: note 22, p.675).

The effect of economic adjustment policies on women's status in Jordan therefore depends as much on the composition of the demand for women's labor - i.e., on what types of jobs are being created - as on its absolute level, and it depends on the effectiveness of social safety nets and in particular of credit provision for small enterprises. The three components of economic adjustment programs most likely to affect the composition of the demand for employment are trade, privatization, and social safety nets

(Arcia and Moreland, 1994). First, shifts in trade patterns towards more exports often increases the number of opportunities available to women workers since the export sector typically has a high proportion of female workers in developing countries. Employers' preference for women workers in export-oriented industries or export-processing zones with labor-intensive production requiring little or no formal training has been widely documented through case studies (Cagatay and Berik, 1991). This trend has led some to speculate that employers, under the pressure of global competition, could be substituting female for male workers (Standing, 1989) This increase in demand for female workers is matched by their greater supply as economic adjustment programs lead to a worsening income distribution and more family members among low-income groups are forced to seek employment.

Second, privatization broadly speaking can *decrease* opportunities for women. Many countries undergoing economic adjustment reduce budget deficits through expenditure cuts. This leads to a greater demand for private sector employment because of low wages in the public sector, but also due to an actual decrease in employment opportunities in the public sector. Yet it is the public sector that has provided relatively more job opportunities and higher salaries for women, especially educated women, and provided employment protection and social security (Standing, 1991). Furthermore, women hold positions at a variety of levels in the public sector and can be found across many occupations (Bakker, 1994:10). As a result, there is a general expectation that unless governments intervene, privatization will lead to a decline in wage levels and/or an increase in labor insecurity (Standing, 1991).

And third, the social safety nets some governments have put into place as a temporary measure to relieve suffering among the poorest of the poor during transition, may affect women's status if they take the form of resources provided directly to women. The extension of credit to low-income women has been one of the most successful types of interventions pursued under the Women in Development rubric over the past several decades. Women have proven to be very reliable in repaying their loans and through their efforts have been able to contribute to their own and their family's well-being.

METHODOLOGY

Study location

The sites covered in this study were selected to represent different environments in the Amman governorate. Madaba, a town of 55,156

inhabitants[10] located 19 miles southwest of Amman, was chosen because of the diversity of its population and economic base. It includes sizeable refugee and Christian populations and boasts several major factories and a thriving commercial sector. Madaba is also the site of several important tourist attractions: it experienced a 106% growth in visits by foreign tourists between 1994 and 1995 (Doan, in press). Marka, in the eastern part of the city of Amman, was chosen to represent a cross-section of middle-income residents with access to the city's employment opportunities. And Baqa'a, a refugee camp just north of Amman was chosen to represent camp residents with access to city jobs but also with employment possibilities in agriculture.

Focus group implementation

Groups of single men, single women, married men and married women were convened in each of the three areas on the basis of characteristics they shared in common and that related to the topic of interest. All participants were either currently working or looking for work; most had a preparatory or tawjihi level of education or a 2-year college diploma. The method used to recruit participants differed from that suggested by American experts (see for example Krueger, 1994:14). Getting people to attend a focus group is always a challenge (Krueger, 1994:89). In the Jordanian context, what worked best was to work through local contacts. For the women's groups, we worked through local branches of the Jordanian Women's Union, a fairly decentralized organization known for its diverse, grass-roots constituency. Lacking an analogous organization for men, we worked through work-related personal connections to recruit participants. This ensured that people actually attended since they had been invited by someone in their social network. The fact that people had social ties in common may have in fact facilitated more open communication[11] In addition, every effort was made to keep the atmosphere surrounding the focus groups as informal as possible and to make participants feel their views and active sharing were critical to the discussion[12]

I trained a young female university graduate from Amman to moderate the focus groups involving women and a young male university graduate from Madaba to moderate the men's focus groups. Both had prior experience with field research but no experience leading group discussions. The training took place over a three-day period covering the goals and objectives of the research, the thinking behind the questioning route I had prepared for them to use, the skills of appropriate moderating including clear instructions on which prompts they could use to encourage deeper sharing

[10]Jordan Census of Population, preliminary results 1994.
[11]I owe this insight to Dr. Nora Colton.
[12]I am grateful to Dr. Tony Sabbagh for these and other pointers based on his experience moderating focus groups in the GCC countries (see "Qualitative Research in the G.C.C. Countries", based on a talk he delivered on the occasion of MERF's seminar "Crystals into the 90's" on February 4th, 1987 at the Berysted Hotel, Ascot).

without biasing its content, and how to deal with dominating participants. They practiced on two different focus groups made up of university students from across campus; I did not use the results of those focus groups in the study presented here. A note-taker recorded the discussion at each session; sessions were also taped. The moderators assured participants only first names would be used to ensure confidentiality.

Group composition

Although Amman as a governorate has benefitted from recent economic trends much more than other governorates, it has also experienced growing inequalities within its administrative boundaries (ESCWA, 1993). The focus groups included in this study reflect these differences with Madaba and some of the participants in Marka representing more well-off residents, and Baqa'a and the rest of the Marka participants representing those with much less access to resources. The Madaba focus groups included both Christian and Muslim participants, mostly from the city, and some property owners. The Marka focus group participants were mostly residents of a government housing scheme with a mix of returnees from the Gulf and others, many of whom moved from squatter settlements near the downtown. Participants in the Baqa'a groups were all Palestinian refugees. Table 13.1.A in the Annex compares the employment status of the group participants.

In response to the question "over the past 5 years, what changes in standard-of-living have you and your family experienced and what specific measures have you taken to cope", several participants in both Madaba and Marka indicated they had property to sell, or had started a new business and were doing better than before. The vast majority of people however have seen their purchasing power drop precipitously and their standard-of-living go down. Focus group participants were eager to talk about fixed salaries and how much less they buy today than five years ago, about how difficult it is to find jobs, especially if you don't have any "wasta", how carefully they have to budget now and how much they have given up.

Table 13.2.A in the Annex summarizes responses by area and sex. Increasing the number of earners in the household, or the number of jobs existing earners carry, was a strategy mentioned by participants in all three areas. This often involved some family members quitting school earlier than anticipated in order to work. A young man in Marka said he had to work to earn money to re-take his tawjihi "in order not to burden the family". A young woman in Marka stopped her education in order to help her sisters. Their stories undoubtedly mirror those of many other young people.

Cutting down on meat (to once a week or in some cases once a month), expensive meals, and fruits was mentioned across the areas. Several women mentioned cutting down on gift-giving and social visits, both of which are important in nurturing the social ties that people turn to in times

of need. Further responses in both Madaba and Marka, however, indicated a higher baseline level of resources and opportunities, and more family sources to draw on than in Baqa'a. At the extremes, several participants in the Madaba and Marka groups started new businesses or rented property or took their children out of private schools, whereas the Baqa'a participants voiced a general sense of despair captured in the following account:

> "The rise in prices spoiled everything for me. I receive 115 JD and also make 50 JD off the pick-up truck I own. I have 8 people to take care of, six of them my children; the rent on the house is 50 JD... my children are losing weight and their health is worse... I hope God will help us through" (Baqa'a).

Widespread insecurity and pessimism about the future were reflected in all the focus groups.

Feminization of the labor force due to economic adjustment?

A look at national level data for Jordan suggests that far from feminizing the labor force, economic adjustment has been associated with a reversal in the recent trend towards increasing female labor force participation. There is neither an increase in numbers of jobs for women nor a change in the sectors hiring them. As in many other countries, the rise in reported female labor force participation in Jordan in recent years, reaching 14% by 1996, was at least at first largely due to growing opportunities in the public sector. Facing serious manpower shortages in the mid-seventies, the Jordanian government introduced a variety of measures facilitating the participation of women, including married women, in the labor force. Many of these measures dealt with improving conditions for working mothers by increasing maternity leave, increasing pay levels during maternity leave, and requiring institutions that employed a minimum number of women to provide day-care centers (Hijab,1988:101).

The drive to integrate women in the workforce seemed to slow down by the mid-eighties as the economy took a turn for the worse (Hijab,1988). With the economic adjustment policies that have characterized the late 80's and 90's, public sector opportunities have been shrinking for both men and women, even as the numbers of young people seeking jobs for the first time continues to grow. By 1994, there was actually a higher proportion of women workers in the private than the public sector in the Amman governorate (29% compared to 13.7%; an even higher proportion however, 45%, were unemployed and had never worked) (Kawar,1996:240). A study using the Jordanian government's 1991 Employment, Unemployment, and Poverty Survey, concludes that no new sectors are being opened up for young women and there is also "a marked decline in what are considered traditional female sectors such as health, education, personal services, and government" (Kawar,1996:241). There is clearly no evidence of women moving en masse into occupations previously dominated by men.

Towards a renegotiation of the sexual division of labor within households?

In an attempt to better understand whether and how women's paid work affects their status within families in the Jordanian context, the moderators presented focus group participants with a scenario in which both husband and wife work for pay and have a small child. She (or he in the case of the men's groups) then asked participants what household maintenance activities were likely to be done by the wife, the husband, and who was likely to take care of the child. Participants were also asked how they thought the couple would decide about their finances and about having another child.

In all of the groups, the first response was almost always reflective of the traditional, normative view: that child care and taking care of the home is a mother's responsibility; the husband is the head of household, the provider. He does not have to work in the home. Even if the wife works, it is her responsibility to make sure her household duties are covered. In response however, others came up with counter examples, either from their own experience or from others they know. From this deeper sharing, focus groups reveal several factors that facilitate the renegotiation of household maintenance tasks when both husband and wife work. One that emerged in several of the groups, the timing of the work day, was a job-related factor not mentioned in prior writings on work-related autonomy; the focus groups made clear it was not just the wife's schedule that made a difference but hers in relation to her husband's. The other factors that emerged all had to do with household and community context: presence of the extended family, differences in employment status between husband and wife, availability of child care.

The issue of who did what in the household did not generate much discussion in the Marka group of married women. They were mostly older with grown children. They met in the home of the woman who recruited them, one of the founders of the Marka women's income-generating cooperative, a group associated with the Jordanian Women's Union. The three teachers all said their husbands helped with housework but emphasized it was only because they were working; they did not specify which types of household tasks were involved. Two were clear however that their husband didn't help in front of the extended family. Their responses to an earlier question about who decides what kind of work their daughters can accept, indicate their feeling that teaching is ideal because it involves only one shift - 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. - whereas most jobs in the private sector require two daytime shifts or night work. Working only one shift allowed them to carry out their responsibilities towards their household and children, a sentiment reflected by teachers around the world.

The other women, all of whom were working at home as part of the cooperative, also said their husbands helped them a lot, although not in front of others. The focus group involving married Marka men, carried out in a private home in the same neighborhood as the women's but through a separate recruitment process, was presented with the same scenario. In

response they were more specific than the women about tasks: they mentioned that husbands might do "light housework", as opposed to "heavy housework" like washing windows which men in this region have traditionally done. They might also iron clothes; views were mixed as to whether husbands might help in cooking. This suggests at least some renegotiation of household maintenance activities in the Marka area when women work, even if their work is at home. No one in either group mentioned husbands helping with child care however. One of the men noted the husband might help by "carrying the baby", a way men have always been involved with their children, but that otherwise caring for children was the responsibility of the wife or female relatives or a day care center because "husbands don't know how to take care of children".

In contrast, in the Madaba group in reaction to the scenario there was general agreement that the wife would do all the housework; they too were mostly women whose children were grown. They met in the Jordanian Women's Union facility at the invitation of one of the most active local members, a teacher; since she was single, she did not participate in the group but was present.

> "We haven't reached the stage of dividing housework yet; only Europeans do this. My brother-in-law and his wife are doctors and they share housework, but his wife is a foreigner. Whereas my sister works and she does all the housework".

Two of the women had been de facto heads of household, one due to her husband's imprisonment and one to her husband's work being far away. The lone dissenter made the point that it depended on the division of labor in the husband's childhood home. Her husband and brothers-in-law had been brought up by a working mother; they all help their wives with the housework. But she had to quit work because she couldn't find adequate child care... clearly their "helping" does not extend to becoming the full-time caretaker for the children! For her (and others in the group who affirmed her position), child care was the binding constraint, not home maintenance.

The married men in Madaba were recruited separately from the women and met on a different day in a private home in a different part of town. Some were open to doing housework as long as it was a task they knew how to do.

> "I support women in order to raise a successful family... the wife is tired after coming home from work too... whoever gets home first prepares the meal for the others" or "I will do everything I can... there is nothing shameful or taboo about it. I enjoy preparing food and it helps motivate my wife when I carry the wash basket and all the heavy things at home".

This suggests that competence was an issue for them. Competence in housework would presumably be developed in the home in which they were brought up since virtually no young people, men or women, live on their own before marriage. Three of the six participants however said housework was the wife's responsibility. Competence was also mentioned in

relation to child care which was mostly seen as women's work. Several mentioned being willing to carry the baby but specifically said they didn't know how to prepare a bottle of milk for the baby or give him a bath.

The Baqa'a married women were mainly younger, with small children. They met in the Jordanian Women's Union facility in the refugee camp, at the invitation of one of the most active local members, herself a married woman. She participated in the focus group along with the others. In response to the scenario, they indicated they felt the husband would help with the housework if his work schedule permitted, but not in front of his mother. The Baqa'a married men were recruited through personal contacts and met in a private home on a different day than the women. They were more specific about what they would and wouldn't do: "the husband wouldn't cook or wash", work traditionally done by women, but "might fix things in the house or paint the walls", tasks more acceptable for men. Only two of the participants mentioned husbands and child care, indicating they might help hold the baby.

In conclusion, focus groups indicate that the timing of the work day for members of a couple may make a difference in whether housework responsibilities are renegotiated. The short hours associated with public sector jobs - usually 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. - have made it possible for both men and women to give a substantial amount of time to household maintenance and social networking. As men move into jobs with longer hours, typical of the private sector, they may become less available to do even the traditional male home maintenance tasks referred to by focus group participants as "heavy housework". If on the other hand it is women who have the longer hours, focus groups indicate there may be more renegotiation of who does what housework; there is no indication however that child care would become more of a shared task.

The presence of members of the extended family came up repeatedly as a constraint to a more equal division of housework. The rationale most often heard was that the husband's mother and sisters would be upset if they saw him helping his wife in a way he never helped them. In response to a scenario similar to the one mentioned earlier but in which the young couple with a small child were living with the husband's family, participants were unanimous in saying the husband would not help with the housework. However, the deeper sharing that arose in response to this scenario indicated that the wife's paid work can reduce the influence of the extended family on the couple's decisions, and open up the possibility of moving out sooner and setting up their own household. Participants were very clear that conflicts over housework and child care, and over control of the budget, are more acute in extended-family households. The wife's salary, because she is not beholden by tradition to share it with her in-laws, expands the choices a young couple faces and therefore is likely to enhance her status within her own marriage as well.

Focus group discussions indicated that differences in employment status between husband and wife can enhance the wife's status but might have other consequences as well; especially in the Baqa'a men's focus groups but also to some extent in Marka, the men clearly felt threatened by their wives having better jobs than they, or being employed when they weren't. Views shared reflected that men could take this as motivation to try harder to find appropriate work, but that some men would take it out on their wives, by divorcing them, or forcing them to quit work and accept a minimal standard of living.

And finally, whether or not acceptable child care substitutes are available may be the critical factor that allows mothers of young children to take on work that will enhance their status in the home and in the community. Although fertility rates are declining slowly, Jordan is still a high fertility society in which the average woman has just under six children over the course of her reproductive years. Focus group participants suggested that mothers and mothers-in-law may not be as available to take on the day-to-day care of young children as they used to be. With the age at marriage rising, the older generation of female relatives is likely to be older by the time the youngsters of the next generation come along... older and more tired. Non-family daycare provision then becomes an important societal commitment.

Can young, single women negotiate to be allowed to take a job away from their parents' home?

The focus groups involving young, single women with at least a high-school level of education indicate that some women who had planned to work have dropped out of the labor market, because of family pressures in one of the areas and due to the "discouraged worker" effect in another. Others, however are still looking, experiencing a high level of frustration and not finding outlets for their ambition and desire to be productive. Education has given them the means to take greater control over their lives but the labor market in many cases has not offered them the opportunity to reap its fruits. The reflections of those who have obtained jobs confirm that work is more than a paycheck: it represents independence from one's family and a chance to escape the bonds of tradition.

The single women in Marka were recruited through one of the founders of the Marka women's income-generating cooperative, a group associated with the Jordanian Women's Union. It included her daughter as well as other young women they know. Several of the participants were university graduates, others had two-year diplomas or were in training. All but one wore the *hejab* (head scarf worn by Muslim women in accordance with Islamic teachings about modesty).

The first reactions to a scenario asking them what factors would facilitate their taking a job outside of Amman reflected general societal views of what work situations are appropriate for young women: if accommodation with other "good" girls was provided, transportation to and from the

workplace, if she was not the only woman working among men. However, after one of the more educated women suggested things were changing, and that only securing accommodation mattered, others reflected a strong sense that they could convince their parents to let them take just about any job if they themselves felt it was right.

> "Jordanian society is becoming more liberal than before regarding these restrictions on girls; families might not object to women going off on their own, even to the Gulf" (university graduate - studied Islamic law). The important thing is to find a job (diploma in office administration).

Where the discussion ended up suggested these young women are far from passive followers of their parents' dictates, but rather are able to think for themselves, to perceive themselves negotiating with their parents, advocating for a job they would like to take. They do not disregard societal views on what jobs are appropriate for young women, but stretch these views to meet their needs.

In this group characterized by relatively high levels of education, they were clear that some of their difficulty was due to discrimination against women workers on the part of employers. Although they felt empowered, and even reflected a willingness on the part of their parents to let them try work situations that were not traditional for women, the labor market out there seemed closed to them. One reported being denied work as a bank teller or secretary because she wore the *hejab;* she was told clients wouldn't like it and wouldn't feel comfortable interacting with her; others confirmed her experience based on hearsay. Another indicated she had applied for factory work, a last resort since it was not work she was eager to do, but was denied. She observed and others in the group confirmed, that factories prefer male workers because they work the night shift; the law prohibits women workers from working the night shift. Only the two young women training to be a nurse and a seamstress respectively were optimistic about finding jobs.

In the Marka group, this sense of self-efficacy derived from education and motivation towards paid work was associated with fairly innovative views towards the sexual division of labor in the household and who controls the budget. The most outspoken women offered religious rationales for their views and seemed to persuade others in this way. One young woman who studied Islamic law at the university suggested it is tradition not Islam that says housework is women's work; "this is work women do voluntarily and they will be rewarded for it, but they have the right to refuse". Similarly, another young woman indicated it is the husband's religious duty to provide for his family, both his family of birth and his wife and children. The wife however is free to do as she wishes with her salary: « if she helps on her own, she does it voluntarily; this is her free will » (university graduate - nutrition).

Yet another, later in the conversation, qualified this view somewhat and added that if the wife sees marriage as a union in which both partners

are equal and in cooperation, she should help her husband with her salary, even if he doesn't ask her to (university graduate - nutrition). These views suggest that women participate in both housework and providing for household expenses out of a sense of responsibility and caring, not because it is prescribed to them by Islam.

The Madaba single women were recruited by a local member of the Jordanian Women's Union, a school teacher who knows a lot of people and is well-respected. Participants were both Christian and Muslim, all of them tawjihi graduates, some of whom also had 2-year degrees. Two of the six were still looking for work. Unlike the Marka participants, these two had virtually given up looking. They felt they didn't get enough support from their families in their search. It is possible that families put obstacles in their daughters' way because there is not an overwhelming economic need for them to work. Picking up on this, the young women, despite their own motivation to work, gave up after trying all the avenues they knew. This is consistent with the literature suggesting that women are more restricted in higher class families than in families with fewer resources.

Both unemployed participants seem to be from families with traditional views of women's and men's roles. One of them characterizes her mother later in the interview as a woman who doesn't allow her husband to work around the house, and talks of her childhood as a time in which she suppressed her demands in order for her brother to enjoy what she had at his age (diploma in secretarial skills). The other reports her family's opposition to most opportunities available to her:

> " they won't let me work as a secretary or at a company, they will only let me work as a teacher or in the public sector or in the army, but not in a co-educational environment". She describes herself as "emotionally attached to my family... I can't live away from them".

The more traditional views of the two unemployed participants were associated with greater pessimism about the chances for and outcome of changing gender roles. Both saw little scope for husband helping their wives, even when both are working. One indicated he would only do so if his mothers and sisters couldn't see him... *"they might say his wife is the boss in the house".* The other suggested *"the husband might help the children in their studies but not in cooking or in laundry".* Men's roles in the intellectual development of their children is encouraged by the Quran and therefore is not a good indicator of change. Both told stories of irresponsible working women: one who wouldn't give any of her salary to help her husband with household expenses even though he was unemployed, and one of a working mother who would leave her child at daycare after she had finished working so she could *"rest awhile and do some housework... thus increasing the money paid to the kindergarten".* Their negativity however was not picked up by the other participants. The single women in Madaba who were working were more optimistic that husbands would help their wives at home

when both were working. Several had observed this in their own families of birth, others' views came out of a sense that this was only fair.

The single women in Baqa'a were also recruited by a staff person at the local branch of the Jordanian Women's Union. They had similar levels of education as the Madaba group: all had the *tawjihi* and some also had a 2-year diploma or further training. Only one however was working for pay outside the home. This may reflect the social isolation of the Baqa'a camp and networks with more limited connections to jobs. It may also be due to cultural factors whose influence is particularly strong in this homogeneous camp population. It is characterized by a high degree of solidarity among residents but also perhaps more rigid social control. One participant suggested *"in the camp, the situation is getting worse for women... the men keep saying the women should stay at home and we will spend money on them"* (tawjihi).

One of the Baqa'a single women makes dresses at home, one quit her job when she became engaged, and one, a nurse, was forced by her family to quit in order to help at home. Two report themselves as "looking for work" but also say their brothers refuse to let them work outside the home. Two others are still looking but don't report family-related constraints. All of these women perceive that the jobs available to them are low-paying. But they would all like to work nevertheless; clearly work has benefits for them above and beyond the salary. The two who had to quit expressed tremendous frustration that they were no longer working, no longer had some independence from family. Work for them was clearly not just a financial necessity - although it clearly was that - but also a chance to develop their own networks, their own sources of information, a way to break out of the family at least to some extent. That the break was not total was confirmed by the nurse who indicated her brothers used to check up on her when she was delayed at the hospital.

The women who reported strong pressure from their brothers not to work also had more conservative views about the potential for change in the sexual division of labor when both members of a couple work.

> "I have three unmarried brothers living at home and I do all the housework... none of them helps... I am sure when they get married they won't help their wives at all" (nurse - not currently working).

> "The Oriental man holds on to his traditions and customs, and he refuses to help anybody" (diploma in accounting - unemployed).

In contrast, the Baqa'a single women not reporting strong family pressures against their working volunteered that husbands might help their wives if both worked for pay outside the home, but only if others weren't watching. Several shared stories about brothers and neighbors who helped with all the housework, even cooking and cleaning, to help their wives. These kinds of stories seemed to temper the cynicism of those who were clear change wouldn't happen.

The general view arising out of the single women's focus group in Baqa'a is consistent with the men's focus group: it reflects traditional attitudes assuming a male's responsibility is to provide for his family and the female's responsibility is to raise the children and care for the home. The young men met in a private home in Baqa'a, on a different day than the women, and were recruited through work-related contacts. The single men in Baqa'a were not willing to talk about the household division of labor when both members of a couple work and have a small child. Five of the eight single men in Baqa'a volunteered that they would prefer the wife didn't work. This was not part of the questioning route the moderators were pursuing but clearly was a widely-held view and therefore needed to surface. One however indicated that if she worked as a teacher it would be acceptable because the environment is all-women. Another modified his remarks to tie them to the number of children she has - "she will quit work after she gives birth to three babies" and later "if they are working to save to build a house, it's better if she does not conceive immediately". The other three were consistent in their view that the wife shouldn't work.

Their responses to later questions reveal a connection between their unemployment or underemployment and their need to retain control over their wife's work, or at least to be perceived by others as doing so. In response to a situation in which the wife made more than the husband, they reasoned: "If she gives him a hard time, he might ask her to quit her job", "people will influence the husband and make him ask his wife to quit work to save his dignity". In response to the more extreme case of a working wife and unemployed husband, their reasoning was as follows: "The husband would feel inferior and this might lead to divorce" followed by "the wife might boss the husband around".

In contrast, most of the single men in Marka and Madaba did not appear threatened by their wives working but they were highly concerned about the effects of their wives working on the care of their children. In Marka only one out of seven single men rejected outright the notion of the wife working*: "the husband will suffer for the rest of his life if his wife keeps on working";* a later response clearly indicates he is aware of the positive association between his wife's earnings and influence in the household. The Marka men were also recruited through personal contacts; they met in the same private home as the married men but on a different day. After a lively discussion of who would do what in the household, two others convinced themselves that the male breadwinner/ female home-maker model was better: "I'll never let my wife work; it would be too hard to cooperate".

As for the single men in Madaba, in response to the scenarios about the division of labor, none volunteered that they would object to their wives working. The Madaba single men were recruited through work-related contacts and met in a private home. Most of them were quite open to the idea that husbands and wives should share the housework if they were both working. Most also felt decisions about how the two salaries should be spent

should be made jointly. Only two saw any problem with the scenario in which the wife worked and the husband didn't, or the scenario in which he made less than she.

However, it wasn't until they were explicitly prompted "what if the wife doesn't work", in response to a scenario about what factors a couple would take into consideration when deciding whether or not to have a second child, that most of the participants began to express a preference that their wives quit work when the children were young in order to take good care of them. They saw the need for their wives to quit work as only temporary however since most preferred 2-3 children.

In short, the focus groups suggest that continuing high rates of under- and unemployment may indeed lead to a deterioration in women's status, both because of its effect on men and on women. Unemployment is more of a stigma for men than for women because of sex-linked gender role expectations. All of the groups of single men reflected the strong societal pressure they feel to get a job, any job because of the widely accepted expectation that they will save money in order to get married and later to support a family. As one of the married men said: "We are not being fair to the young men. If they don't work, the society will stigmatize them as bad and irresponsible" (Madaba).

The young men in Baqa'a reflected the highest level of despair: several were very pessimistic about their prospects of ever marrying. They saw leaving the country as their only escape. Under- and unemployment among the young single men in Baqa'a, an area of greater economic disadvantage, seems to be associated with a stronger adherence to traditional views about women's and men's roles, and to stronger religious views restricting women's mobility. That these views were more prominent in the focus groups of single men than married men in Baqa'a confirms that these are a regressive set of attitudes arising in reaction to the failure of development to reduce social inequalities.

The men's groups in Baqa'a portray the experience of workers with slightly less education and fewer resources being squeezed out by university graduates taking jobs below their level; they are facing an economy that has never had a dynamic informal sector like Cairo, Ankara or other large cities in the Arab region, hence making it difficult for them to create their own enterprises. The young single men saw the private sector as having good opportunities if one had experience and capital. All had considered starting a small business but none had succeeded. The other opportunities these young men face are all extremely low-paid hence their despair at ever being able to save enough to get married. The married men were mostly low-skilled, low-paid public employees, looking for ways to supplement their incomes in these times of rising prices and frozen wages. Their efforts mostly have not amounted to much either due to lack of access to credit or skills.

For many of the young women work was not only a paycheck, but a way to assert an identity separate from their families. If there are no appropriate jobs to even apply to, young women have no opportunity to practice their negotiating skills with their parents, making it less likely they would try negotiating for their interests in their future marriage. The focus groups suggest marriage is what all these young women aspire to. They expressed concern about men's inability to save enough to marry. Furthermore, the power some of them seem to find in religion depends on them having their own income, and in fact depends on their income not being needed to provide for the basic needs of the family.

CONCLUSION

So what do focus groups tell us about the likelihood that economic adjustment policies will lead to a deterioration in women's economic and social status? First, to understand the potential of paid work to lead to changes in the sexual division of labor in the household, one must look at women's work in relation to their husband's. Analyzing the nature of women's economic roles in isolation may give insights into the extent to which they meet a practical gender need. Discovering that the type of paid work women do leaves them time to fulfill their household maintenance and child care duties - teaching being the prime example - tells us that this type of work meets a practical gender need. A job can be seen to meet a practical gender need if it pays somewhat more than the cost of obtaining child care substitutes, or if the work environment meets with society's approval. In an Arab society such an environment would be all-women or one in which there was enough ongoing social interaction to ensure that women employees would not be left alone with men who had power over them.

The focus groups reported on here suggest several factors that might allow women to meet strategic gender needs through paid employment. First, if they work longer hours than their husbands, women may be able to negotiate a shift of some of the household maintenance tasks that they typically take on. The short hours associated with public sector jobs have made it possible for both men and women to give substantial time to family care and social networking. The expansion of the private sector brings with it longer working days for both men and women. Under such a regime, men will become less available to do even the traditional male home maintenance tasks. At the same time, women’s need for others to take on their household maintenance and child care responsibilities will increase.

Second, because women are not expected by tradition to share their income with their husband’s family, having a salary of their own may facilitate a renegotiation of the sexual division of labor in an Arab Middle

Eastern context. This would mainly pertain if the woman's income was not needed to meet the household's basic needs, and could make the difference between living in an extended-family-unit or living as a nuclear family. Extended-family living tends to increase the pressure on the couple to follow social norms even when members of the couple themselves see wisdom in change; it also reduces the intimacy several participants mentioned as critical to couples working out any conflicts over who does what tasks.

How likely are any of these scenarios under economic adjustment? Experience elsewhere would suggest not very. If anything, wages for all but a limited group of educated professionals are likely to fall under privatization. A woman may well make more than her husband but together, they will be lucky if they cover the household's basic expenses. Having both members of a married couple work at low-paying, low-security jobs is unlikely to change their access to resources at the community level. Furthermore, it may actually make renegotiating the sexual division of labor at the household level more difficult. The focus group discussions indicate that male unemployment is highly associated with men's need to maintain power over women's work. As a result, in households with the least access to resources women will take on paid work no matter how low the pay, out of economic necessity. Unless men or the state pick up their reproductive tasks, child care in particular, it is likely that children will suffer. In any case, women's status is not likely to be improved. Among the near-poor and the middle class, the lack of economic opportunities will leave women little choice. Furthermore, there may be an increase in extended-family living in Jordan, a trend that has been observed elsewhere during times of economic adjustment (Elson, 1994). This is more likely to affect the middle and lower-middle classes than the poor or very poor since extended families among the latter cannot afford to take in other family members. Among these social classes, couples may therefore experience more pressure to conform to social norms regarding gender roles and the allocation of labor.

It is not clear how young women will channel their energies in the face of continuing high unemployment rates. Opportunities to do meaningful work outside the house are limited to paid work; no mention was made in any of the groups of opportunities for community management work, an area in which women around the world have always been active (Moser 1993). While women's community management work often grows out of a practical gender need, just the fact of organizing to collectively provide a service can meet a strategic gender need by putting women in contact with others, broadening their communication networks.

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ANNEX

Table 13.1.A. – Distribution of participants' employment status by group and area

	Madaba	Marka	Baqa'a
Single men:			
unemployed	5	4	2
own account	2	1	
public sector employee		1	2
private sector worker	1		2
student/in training	3		1
Total	11	6	7

Married men:			
unemployed	1		1
own account	1	3	
public sector employee	4	3	5
private sector worker		2	
Total	6	8	6
Single women:			
unemployed	2	7	5
public sector employee	2		
private sector worker	2		1
piecework at home			1
student/in training		2	3
Total	6	9	10
Married women:			
unemployed	3		5
own account	2		
public sector employee	1	2	
private sector worker	1	1	
piecework at home		5	1
Total	7	8	6

Table 13.2.A. – Distribution of responses to question "What specific measures have you taken to cope with the current economic situation?" by focus group in which they were raised

	Madaba	Marka	Baqa'a
Men's focus groups:			
Increased number of family members working looking/taking 2nd job	X	X	X
Cut down on meat/fruits/expensive meals	X	X	X
Cut down on non-essentials (not otherwise specified)	X	X	X
Quit school	X	X	
Started a business	X	X	
Drew down savings		X	X
Borrowed from family/friends	X	X	
Started buying on credit	X	X	
Cut down on buying clothes	X		X
Gave up buying/building a house	X		
Rented out/sold property	X		
Bought clothes at second hand shops	X		
Cut down on social obligations/gifts	X		
Broke engagement to be married			X
Children's health deteriorated			X
Women's focus groups:			
Cut down on buying clothes	X	X	X
Cut down on entertainment/trips	X	X	X
Cut down on non-essentials	X	X	X
Cut down on meat/fruits	X	X	X
Borrowed money from family	X		
Increased number of family members working		X	
Borrowed money (not otherwise specified)			X
Bought second hand clothes			X
Cut down on expenses	X		
Bought supplies in small quantities	X		
Cut down on gifts/social visits		X	X
Took children out of private schools		X	
Quit school		X	
No longer able to save			X

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14

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN'S NONTRADITIONAL WORK, FAMILY ORGANIZATION, AND FEMALE EMPOWERMENT IN RURAL GUATEMALA

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Rural Guatemalan women whether of Spanish (Ladino) or Mayan (Indian) culture have been largely confined to traditional work while occupying subordinate positions to their husbands. Traditional work involves domestic chores, and often chicken and pig raising, weaving for themselves and their families, and selling agricultural products in town markets or in home located mini stores. Earnings from this work are considered their property and to be disposed of as wished. However, earnings are very limited and often need to be spread over the families' impinging needs and the husbands' drinking.

Submissiveness to male partners, it should be said, is not as severe as often depicted (see for instance Maynard 1963). Indian women enjoy considerable freedom in some aspects. In addition to earning money, they have the right of inheritance, owning capital, having independent businesses, and even some sexual freedom in some towns and under some circunstances. However, Indian women are restricted in giving opinions, particularly in front of strangers; they partake of food only after the adult male members of the family have eaten, and walk behind them in the street. Ladino women more easily express their opinions and do not have an openly submissive behavior comparable to that of the Indians, but they are often more restricted in their movements and activities including those related to economics, acquaintances, and sexual behavior.

Both ethnic groups live in municipios which have characteristics of corporate social units in the regions concerning us (see Tax 1937, for the Indian and Méndez-Domínguez 1967 for Ladino municipios). These municipios have their own local governments and institutions, subcultures, and not infrequently their own languages in the case of the Indian populations. Typically a smaller proportion of Ladinos and a greater one of Indians live in the municipio's head town and main satellite settlements. The 1979 earthquake which destroyed most of the central and western highlands killing over 27,000 people, and the 37 year old civil war, just ended, caused massive migrations modifying the municipio bond. These new events laid

upon the social reforms and the modernization of the country following the 1944 revolution had already obliged Tax to introduce the term "generalized Indian" in the sixties. The term refers to a growing population sector physically and socio-culturally uprooted from its municipio. The significant increment in communications, the massive migrations to the United States of America, the proliferation of Protestant sects, the emergence of an Indian intellectuality, and the development of a market for nontraditional products have contributed to changes in rural life in the highlands. They have made nontradional labor more acceptable, more available, and more profitable labor for women. If these changes are making it easier for women to free themselves from traditional work, others are forcing them to take a more active role in the family economy. A 5.6 total fertility rate (APROFAM 1996) has produced densities above 2,000 inhabitants per Km2 in some agricultural regions. The average family agricultural plot of the poor has been continuously reduced making it impossible to survive by the traditional agriculture based on corn and beans. Production of vegetables, fruit, and flowers largely for exportation has developed as a complementary surviving option (Méndez-Domínguez 1993 : 147-154). In these activities, as in craftsmanship, commercially oriented weaving, and sweat shops women are finding new working opportunities and ways to contribute to their families. Thus, land scarcity, urbanization, and rising aspirations are throwing women into the national force labor.

This article presents data on the relationship between women's use of these new labor opportunities and the parallel changes that have occurred in the family organization and in the position of these women within it. Easy to make, but not exempt of naiveté, is the guess that a greater commitment to outside home labor, by increasing earnings, leads to women's empowerment. The extent and ways in which this may occur is a guess of a greater difficulty, and so is to foresee the associated changes in family organization. Furthermore, given the other changes occurring in society at large, it may be hasty to infer a deterministic relationship between these changes and women's nontraditional labor. Even a comparison within the same region between families of women who labor in traditional and non-traditional ways, as this article presents, does not eliminate the potential role of other variables (many associated with changes in society at large) not considered in the analysis. But if such a strong claim can not be made, the nature of the parallelism appears in itself suggestive and important.

THE STUDY

The results presented are based on data collected through interviews in a study conducted in the 80s which originally included 1,721 randomly

sampled women of 11 central and western highland municipios. The data reprocessed and presented here correspond to the families of 393 married women of eight of the municipios; 330 working traditionally, and 63 working in nontraditional ways. Interviews were conducted with the help of questionnaires and field instruments by trained interviewers in the Spanish and Mayan languages, as needed.

Family structure and organization

The nuclear family, composed of parents and single children, is the dominant type in rural Guatemala (Hunt and Nash 1967:254-5 for the Indian families and Méndez-Domínguez 1983: 251-252 for the Ladino and Indian Families). This dominance has often not been well defined, sometimes meaning a greater frequency and other times an ideological preference (Gross 1975). Whichever may be the case, the fact remains that generational, collateral, and affinal extensions are frequent. Probably the situation should be described by saying that the people prefer and organize themselves around the nuclear family, extending it in one or another way to accommodate for circumstances that make survival or greater comfort possible for nuclear members and other selected relatives. The extensions have often been analyzed in terms of land possession, inheritance, and culture patterns (Gross and Kendall 1983, Méndez-Domínguez 1967), but rarely, if ever, in terms of women's labor.

Since these extensions are not structural features (neither in an ideological nor statistical way), but rather circumstantial modifications to an ideologically manifested structure, they do not occur in a readily visible and regular pattern nor is their normality easily elicited by community members. These may be reasons why their study has posed some difficulties. To be able to detect and describe a large number of patterns as they may occur, it would be necessary to work with a great quantity of cases. Handling a large number of families and types becomes extremely cumbersome and often unrewarding if conventional analyses are used.

The analysis and description of kinship systems have relied on the postulation of universally structural principles, such as sex, age and generation. The tendency has been toward a more configurational or type approach in the case of families (see for instance Laslett 1972). In the first case, analysis involves very precise definitions of each unit in terms of the principles, identifying how these principles are interpreted in a particular society, how they are interlocked to create a system of socially interdependent positions, and a total system of cognitive and social interrelations. In the second case attention is placed on which kinds of social units, very extensively defined, are represented in a family or household

group. In describing a kinship system, "uncle", for instance is defined as a consanguineous, male, collateral, first ascending generation ego's relative from which formal and behavioral issues ensued in a particular society in accordance with the interpretation of these principles and its relation to the other positions these principles create. In a family description, the presence or absence of members of the general kind belonging to the ascending generation or to the affinity set may be enough to define a family type. Similarly, extensions from male of female consanguineal or affinal relatives may be lumped together. This tendency is to a great extent a practical necessity since it would become extremely cumbersome to identify dozens of types in a single society resulting from adopting very precise definitions.

Several years ago (Méndez-Domínguez 1983), the author saw in the use of kinship structural principles an opportunity to gain the sufficient detail to record important family changes that otherwise may go undetected when more conventional analyses are used. By quantifying the variations in the family components born out from these structural principles, he found it possible to handle a large number of cases at the same time as avoiding the problems inherent in the type approach. Using similar methods and a sub-sample of the same data, families in which women work in traditional and nontraditional ways are compared here.

The kinship principles used are consanguinity and affinity, lineality and collaterality and generations in ascending and descending directions to ego's own generation. Descriptions are made on the basis of rates. For instance, the extent of the affinity component in a family is related to the degree of consanguinity component in it. All measures are made with reference to the female respondents. In a typical nuclear family with five unmarried children there will be five consanguineous relatives and an affinal one. For the purpose of standardizing the rates, the women themselves were added in this and other rates making it possible to proceed with the calculations, to avoid the denominator value of a family to be 0 with a resulting infinite quotient. In our example the consanguinity-affinity rate will be:

$$(5 + 1) / (5 + 1 + 1) = 0.86.$$

Since a family's rate is modified by changes either in the consanguinity or affinity components, the rates do not describe conventional family types such as nuclear family or affinal extended families. It rather gives an exact and numerical expression of the family composition in structural components making it possible to discriminate even between societies with the same family type. Similarly, knowing the average number of children in society, or a segment of it, the average nuclear family rate can be calculated for comparisons as desired. In this study such a characterization is not reached, the purpose being to establish only the organizational differences between the two sets of families, with and without working women. This has been done by averaging the individual rates of

each of the families and then testing for statistical significance using the t-test with an error margin of alpha equal to .05.

The consanguinity and affinity components

Families in which the women work have a greater consanguinity component and a smaller affinity component than those in which the women do not work. The Rate A difference between .77 and .88 of consanguinity is statistically significant. Reasons for greater consanguinity in families in which women work could be due to:
- More children in nuclear or nonnuclear families;
- Fewer affinal extensions;
- a combination of both.

Whichever may be the reason, the affinity component has diminished, giving to the family of the working woman a more consanguineous profile. Were we interested in further defining the changes, it would be possible to eliminate one or more of the above possibilities, by other rates. Option 1, for instance, is not viable since there are no statistical differences in the children's generational component between the two family groups.

Affinity of consanguinity vs. consanguinity of affinity

Not only do the two groups of families differ in their degree of affinal component, but also in their affinal component preferences.

Rate B was used to calculate the weight that the woman's affinal extensions through their own consanguineous relatives have in the average family as opposed to the weight that their husband's consanguineous relatives have.

Rate B: [1 + (affinal relatives of consanguineous ones) + (consanguineous relatives of affinal relatives of consanguineous ones)] / [1 + (affinal relatives) + (consanguineous relatives of affinal ones) + (affinal relative of consanguineous relative of affinal relatives)].

Families in which the female does not work were found to have an average of .599 of affinity through women's consanguineous relatives, while those in which women work have .547, the difference being statistically significant. This contradicts all expectations since it is by her husband's (and other relatives of her affinal relatives') consanguineous extensions (common children excluded) that the nuclear family extends with women's labor rather than through the affinity of her own consanguineous relatives. There is no certainty as to how to interpret socially this finding. One possibility is that women relatives on the husband's side take over the household chores as a sort of pay-off for acceptance in the household. In such case, the wife is released from these chores, making it possible for her to engage in nontraditional labor. Acceptance of the husband's consanguineous women

into the household may actually be conditioned by the need for somebody to take care of some of the domestic functions.

Lineality vs. collaterality

Families with working women are less lineally organized than those without working women.

Rate C: (1 + lineal relatives) / (1 + lineal + collateral relatives)

The values of .839 and .788 were found for the first and second groups of families, respectively, the difference being statistically significant. Traditional families adapt to life "horizontally" by collateral extensions, while the families with working women phase life more vertically through lineal extensions.

The generational composition

The previous difference may lead one to believe that there is a greater generational depth in the families of the working women. This is only partially true since the proportion of members in ego's generation remains relatively constant in relation to the number of members of the ascending and descending generations. Thus, no statistically significant differences were found between the two sets of families when applying for the ascending generations rate D and D1, where G0 stands for ego's generation, G1 and G2 for the members of ego's parents and grand-parental generations, and G-1 and G-2 for members of the children and great-children generations.

Rate D: (1 + G0) / (1 + G0 + G1 + G2), for the ascending generations,

Rate D1: (1 + G0) / (1 + G0 + G-1 + G-2), for the descending generations and when the ascending and descending generations were combined in one single formula.

This suggests that there is some sort of range of stress in extending lineally beyond which families are not able to operate efficiently. The basic role that ego's generation plays in the family economic activities forces families to keeping within close margins of variation in the proportion between this and the other generations. Limitations may also derive from unnecessary position and function duplication with extensions of the ascending generations. Simpler issues, such as the size of the dwellings, may also be a factor. However, there is evidence that although moderately (and without the support of a test of statistical significance), women's labor makes it possible for families to have a smaller ego's generation core. With this comparatively smaller component they are able to integrate a comparatively larger component of other generations. Thus, in the traditional family, ego's generational component in relation to the ascending

generations is 2.01 while in the families in which women work it is 1.78. The values are .92 and .46 with respect to the descending generations.

Ascending and descending generations

The small differences mentioned hide a statistically significant one in the proportion that ascending and descending generation relatives are incorporated into the two sets of families. While the families of the nonworking women favor the descending generations, the ones of the working women favor the ascending ones.

Rate E: (1 + G2 + G1) / (1 + G-1 + G-2)

The difference is between the averages of .392 and 1.100 for the families of the nonworking and the working women, respectively. This makes sense since households with a large proportion of members of the children's and grand-children's generations would demand more in-home activity, the more tilted the proportion of the ascending and descending generations is, the less feasible it may be for women to work outside the house. On the other hand, women of families with a larger proportion of ascending extensions not only have greater opportunities for work, but because of the limited contributions that these members can make to the family there is an urgent need to increase income to be able to carry the additional burden.

Gender components

A priori one is inclined to think that a redundancy of female roles, resulting from an excess of women, would favor labor outside the household. However, this is not the case. In effect, the average number of women per man is smaller in the families with working women than in the rest although the difference is not a statistically significant one. As in the case of the generation components, it may be useful to hypothesize a generic range within which families are able to function efficiently.

Women's empowerment

Women were asked how much they commanded in their families in relation to their husbands. Command referred to the power they have to make their volition carried out by family members above their husbands' wishes. A larger proportion of working women (37%) than the rest (29%) see their commanding situation as one that is equal to their husband's. When they were asked if in taking important decisions they consulted their husbands, working women were found to be more prone (97%) to always consult them than the nonworking ones (92%).

It would be naive to take these answers as an expression of a behavioral reality. However, they show differential attitudes.

There are indications of a move toward a more egalitarian and communicative relationship between couples in families in which women work.

CONCLUSIONS

The data show nontraditional labor on the part of adult women relates to differences in family organization and self-perception of their power position in relation to their husbands.

Families in which women work in nontraditional ways show, from the perspective of these women, greater consanguinity and lineality components than families in which women work in a traditional way; a preference for extensions through the husband's consanguineous and affinal relatives, rather than through their own relatives as in the rest of the families; a greater incorporation of members of the ascending generations rather than of the descending ones, and a greater male than female component. The quantitative differences in each of the components result in families of a very different total composition.

The significance of the differences in each of these components and in their combination is yet unclear. The principles on which the quantitative component differences are based have been extensively proven throughout human societies to bear on the distribution of rights and duties and to condition behavior. Consequently, these differences are likely to represent more than formal features, and the method employed more than another way to count heads. However, at this point of the research, it is only possible to put forward some alternative explanations for their occurrence, and to guess at their consequences.

The greater consanguinity support that nontraditionally working women have in their families may facilitate work outside the home. Alternatively or in a complementary way, her work outside the home may allow her to be more independent from affinal relatives. Living with them may have economic advantages but they may also cause stress and cohersion. In reducing the affinal component, the consanguineal one becomes comparatively stronger.

Women's power increase may be reflected in the relative increase in the number of consanguineous relatives of her husband rather than in her own affinal relatives linked to her through her own consanguineal relatives. Those relatives may be under her direction relieving her from many family chores while she works.

The increase in lineality as opposed to collaterality may be bound to the elimination of role duplication. Male collateral relatives generally duplicate or supplement the husband's functions, and women collateral the wife's by household chores. Women's labor may be either the outcome of failure to get this additional support, or the reason why this help becomes superfluous when additional money is earned by the family.

The increase in the ascending generations component may be a luxury in poverty, that is, the care of the aged, or a compelling issue : the need for children's care while working.

The detection of these differences was made possible by the use of a somewhat innovative methodology. Structural principles are used to determine the amount of structural components present in the family from an ego's point of view, for instance size of the lineal component. In conventional methods the presence or absence of kinds of positions rather than the quantity are important, for instance, is there a "husband of female household head" or are there "afinal relatives of the male and female household heads." If quantification is used, it is to measure the number of families within a type.

Thus conventional approaches, although they do not start from structural principles, aim at detecting structural family types. Paradoxically, the approach used here, while departing from structural principles, is probably better suited for detecting changes that have not reached (or will never reach) the normativity and stability usually associated with the conception of social strucuture. Here we have referred to them as social organizational variations.

While in conventional approaches the recurrence of individuals in the same positions does not change the type, the rates used here are not only susceptible to these changes but made to detect demographic variations which may eventually lead to structural changes. These variations create a different social environment for the individuals which is likely to have important effects on their behavior, as seems to be the case with women engaged in nontraditional work.

This approach is seen as complementary to rather than conflicting with the conventional ones. The application should be determined by interest, subject and practicality. In the present case, the application of conventional methods would have probably failed to detect family changes associated with women's work simply because there is nuclear family normativity and most likely no set pattern of recurrent family extensions. But the changes occurring at the organizational level not only are likely to be important by themselves, but throw light on the process of change.

Much work is still ahead to confirm with more recent data the process described here and to clarify the meaning through additional field research. At this point it is also important to call attention to the fact that the rates presented here are only a few of the possible ones. Women were used as

referential points in them, but children and other members (or combinations of them) could also be used in a similar way, which no doubt could provide additional insights into the ways families adjust to new circumstances and create opportunities for their members.

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15

WOMEN'S HOME-BASED WORK IN TIJUANA, MEXICO: TIME-SPACE HOUSEHOLD ARRANGEMENTS AND GENDER RELATIONS

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As a response to economic crisis and industrial restructuring, in less industrialized countries women are engaging in home-based informal work, creatively adjusting schedules and using the home as a working space while carrying out reproductive activities in their everyday lives. However, being tied to the home may have consequences for the social ecology of family life, gender relations and women's condition. How do women manage to accommodate paid work in the microgeography of the home? Is working at home an effective strategy for integrating work and family or does it create problems and tensions? This paper documents and examines the time-space household arrangements that women home-based workers make in order to accommodate productive work into the home, emphasizing the consequences for gender roles and gendered spatial relations.

WOMEN'S HOME-BASED WORK IN TIJUANA

In an economic context highly determined by the border interaction with the United States, like other border cities in northern Mexico, Tijuana's labor market is characterized by high rates of female participation in the manufacturing sector due

to the establishment and development of maquiladora enterprises. However, self-employment in the commerce and service sectors has been a traditional source of employment for women in Tijuana. The percentages of female participation in these sectors (services, 62% and commerce, 21%) are higher than in manufacturing (14%) (Browning and Zenteno, 1993:18).

According to Zenteno (1993:92), despite the fact that Tijuana is characterized by the lowest percentage of the labor force in the informal sector, this is the only border city that shows higher probabilities of female activity in the informal sector. Oliveira (1990) showed that the national trend towards an expansion of female employment in the informal sector in modes of work such as home-based work was also present in Tijuana during the years of economic crisis[13].

Home-based work is usually considered as part of the so-called informal economy in Third World countries. Working at home is commonly referred to as industrial productive, wage work which takes place at the worker's home (García Ramón *et al*., 1995; Beneria and Roldan, 1987). However, the nature of work at home is diverse and covers an ample variety of activities. For this study, I consider work at home "...as the production of goods or services in the worker's household for monetary or barter exchange" (Oberhauser, 1993).

Home-based work refers to self-employment and small businesses established in the homes of women. For example, commerce and service activities such as production of foodstuffs, handcrafting, marketing groceries, catalog marketing (tupperware, cosmetics, clothes), child care, hair styling, sewing and professional services such as dentistry, accounting and cosmetology are different forms of work at home.

All these activities can be carried out at the employer or employee's home, where work is done according to unfixed, flexible schedules, and income is frequently irregular. In addition, this kind of work can be informal or formal, depending on if the businesses are taxed or not, and as a result, workers may not enjoy regular salaries and labor benefits.

Working at home is heterogeneous in terms of the kinds of activities, material resources, labor conditions, and individual and family situations involved, as well as with respect to women's motivations and experiences. What distinguishes this type of work is that it takes place in households using both home space and resources. Thus, the uniqueness of these activities is their location.

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[13] To some authors the increase of female participation in self-employment might be related to the growing percentage of female heads of household, and the strong participation of women with small children (Oliveira, op.cit.).

According to the National Survey of Urban Employment (ENEU), 20% of Tijuana's economically active population is working as self-employed labour in Tijuana. In particular, the National Survey of Microenterprises (ENAMIN) conducted in 1992 reports that 15% of the population working in microenterprises are self-employed and working at home. Out of this population, 73% are men and 27% are women, working at home with or without proper installations. However, it is presumed that women's participation in work at home is larger that the data reflects. This underestimation might be due to the use of categories that hide this type of work as well as the fact that many women home-based workers are declared as nonwage family workers.

Despite the increasing recognition of segregation in the informal sector expressed in the existence of specific forms of employment in which women are concentrated, such as petty commodity producers, street vendors and home-based workers, these modes of work have not been studied in detail[14]. Most important, studies about dealing with the informality of working at home in Latin American countries have mainly focused on the features of labor and the businesses (Menjivar y Perez, 1993; González de la Rocha, 1986; Aguirre, 1988; Escobar, 1988). Only a few of them have considered the household as a focus of analysis, and despite the fact that space is implicit in this research, it has usually been taken for granted and not studied as a critical factor in home production.

Thus, in addressing working at home as an increasingly evident economic strategy, and because space merits greater consideration as a variable in work-family adjustment than it has received, this paper analyzes the intersection of space and gender at the scale of the household. I will show some of the concrete ways in which home-based work and reproductive activities are worked out by women in time and space. In exploring the spatial outcomes of paid work at home I will examine how the re-use of space constrains or helps women to negotiate gender relations and the consequences for their social status.

WOMEN'S WORK, GENDER AND HOUSEHOLDS

Conventionally, the home is defined physically and symbolically as a private place where domestic activities and family affective relationships take place away from the public world of work (Saegert and Winkel,1980:41). Conversely, the public

[14] This is both a conceptual and empirical problem, for instance, these kind of activities are commonly seen as informal due to the fact that most businesses do not pay taxes. However, there is a problem with equating self-employment with informality because at least for the case of home-based workers, some of them pay taxes and provide social benefits to their employees.

is everything that occurs outside the home and the social relations not ascribed to kinship, conjugality and friendship (Barbieri, 1990). Most importantly, the home is a place for leisure; a non-working space. Work in the home is generally not conducted on a wage basis and it is mostly done by women.

Feminist scholarship in human geography has criticized these gender biased definitions of the home, emphasizing that the household, considered as a physical and social space, is not a private and static place only for reproduction. Feminist geographers consider the home as a dynamic space where production also takes place, and the distinction between private and public is blurred (Oberhauser, 1993:2). In these terms, the household is a significant productive environment for women.

The spatial dimension of women's work has also been addressed by feminist geographers. They study economic processes and how these are both affected by, and influence, economic and social relations in the household. This approach focuses on the spatial dimension of family arrangements and strategies of social reproduction, emphasizing the gendered and changing nature of the relation between production and reproduction as part of a single process that varies in time and space (McDowell, 1989:59; Pratt and Hanson, 1991; Mackenzie, 1986). The focus is on how household arrangements are worked out in time and space.

This type of analysis addresses gender relations and the use and construction of space at the level of the household. This approach focuses on social practices in everyday life and proposes a reconceptualization of the domestic space. It holds that women are breaking the theoretical separation between work and home, reproduction and production. In the light of this theoretical approach, some studies have shown that women are creatively using and producing their living spaces and home resources for paid work. By working at home, women make their own time-space arrangements, use household resources, and create new uses of domestic space challenging the content and meaning of their roles (Pratt and Hanson, 1991; Mackenzie, 1986; McDowell, 1989).

RESEARCH BACKGROUND

As a part of a broader project about home-based work, I interviewed women from occupations such as sewing, dentistry, home baking, hair cutting, assembling, marketing, childcare and seamstressing. I contacted women in working class and middle class neighborhoods by the snowball sampling technique.

Most women interviewed are married and have children under eighteen. Women's ability to work at home changes as they move across the life course (Katz

and Monk, 1993). Thus, while women under 40 are raising their children and experience some difficulties in balancing family and work, women older than 40 have more room to develop their productive activities at home because their children are older and some of them have married.

Among the interviewees, class differences are expressed in the level of education and type of activity that women do. While middle class women hold higher levels of education, working class women workers hardly complete primary school. Most of the interviewees had formal jobs before engaging in work at home, two of them were housekeepers, and only one had a long trajectory as a home-based worker.

WOMEN'S REASONS FOR WORKING AT HOME

Regarding the motives for creation of a home-based business, data from the ENAMIN inform us that both women and men cited "independence" as the main cause for working at home. Among the interviewees, while working class women entered home-based work because of economic need, middle class women declared "being independent" as an important reason to work at home.

Motives for entering home-based work vary across the life course. Older women prefer to work at home because they cannot get a job in the market, avoid formal responsibilities and can easily re-make their daily schedules.

> "At my age it is difficult to work in a beauty shop, it implies more responsibility. If you do not feel well, you have to tolerate any inconvenience. If one morning I feel sick I cannot go to work, I feel I cannot do formal schedules anymore. Conversely, if I work at home I do not have any problem because if I do not feel well, I can call my customer and make up the appointment." Consuelo, 63, hair styler, living alone with one of her children.

According to the ENAMIN when home-based workers were asked about the motives for their work location most of them, women and men, said that it was more comfortable. However, this option was higher among women (75.7%) than among men (63.6%). To men, the second cause for home location was because they could not afford a premises for their businesses. In addition, 11.6% of them declared that home location was required to do their work. Most of the responses of the interviewed women are consistent with the above information. Married women with children decided to work at home because ideally they could set their own schedules according to family needs. To these women, unfixed schedules allow them to combine productive and reproductive activities.

To sum up, working at home results from a combination of factors for each woman. For example, independence and the absence of jobs promote self-employment, in addition to economic need and the flexibility to combine domestic work and work at home. However, as we will see later on, working at home can often be problematic and women have to implement new and different time-space strategies to face the conflict between family and paid work at home across the life course.

Home-based work organization in time-space: Alternative arrangements

Feminist geographers have illustrated the ways in which home-based women workers are using and reproducing space in everyday life. By working at home women attempt creative solutions to the problems of fixed schedules of formal employment, long journeys to work, low-paid jobs, and economic crisis (Mackenzie, 1989; Dyck, 1989; Watson, 1991; Pratt and Hanson, 1993; Friberg, 1993.) However, because women continue to be responsible for most of the domestic work, home-based productive work often creates tensions and conflicts. Negotiating the two rounds in the space of the home can be complicated and even oppressive for women. After showing the diversity of schedules and uses of domestic space that women practice in order to work at home, I will focus on some of the conflicts that this strategy causes for homeworkers and their families, as well as the challenging ways in which women face these problems.

WHEN DO WOMEN WORK? UNCOMMON WORK SCHEDULES

There are of course advantages to working at home, such as flexibility of schedules. For instance, women can pace their own hours and combine productive and domestic responsibilities. Women may also feel liberated from fixed job schedules and may have more control over their lives (Salmi, 1993). It allows them to reschedule, increase or decrease work in order to accommodate particular family needs.

Among the women workers interviewed, work is heterogeneous and ranges from a couple of hours up to 50 hours a week. I also found diverse work schedules; women work on weekends, at night, in the morning, depending on their reproductive and productive activities. For instance, women frequently take advantage of mornings, when children are at school, to do their home-based work. Sometimes women workers at home have to set work schedules according to the needs of their customers. An example of this practice is the case of a children's dentist who works only during the afternoons when children have time to attend the appointments.

In other cases, women work only on weekends. For instance, a woman who produced foodstuffs used to work on weekends due to space restrictions in her home where the kitchen was also used as a living room. By working on weekends, when the family schedule is relaxed, she also avoids the conflict between cooking for her family and cooking the foodstuffs she and her daughter sell outdoors in their neighborhood.

Many women work by appointment due to the flexibility of this arrangement. For example, if the client can not attend the appointment, she/he can call to postpone or cancel it, and by being at home the woman home-based worker can continue doing domestic chores. This would not be possible if they were working outside the home. This is the case for a hairdresser who said:

> "Working at home is more comfortable. I set the schedule with my customers, they call to make appointments and it makes it easier to organize my work." Consuelo, 63 years old, living alone with one of her children.

These time arrangements seem to work well for some women, however, other women sometimes work more intensively than if they were working outside the home because their unfixed schedules may result in longer work days. For example, Mariana is a seamstress who works at home when her husband and children are sleeping, and Tony distributes pharmaceutical products and has a long work day because she has an unfixed schedule and her clients call her and come to her home any time which interrupts her family life.

Space expresses the blurred distinction between production and reproduction within the household. Research on the topic has shown that women often engage in both kind of activities at once in a single space (Mackenzie, 1986; Christensen, 1993). For example, in my own case studies the seamstress sews at the same time as doing the family's laundry and the diapers' seller interrupts packing products for tending her children.

Some studies depict work at home as occurring simultaneously with domestic work (Christensen, 1993; Oberhauser, 1993). However, this is not always the case because while both activities are carried out in the domestic space, they are not necessarily taking place at the same time (García-Ramon, 1995). There are some productive activities which demand concentration and women cannot do anything else at the same time. Work schedules reflect differences according to the domestic or non-domestic character of the activities. For example, due to the domestic nature of their paid activities such as baking goods and childcare, women can do their reproductive practices at the same time. In these conditions paid work is an extension of family life. However, this is not the case for professional activities such as dentistry. For example, due to the higher concentration that this work requires, a dentist cannot attend a patient while simultaneously cooking.

WHERE IN THE HOUSE ARE WOMEN WORKING?

Home-based women workers look for alternative ways of organizing their paid activities in the microgeography of their homes. They are creating new uses of space, e.g., using bedrooms and kitchens temporarily as work spaces, and remodeling yards, laundry and T.V. rooms, and building extra rooms to carry out paid work (Mackenzie, 1991:89).

Home work arrangements have to do with available home space. According to my own interviews, women transform home spaces into temporary working areas such as the kitchen where, using domestic equipment and appliances such as the oven, they produce foodstuffs. Frequently, the living room and the bedroom are also temporary work spaces. While the living room becomes a waiting room for a dentist, the bedroom can be the fitting room for a seamstress or the consulting room for a cosmetologist.

Many times women work in restricted spaces and inadequate environmental conditions, for instance home-based workers complain about not having enough light and space to work at home. It seems to be worse for poor women who have less room to develop their home-based activities (Watson, 1991). Conversely, middle class women sometimes have the chance to remodel their homes to permanently establish their productive activities. For example, among my interviewees, while the seamstress adapted the T.V. room as a workshop, the dentist restored the laundry room to install her consulting room, and a diapers' seller built a roof in the yard of her house under which she packed the product.

Having a special place within the home to do their productive work might help women to balance the relationship between family and work and redefine the content and meaning of gender roles and relations. However, as I will show in the following section, changes in the physical space do not always contribute to a change in social relations, or changes may cause new conflicts that have to be renegotiated.

CONFLICTS, CONTRADICTIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS

Activities that are taking place in the same space may create a conflict for women. For some of them it is difficult to try and separate work and family in the home. Usually women are not conscious about space and the conflicts it may cause for family relations. Although women clearly perceive the conflict between family and work, they do not always perceive it as related to the use and

transformation of the domestic space into a workplace, in the sense of both material and social space.

The strategies used by home-based workers to deal with the conflict between their productive and reproductive activities are diverse. Some arrangements are partial or temporal, others are more permanent, but women continuously have to make decisions depending on their family and work situations. Although there are class differences in the use of the home as a workplace, in what follows I introduce the case studies of three middle class women that present evidence of how and in what conditions they decide to rearrange their work-at-home strategy. These women are diverse with respect to the life cycle and their level of education. The names of the women have been changed to protect their identities. The quotations I include in the text come directly from the interviews I held with these women.

WHEN WORKING AT HOME BENEFITS FAMILY DEMANDS BUT NOT WORK DEMANDS

Rosa is a 43 year old dentist and a mother of two children who works at home. When she was younger she wanted to be an elementary school teacher but her parents encouraged her to enter the university and she decided to study odontology. After finishing her studies she started teaching at the university and some time later she took a graduate program. When she got married she continued her academic career at the university. At that time she lived in Mexico City and while working at the university as a program coordinator of public health, she first established a consulting room in a bedroom at her home. Her parents took care of her children while she attended to her patients who were neighbors, friends, and co-workers. Because of economic circumstances, her husband was working outside of Mexico City and the income she obtained from the consulting room was very important for the family's economy. In 1992 she and her husband and children moved to Tijuana because they were tired of Mexico City's pollution and way of life. Rosa and her family live in a two story house in a middle class neighborhood near the sea. Her husband bought the house thinking that it had enough space for the consulting room.

Rosa would prefer to work outside the home to better achieve her professional aspirations but because her children are small (9 and 6 years old), she remodeled the laundry room to install the consulting room in the house so as to be close to the children. Rosa really liked her work as a professor and researcher but she decided to interrupt her professional career for 5 years in order to dedicate her

time to her small children. After that period of time she plans to return to academia, the field in which she is more experienced.

In these conditions, working at home benefits family demands but not work demands. Although Rosa planned to prioritize her family for a 5-year period, she could not deny her professional aspirations and thus she decided to open the consulting room in her home. After some months of working at home as a dentist, she experienced conflict between her family and her work because she had more patients than she expected. Working at home started to be intrusive on her family life and she said she felt she was losing control over it. In addition, her husband complained that she did not take good care of the children. Rosa narrates the situation:

> "When the number of patients increased, I did not look after my children. I am a dentist and children come to see me in the afternoons because during mornings they are at school. Then, I stopped supervising the children's homework, and my kids changed radically. They watched T.V. all the time because there was nobody to take care of them and they only ate cereal and cookies."

Then, she decided to attempt another strategy to pay more attention to her children at the same time as maintaining the consulting room. She said:

> "A mother cannot divide herself in two. I analyzed the situation and I had to adopt new policies, establish schedules, and increase the rates, and in that way I reduced the number of patients. Since then, I have time to see Ale, now I know his books and what he is doing for school. I did lose three months of the life of my kid and I did not like it because we (mothers) encourage them (kids) very much. I did a master's degree but I know that the work a mother does at home is harder than any other, and we do not have a school for that kind of work."

But the tension between family and work continued and she had to rearrange the situation trying to balance the equation once again. The first time I met her, she let me in by the front door of her home and the interview took place in the dining room. At that time, she told me that because of the tension that her double role was causing her she was thinking of closing the consulting room. She wanted to be a "good mother" as she thought she had been in the past. Our following meeting took place in the consulting room, this time I was a patient. When I arrived at her home, a maid whom I had not seen before received me and asked me to wait in the front yard of the house where there was a small table and a couple of garden chairs which served as waiting room. After a while, Rosa met me. Dressed in a dentist's robe with a childlike print she invited me to go into the consulting room through the service door. She really treated me as a patient but after a while we talked about my work and she told me that the interview had been very helpful to her because afterwards she realized the amount of work she did both in the home and in the consulting room. She hugged me and she said that she had talked to her husband about the interview and the things that she had learned from it. She told her

husband that he and the children were exploiting her. At the same time she laughed and stated that "now, my husband hates you[15]".

It was evident that after our first meeting she had second thoughts about closing the consulting room, and she had instead decided to hire a maid (who also works as her assistant) to clean the house and look after the children while she was working in the consulting room. Through this new arrangement, domestic work and child care were better organized and she could attend to her patients without worrying about her children. In addition, the new schedules and fares she established diminished the number of clients she had while allowing her more time to be with her children.

Rosa was able to implement this strategy because her husband supported her decision and also because she had money to hire a maid. In general, while middle class women may partially resolve the work-family conflict by hiring someone to help them with domestic chores, poor women delegate this work to daughters.

A DISPUTE FOR HOME SPACE

Additional conflicts come out as a result of working at home because women have to share the home space with other family members, creating a dispute over home places such as the bedroom, the living room, and the kitchen. This is the case of Elsa, a 33 year old mother of three children who packs and distributes diapers. Like many people in Tijuana she and her family are migrants. She was born in Campeche, in southern Mexico. In that city she studied until the first year of Law because she got married at 19. At that time she was also working as a secretary. After she married, she went to live in Puebla with her husband and there she entered the university to study psychology but dropped out when she was in the first year because she got pregnant. Elsa arrived in Tijuana in 1990 with her husband and three children because her husband, a salesman, was offered a job promotion. However, because of the economic crisis that affected the whole country in 1994, her husband, who was afraid of being fired, decided to open the diapers business and asked her to be in charge of it. As a salesman, Elsa's husband knew some contacts who helped him buy shoddy diapers from U.S. companies that discarded their defective diapers products. At the very beginning Elsa did not want to work in the business because she was afraid of not doing it well. Her husband consulted other distributors who taught them how to replace or fix the diapers' adhesive tapes as well as to quickly pack them.

[15] Within a perspective that promotes feminist methods of research, I found that the interview opened up possibilities for women's consciousness-raising.

Initially she packed the diapers in the living room but as the demand for diapers increased, they were all over the house and it soon proved to be a problem for her children and herself.

> "I was packing the diapers in the living room, but my home was messy all the time and my kids could not watch T.V. I also feel that I was losing my home. Then, we decided to build a work space in the yard to pack the diapers."

Elsa had to negotiate the use of the home space with her three children and herself. To her, it was very important to maintain the home space and although they were at home, she and her children missed their home. Her husband did not experienced the same feeling because he travels constantly due to his job.

The home is a place that is continuously renegotiated, and to recover her domestic space Elsa re-located her paid work to the back yard. However, this new location in the rear of the home did not allow to her to supervise what her children were doing. Another socio-spatial conflict emerged when she realized that she could not do all the packing herself. The children helped her at first but after a while they protested and did not want to do it anymore. Thus, Elsa and her husband decided to hire her brother-in-law and his wife. The brother-in-law distributed the diapers in grocery stores, in low-income neighborhoods, and his wife and small daughter stayed at Elsa's home while the wife helped her pack the product. Elsa's relatives spent the whole day at her home, even on weekends, and she felt her space and privacy had been invaded. She was also concerned about her small nephew because of the danger of consuming the polymers (the content of diapers), and she had to keep an eye on him all the time. As the situation became more stressful, she asked her sister-in-law to do the work in her own home.

Although Elsa's sons cooperate by doing some of the cleaning, her double role taking place at home resulted in a burden on Elsa's workload because her husband and children demanded hot meals and clean clothes.

> "The demand for diapers increased and I had to pack them all the time, so I did not make beds, I did not cook and when my husband arrived to home he complained about it. My children also missed cookies and pastries that I used to cook for them."

Finally, she could not resolve this conflict. While her husband asked to her to run the business he did not cooperate with domestic chores. In spite of hiring two workers to help, working at home became oppressive to her. She used to work the whole day, juggling between packing diapers in inadequate environmental conditions and cleaning and cooking for the family.

When I called Elsa to schedule the interview, she agreed to meet me immediately and said that she needed to talk about her work at home to relieve herself. At that time, she had just closed the business. She said she would like to

re-open it but outside the home to separate work from family issues, and in a place with better lighting conditions and with enough space to store the diapers.

WORKING AT HOME ACROSS THE LIFE COURSE

Women's ability to work at home changes across the life course. While working at home is more difficult for women with small children, when children leave home or are adults their mothers have a greater chance to use the home as a workplace. This is the case of Tony, who works at home distributing pharmaceutical products. She lives in a three bedroom house with her husband and three daughters.

Tony was born in Guadalajara, Jalisco where she studied accounting, but since what she really wanted to be was a beautician, her family established a beauty shop for her in the garage of her parents' home. When she got married, she continued working as a beautician at her home where she installed a beauty parlor in one of the bedrooms. She used to work only during the time that her husband was out of the house. Her friends took care of her small children while she gave haircuts. She closed the beauty parlor when she moved to La Paz with her family. In this city, her husband asked her to work with him at a pharmaceutical products company. In 1988 the company moved them to Tijuana to open a branch. In 1992 the company closed the warehouse and asked them to administer the business on their own. While she and her husband continued working for the company as salaried workers, they established the distribution office at their home, just in front of the living room, because it was more convenient for the business. Initially, one of her daughters was in charge of the business but when she got a job related to her professional training, Tony decided to run the business herself.

Tony's daughters are in their twenties and they do not need much attention. Anyway, she recognizes that her working arrangement allows her more time to be at home and take care of her family. For example, although the business seems to be her priority, the kitchen is right there and she can take a look at what she is cooking while attending to her clients.

However, the workplace is materially and socially blurred with the domestic space, and the intrusion of work into the home required a careful negotiation among the members of her family. Tony said that since she was working at home, family and business issues were frequently blurred. To resolve this conflict she agreed with her husband and daughters to discuss work issues in the office, and family issues in the living room or some other part of the home.

Despite this arrangement, Tony's work at home has been problematic for her because she did not set work schedules and their clients call at 7 in the morning or at 10 at night. Although she told clients to call and visit only during business hours,

this was unsucessful because her husband continued to answer the phone and receive them at the office at any time.

To sum up, both Rosa and Elsa, who have small children, found that by working at home they experienced constraints and conflicts between their paid work and their role as mothers. While Rosa changed the strategy to preserve her business at home, negotiating her professional expectations, Elsa closed her business because it was becoming oppressive to her. She felt trapped between the demands of work and her family's complaints about abandoning them. Before her paid work at home, she was a full-time housewife and to her, it was more rewarding to be a mother and wife. Tony partially resolved the conflict between family and work through the mental separation of space but she could not set regular work schedules because of the interference of her husband.

The diversity of these home-based workers' time-space strategies shows that working at home is a process related to the larger condition of women's lives. It changes in its temporal and spatial character according to the conflicts that may result from its practice, depending on women's activities, available home space and domestic resources, as well as the stage in the women's life cycle.

Ambivalent Meanings of Women's Domestic Roles and Homeworking

By working at home, women are changing their space and time patterns through their activities, breaking the separation between production and reproduction, and at the same time altering the content of gender and environment categories, as well as the meaning of home and work (Mackenzie, 1986; Watson, 1991). The conflict between family and work involves cultural ambivalence toward devaluation of mothering, homemaking activities, and the homemaker role (Saegert and Winkel, 1980:43).

Some of the main roles that define women's gender identity in Latin American culture are: being a mother, wife and worker. However, these roles and their content are continuously challenged through women's action in everyday life. The interviewees expressed the priority of children and home in their lives because through socialization they learned that a good mother was one who stayed at home, spent a lot of time with her children, feeding, bathing and caring for them (Christensen, 1993:58).

For instance, Rosa experienced contradictory feelings about family and work. Intrusion of work at home in her family life caused to her to have feelings of devaluation of her role as a mother. She made different arrangements to cope with family and work and although she did not spend a lot of time with her children she felt better about being a good mother. Although she verbally expressed the priority of being a mother, this assumption was a source of conflict to her because in practice she wanted to continue with her paid work. She could not ignore her home-

based occupation and the meanings attached to it. Being a worker was also an important part of her identity.

> "I am satisfied with being a mother but not of being a professional. My occupation is being a mother, the other is an extra. However, I cannot erase myself, and disappear. The most important for me is the home, but at least I have the consulting room. If it disappears I would cry of sadness. I love it." Rosa, 45 years old, dentist, two children.

Elsa also experienced the same feeling of not being a good mother, but since she is not a professional like Rosa, she did not have the same concern about her paid work. Educated women or women with previous work experience seem to be more concerned with developing their professional careers.

These home-based workers are also wives, and for the three women this was a very important role. As a traditional rule dictates "woman must follow her husband", the three of them migrated to Tijuana because their husbands were looking for a better job. Husbands accepted the paid work of their wives but these women also had to fulfill their domestic duties to be good wives. Research carried out on working at home shows that although some husbands cooperate with domestic work and childcare, women generally are left with the responsibility of household care (Christensen, 1993). According to my own case studies, husbands and male children did not cooperate very much in household work. Women did not demand cooperation from their husbands because they consider them as the main providers. These women assume the role as supplementary income providers, their main role being as housekeepers. However, some women are trying to change the traditional division of labor by involving their male children in the making of beds, cleaning baths and some other domestic chores. On the other hand, in some cases, the husband and children participated in the women's productive activities.

The interviewees in my sample define themselves as domestic workers and as wage workers. However, some of them experience devaluation of their home-based work. On the one hand, some women define their work as professional as if they were doing it outside the home because they organize schedules, set appointments, just like any other doctor or lawyer.

On the other hand, working at home implies a lower status in the eyes of clients and misidentification of their work which can be disturbing for the women (Ahrentzen, 1997:82). Some people do not recognize women's professionalism because their work takes place at home and this may affect the confidence the clients have in them. In the words of Rosa:

> "It is not the same to work at home as working outside the home. When you leave home, you cross the doorway and go to a clinic where you are Dr. Martinez, there you have the same salary as those of your same category. You have respect and a schedule. But when you are working at home, you are the Mrs. who is a dentist. But

> you are first the "Mrs." Then, I feel as if it were a secondary job. It would not be the same if I were working in a consulting room at a hospital. Thus, you are working in a consulting room but it is not the same. At home I cannot charge the same, and I do not feel good at all." Rosa, dentist, 45 years old, two children.

People's perceptions about working at home are attached to conventional definitions and the meaning of the home as a non-working place, as Rosa said:

> "I do not think people will change their perception about my work. Particularly because their perceptions are based on appearance. When we go to the physician we look in the waiting room, and at the physical appearance of the secretary. Then, here (in my home) there is a baseball bat in the middle of the yard, and the seeds to feed the birds. This is not the ideal way of having a consulting room. It would never be. That is why I only attend to my friends and relatives."

Nevertheless, some husbands and children acknowledged women's home-based work. They did so not only because of the economic reward, but because they respected the women's skill and knowledge. This is particularly important for children's socialization where they may learn that working at home is as worthy as working outside the home.

> "My daughter did not realize about my work until she saw that her friend's mothers only watched T.V. in the afternoons. Now she thinks that 'my mom is very creative', and she is proud of me." Mariana, seamstress, two children.

Women are supposed to think of their home more as an expression of their own identity. They also tend to see the meaning of the home as involving important relationships with other people and to feel that the home is a personalized place (Saegert and Winkel, 1980). That is why women home workers work only with people they know, or those introduced to them by relatives and friends, and in this way they do not want to break the intimacy of their families:

> "My clients are my friends and neighbors. My home is not like an emergency room in a hospital, I cannot attend to anyone who knocks my door". Rosa, 43 years old, dentist, two children.

According to Saegert and Winkel (1980:450), the home is a setting that establishes the boundary between public on-stage activities and private interpersonal pursuits. However, the use of home spaces is daily transformed through productive activities involving the juggling between private and public. Women homeworkers decide not only what home places can be public but also the persons they want to share it with. For example, the seamstress uses the bedroom as a fitting room only for those people she feels well-acquainted with and the bathroom for people she does not know very well. The public-private dichotomy sometimes prevails, sometimes vanishes, sometimes blurs. Working at home involves blurred and contradictory practices, relationships and meanings. On the one hand, women home-based workers transform different areas of the home to

public places, and on the other, they want to preserve the privacy of their families and homes.

IMPLICATIONS OF HOMEWORKING FOR WOMEN'S STATUS

Women's status is a result of a variety of cultural and socioeconomic factors. Among these factors, Spain (1993) emphasizes physical segregation because it contributes to and perpetuates gender stratification by reducing women's access to socially valued knowledge. Thus, women's social status is related to spatial segregation insofar as existing physical arrangements facilitate or inhibit the exchange of knowledge between women and other social agents. Measurement of spatial segregation has to do with patterns of use of space at different scales as well as with mobility (Spain, 1993; Katz and Monk, 1993). I will refer to mobility as a spatial indicator of women's status for the case of the home-based workers.

In the Latin American literature, some scholars point out that work at home reifies women's place in the home (Benería and Roldán, 1987, Barbieri and Oliveira, 1986; Chant, 1989, among others). White feminist literature demonstrates that there is a greater diversity in women's experiences derived from socio-spatial relations. While some women enjoy being at home, others experience isolation (Ahrentzen, 1997:84-5).

Among my case studies I found that some women do work at home because they enjoy being at home, this is the space they control better. A seamstress I interviewed converted the T.V. room into her workshop. The location of this room was strategic to her because from the workshop she could control everything that was going on in the home. In addition, working at home does not necessarily mean that women are confined all the time because they often have to visit other sites and they meet and establish relationships with clients, suppliers, colleagues and professional organizations. Thus, spatial dynamics related to work at home might take place within or outside the home.

Places that home-based women workers go to and move around depend on their activity and home location. In my sample of home-based workers, I found that some women did not know the city and did not even know their neighborhood. It can be oppressive for women inasmuch as it impedes the development of their work at home and other daily activities. The degree of physical segregation of the home from the outside world will influence the use and meaning of the home as a workplace for women.

In general, the women home-based workers I interviewed have no mobility restrictions imposed upon them by their husbands. The restrictions are related to the knowledge of the city and their neighborhoods, as well as access to transportation. This is particularly true for older women and women from the lower-income sectors. Middle class home-based workers are more mobile because they

or their families own a car. In addition to the sites women home-based workers visit in relationship to their paid work, in general they take their children to and from school, go shopping, and visit relatives and friends. Middle class families sometimes go out for dinner.

Finally, Spain (1993:144) suggests that the school and the workplace are more consequential to women's access to resources than the home because little valued knowledge is located in it. However, among women working at home, those who did not have professional education learned and practiced new kinds of knowledge through their work. For example, Elsa, the diapers' seller, had to be innovative in ways of packing the diapers in order to do it more quickly and efficiently. She also learned how to manage a business although she did not have any previous experience.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This paper focuses on the time-space strategies that home-based women workers implement in order to accommodate productive work at home. As social actors, women face the contradictions of their dual roles which are often expressed spatially. In analyzing some of these socio-spatial practices and interactions of women workers at home, I attempted to reveal the interrelationship between gender and spatial dimensions.

Working at home is a process related to the larger conditions of women's lives, as well as the specific circumstances in which they are working at home. As a process, home-based work results in a diversity of experiences. Case studies show that home is a place that is continuously renegotiated. Working at home can be an integrative strategy that allows women to combine productive and reproductive work. But working at home may also result in a conflict that women intend to resolve by remodeling and reusing household space and establishing their own schedules. While restricted home places and inadequate environmental conditions might be oppressive for some home-based women workers, case studies also show that women's management of the household as a workplace helps them and their families to revaluate working at home as well as their domestic roles thus opening up possibilities for an improvement in the condition of women.

This study contributes to the literature on the topic to explain the ways in which home environments are pervasively gendered and how women have changed their use. The constant interaction between women and their living space helps them to redefine gender roles and relations, as well as the social ascriptions of what home and work are.

Working at home does not sustain the ideology that privatizes the home and renders it fully domestic (Ahrentzen, 1997:77). With home-based work, the home can be a public, dynamic site in which women are experiencing a diversity of relationships. By producing their homes as workplaces, women may have more chance of establishing control over their lives. Consequently, the spatial consideration of productive practices can help us to a better understanding of the specific modes of work and the consequences for women and family life.

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16

ROLE AND STATUS OF WOMEN WITHIN A PLANTATION ECONOMY SYSTEM

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The analysis of the role and status of women in plantation economies is based on a case study of the Abè in southeastern Côte d'Ivoire. The study began in 1992 and is still ongoing. The results presented in this paper are provisional.

The Abè are farmers who have gone from subsistence farming to producing cash crops, coffee and cocoa. Traditional social structures have been extensively shaken by new economic and cultural conditions. Solidarity within lineages is undergoing a complete transformation, leading to the creation of small family production units in which women play an important economic role.

BACKGROUND: PLANTATION ECONOMICS

The plantation economy is a commercially-oriented agricultural production system introduced by Europeans in tropical regions which until then had mainly been oriented primarily towards subsistence farming. The plants (shrubs) it relies on, as well as the forms it takes, vary from one region to the next. The plantation economy of Côte d'Ivoire, traditionally based on coffee and cocoa, has diversified and today includes poyo banana, oil palm, rubber tree, coconut palm, cotton, pineapple, etc.

Production is organised in two ways. The first organisational form concerns very large cultivated areas. It is managed by private individuals (from Côte d'Ivoire and from abroad) and by companies, especially state companies (SODE). This type of organisation employs hired workers, requires considerable capital investments, and involves the technical division of labour. It relies on advanced production techniques and a system of accounting procedures. Plantations organised and managed in this way in Côte d'Ivoire are called industrial plantations, as opposed to village plantations. The latter are set up and managed by smallholders.

This study concerns the second type of plantation. These plantations are run by families with or without the help of hired workers. They usually cover smaller areas than the first type of plantation, entail low investment, use little equipment and do not rely on any accounting procedures. The man is recognised as the founder and owner; this is not the case for his wife who works with him.

Coffee and cocoa are the plantation crops which have had the most success with smallholders. The plantation economy, defined as a system of production essentially commercially oriented and based on export crops, excludes food crops. However, in coffee and cocoa producing regions where the economy is considered as a plantation system, food crops such as plantain banana, cassava, yams, taro and vegetables are still produced and often in quite large quantities. These crops are used to feed the family and the paid farm workers. Peasant women sometimes sell some food crops just to obtain certain essential goods. But with the phenomenon of urban development and the decline of this plantation economy, there is today a substantial commerce in food crops toward urban areas. This activity is essentially female.

It is in this general context of the plantation economy that the question of the status and role of women in rural society is analysed in this case study of Abè society in southeastern Côte d'Ivoire. The study will attempt to show, based on a field survey, the role and status of women in the plantation economy.

PLANTATION ECONOMY AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR BETWEEN THE SEXES

The introduction of new crops has not been accompanied by any improvements in farming tools. What is new is that the peasant farmers no longer produce these tools themselves but buy them on the open market. The transition from artisanal to industrial production has only brought with it

a few minor changes in the shapes of the tools. They have remained similar to traditional tools and their design is basically the same, in that they are an extension of the arms and their use relies on human energy.

The acquisition of the plantation relies on traditional farming methods, with their simple and discontinuous character: an area of forest land is staked out and cleared, trees and plants are cut down, the branches are burnt and then the sowing is done.

As for space, the smallholder has quickly adapted to the new crops and the current farming system follows a specific pattern. Instead of cultivating food crops on one side and industrial crops on the other, the farmer combines in the same field food and shrub crops (coffee, cocoa). Given that the clearing of forest land using traditional tools requires a great deal of labour, clearing land specially set aside for shrub crops in addition to land used for food crops would require twice as much work. The growing of shrub crops and food crops in the same field allows the smallholder to save time for other activities.

However, the work involved in growing these new crops has been added to that of the food crops, thus increasing the overall workload. Therefore, the traditional design of farming implements explains why traditional work methods persist as well as their order of succession and their traditional division between men and women. The traditional gender division of labour linked to the traditional economic mode still remains. In such a context any production increase can only be obtained from an increase in the labour force.

WOMEN'S WORK IN PLANTATIONS

Starting up and running a plantation involves a certain number of tasks (Tables 16.1.and 16.2.)

Table 16.1.–Tasks carried out by women on plantations.
(For a total of 147 women)

Tasks:	Number of women engaging in each task
Clearing land	6
Felling trees	-
Clearing of ground	22
Sowing	145
Planting coffee or cocoa	70
Cleaning of plantations	123
Harvesting of coffee or cocoa	98
Shelling of the coffee	-

Sorting of the coffee	-
Drying	-
Transporting the products	-
Does not work on the plantation	2

Table 16.2.– Distribution of agricultural tasks according to sex

Tasks	Men	Women
Clearing land	+ + +	+
Felling trees	+ + +	
Clearing of ground	+ + +	+
Sowing	+	+ + +
Planting coffee or cocoa	+ + +	+
Weeding		+ + +
Cleaning of plantations	+ + +	+ +
Harvesting coffee	+ +	+ + +
Harvesting cocoa	+ +	+ +
Shelling coffee	+	
Sorting coffee	+ +	+ +
Drying	+ + +	+
Transport to market	+ +	+ +
Does not work in the plantation		

Legends: + + = high rate of involvement
+
+ + = predominant
+ = involvement
= no involvement

Out of 147 women, 145 work with their husbands on the plantations. In 1981, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock decided to purchase coffee in the form of fresh beans, thus putting a stop to the drying, shelling and sorting of the coffee. Moreover, the organisation of planters into farming cooperatives made it possible for each village or cooperative organisation to own a truck for collecting the produce in the fields. This enabled smallholders, and especially the women for whom this task was reserved, to avoid having to carry the harvest on their heads. These changes which have had an impact on predominantly female tasks have freed peasant women from certain exacting tasks. In addition to traditional tasks (sowing of food crops, weeding) women play an important role in the growing of industrial crops. They are largely involved in cleaning of the plantations, harvesting, shelling, sorting and transport of the harvest to where it will be sold. Industrial crops have greatly increased workloads and especially women's workloads. In fact, the introduction of industrial crops has contributed to the disappearance of a number of tasks traditionally carried out by men (hunting, fishing, food gathering) freeing them for new agricultural tasks.

However, to the women's traditional farm work activity has been added the plantation work, thus greatly increasing their workload.

In the age group considered as being most active (30-49), women dedicate 85.12% of their time in the day to work, of which 49.7% is farming work. The corresponding figures for men are 60.4% and 46.7%, respectively.

Table 16.3.– Distribution of time into productive and non-productive activities, men and women aged 30-49

Time use (activity)	Men	Women
I- Nonproductive time	39.6	14.8
-Inactivity	25.4	7.8
-Social activities	14.2	7.0
II- Productive time	60.4	85.2
-Domestic activities	4.8	30.1
-Farming	46.7	49.7
including: - food crops	10.2	27.1
- cash crops	36.5	22.6
-Gathering	7.9	2.2
-Activities linked to farming	1.0	3.2

Moreover, the time women spend on domestic chores is very high (30%). Many of the tasks carried out by women are directly linked to the men's work. For example, if women often leave in the morning to go to the fields after their husbands it is because they prepare breakfast and bring it to them. This allows the husband to avoid having to wait in the village or the camp and permits him to go directly to the field, thus saving time and allowing him to work longer. In the same way, if the woman goes home from the fields before the husband it is to prepare meals.

Women's domestic work thus provides essential support for men's work on the plantations. This domestic role played by the woman is crucial for the planter. In fact, it is one of the reasons why smallholders marry before becoming planters or as soon as they become planters. When considering agricultural production, women's work exceeds that of men, and more generally, productive work time of women is substantially greater than that of men. The man spends a good part of his time in social activities (14.2%). Women have much less spare time than men. The work of the woman is as essential for food crops as it is for cash crops.

POLYGAMY AND THE PLANTATION ECONOMY

In the overall process of change affecting Abè society, the production unit, which was the patrilineal lineage, has been broken down into small units, reducing the work force of each unit. At the same time, the plantation economy has substantially increased the agricultural workload. To make up for this reduction in the work force, the planter has two options: to increase the number of wives or to hire workers.

To check the relation between polygamy and the plantation economy, a link has been established between the number of women, the age of the smallholder and the size of the plantation (Table 16.4).

Table 16.4.– Cultivated area of plantations, average number of wives and age of planters

Size of plantation in hectares	Age group of planter	Average number of wives
1 to 5	24-35	1.4
6 to 10	36-45	2.3
11 to 15	46-55	3.6
16 and over	56 years and over	2.1

As the age of the farmer increases, the size of the plantation also increases. The reason for this link can be looked for in the gradual accumulation of new plantations created over the years added to already existing plantations. But this increase in the size of plantations is reversed in the oldest age group of planters. They have older plantations which are partly destroyed. This changing trend reveals the influence of time on the starting up, the size and the disappearance of plantations. There is also a link between the size of the farms and the number of wives. Planters with the largest farms often have more wives than others. One hundred and thirteen (113) of the 147 women have a polygamous husband. The number of wives varies from 1 to 5.

The plantation economy has strengthened polygamy. In fact, a comparison with the previous generation shows that out of the 113 women with polygamous husbands, 76 had monogamous parents. The association between the number of wives and the size of the plantation is only a general one: the biggest plantations are not always those with the most wives. The biggest planter (21 hectares) only has two wives whereas two farmers with 11 and 14 hectares each have five wives. Moreover, polygamy exists at all ages and among all plantation size categories. The increase in the number of wives for many planters, especially for beginners, is a means of increasing farm size and the main way of increasing the work force.

HOW DOES POLYGAMY SERVE THE PLANTATION ECONOMY?

When a planter acquires a second, third or fourth wife he has to increase the size of the new field so that each wife may have a plot large enough to grow food crops and increase production, especially if there are many children. The planter then plants all the plots with coffee and cocoa shrubs which will be tended by the wives during the first two years. As new fields are opened every year, the polygamous planter increases the size of his plantation faster than the monogamous planter. Afterwards he benefits from the help of all his wives in cleaning the plantations once the food crops have been harvested.

Polygamy also plays an important role in the race for land: to stop competition, the first thing planters do is to open several plots at the same time and increase the number of their wives. The plots cleared by the farmers are entrusted to the wives to avoid the land being taken over by other planters. Thanks to the women's work in the fields every day (sowing, weeding, etc.), all the plots of land cleared on the initiative of the husband may either be exclusively used to grow food crops, or may be used to grow both food and industrial crops and to be handed over to the person in charge of the clearing of the plot. The work of the wives during the first year after clearing the land is decisive in the upkeep of the plots, of their immediate vicinities and therefore in the process of extension and accumulation of land and of plantations. From the second year on the plots are tended by the planters themselves or by farm workers. The wives are then free to tend a new plot of land.

LIMITS OF POLYGAMY

One might think that the economic success of the planter automatically depends on the productive work of his wives and on increasing their numbers. If this were the case, the biggest planters would have the most wives. However, it appears that the planters with the most wives are not necessarily the owners of the largest plantations. This raises the problem of profitability as the number of wives increases.

Indeed, the increase in the number of wives does not relieve the husband from carrying out the tasks ascribed to him by the sexual division of labour. Although his wives help him with these tasks, they cannot replace him. By increasing the number of wives and as a consequence the size of the fields, the planter increases his workload to more than he can handle: the work of opening up new land and of tending it. Often busy with the many tasks involved in managing existing plantations, the planter cannot plant the

new fields with coffee or cocoa plants. The fields then become overgrown after the food crops have been harvested.

The increase in the number of wives up to a certain point constitutes an economic advantage for the planter. Beyond this, polygamy is no longer profitable we can speak of a “threshold of profitability of polygamy”, threshold beyond which the planter can no longer properly exploit fields which have become too big because of the increased number of wives. As the new fields are opened up for farming, the old fields or part of them are abandoned. Therefore, instead of a rapid extension of the plantation with the increase in the number of wives, there is rather a stagnation in the cultivated area because of insufficient male labour power.

Moreover, even though coffee and cocoa growing still relies on family help, it also relies greatly on labour provided by hired workers. This is especially true in the large plantations where a large part of the work is done by labourers. In fact, in the large plantations the women's work is often limited to traditional tasks. After having done the sowing and the weeding, and between harvests, many of them leave the farming camps and will stay in the village to look after their children who go to school. The planter who has become a big farmer now has the means to employ labourers. He then moves gradually from using family help (his wives) to using hired workers. The transition from one type of labour to another marks a change in the structure of the plantation and a change in the planter's socio-economic situation.

MARRIAGE AS A MEANS OF INTEGRATION OF WOMEN INTO THE PLANTATION ECONOMY

Coffee and cocoa farming, which are the only sources of income, are controlled by men. The woman occupies a marginal status in this economic system. When she does not go to town, which is one way for her to cope with this marginalisation, a woman is obliged to get married. Marriage to a planter is for her the only means of becoming a part of rural economic life. With this concern in mind, she will readily agree to marrying a polygamist, which represents an economic and social advantage for men. Moreover, although women have now acquired more freedom and freer access to divorce, plantation economics tends to keep them in the home. In fact, the new economic conditions have not changed the traditional relations concerning family property. According to tradition, the wife cannot inherit from the deceased husband. But through the levirate system she is given in marriage to the brother or the cousin who inherits. Current economic conditions force her to accept this system because it is difficult for a woman to accept that she may, at the death of her husband, be suddenly dispossessed of her plantations, the fruit of many years of hard work. The

thought that if she should refuse to marry her husband's heir she may not be fortunate enough to marry another rich planter, but rather a beginner with whom she will have to start from scratch, is enough to make her accept the heir.

In this way, plantation economics play a part in and support the levirate system insofar as they contribute to perpetuating it.

PLANTATION ECONOMICS, POLYGAMY AND FAMILY SIZE IN RURAL AREAS

As a means of acquiring wealth (plantations), men take several wives to benefit from their work. The Abè planter knows he cannot count too much on his children's labour in the fields, since they will go to school or sooner or later they will leave to go to the city[16]. Some of the children who have left school will eventually return to the village. They will work for a certain time for their father or mother. The boys will set up their own plantations and once they are married the girls will leave the family home. Therefore, family production units are often reduced to a man and his wife or wives.

Given current living conditions the planter knows it will be very difficult for him to send many children to school. He no longer seeks, as in the past, to assert his wealth and social status through having many children. However, he does wish to acquire a certain social status by having children. Even if he is a big planter, his social status will be diminished if he has no children. Consequently, although he may rely greatly on his wife's work, he will repudiate her if she is sterile. As for the woman, she will leave her husband if he cannot father a child with her.

The average number of children per family is 12. It is 9 in monogamous families, 14 in families with two wives, 20 in families of 3 wives, 24 in families with 4 wives and 28 in families with 5 wives. The number of children thus increases with the number of wives.

Although the number of children is higher in polygamous than in monogamous families, the wife of a monogamist has on average more children (9) than a polygamist's wife (7). Polygamy as an element supporting plantation economics by providing labour is definitely also an important means of increasing the size of families.

[16] Out of 100 children of school age, 92 attend school. The rate of attendance in the region is close to the highest rates in Côte d'Ivoire.

PLANTATION ECONOMICS AND WOMEN'S INCOME

Income Generated by Work in the Plantations

In exchange for her work the wife is rewarded by her husband. This reward can take the form of a gift, the harvest or cash. The gifts are cloth, shoes or jewellery. The husband buys these things either at the market in town in the company of his wife or in the village from travelling salesmen. Apparently in the past, remuneration in kind in the form of gifts was the most common practise. Today this form of remuneration is less frequent. Only two women received gifts as payments in kind.

Payment by harvest is often practised. During one or two years, the husband has his wife harvest on her own account the often small yield of a young coffee or cocoa plantation which is just beginning to produce crops. Since the woman is the symbol of fertility, this is seen as a way of ensuring the plantation will yield good harvests in coming years. The money from this harvest is paid to the woman, it is her reward and also allows the man to stop giving her anything else if he considers she has earned enough. The gift of money is the type of reward most often used. The sums paid vary considerably among the wives of planters belonging to the same category as well as among the wives of planters belonging to different categories.

The substantial variation in the amounts depends on several factors:

- on the work carried out by the woman and according to which her reward is evaluated. Sometimes when the woman does not work she receives nothing. Out of all the work done by the woman it is often her participation in the harvest which is decisive and it is often according to the harvest that the man evaluates and gives the reward.

- on the expenses the man has;

- on the number of wives. When a planter has several wives, it is often difficult for him to give each wife enough money; he avoids putting a strain on his resources. Therefore, the wife of a monogamist usually gets more money than each of the wives of a polygamist.

Moreover, traditionally the first wife always receives a much bigger reward than the others. The reward also depends on the relations between the man and the woman and on how generous the husband is.

How Income is Used

Usually the wife's reward is 3 to 5% of the income from the sale of the coffee or the cocoa. The average annual income per planter is about 450 000 CFA Francs.

The way the income is used follows the traditional sociological model involving the purchase of prestige goods, but now it can also follow a new model.

As before, women use their income to buy cloth, jewellery and cooking implements which they accumulate. But whereas in the past women had only one occasion to appear in public and that was at the traditional feast or celebration, now there is mass on Sunday, there are religious celebrations, New Year celebrations, visits from important civil-servants in the villages, all of which provide occasions for popular celebrations, and travelling also provides opportunities for the women to dress up and show off their possessions. This means the women always need to acquire more possessions for which they spend a large part of their income. The two main new expenses for women are for food and for the schooling and upkeep of the children.

The rule in traditional marriage is that the man is responsible for the family. Therefore, it is he who must pay for everything. In fact, the husband only pays for major expenses: lodging, food, etc. For food he buys during the period when income is provided by the sale of coffee or cocoa. A few months later when his resources are exhausted, he relies on his wife who pays for everyday expenses. This is the case especially in polygamous households where everyday expenses are usually paid for by the women. Especially as traditionally each wife keeps her own fire and looks after her own children.

Children's schooling is an area which uses up all the income of many women. The wife of the man who does not have large plantations and who has children at school must confront high expenses, which obliges her to take a higher degree of economic responsibility in the household.

In addition, the wife has to cover travel costs, medical expenses, contributions for the construction of public buildings (churches, maternity hospitals, health centres, schools), contributions for funerals or undertaker's fees and domestic expenses (purchase of essential goods, etc.). Most women end up with no money some time afterwards.

The wives of the big plantation owners have fewer expenses and therefore contribute less to the household budget. Since their husbands have more means they pay for all the big expenses and pay for the family's food all year round. Therefore, among the wives of these planters there is an increase in spending linked to prestige.

Women's Other Income Sources

Current problems in plantation economics, linked to the ageing of the coffee and cocoa orchards and to the constant reduction in prices paid to

producers, have resulted in a degradation of the economic situation of rural families and especially of women. The production and commercialisation of food crops (cassava, vegetables) is gradually replacing coffee and cocoa or is becoming an essential support activity. This activity is mainly undertaken by women.

The dynamism of women expressed through these extra activities corresponds to two lines of action: one in which they seek greater financial independence from men, and the other in which they seek to improve their families' living conditions.

The women work with their husbands on the coffee or cocoa plantation. The income from this work is managed by the husband. The woman must wait for him to give her the money to satisfy her personal needs. She is often deprived of this money. Modern life has brought with it an increase in women's needs. They want to acquire certain goods but find themselves limited because they depend on their husbands for their income and because this income is small.

For the women an extra activity represents a means of obtaining money to buy things they want without having to ask their husbands. In this way they acquire financial autonomy. On the other hand, this represents an advantage for the woman only if almost all of her income is not used for the household and the children, in other words when the husband also guarantees the subsistence of the family with his income. However, observations already made concerning the woman's contribution to the household budget seem to indicate that this situation is the least frequent. Women are limited in their savings by household expenses. It is in fact the main reason for their taking up another activity. The growing of cassava is undoubtedly a means by which women can possibly gain a certain degree of financial autonomy. With the current reduction in the standard of living of rural households, women's auxiliary activities have become more than ever an economic necessity.

When the woman grows and commercialises her own food crops it is to provide extra income for the family and to cover the expenses that the husband's income cannot cover. Often when the man has only a small income he may be fully dependent after the period of "financial abundance" and for a certain period afterwards on the woman who provides for all of the family's food needs. The women in families with small plantations play a more important economic role in their households than women in families of large plantation owners. Among the wives of the latter, financial necessity is not the incentive for extra activities. The growing of cassava provides them with an extra income making their lives a little less uncertain. Having fewer expenses they lend their money for interest which enables them to strengthen the socioeconomic position they have acquired from their husbands and to climb the social ladder.

The economic role of women is becoming more and more important, since not only are their contributions an absolute necessity in the planting of perennial crops, but the extra income they generate is becoming indispensable for their family's survival.

CONCLUSION

The disintegration of the traditional family, the fact that children attend school and the fact that the young are leaving has reduced the farm household's labour power. At the same time plantation economics have increased the amount of agricultural work to be done on the farm. Polygamy therefore has become a means for the man to increase the work force of the production unit. This is how in plantation economics the important role the woman plays is perceived. The indispensable and complementary tasks she carries out at her husband's side are essential to production, however her status within the system remains marginal.

Given the difficult economic context plantations are currently facing and in which planters' incomes are insufficient to cover all of their expenses, the women are forced to grow and sell food crops. These extra activities, in addition to their role on the plantation, provide women with new sources of income and enable them to improve the poor living conditions of rural families.

17

THE IMPACT OF THE EMIGRATION OF THE HUSBAND ON THE STATUS OF THE WIFE: THE CASE OF EGYPT

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With the oil boom in the countries of the Persian Gulf in the 70s, a strong labour migration from neighbouring countries was triggered off in the direction of the Arab countries of the Gulf. This migration increased later on, encouraged by the social repercussions of the liberal policies implemented from the beginning of the 70s, by the implementation of the structural adjustment programme, the official encouragement of emigration and the massive appeal of the labour markets in the immigration countries of the Gulf. Thus, the number of Egyptian emigrant workers went from 75 thousand in 1974 to 188 thousand in 1979, reaching 1.2 million in 1985, at which date the first national survey on the international migration of Egyptians was carried out (Fergany, 1987). The total number of Egyptian emigrants during the period from 1975 to 1985 (reference period for the survey) reached approximately 3 million people, which would represent 32% of the work force (Khoury, 1994). Almost 20% of households experienced migration by one of their members during the reference period of this survey (El Heneidy and Mohammed, 1993). In a short time labour migration became a structural phenomenon occupying an increasingly important place in the State budget and in the budgets of thousands of households, and spreading geographically to recruit workers from all over the country. Neither economic recession in the wealthy countries of the Gulf during the 80s nor even the Gulf War at the beginning of this decade were able to stem this movement for any length of time: Iraq before the Gulf War, Libya, Jordan and Western countries partially compensated for the slowing of demand in the Arab countries of the Gulf.

Among the most salient characteristics of this migration, as revealed by the survey mentioned above, is the fact that the migration observed is essentially that of married men who are not accompanied by their wives, especially among emigrants from rural areas. More than 96% of labour emigrants were in fact male, with more than 80% married and more than 5% engaged to be married (87.4% of emigrants from rural areas were in this situation). Barely 15% of the emigrants were accompanied by at least one member of the family, and this percentage was only 7.6% for emigrants from rural areas and 23.7% for emigrants from urban areas. Lastly, migration from rural areas seems to be increasing: on average it represented 47% of all migrants for the period from 1975 to 1985, compared with 55% at the time of the survey in 1985 (Fergany, 1987).

This shows therefore, especially in rural areas, the extent to which women are separated from their husbands and children from their fathers for periods lasting several years. El Heneidy and Mohammed (1993) estimate the percentage of households with one member having emigrated between 1975 and 1985 at 38% in the region of Upper Egypt. However, interest in this field of research in Egypt and in the region has been very limited, regarding both the number of studies as well as the approach and method adopted.

RESEARCH CARRIED OUT IN THE FIELD

A prevailing aspect among the studies dealing with the effects of the husband's emigration on the family as a whole and particularly on the status of the wives who remain behind is that global conclusions for most of these studies rarely concur.

Several researchers believe there is a positive contribution of husband’s migration to women's status. They have noted a tendency for change towards the nuclear family (Khattab, 1982; Amin, 1985; Moheddin, 1988; Abou Mandour *et al.*, 1989; Brink, 1991; Horchani, 1992; Kraiem, 1993), and most of these researchers believe that the trend has a positive impact on the status of women, freeing them from the influence of interventions and control of other members of the extended family and of that of the husband. Several of them observe that the emigration of the husband increases the wife's participation in economic activities (Abaza, 1987; Abou Mandour *et al.*, 1989).

However, other researchers have noted that the emigration of the husband reduces the wife's participation in economic activities and creates a tendency towards a return to living with her parents (Zaalouk, 1988), or that the duration of the absence of the husband is negatively related to the wife's independence. In other words, the longer the husband is away the less freedom the wife has (Moheddine, 1988). It has been suggested that the husband's emigration does not change anything concerning the wife's submission to the patriarchal order, which is maintained, in the husband's absence, by members of his lineage (El Singaby, 1985), or that exclusively male temporary migration is possible "only if the traditional values of group solidarity of the agnates remain sufficiently strong for the whole of the group" and that the presence of the father of the married emigrant would be a condition facilitating migration (Baduel, 1980).

A third group of researchers has noted that the husband's emigration has an impact both ways and at the same time: for example, they observed that it reduces the wife's participation in salaried employment but increases her participation in other economic activities, notably agricultural activities (Abou Mandour *et al.*, 1989), or that the trend towards the nuclear family does not necessarily imply increased freedom for the wife but may provide a number of means by which the wife's actions can be controlled (Moheddin, 1988), or that the freedom acquired by the wife of the emigrant is neither complete nor lasting (Taylor, 1984 for the case of Egypt, and Kadioglu, 1994 for the case of Turkey), or finally that migration, on the one hand, reduces traditional relationships, but on the other hand creates serious problems within the family (Kamiar and Ismail, 1991). The results of a survey carried out in approximately 100 developing countries on the theme of migration, which touched on this subject, resulted in similar observations (Stalker, 1995).

Other researchers present a rather negative picture of the impact of the husband's emigration on the status of the wife. Zaalouk (1988) concludes, based on a survey carried out in a suburb of Cairo using a sample of wives of emigrants, that migration "causes a greater marginalisation and exclusion of women", or that it creates a gulf between the migrant and his wife (Abdel Muaty, 1984; Abaza, 1987; Kamiar and Ismail, 1991). Several researchers have observed that migration implies a recurrence of social and psychological problems as well as problems with children's education (Abdel Muaty, 1984; see also the conclusion of the 1986 UNESCO report cited by Brink, 1991, and the results of the study conducted by Goza *et al.*, 1993).

These different observations, sometimes contradictory, are no doubt essentially, but not only, due to the diversity of places and populations studied and to when they were studied. However, other factors must also be considered, notably the survey methods used. Concerning the latter, it should be noted that the comparative approach was rarely used, especially with regard to nonmigrant populations. This considerably reduces the validity of the conclusions. As an example, several researchers have observed among the families of emigrants a change from an extended family to a nuclear family. But these conclusions were based only on a comparison related to the length of the husband's migration, whereas it is a known fact that this change is being experienced by a major part of society and that there is also a tradition, especially in Egyptian society, of passage towards the nuclear family as the couple's life cycle progresses, as we will demonstrate further on.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

This article is based on the results of a national survey which was conducted in Egypt in the autumn of 1994[17], covering a sample of 1 651 households with husbands who were labour emigrants at the time of the survey whereas the wife had stayed in Egypt. This sample was drawn from the main sample of the Demographic and Health Survey (nearly 63 000 households), systematically covering all the households who met the criteria. The sample is divided according to the following categories: 76.5% in rural areas, 23.5% in urban areas. Compared to the distribution of the entire migrant population mentioned above, our sample already shows that the migration of husbands, unaccompanied by their wives, is a phenomenon primarily involving rural populations.

[17] This survey is part of a study on "Migration and the Status of Women" carried out by the *Unité d'Etudes et de Recherches en Population* (UERP/LAS) in collaboration with UNFPA. This study covers 4 labour emigrant Arab countries: Jordan (1993), Egypt (1994), Tunisia (1995) and Morocco (in progress).

The objective of this study is to gain an understanding of the changes concerning the status of the wife of the emigrant who remains at home after the husband has emigrated and to determine the importance of factors involving migration in these changes. Two aspects of the wife's status have been chosen. First is the wife's independence, which we tried to check through changes in her participation in economic activities, changes in the type of family in which she lives, of her movements away from home to do the shopping for the family, of her movements for personal reasons, and lastly changes in the interventions of other relatives in family affairs. The other aspect of the wife's status covers changes concerning her authority which were checked essentially through financial authority, including that over transfers from the husband, supervising the family budget and sharing in decisions concerning family property, but also her authority concerning her children's behaviour. With the aim of more clearly defining the weight of migration factors in the changes in the wife's status, we included two sections in the questionnaire, covering both periods, before and during the husband's migration. This permitted an initial comparison, which we later verified at different times, of the observations of the population of households of the emigrants with similar samples (of the households of married women aged 15 to 49) from nonmigrant populations[18].

It should be noted that the results of this survey revealed a variety of situations, according to regions, the length of the migration, the migratory tradition and the life cycle, which we partially referred to in the survey report (Louhichi, 1996). However, in this case we simply checked the global data by place of residence (urban and rural).

MIGRATION AND WOMEN'S AUTHORITY

The survey results, summarized below, covering diverse aspects concerning the rights and authority of the wife, show for the majority a tendency towards the wives of emigrants having greater authority with regard to the money sent by the husband, control of the budget and of family property.

The first observation is that 85% of emigrant husbands send money (remittances) to their families, compared to a little under 50% for all emigrants (Fergany, 1987). Further, 74% of women whose husbands send money actually receive these remittances and decide how to spend them. Most of the 15% of emigrants who do not send money to their families have emigrated for only a short period of time, which would indicate that they did not have enough time to save money. Moreover, 73% of the wives of

[18] Including the EMCHS91 survey (PapChild/LEA), the 1993 survey on "Women's Economic Activity" (UERP/LEA) and the 1995 DHS survey (Cairo, 1996), all three of which were carried out in Egypt using samples of married women aged from 15 to 49.

emigrants reported that the remittances from the husband were only enough to cover household expenses, and only 10% of the women declared that the transfers allowed other investments. In other words, the remittances from emigrants were hardly sufficient, as Moheddine has already observed (1988), to compensate for the husband's income before his emigration. However, it should be noted that 26% of the women had no control over the transfers sent by their husbands (8% in urban areas and 31% in rural areas). In more than 90% of such cases, this control is in fact reserved only for one of the members of the husband's family.

Other data confirmed the tendency towards greater financial autonomy for the wife of the emigrant. The first observation made was that the percentage of women who had complete control of the household budget went from 37% before the husband emigrated to 86% at the time of the survey for urban residents and from 8% to 64% for rural residents. Concerning this point, the percentage of Egyptian women (DHS, 1995) who had complete control or shared with their husbands the control of the household budget was 61.6% in urban areas and 42.3% in rural areas.

Moreover, the percentage of wives of emigrants who said they had complete control or shared in the control over family property (farm, commercial or housing property) went from 31% before migration to 57% at the time of the survey. What also deserves mention is that the change in the possession and sharing of financial authority in favour of women operated essentially to the detriment of the husband and to a lesser degree to the detriment of his relatives. But the control of the husband's relatives on the household budgets of emigrants seems to persist, especially in rural areas. Thus the percentage of households where the husband's relatives control the household budget dropped from 34.3% before the emigration to 28.5% at the time of the survey, and respectively from 33.7% to 24.6% with respect to control over property.

Concerning the wife's authority over the children's behaviour, 61% of women in urban areas and 51% in rural areas said they had more authority after the husband emigrated and only 3% declared the opposite. The answers to another question show, however, that more than a quarter of the wives of emigrants, especially among urban residents, had problems with their children. These problems, from their answers, essentially concerned school and the psychological impact of the father's absence.

This data establishes that the woman's financial authority is strengthened after the husband's emigration, especially in urban areas where a third of the women questioned had financial authority compared with 19% of those in rural areas. This authority increases with the duration of migration.

The percentage of women who acquire no power (concerning the money transfers made by the husband, control of the budget and of the property of the family) varies from 35% among those wives whose husband

had emigrated for less than one year and 19.5% for those women whose husband had emigrated for at least 4 years, and the percentage of wives who acquired full authority went from 14% for the first category to 30% for the second. However, other factors appear to be closely linked to this evolution, especially the type of household the emigrant's wife is living in and at which stage of the marital life cycle she is.

It has therefore been observed that among women living in a nuclear family at the time of the survey only 3.2% had acquired no autonomy during the husband's migration and 32.5% acquired all the powers considered in this survey, compared with 60.8% and 5.6%, respectively, for women living with the husband's parents at the time of the survey. In the same way and by comparing this time the youngest and oldest age groups (under 25 and over 44), it was noted that the percentage of women who acquired no autonomy during their husband's emigration varied between 52% for the younger women and 4.8% for the older women. The inverse relation also confirms this tendency, the percentages of women who acquired full authority were at 8.7% and 35.7%, respectively.

More than the length of the husband's migration, the age of the wife and residential independence seem to be the key factors that influence the wife's ability to acquire new powers in the husband's absence. Later we will try to expand on this observation.

MIGRATION AND INDEPENDENCE

The evolution of the independence and personal freedom of the wife after the husband has emigrated proved to be somewhat more contrasted than that of her power. Study of the family type[19] in which the wife lives before and after her husband's emigration, shows that there has been a strong change towards living independently: the percentage of women living in nuclear families increased from 37% before the migration to 59% after. The relationship of this change with the length of the husband's migration also confirms this tendency. The percentage of women in nuclear families varies from 18.2% on average among the women whose husbands have been away for less than one year to 49.3% among those whose husbands emigrated more than 5 years ago. However, the extent of this change in the type of residence is called into question by the comparison of the sample of wives of emigrants with another sample of Egyptian women (EAEF 1993). This comparison revealed that there are few differences between the two populations: the percentage of households made up of nuclear families at

[19] Families are classified in two types: the nuclear family, where the household is made up of the wife alone or with her children (and possibly other people who have no family ties); and the complex family, divided into three types according to the family ties of the members of the household with the wife or her husband: with the husband's parents, with the wife's parents, or even with other relatives.

the time of the survey was 59.5% and 56.3%, respectively, in the two samples. The time factor therefore seems to affect both populations in the same way, and the amount of money sent by the husband does not seem to be a determining factor in this change.

As a rule in Egypt young couples live with the husband's parents, especially in rural areas. The change to the nuclear family, after a certain time has elapsed, is also generally the case as revealed in several survey reports (notably the EMCHS 1991, EAEF 1993 and DHS 1995 surveys; Shorter and Zurayk, 1988; Khattab and E. Daef, 1982). For example, according to the results of the EAEF 1993 survey, the percentage of women living with their husband's parents immediately after getting married was 43.8 in urban areas and 82.8 in rural areas, whereas at the time of the survey these percentages were 17.6 and 40.2, respectively. The case studies also revealed a strong link between the transition towards the nuclear family and the life cycle: the greater the woman’s age, parity and as a consequence the length of the marriage, the greater the chances are for the wife to leave the home of her in-laws. Table 17.1 illustrates the relations between these variables.

Table 17.1. – Percentage distribution of women who lived with their in-laws before the husband emigrated, according to the change in the type of family after the husband's emigration and the characteristics selected

Age of the wives	Do not receive money from the husband		Receive money		Average number of children		
	stayed with in-laws	changed to nuclear family	stayed with in-laws	changed to nuclear family	Living in nuclear family	Living with in-laws	Total
Under 25	96.7	3.3	63.6	36.4	2.1	1.7	1.7
25-34	88.3	11.7	36.3	63.7	3.6	3.2	3.1
35-44	61.9	38.1	17.1	82.9	4.9	4.7	4.6
45 +	23.1	76.9	11.3	88.7	5.6	4.5	5.1
Total	85.5	14.5	30.4	69.6	4.3	3.0	3.5

The table shows, on the one hand, the strong relation between the money from the migration and the transition of the emigrant's wife from the complex family to the nuclear family. The percentage of women who were able to make this transition after the husband emigrated, out of all the women living in complex families before the husband emigrated, was 70% among the wives receiving money transfers from their husbands, compared with only 14.5% among the women who did not receive any money. However, on the other hand it would seem that this change, for both groups, was automatically conditioned by the wife's age and parity. The transition towards the nuclear family only takes place in 95% of cases from the age of 25 and with a minimum of three children. Lastly, the data in the same table shows that at a certain age the wives' chances of living independently become much closer for both groups. From the age of 45 on the percentage of women having made this change was for each group 89 and 77%, respectively.

Other data also show that the fact that the wife of the emigrant lives in a nuclear family and separate residence does not mean that she is geographically completely independent from the other relatives: 76% of emigrants' wives said that they lived, at the time of the survey, near the parents, especially the husband's parents. And 21% of these women added that they often shared meals with them.

We can therefore conclude that the transition towards the nuclear family, for the households of emigrants as well as for those of non-migrants, depends on the stage reached in the family life cycle, which must be taken into account for comparison of the situation before and after the husband's emigration. Another conclusion is that despite the fact that the emigrant's money is spent, as we know (Fergany, 1987; Louhichi, 1996), essentially on

the acquisition or the construction of homes, this type of investment does not seem to be much greater than that made by nonmigrants[20] and would not imply a great difference of residential independence between the households of emigrants and those of nonmigrants. The money from the migration seems to enable the wives of emigrants who live in a complex family to move a little sooner and in slightly greater numbers towards the nuclear family situation.

Regarding changes in the participation of the emigrant's wife in economic activities, the results of the survey show on the one hand that there has been a reduction, in actual numbers and percentage, of salaried work after the husband emigrated for women in urban areas as well as wives living in rural areas. In urban areas the percentage of employed emigrants' wives dropped by 2.5 points and it was lower than for the wives of nonmigrants from the EAEF93 survey sample with 19% and 21.4%, respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of employed wives in rural areas increased after the husband emigrated and gained 2 points, thus overtaking the number of women employed in rural areas from the other sample with 23% and 19% respectively.

The reasons for stopping work are essentially (in almost 80% of cases), according to the responses of women from urban areas who stopped working after their husbands emigrated, due either to the wife herself refusing to work or to a refusal on the part of the people in her social circle and especially of the husband. The characteristics of the husbands of this group of women also show that most of them are in management with a relatively high level of education, which would imply a higher level of income in the receiving country. Lastly, the relation between the frequency of money transfers and the women stopping work within this category also seems high: the more regularly they receive money the more likely they are to stop work. Moreover there is the traditional belief among the middle classes in Egypt (Hatem, 1992) that the fact that women work (salaried employment, specifies Morsy, 1993) is a sign of poverty. Everything seems to point to the same conclusion, especially in urban areas, which is that the money from the migration combined with the low status of working women according to prevailing values tends to reduce the participation of the wives of emigrants in remunerated economic activities.

The situation in rural areas is different. After their husbands emigrate, wives must replace their husbands as far as farming and supervising the family farming activity. The percentage of women who are self-employed or who manage their own business was 46% at the time of the survey, compared with only 10% before the husband emigrated. Among

[20] The results of the Egyptian survey on international migration show that during the reference period of the survey 29% of the savings of emigrants were invested either in the acquisition of a home or of a plot of land to build a home, compared with 26% for nonmigrants; and 59% and 58% respectively acquired, during the same period, either homes or plots of land to build homes (Fergany 1987).

characteristics of women in this category it was noted that 77% worked in agriculture, 81% of whom replaced the husband, that they replaced him generally with the help of another person in the family (the average number of persons working in these projects was 1.8 per project), and that 40% of these projects were intended only for family consumption. The rest of the economically active wives of emigrants among rural populations either worked as salaried employees (27.5%) or as unpaid family workers (26.8%).

The massive assigning of women to production or supervision work in agriculture, a phenomenon which seems to be gaining in many regions in Egypt, in relation with the emigration and departure of men, but also linked to rural men switching to more profitable work such as private transport, trade or services, is in fact a subject of disagreement between researchers concerning its outcome and its repercussions on the status of women. Some researchers think that this change has improved the status of women by giving them new authority and sometimes even the possibility to frequent certain places reserved for men, such as farming cooperatives and markets (Abou Mandour, 1988; Khattab, 1982; Khafagy, 1984). Others believe on the contrary that the feminisation of agricultural labour has devalued this type of activity, which has become the work of women and children, a feminisation of poverty therefore which has only introduced a new form of gender inequality (Hatem, 1992; Morsy, 1993; Abaza, 1987). Moreover, in several respects changes in the roles of the wives of emigrants in rural areas such as observed in our case could correspond to Meillassoux's theory (1975): the migration of the husband has assigned to a number of women, in addition to their roles as mothers and of parents in charge of the education of the children, the roles of domestic production, in other words the reproduction of life as well as of cheap labour, which allows a greater exploitation of migrant labour and the reproduction of the migration itself.

After her husband's emigration, the wife seems to have more opportunities for going out when it is to go shopping or to settle affairs concerning household needs (paying bills, going to the market, sorting out administrative problems or problems concerning the children's education), but less when her reasons are personal (visiting parents or neighbours, leisure outings). In the first case the percentage of women who enjoyed this freedom went from 30% before the husband's emigration to 73% at the time of the survey for women in urban areas and from 5% to 43% for women in rural areas. It was noted therefore that half the women, who did not fill these roles in the husband's presence, replaced their husbands in such roles. The inverse movement also deserves mention: in more than a quarter of the cases these roles were actually left to the husband's parents (17% in urban areas and 30% in rural areas).

In the second case, the percentage of women who said they had few opportunities to go out for pleasure outings after the husband emigrated was 34% among women in urban areas and 43% in rural areas. The absence of the husband therefore enables the wives to go out more often, including for

dealing with administrative affairs, traditionally reserved for men, but this is usually allowed when such outings concern the needs of the household and not when they concern the individual freedom of the wife herself. However, it is noted that one fifth of the wives (19% in urban areas and 21% in rural areas) said they had more opportunities for leisure outings after the husband emigrated.

It seems that the pressure of values and traditions weighed much more on the change affecting this aspect of the woman's status than on other aspects. Thus, on the one hand, the increased freedom for wives to go out, especially for leisure outings, seem, as with everything else, to be closely linked with the life cycle and type of household. The percentage of women who had more opportunities to go out for leisure reasons varied between 16% among women under age 25 and with fewer than three children to 25% for the other women, and from 8% for wives living with their husband's parents to 22% for wives living alone. On the other hand, the women's responses revealed that they felt social pressure weighed greatly against them going out. The main reason for the reduced opportunities for leisure outings given by 63% of the women having experienced this change, was because the husband, the parents or traditions opposed this. The second reason, given by 30% of these women, was the extra load of domestic chores.

EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS

Lastly, concerning changes in the wives' social relations after the husband's emigration, the responses made by the wives seemed rather surprising to us. First of all very few women reported that interference from the parents in the affairs of the household increased: hardly 15% who still have at least one parent living (father or mother of the wife or the husband). Very few reported that their relations deteriorated after the husband emigrated: 2.4% concerning relations with the husband, 6% for relations with the husband's parents, scarcely 1% for relations with the wife's parents and only 3% said that the image others had of them had deteriorated. On the other hand, a substantial number of wives said that these relations had improved after the husband left and one third said that the image other people had of them had improved, insofar as the people around them respected them more. Better still, over 90% of the women questioned said they were satisfied or very satisfied with the overall benefits of the migration and 79% said they would encourage their sons to emigrate should the opportunity present itself. However, almost a third of the women said they did not want the husband to return, neither soon nor even after a certain length of time, justifying this attitude in most cases by the need of ensuring a future for the children and of being able to cover household expenses.

Therefore, despite the apparent negative effect of the husband's emigration for many wives regarding personal freedom (fewer leisure outings, less participation in economic activities outside the home, more domestic chores of all types, a little more interference from the parents and therefore a tendency to stay at home more, especially for women in urban areas), these women seem mainly satisfied by the changes in their status after the husband's emigration. From the data available, the only aspect which could explain this attitude on the part of the women is their increased authority, especially regarding financial matters. In this case, the change could be described in the following manner: for the wife of the emigrant to be able to adopt the roles and prerogatives of the husband she has to prove her worth regarding unanimously recognised values, such as being a good homemaker and above all, as we have shown, be at an advanced stage in the life cycle. To save time, especially as what is at stake is important, the emigrant's wife seems to confine herself more to domestic tasks and roles and to bringing up the children. She has therefore sacrificed some of her freedom, essential in gaining the trust of the family circle and others, to speed up the process of being invested with more autonomy. It is a little like the game of the veil and the hijab that many young women wear so that they may frequent public places (Haenni and Fuger, 1996; Ghannam, 1996; Ferchiou, 1995)[21].

CONCLUSION

The results of a survey conducted on a representative sample of wives of emigrants residing in Egypt, devoted to establishing the repercussions of the husband's migration on the wife's status, established the following points:

– First, this migration generally allowed women who stayed at home to replace the husband in several of his roles, and above all it invested them with greater financial authority. However it was noted that there was a tendency for wives to stay at home and dedicate themselves more to household chores after the husbands emigrated. In other words, the increased authority did not automatically imply increased individual freedom. This is especially evident among women in urban areas, where it was observed that the more the wife's authority increases the less freedom she

[21] Ghannam observes in this regard that "to cross the boundaries that separate the public from the private, women need to protect themselves and prevent any potential social disorder or *fîtna* by wearing the veil: women thus can 'enter men's public space only by remaining shielded in their private space'; and the veil is seen as a 'symbol of inferiority', or one that renders the women 'invisible' in the street" (p. 178). Ferchiou, describing the situation in Tunisia, insists on the fact that the "*hijab*", derived from the verb *hajaba*, meaning to hide in the sense of protecting, is used by these women as protection against malicious remarks... the *hijab*, because of this, actually becomes an element giving them freedom (p. 190).

has. For example, wives who regularly receive money transfers from the husband are more often tempted not to work as salaried employees.
– On the other hand, it would seem that the increased authority of the wives of emigrants is conditioned to a great extent, as for Egyptian society in general, by the point in the life cycle she has reached. In other words, she must prove her reproductive capacity to be able to enjoy this privilege. Women in Maghreb, according to Lacoste-Dujardin (1996), are only really accepted into society once they have become mothers. It is only from this moment that they begin to play a role in society and acquire a status that men recognise.

The husband's migration and especially the money from this migration, have on the one hand invested the wives of emigrants with greater powers, and on the other hand, reduced the time needed for obtaining such powers. In considering patriarchy in the Arab word as a privilege for males and elderly people, including women (Joseph, 1996), one can conclude that the husband's emigration leads especially to reinforcing and speeding up access of women to the powers of the patriarchy. What also deserves mentioning is that the emigrant's wife is not completely passive in this process. Rather, everything seems to happen with her consent: the emigrant's wife seems to scrupulously submit her behaviour to traditions, thus giving up some of her freedom in exchange for acquiring certain powers sooner.

What will the status of the wife be after the husband's return, what will become of her acquired authority, especially financial and moral authority, and what about the contraction of her personal freedom? A few observations concerning changes in values and attitudes of returned emigrants regarding agricultural work and women’s work deserve mentioning. The first observation is that several survey results globally concur regarding the fact that returned emigrants prefer to work in trade and private transport, especially as small entrepreneurs (Fergany, 1988; Choukry, 1987; Moheddine, 1988). Choukry and Moheddine add that there is a tendency among the returned emigrants in rural areas to turn away from agriculture: the percentage of emigrants working in agriculture compared with the total number of returned emigrants in the survey sample of the CAPMAS survey (Choukry, 1987) went from 30% before the migration to 11% at the time of the survey. Abdel Muaty (1984) also concludes, in his study of the village of Dafra in Egypt, that emigration has brought about a transformation of values in favour of being one's own boss or setting up small businesses. Abaza (1987) reports that migration brings about a condescending attitude towards agricultural work which has become the work of women, and finally, Morsy (1993) concludes in his study of the Egyptian village of Bahia that the work of the wives of emigrants has not reduced the poverty of these women, but has perpetuated the devaluation of women’s work compared with men's work.

Concerning the contribution of this survey, as an exploratory study, towards certain aspects of the hypotheses and methods of investigation into the relation between the status of women and migration, I would like to make a few remarks.

– The results have shown, among other things, the relevance of and need for a comparative approach, not only between the two periods, before and after the migration, but also and especially between the households of migrants and those of non-migrants. Many researchers have indeed relied on only the first comparison, and their conclusions seem rather exaggerated concerning the effects of migration on women's status. In addition, and due to the fact that this type of migration (that of non-accompanied husbands) seems to affect mainly specific regions and populations, I believe it would be more relevant for the comparison to be carried out using samples from the same regions as those of the migrants. In cases where I have been able to carry out such a comparison, the results seem substantially different from the comparison made with the society of the country of emigration as a whole. Surveys carried out on the same theme in Jordan and in Tunisia (Louhichi, 1996) were conducted on samples of households of migrants and non-migrants taken from the same cluster of the sample frame, and the results quite often confirmed my previous remark.
– Another aspect to be stressed is the wealth of the comparison between the diagnosis of, for example, women's status and how it is changing, based on theoretical concepts and set definitions, and the reality of these changes as revealed by the perception of the women themselves. This could lead, as I have already demonstrated, to conflicting results.
– The survey showed the validity of the approach based on the household as the study unit. In the study on changes in women's status, it made it possible to observe the effects of factors regarding the structure of the household, notably type of family and the family's life cycle stage, on changes in the status of the wives of emigrants, which made it possible to put the effects of migration factors into context.
– However, the survey has shortcomings, such as the absence of complete data on the characteristics, the roles and especially the perceptions of the husbands. The gender approach would allow a better observation of changes in the status and roles of women, but the problem obviously resides in the fact that the husband is absent and therefore cannot supply such data. In addition, several questions would require more qualitative investigations, based mainly on more in-depth interviews of an anthropological nature.

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18

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CHANGES IN WOMEN'S ROLES WITHIN THE FAMILY AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON WOMEN'S STATUS: THE CASE OF KERALA, INDIA

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OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The study aims at identifying the factors contributing to the deviations from the traditional role of women within the family and their influence on women's status. Specifically, the study attempts to answer the question: Does employment and/or access to an independent source of income contribute to increase the status of women within the family, measured in terms of alterations in the family power structure and authority relationship (which are traditionally male centred) in favour of women? The underlying assumption is that the male claim to superiority in the family inter alia is due to his role as the bread-winner and/or control over the family resources.

The study used both primary and secondary data from the State of Kerala in India - a State where women traditionally enjoyed better status than their counterparts in other parts of India.

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

The traditional position of women in India is exemplified by the dictum of Manu, the great codifier of Hindu Law (circa 3rd century B.C.). This dictum is as follows:

- The father protects her in childhood;
- The husband protects her in adulthood;
- The son protects her in old age;
- At no time in life a woman deserves to be free.

The Kerala society was an exception to this rule. In Kerala, there was a unique institution called the "Tharawad", a peculiar variant of the Hindu Joint Family, where lineage was reckoned through the female and where matriarchal values prevailed. This is in contrast to the patriarchal and patrilineal system prevailing in most parts of India. The ideal type of the Tharawad prevailed among the Nayar community of Kerala, though some other communities, like the Ezhavas and Mappila Muslims, also followed this system. In the Nayar Tharawad, inheritance of property was through the female and a woman also had the freedom to choose and divorce her husband at will. This practice was called "Sambandham". Education of woman was a sine qua non of the Nayar family and it extended much beyond the three "R"s, well into literature, music, dance and rudiments of astronomy and Ayurveda (the Indian system of medicine). Upper class women also had to attain proficiency in the martial arts. Obviously, these talents equipped the Nayar woman with high functional skills which she could use with advantage outside the family.

Through the process of "sanskritisation" the values of education filtered down to other communities, so much so that when the State took up the promotion of education it was enthusiastically welcomed by the people. The higher status of women in Kerala enabled them to play the role of powerful change-agents in health care and family planning programmes in modern times. The high attainments of Kerala women on different indices of women's status, compared to other women in India, are mostly due to this advantage.

Table 18.1. – Selected indicators of status of women - India and Kerala

	Sex	India	Kerala
Birth Rate (1991) ‰		34.3	19.7
Death Rate (1991) ‰	M	10.7	5.9
	F	10.9	5.8
Growth Rate (1991) ‰		23.5	13.98
Life Expectancy at Birth (1991) years	M	57	68
	F	56	72
Infant Mortality Rate (1995) ‰		80	15
Effective Couple Protection Rate (1989-90)		30	55
Maternal Mortality Rate (1991) per 10,000		5.8	1.9
Deliveries in Hospitals (1987-88) %		14.2	46.2
Age at Marriage of Girls (1991) years		18.5	21.3
Literacy Rate (1991) %	M	63.66	94.45
	F	39.42	86.93
Physical Quality of Life Index (1984)	M	46.5	93.7
	F	32.1	89.7

THE SURVEY DATA

Much of the earlier social milieu that contributed to the status of women in Kerala in the past has disappeared due to legislation and cultural invasion from the North. The Tharawad, the bulwark of matriliny and matriarchy, was abolished by law in the 1920's. Patriarchy came in its wake and gathered momentum after independence (1947) and with this, the values fostered by women's equality received a setback. But the gains already made continued though with some handicaps. The ethos of the Tharawad system was control of women over the family property coupled with education. In modern times, education continued to be an asset of the Kerala woman and loss of control over Tharawad property was partly substituted by some form of employment or income. To what extent these new forms of power have enabled women to gain status is the purpose of the present enquiry. In this study, an attempt is made to measure the effect of employment or/and inherited property or income on the status of women through a change in traditional sex roles within the family.

An experimental sample of 100 married women in white collar employment and aged between 25 and 55 years and a control group of another 100 married women in the same age group but without employment but comparable education were chosen for the study. The samples of respondents were interviewed to collect the required information. The analysis of the data is given in the following tables.

AGE COMPOSITION

The age distribution of both categories of respondents is more or less the same except for a slight difference in the last category.

Table 18.2. – Age of respondents

Age	Employed	Not employed
25-35	25	22
35-45	53	49
45-55	22	29
Total	100	100

NUMBER OF CHILDREN

It is evident that employed mothers have fewer children than nonemployed mothers. The average number of children per employed mother is 1.94 and for the nonemployed mother it is 2.67. Of course, for both categories, the number is small and this is a reflection of the State's average. Though the knowledge about contraception among both categories is close to 100%, it is the employed women who have adopted birth control practices more. For them the problem of rearing an additional child while holding a job is more acute than for those without employment. Since procreation till nature put a stop to it was the accepted role of a married woman, the new practice of limiting the number of children is a deviation from established practice.

Table 18.3. – Number of children of the respondents

Number of children	Employed	Not employed
No child	6	2
1 child	22	19
2 children	48	26
3 children	20	36
4 or more	4	17
Total	100	100

Control over births brings status to women in at least five ways, as follows:

- Control over the desired number of children and the time for bearing them enables a woman to liberate herself from the frequent and lengthy preoccupations with pregnancies, childbirths and child care which immobilise her and deprive her of the ability to attend to anything else in life other than household chores;
- The time thus saved can be used for better management of the home including better care of children and better health and happiness of members. She can engage herself in more remunerative jobs and better social participation;
- Fewer children reduce the strain on family resources and the money saved can be used for a higher standard of living;
- Fewer births reduce the risk of maternal mortality which is a major killer of women where hospital facilities are few and superstitions on pregnancies and childbirth are abundant; and
- Finally, the knowledge that a woman can eliminate unwanted pregnancies removes from her the source of the greatest tension in her life, strengthens her self-confidence and develops her personality which is stunted by the

double disadvantage of subordination to man and having to bear children, possibly against her will and possibly also beyond her endurance.

EDUCATION

In the family situation, especially involving status of women, education of a woman has meaning only if it is contrasted with education of her husband; for, in many cases, status may be determined on the basis of who has the higher education. Hence we have given in Table 18.4 the education of our respondents in a comparative frame of reference.

Table 18.4. – Education of respondent vis-a-vis education of husband

Education	Employed	Not employed
Higher than husband's	28	24
Same as husband's	45	39
Lower than husband's	27	37
Total	100	100

In general, more employed women had a higher level of education than their husband's while the contrary was the case with nonemployed women. One reason for this phenomenon was that white collar jobs required higher educational levels. Also, a husband looking for a nonemployed wife may not be very much concerned with her educational attainment.

EMPLOYMENT

Table 18.5 gives the employment level of the respondents in relation to that of their husbands. Interestingly, around one-fourth of the respondents had higher jobs than their husbands. Also, only one-fifth of the respondents had lower jobs than their husbands. The implications of this for woman's status are described in two later tables (Tables 18.9 and 18.10).

Table 18.5. – Respondent's employment level vis-a-vis that of husband

Employment level	Employed
Higher than husband's	24
Same as husband's	48
Lower than husband's	21
Husband self employed*	7
Total	100
* In business or agriculture.	

INCOME

Since our assumption on woman's status in the family also involves her possession of an independent income (whether from employment or inheritance or other sources) and since this income could be available to all our respondents whether employed or not, we have given prominence to this aspect in our study. Again, this is contrasted with the income of the husband following the logic used earlier.

One more table will complete the picture on income, viz., the respondent's income as a proportion of the total family income. For assessing status, it is not enough if one knows whether the income of a woman is higher or lower than that of the husband. It is also necessary to know what is the proportion of this income in the total family income pool, which may consist of incomes of in-laws and others besides the husband and wife who are living in the family and sharing the family expenditures. It will be seen from Table 18.8 that only 38% of employed and 35% of unemployed respondents are living in nuclear families.

Table 18.6. – Income of respondent vis-à-vis income of husband

Income level	Employed	Not employed
Higher than husband's	26	20
Same as husband's	38	34
Lower than husband's	36	46
Total	100	100

Table 18.7 shows that in one third of the cases, the respondent's income constitutes more than 50% of the total family income. This is true of nonemployed women as well.

Table 18.7. – Percentage of respondent's income in the total family income

Percentage	Employed	Not employed
More than 75	8	14
50-75	26	21
Less than 50	66	65
Total	100	100

FAMILY TYPE

The type of family of residence is a possible contributor to the woman's status in the family. We have mentioned earlier that in the Tharawad, which was a joint family, women enjoyed high status. In nuclear families also, since responsibility is in fewer hands, the probability for the wife to have power is high. Of course, the dynamics of woman's status may not be dependent on the type of family alone though at times this may emerge as an important factor.

Table 18.8. – Family type of respondents

Family type	Employed	Not employed
Purely nuclear	38	35
With in laws	26	31
With parents and others	36	34
Total	100	100

HELP RECEIVED FROM HUSBAND IN FAMILY WORK

In assessing the changes in the role of a woman in the family, the extent of help received from the husband is critical. If the husband entertains the notion that it is beneath his dignity to do any household chores or to help

his wife in her household work, he will not help even in genuine cases where she needs help. When both husband and wife are employed, the husband would understand the problems of his wife who has to perform the double role of an employee and housewife. For a nonemployed wife, the problem may not be very serious.

Table 18.9. – Amount of help from husband

Extent	Employed	Not employed
Very much	30	4
Much	37	25
Little	33	47
Very little	0	24
Total	100	100

Employed wives get more help from their husbands than do nonemployed wives. This will be as much out of sheer need in a nuclear family as by the free will of the husband; in the nuclear family the wife cannot look for help from any source other than the husband, especially when a servant is not available. Whether by necessity or by choice, the effect is the same; the wife gets relieved of much of her tension and burden. From the point of view of role sharing some of the female roles get shifted to the male and, to that extent, the stereotype of gender-based roles becomes less categorical.

A further analysis of this data in terms of the level of employment and income of the wife showed the following relationships:
- Husbands whose wives have higher level employment or whose wives have higher income or whose wives' income forms a substantial proportion of the family income form a larger percentage of those who help their wives "very much" and "much" in household chores.
- Higher educational level of the wife is also a factor in this though it is not as strongly co-related as employment and income.
- Husbands in nuclear families help their wives more than those in other type of families.

DECISION MAKING

Share in family decision making is an important indicator of a woman's status in the family, since decision making is associated with the authority to make decisions and power to implement them. Because of this importance,

we gave serious consideration to this aspect in our study. We divided family decisions into two categories - routine decisions, i.e., day-to-day decisions on everyday problems of home management including purchase of provisions, decision on menu, disposal of routine issues, etc. and critical decisions, i.e., decision on the number of children including decision on sterilisation and those decisions that are taken occasionally and involve a sizeable portion of family income (purchase of consumer durables, property - moveable and immovable, education and marriage of children, etc.). The major areas of family decisions were identified and put in the two categories and questions were separately asked in these two clusters and their average scores were taken. These are shown in Table 18.10.

Table 18.10. – Decision making in the family

Who decides	Employed		Not employed	
	Routine	Critical	Routine	Critical
Mainly by self	58	11	57	3
Jointly	23	57	37	31
Mainly by husband	19	32	6	66
Total	100	100	100	100

While it could be accepted that the complexities of modern living required that many of the day-to-day decisions be taken by the wife because it is more pragmatic and because she is a better judge than the husband on such issues, the decisions on critical issues continue to be a male prerogative. The power of our respondents to enter this area both independently and jointly with the husband, therefore, should be considered as something revolutionary - in fact more revolutionary than the husband going to the kitchen and helping his wife in cooking. This is the case of both role sharing and role exchange.

Since this is also an important area of status gain, we analysed the data in terms of other significant variables. The findings are given below. Critical decision making by the respondent alone and jointly with husband was related to the following factors:
- Higher level of employment of wife;
- Higher level of income of wife;
- Larger proportion of wife's income in family income;
- Higher educational level (much above the threshold) of wife;
- Living in nuclear families.

In fact, all those variables which were related to the husband's sharing wife's household chores were found to be related to decision making also.

SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

We have identified some of the more critical factors that contribute to changes in women's role within the family and the consequent increase in status. In traditional Kerala, the matrilineal system and education of women contributed to the status of women. In modern times, the matrilineal system was replaced by patriliny but education of women continued. In any case the advantage of education once established cannot be undermined. Education equips women for modern jobs. Some among those who did not go for jobs could inherit sufficient property/assets to have an independent income after marriage.

Both education and employment modified the roles of the woman in the family. Early marriage, unlimited number of children, spending of one's whole time in childbearing, child rearing and in household chores and subordination to husband and other male elders were the normative roles of a woman in the family.

Education modified a woman's role by keeping her in school for a longer time, delaying marriage and equipping her for a healthy married life and a professional career. The first gave her control over pregnancies with all the advantages that it brought. Education helped her to increase her worth to other members of the family. It expanded her mental horizon and increased her self-confidence, both of which helped her to remove her marginal status in the family.

Employment shifted her main activity from the hearth and home to office where she has to spend around one-half of her waking hours. To that extent, her role as cook, kitchen and home worker gets modified. Employment broke the male monopoly as bread-winner and the control that it helped him to exercise authority over the family members. In some cases, there would be given a complete role reversal as in the case of a woman-headed household.

Possession of income which employment permitted gave her a voice in its spending, i.e., a share in family decision making and this helped in many vital areas of family life.

A flow chart linking the different variables involved in our scheme of things is given below.



19

HOW FAMILY POSITION INFLUENCES MARRIED WOMEN'S AUTONOMY AND POWER IN FIVE ASIAN CONTRIES

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This paper presents a preliminary analysis of how aspects of married women's family position influence their domestic power and autonomy in the developing countries of South and Southeast Asia. The analysis is part of a larger study that is investigating the determinants of women's autonomy and power and their relationship to women's reproductive intentions and behavior (Mason *et al*., 1989). A basic premise of the larger study is that the nature of women's power and autonomy reflects the social context in which they live, as well as their personal characteristics (Smith, 1989). National, regional, and local cultures and even individual households have distinct traditions about the rights and duties of women and men, rights and duties that are enforced through formal and informal social sanctions. Thus, whether individual wives are able to make important economic decisions, can move about freely, or live relatively free from coercion usually reflects the country, region, community and household in which they live.

The current paper focuses on how certain family characteristics and women's position within the household contribute to their power and autonomy. Three aspects of women's autonomy and power are considered: their economic decision-making power, their freedom of movement (or lack thereof), and the extent to which they are subjected to coercive interpersonal controls by their husband. Although we initially focus on the relationship of national context to these aspects of autonomy and power, most of the analysis concentrates on the impact of household variables: both the socioeconomic position of the household in the broader stratification system, and the position of the married woman within the household as indicated by

such variables as the length of time she has been married, the number of children she has borne, whether she is married to the household head, whether she was related to her husband before marrying him, and the frequency with which she and her husband communicate about reproductive and other matters, such as community events and financial issues. The next section of the paper describes the countries in which the study was conducted. A subsequent section describes the data, measures, and methods used in the analysis. After presenting the analysis, the paper closes with a summary and discussion of results.

COUNTRIES

Because of the assumption that women's autonomy and power are largely determined by social context, this study was conducted in five countries chosen because they have different gender traditions as well as different levels of socioeconomic development. The countries are Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. In the South Asian countries (Pakistan and India), family patterns and gender traditions tend to deny women autonomy, decision-making power, and freedom of movement in most spheres. Especially in Pakistan and North India, women are expected to observe some form of *purdah* ("seclusion" or norms of modesty *vis-à-vis* members of the opposite sex). Family structure in this part of the world also is built around the ideal of a multi-generational patrilineal household in which sons remain throughout their lives while daughters marry out and wives marry in, often from a considerable distance away (Dyson and Moore, 1983; Srinivas, 1976). This puts in-marrying brides at a disadvantage because they enter the household as strangers, without legitimacy or social supports. Thus, in addition to social norms that dictate that men are the head of the family, the inheritors of the land, and the leaders of the community, and that women are to be modest and obedient, first to parents, then to husbands and parents-in-law, family traditions put women at a considerable disadvantage when it comes to household decision-making power and autonomy.

In South India, gender norms are somewhat more egalitarian than in North India and family structure less disadvantageous to new brides (Dyson and Moore, 1983). South India does not practice *purdah* to the same extent as it is practiced in North India, and the custom of preferential cross-cousin marriage means that women often marry within their natal villages into a household known to them since childhood. Thus, women in South India, although expected to maintain modesty and obedience to their husbands, are more able to attend school and to work outside the home, and are less powerless domestically when they marry than are their counterparts in the North of the country.

Southeast Asia stands in even greater contrast to Pakistan and North India than do the southern states of India (Dyson and Moore, 1983). Compared to most of South Asia, norms of female modesty and obedience are less stringent in Southeast Asia, tolerance for women's public-sphere activities is greater, and family patterns less disadvantageous for women's power and autonomy (Mason *et al.*, 1995). For example, Southeast Asian family patterns place less emphasis on the male line than do South and East Asian patterns. Indeed, if there is a bias in these family systems, it is toward the female line.[22] An emphasis on the conjugal household, rather than on the joint or stem family household idealized in South and East Asia, also is relatively strong in most Southeast Asian countries. Thus, while women in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines can hardly be characterized as being equal to the men of their class and ethnicity, they tend to enjoy greater autonomy and power than do their counterparts in South Asia. We thus expect to see higher levels of female autonomy in our samples from Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines than in the samples from India or Pakistan[23].

DATA, MEASURES AND METHODS

The data for this study were collected collaboratively by teams of researchers located in the five countries involved in the study[24]. In each country, from seven to 21 communities were purposively selected to represent a range of gender and development conditions within that country. In all countries except Pakistan, both Muslim and non-Muslim villages were sampled so as to permit a test of the idea that Islam restricts women's freedom. In Pakistan, villages were selected from three agro-economic zones of Punjab state thought to differ in terms of feudal organization and hence the latitude given to females in their day-to-day lives. In India, the state of Uttar Pradesh was selected from the northern part of the country and the state of Tamil Nadu from the southern part. Within each state, Muslim and non-Muslim villages at different levels of economic development were then selected. In Malaysia, samples of the three major ethnic groups

[22]For example, in Thailand, the youngest daughter is expected to remain with or near her parents to care for them in old age, meaning that it is her husband who must move at marriage and live with another family, rather than the young woman.

[23] The case of Malaysia is complicated by the presence in that country of three major ethnic groups, Malays, Chinese, and South Indians. These groups have different family and gender traditions, some of them quite conservative. For this reason, we expect Malaysia to hold a position intermediate between the South Asian and the other Southeast Asian countries in our study.

[24]Teams leaders were, in Pakistan: Dr. Zeba A. Sathar; in India: Dr. Shireen J. Jejeebhoy; in Malaysia: Dr. Shyamala Nagaraj; in Thailand: Dr. Napaporn Chayovan; and in the Philippines: Dr. Corazon M. Raymundo.

comprising the population of that country (Malays, Chinese, and Indians) were drawn in both urban and rural areas. In Thailand, a series of villages representing the four major regions of the country were selected through probability methods, as were neighborhoods within a city in each region plus the capital city of Bangkok. In the southern region of Thailand, two of the four selected villages were Muslim while two were Thai Buddhist[25]. Finally, in the Philippines, purposively selected were two Muslim villages from Zamboanga Province (the province where the majority of rural Filipino Muslims reside), two areas within metro-Manila, the capital city, and six additional villages from three central provinces of the country with different agricultural and economic conditions. In each of the 59 villages selected for the study, a sample of currently married women ages 15–39 was interviewed, along with approximately half of their husbands. Thus, instead of consisting of probability samples of national populations, the data used in this study consist of samples of women from mostly rural communities purposively chosen to represent distinct gender and development conditions.

The interviews with married women aged 15–39 asked about a number of aspects of their decision-making power and autonomy. Six items concerning their economic power and autonomy are combined into a single scale in this analysis[26]. In all countries except Thailand, women were also asked a series of questions about whether they needed to get permission from a family member in order to travel to seven types of locations, including a local market, a local health center, the fields outside the village, the village community center, the home of a relative or friend, a nearby fair, shrine or temple, or to the next village. Responses to each item were coded 1 for yes and 0 for no, and were summed to form a scale representing the number of places the woman is required to get permission before traveling to. The scale thus represents her relative *lack* of freedom of movement.

In addition, in all countries except Malaysia, women were asked two questions concerning coercive interpersonal controls applied to them by their husbands, first, whether the husband beats them, and second, whether they are afraid to disagree with the husband for fear he will become angry

[25] In Thailand, communities were chosen using probabilistic methods from the sampling frame used in the first Thai Demographic and Health Survey. In all other countries, selection was purposive, as noted in the text.

[26] The six items are: (1) Please tell me who in your family decides about the following: whether to purchase major goods for the household such as a TV/refrigerator? (Wife=1, others=0); (2) Please tell me who in your family decides the following: whether you should work outside the home? (Wife=1, others=0); (3) & (4) Who of these people usually has the greatest say in this decision? (Wife=1, others=0); (5) If you wanted to buy yourself a dress/sari, would you feel free to do it without consulting your husband [or a senior member of your family]? (Yes=1, no or undecided=0); (6) If you wanted to buy yourself a small item of jewelry, such as a bangle/beads/etc., would you feel free to do it without consulting your husband [or a senior member of your family]? (Yes=1, no or undecided=0). Responses to the six items were summed to create a scale ranging in value from 0 through 6 (highest level of economic decision-making power/autonomy).

with them. Responses to these yes-no questions were summed to form a three-point scale that roughly taps the extent to which the woman is subjected to coercive interpersonal controls by her husband.

The properties of the three scales vary. An earlier analysis of the economic decision-making power scale suggests it is reasonably coherent as judged by loadings on a principal components factor analysis (Mason, 1996). The seven freedom of movement items also are strongly interrelated as judged by principal components analysis, although an as yet incomplete analysis suggests that not all seven items scale equally well in all countries under the Rasch model (results not shown). The coercive interpersonal controls scale, however, is relatively weak and is used here primarily for convenience[27]. In future analysis, we will examine responses to individual items. In the present paper, however, the aim is to provide an overview of how family conditions are related to three distinct aspects of women's autonomy and power, namely, their economic decision power, their freedom of movement, and the extent to which they are subjected to coercive interpersonal controls by the husband.

The plan of the analysis is as follows. We first examine means on the three measures of women's autonomy and power in order to assess the extent to which there are country differences. We then turn to ordinary least squares regression results predicting each of the three scales of women's autonomy and power from a series of family and background variables[28]. The wife's position in her family is measured by the length of time she has been married, whether she is the wife of the household head or instead is married to some other family member, whether she was related to her husband before marriage, the number of children she has borne, and how often she and her husband discuss two types of issues: those related to fertility, and those related to household finances or the community. The last two variables each are scales formed from two underlying items asking women how frequently they and their husbands discuss four issues: how many children to have, whether to use birth control, what to spend money on, and what is happening in the community[29]. We expect all of these measures to be related to women's autonomy and power positively. Being married for a long time should give women more experience and a more secure position in the family and hence should increase their autonomy. Being married to the household head should also enhance their autonomy

[27]Although the two coercive control items do not correlate strongly with the items included in the other two scales, their correlations with each other are modest, although positive. These intercorrelations vary from .3 in India to .01 in the Philippines, with the other values falling in the .1–.2 range.

[28]Because the coercive control scale has a very limited range (from zero to two), we also replicated the analysis for this scale using ordered logits estimated with maximum likelihood. With only one exception (discussed in the text), the results from the ordered logit analysis were very close to those from the ordinary least squares analysis in terms of the sign of relationships and their statistical significance.

[29] Each item is scored 1 for "never", 2 for "sometimes", and 3 for "frequently", and values for the two items in each scale are summed to form the scale.

because this means either that the woman lives in a conjugal family household or, in an extended or stem family household, is the senior wife who, by virtue of being married to the head, should have decision-making authority in traditional "female" spheres. Having children is frequently speculated to enhance women's authority because it fulfills her basic obligation to continue the family line. Finally, discussing issues with her husband is an indicator that the wife is privy to information about a subject and is regarded by her husband as worthy of entering into a discussion. Discussing an issue more frequently should therefore be associated with having greater autonomy or decision-making power in that sphere.

The regression analysis also controls for two personal characteristics thought to be important for women's autonomy and power in most settings: their age and level of education. Both represent exposure to experiences likely to build self-confidence and knowledge of the world. Older women and those with a higher level of schooling should therefore enjoy greater autonomy and power. The analysis also controls for the family's socioeconomic position as measured by three indicators: 1) the husband's level of education, 2) the household's total income relative to the average in the total sample for that country (trichotomized into high, medium, and low categories), and 3) an index of ownership of six non-electric household possessions[30]. Whether a high socioeconomic status should enhance or detract from women's autonomy and power is unclear. Although well-educated husbands may be more liberal about granting their wives autonomy and a say in important household decisions, well-off families are also able to engage in culturally-prescribed practices such as *purdah* that poorer families cannot afford and that are also likely to reduce women's autonomy and power (Balk, 1996).

Finally, all regressions also control for community, as represented by a dummy variable classification. Thus, in the regressions estimated for the total sample, 58 dummy variables for community (and country) are included, while in the within-country regressions, between six and 20 dummies are included.

[30] We restricted this index to non-electric goods in order to avoid confounding the availability of electricity in the community with the socioeconomic position of the household.



Figure 19.1: Autonomy Measures by Country.

RESULTS

Figure 19.1 graphs the means for the three autonomy scales by country. On all three scales, women's power or autonomy tends to be higher in the Southeast Asian countries -- especially in Thailand and the Philippines -- than in Pakistan or India. For example, women's economic power is lowest in Pakistan and highest in Thailand. Their freedom of movement is greater in Malaysia and the Philippines than in Pakistan or India. And their exposure to coercive interpersonal controls is highest in Pakistan and lowest in the Philippines, with the level in India and Thailand intermediate. Because the sample for each country is (with the exception of Thailand) a non-probability sample, there is no necessary reason for country means to line up as expected.

That they do suggests that there are indeed major differences across the five countries in gender conditions. We return to this point after examining family correlates of women's autonomy and power.

Let us first examine the correlates of women's economic decision-making power. The metric regression coefficients relating family and individual variables to the decision-making scale are shown in Table 19.1, both for all countries combined and for each country separately. Although we do not show the coefficients for community in Table 19.1, it is important to keep in mind that the underlying regression equations contain dummy variables representing the relevant communities. Thus, the regression coefficients shown in Table 19.1 are estimated net of the effects of community and, by implication, of country. Note also that although owning land and engaging in paid work are strong predictors of women's economic decision-making power (Mason, 1996), controlling for these variables does not appreciably change the results shown in Table 19.1 (results not shown).

Generally, the longer that a woman has been married, the more likely she is to enjoy economic decision-making power. This effect can be seen in most of the countries, but is pronounced enough to achieve statistical significance only in the South Asia ones. Being the wife of the household head -- that is, either residing in a conjugal household or as the wife of the head of a joint household -- also is associated with having economic decision-making power. This effect is consistent with the observation that women in conjugal family households have more power and autonomy than those in joint or stem families, unless they are married to the senior male in the family. Again, the effect of residing as the wife of the household head, although evident in all five countries, is strong only in Pakistan and India.

The literature on family patterns in South Asia frequently mentions the idea that marrying a relative -- especially a cross-cousin -- enhances women's autonomy and power after marriage because it normally involves marrying into a family that already knows and has some affection for and

commitment to the bride. Marriage between related individuals is quite common in South Asia. For example, 80% of the Pakistani women in our sample and 60% of the Tamil Nadu women are related to their husbands, as are also 51% of the ethnic Indians in the Malaysian sample. As can be seen in Table 19.1, however, being related to the husband does not appear to enhance women's economic power and autonomy. To the contrary, if anything, it detracts from it, especially in South Asia. Thus, despite claims that marrying a related man helps to allay the powerlessness of young brides, our data suggest the opposite.

Table 19.1. – Metric regression coefficients for the economic power scale regressed onto family and background variables: Five countries.[a]

Predictor variable	All countries	Pakistan	India	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines
Family measures:						
Marriage duration	.01*	.05**	.04*	.02	.00	.01
Is wife of head	.34**	.49**	.42**	.14	.32**	.10
Related to husband	-.10*	-.20	-.17*	-.14	-.01	.24
Number of children	-.05**	-.05*	-.03	-.10**	-.07*	-.03
Couple discusses:						
Fertility matters	-.02	.02	.04	-.02	-.04	-.04
Other matters	.09**	.16**	.21**	.03	.00	.06
Background:						
Woman's age	.04**	.00	.01	.06**	.07**	.04**
Years of education	.04**	.05*	.00	.06**	.05**	.03*
Husband's education	.01*	-.00	.02	-.01	.02	-.01
Household income:						
High (omitted)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Medium	-.10*	-.20	-.07	-.20	.11	-.43**
Low	-.11*	-.29**	-.16	-.26*	.06	-.25
Possessions index	-.03	-.02	.01	-.10*	-.05*	-.04
Constant	-.12	.25	-.06	1.38**	1.12**	3.74**
R-squared	.49**	.16**	.15**	.20**	.15**	.13**
No. of observations	7261	978	1839	1273	2184	987

*Significant, .05 level. **Significant, .01 level.

a- All regressions in this and in subsequent tables also control for community (represented as a series of dummy variables).

Why is this the case? Especially in Pakistan, where uncle-niece marriages are fairly common, the results for relationship to husband might be supposed to reflect an unusually large age gap between the husband and his wife when the two are related rather than anything about their being related *per se.* Adding an explicit measure of the difference between the husband's and wife's age to the regressions, however, in no way alters the

results for being related to the husband. Indeed, the age difference between husband and wife is unrelated to wives' economic decision-making power in all five samples (results not shown).

An alternative explanation may be that marrying a cross-cousin or uncle in Pakistan and India has become a sign of traditionalism, and that wives who are married to related men enjoy less economic power than average not because they married a relative, but rather because they come from traditional families. Again, however, adding measures of the wife's attitudes about the roles of women and men to the regression equations in no way alters the results for being related to the husband before marriage. Thus, if these attitudes accurately reflect how traditional in outlook the wife's household is, then traditionality does not appear to explain the unexpected result for being related to the husband, either. Although the reason for the result thus remains unclear, it would appear that marrying a related man does not enhance women's economic power in South Asia.

We expected that having borne a fairly large number of children would enhance a woman's power and autonomy because she would have fulfilled one of her most important traditional duties and would thereby have proven her worth to her husband and his family. In fact, however, our regression results show a negative net relationship between the number of children a woman has borne and her level of economic autonomy and power rather than a positive relationship. It is important to note that this relationship is positive before controlling for marriage duration or age (results not shown). It is only when the length of the current union is taken into account that a high level of childbearing becomes associated with a lower level of economic power and autonomy (although the relationship does not achieve statistical significance in India or the Philippines). Perhaps this means that it is women who have failed to bear sons and who consequently feel pressures to bear an inordinately large number of children who tend to lose economic power. Controlling for the number of living sons in the regressions, however, does not alter the results.

Another possible explanation for the inverse relationship between number of children and economic decision-making power may be that it is the most traditional families that both encourage high fertility and deprive married women of such power. As was the case with being related to the husband prior to marriage, however, controlling for the wife's gender-role attitudes in no way alters the results for number of children. Thus, family traditionality does not appear to explain the inverse relationship between fertility and women's economic decision-making power. This leaves as the most likely explanation the opposite causal path from the one implicit in the regressions shown in Table 19.1. In other words, it is probably wives' economic decision-making power that helps to determine their fertility rather than their fertility that determines their power, a common hypothesis in the literature (Mason, 1993). Regardless of whether this explanation is correct, it is evident that having additional children does not, in general, secure a

greater say in the household's economic decisions for the wife. Rather, age and a longer duration of marriage help to accomplish these, as does residing in a conjugal household or as the wife of the head of a joint household.

The final variables concerned with women's familial position are the two measures of husband-wife communication. As is the case with many of the other variables considered in this analysis, the endogeneity of these variables with respect to women's economic decision-making power is unclear. Women who have a lot of say in the household's economic decisions may as a consequence tend to engage their husbands in discussions of family finances or community events more frequently than do wives who have little say. Or it may be that by discussing family finances or community events, a husband empowers his wife economically and socially. In any case, the regression results suggest that discussing non-fertility issues, such as family finances and community events, is related to a greater say in family economic decisions in the two South Asian countries although not in the other three countries. Perhaps in contexts where husbands and wives often lead separate lives and are not expected to discuss much of anything, having such discussions fairly frequently is a marker of a less traditional, more conjugally-oriented relationship, and hence of conditions that tend to enhance the wife's economic decision-making power and autonomy.

In addition to family position, a woman's age and education both are important for her say in family economic decisions. Older and better educated women usually have more say than do their younger, less schooled counterparts. This is especially the case in the three Southeast Asian countries where norms about women's participation in economic activities and decisions are relatively supportive. In South Asia, a woman's age and education are not very important for her say in family economic decisions, but her position *vis-à-vis* her husband and the other members of her household are. The opposite is true in Southeast Asia. It would thus appear that kinship variables are especially important for women's domestic economic power in settings that generally grant women few freedoms and have family patterns that constrain women's autonomy. In settings whose family systems constrain women less, personal characteristics that influence their experience and independence are, not surprisingly, much more important for the extent of their economic decision-making power.

Because we are dealing with multiple indicators of the family's socioeconomic status (SES), reaching a clear generalization about the impact of this status on women's economic autonomy is not always easy. The results in Table 19.1 suggest, however, that the higher the socioeconomic status of the family, the greater is the wife's economic decision-making power. This may in part reflect the greater level of disposable income likely to be available to women from higher SES families

than to those from poor families[31]. In any case, it does not suggest any tendency for high SES household to deny women economic power.

Let us now turn to the results for women's freedom of movement (or lack thereof), which are shown in Table 19.2. Generally, position within the family makes little difference for women's freedom of movement, except that women married to the household head enjoy greater freedom of movement than those residing as daughters-in-law or sisters-in-law, especially in Pakistan and India. Age is also related to freedom of movement in most settings, although not in the Philippines. Especially in the more conservative settings, older women are more trusted to move about on their own than are young brides. Interestingly, however, a woman's education is not very strongly related to her freedom of movement, except in Malaysia where this result is probably an artifact of sampling procedures[32].

Thus, being wife of the household head and being older are the only family and personal characteristics that appear to enhance women's freedom of movement, especially in the more conservative South Asian settings.

Although it is frequently speculated that wealth enables South Asian families to enforce *purdah*, the results in Table 19.2 suggest little relationship between family SES and wives' freedom of movement, either in general or in South Asia in particular (see Balk, 1996 for rather different results obtained in Bangladesh). The only SES indicator with a significant relationship to the movement scale is the index of household possessions. Although the results for this scale are in the expected direction -- they are positive, meaning that women from wealthier families lack freedom of movement more than do those from poorer families -- the relationship is weak and fails to achieve significance except in Pakistan. Thus, while there is a hint that in India, women in poor families may enjoy greater freedom of movement than women from wealthy families, there is little to suggest this relationship holds in Pakistan or in the Southeast Asian countries.

Finally, let us turn to women's exposure to coercive interpersonal controls, i.e., beatings and intimidation. The regression results predicting these controls are shown in Table 19.3. The results here for the family variables are rather surprising. They suggest that longer-married women with large numbers of children who discuss reproductive issues with the

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[31] An earlier analysis (Mason, 1996), however, showed that the economic decision-making scale does not simply reflect variations in household income; it also reflects variation in the latitude given to wives to enter into economic decisions in different households.

[32] In Malaysia, the initial sample of rural Malay women was drawn by interviewing rural-based market sellers in the city of Kota Bharu; most of these women were unusually well educated and obviously were self-selected for their ability to leave their home villages and travel to the city to engage in market selling. The market seller sample was later supplemented with additional women from the surrounding rural towns in which the market sellers resided. Despite this supplement, however, a sample selection bias for women who are both well educated and able to go to town to sell their produce undoubtedly remains.

husband frequently are *more* likely to be subjected to coercive interpersonal controls than are other wives. These results are difficult to interpret. Were it not for the significant coefficient for discussing fertility issues, one might interpret them in terms of the family's traditionality. That it is couples who engage in a rather *untraditional* behavior, namely, discussing birth control and fertility, who are most likely to live by the fist and the frown rather than the couples who do not engage in this untraditional behavior suggests otherwise, however. And in fact, when a woman's gender-role attitudes are controlled, none of the results shown in Table 19.3 is significantly altered[33]. Thus, although the explanation is elusive, it would appear that longer-married women with larger numbers of children suffer more coercion from their husbands than do their younger counterparts.

Table 19.2. – Metric regression coefficients for the lack of freedom of movement scale regressed onto family and background variables

Predictor variable	All countries	Pakistan	India	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines
Family measures:						
Marriage duration	-.02*	-.01	.02	-.02	__	-.03
Is wife of head	-.20*	-3.5*	-.20	.03	__	.14
Related to husband	.11	.17	.08	.08	__	.14
Number of children	.02	-.06	.05	.05	__	.01
Couple discusses:						
Fertility matters	.02	.04	-.08	.03	__	.09
Other matters	-.01	-.11	-.10*	.13	__	.13
Background:						
Woman's age	-.04***	-.03	-.08**	-.05*	__	.01
Years of education	-.02*	.01	.01	-.06*	__	-.02
Husband's education	-.01	-.04*	.00	.01	__	-.03
Household income:						
High (omitted)	__	__	__	__	__	__
Medium	-.10	-.06	.04	-.26	__	-.06
Low	.08	.08	.11	-.00	__	.36
Possessions index	.07**	.03	.09*	.11	__	-.01
Constant	6.51	6.91**	9.00**	5.53**	__	5.19**
R-squared	.42**	.08**	.35**	.34**	__	.41**
No. of observations	5075	979	1839	1269	__	988

*Significant, .05 level. **Significant, .01 level.

[33] The only result that differs in the ordered logit analysis from what is shown in Table 19.3 is for being related to the husband. In the Philippines, the ordered logit coefficient for this variable fails to achieve statistical significance.

Table 19.3. – Metric regression coefficients for the exposure to coercive interpersonal controls scale regressed onto family and background variables

Predictor variable	All countries	Pakistan	India	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines
Family measures:						
Marriage duration	.01**	.01	.01	__	.02**	.01
Is wife of head	-.01	-.06	-.02	__	.02	-.00
Related to husband	-.01	-.02	-.02	__	.03	-.14*
Number of children	.02*	.05**	-.01	__	.02	-.00
Couple discusses:						
Fertility matters	.02**	.01	.06**	__	.01	.01
Other matters	.00	.02	-.06**	__	.06**	-.03
Background:						
Woman's age	-.01**	-.02*	-.01	__	-.02**	-.01
Years of education	-.01**	-.02*	-.02*	__	-.01	-.01
Husband's education	-.01**	-.00	-.02**	__	-.01	-.02**
Household income:						
High (omitted)	__	__	__	__	__	__
Medium	.06*	.03	.07	__	.06	.07
Low	.07**	.05	.13*	__	.02	.07
Possessions index	-.03**	-.03	-.01	__	-.04**	-.00
Constant	1.39**	1.32**	1.04**	__	.91**	1.32**
R-squared	.15**	.10**	.11**	__	.07**	.17**
No. of observations				__		

*Significant, .05 level. **Significant, .01 level.*

With regard to the household's socioeconomic position in the community, the results in Table 19.3 make clear that SES is strongly and inversely related to experiencing coercive interpersonal controls. Wives who are older, better educated, married to better educated men, and whose households enjoy relatively high incomes and own relatively large numbers of possessions are less likely to experience beatings or intimidation than are wives who are younger, more poorly schooled and who live in poor households. Thus, in many Asian settings, intimidation and beating appear to be behaviors that are encouraged by poverty and ignorance. Perhaps high fertility produces additional strains for the family that help to account for the positive relationship between having large numbers of children and experiencing coercion, at least in Pakistan. In any case, when it comes to living free from coercive interpersonal controls, it would appear that the family's SES is more important than is a woman's position within the family or household.

Before ending this discussion of the regression results, we wish to comment briefly on the role of community and country in determining the three facets of women's autonomy examined in this paper. In order to

understand the role of social context, we regressed the three measures of women's autonomy onto the community dummy variables without introducing any of the family or personal characteristics. The R-squares from these regressions as well as from the regressions shown in Tables 19.1-19.3 are shown in Table 19.4. These results make two things clear. First, it is evident that social context has a strong role in determining women's autonomy, especially their economic decision-making power and freedom of movement. In the all-country equations, social context can explain 92% of the variation in women's economic decision-making power that all variables together are able to explain (i.e., .45/.49). Likewise, social context can explain 95% of the variation in women's freedom of movement, and 73% of the variation in exposure to coercive interpersonal controls. Thus, the fundamental assumption of this study that social context strongly influences women's autonomy is confirmed.

Second, however, if one compares the R-squares from the all-countries equations with those from the within-country equations, it becomes evident that *which* social context is most important varies according to the aspect of women's autonomy one considers. For the economic power scale, the R-square is far larger in the all-country equation than in any of the within-country equations. This suggests that country is a more important context for determining women's economic decision-making power than is community within countries. The same cannot be said of either freedom of movement or exposure to coercive interpersonal controls. Here, the all-country R-squares are in the same range as at least some of the within-country R-squares. For these aspects of women's autonomy, then, community within country is as important as is national context. We do not know why this finding holds, but plan to explore it further in future analysis.

Table 19.4. – R-squares from all-country equations containing all predictors versus from equations containing only community and country indicators

Autonomy measure	All predictors	Community/country indicators only					
	All countries	All countries	Pakistan	India	Malaysia	Thailand	Philippines
Economic	.49	.45	.04	.08	.16	.06	.09
Movement	.42	.40	.02	.29	.31	—	.40
Coercion	.15	.11	.04	.07	—	.02	.13

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has briefly explored family correlates of women's autonomy and power in South and Southeast Asia, using specially-collected data from a sample of almost five dozen communities in Pakistan, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Consistent with the oft-repeated admonition that the « status » of women is a multi-dimensional concept (e.g., Whyte, 1978), the analysis has found differing correlates of the three aspects of married women's autonomy and power examined: economic decision-making power, freedom of movement, and exposure to coercive interpersonal controls in the family. In some cases, the correlates of women's autonomy have also varied by country, a pattern consistent with another frequently made admonition, namely, that women's « status » is context dependent (Mason, 1986). For example, in Pakistan and India, the duration of a woman's marriage and whether she is the wife of the household head are both important for whether she has a say in the family's economic decisions, whereas in the three Southeast Asian countries, a woman's age and educational level are far more important. Thus, in contexts in which traditional family patterns and gender norms give married women little economic decision-making power, the trust and experience accumulated after many years of marriage, and the power a woman acquires by residing as the wife of the household head, both tend to give her a greater voice in financial decisions. In contexts where family patterns and gender norms do not deny family economic power to women nearly as much, however, the extent of their power is determined not so much by the accumulation of marital experience and residence as wife of the head as by personal characteristics such as age and education that give women greater independence and self-confidence.

A somewhat surprising result was that marrying a related man did not enhance women's economic decision-making power. If anything, it detracted from it, especially in social contexts where cross-cousin and uncle-niece marriages are most common. This unanticipated result cannot be explained by a wider age gap between spouses in related marriages, nor by the degree of family traditionality (as measured by the wife's gender-role attitudes). Regardless of explanation, however, it is evident that marrying a related man does *not* enhance a woman's say in the family's economic decisions, as has been claimed in the past.

Another surprising result was the unexpectedly inverse relationship between women's fertility and both their economic decision-making power and freedom from coercion. It is frequently speculated that fulfilling the traditional obligation to produce children enhances women's autonomy and power, and that high fertility therefore should give women a power "bonus." In our analysis, however, the net relationship of number of children to two of the three measures of autonomy and power was negative, that is, the more

children the woman had, the lower was her power or autonomy. There may be settings (e.g., sub-Saharan Africa) where high fertility indeed gives women additional power or autonomy, but in South and Southeast Asia, this does not appear to be the case. Instead, we speculate that the inverse relationship between fertility and women's autonomy in Asia probably reflects the fertility-inhibiting effects of women's autonomy (Balk, 1994; Mason, 1993; Morgan and Niraula, 1995).

Yet another common speculation that this analysis failed to confirm is that socioeconomic status is inversely related to women's autonomy, especially to their freedom of movement in South Asia. In contexts with norms of female seclusion, or where female idleness is used as an important symbol of a family's high economic status, it is frequently speculated that women in well-off families will enjoy less personal autonomy and power than women from poor families (Mason, 1987), a finding confirmed in some analyses (Balk, 1996). In our analysis, however, the socioeconomic status of families and of women themselves was either positively related or unrelated to their personal autonomy and power. Indeed, in the case of women's exposure to coercive family controls, it was evident that coming from a high status family was one of the single most important *protections* against family coercion. Again, there may be contexts in which a high socioeconomic status reduces women's autonomy, but it does not appear to do so in much of South and Southeast Asia.

The analysis presented in this paper has made clear that social context is very powerful in explaining variation in women's autonomy and power. One of the most important questions that remains to be answered, however, is *why* social context is important. We were able to ascertain that most of the social variation in women's economic decision-making power occurs between countries rather than within them. For freedom of movement and exposure to coercive interpersonal controls, however, there was as much intra-country as inter-country variation. Especially when it comes to variation within countries, whether it is religious differences among communities, differences in their treatment of girls *vis-à-vis* schooling, employment or health care, or differing attitudes about the roles of husbands and wives that makes a difference for wives' autonomy and power remains to be explored. Future analysis in the current project will focus on this question.

Acknowledgement

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20

EXAMINING WOMEN'S STATUS USING CORE DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH SURVEYS DATA

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The collection of data on women's status has not been a primary objective of the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program, nor have these data been traditionally used to examine women's status[1]. Nevertheless, a large part of the data routinely collected by these surveys can be used very effectively to measure several dimensions of women's status. The use by DHS of a standard questionnaire with only minor modifications for data collection in all countries, permits the development of identical indicators and makes comparisons of women's status across countries feasible. There are few if any data sets that can compare to the spread and scope of the Demographic and Health Surveys data: since its initiation a decade ago, this program has interviewed over half a million women in 47 countries. In addition, most of these data sets are available for public use. The exploration of non-traditional uses of this vast and easily accessed data source is made particularly imperative in the prevailing stringent financial and budgetary climate which has eroded research funding.

Despite the empirical feasibility of comparing women's status across countries afforded by the Demographic and Health Surveys data, there is legitimate skepticism as to whether cross-country comparisons of women's

[1] This paper is concerned only with data collected using the DHS core questionnaires. Country specific questions, or questions in special modules (for example, AIDS module, female circumcision module, women's status module etc.) used in some countries, but not all, are not discussed here. Criteria used to construct the summary measure of women's status are in Appendix.

status are meaningful. For one, there is no one accepted definition of women's status: terms such as women's empowerment, female autonomy, gender equality, access to and control over resources and even prestige have all been used to define women's status in the literature. In addition, women's status is multi-faceted, making it difficult to measure uniquely: not only can it vary along different dimensions such as decision-making power, freedom of movement, access to education, etc., but it can also vary between the different spheres in which women function, such as the domestic and non-domestic (Mason, 1986; Whyte, 1978). This implies that women may score high on one dimension of women's status while simultaneously scoring low on another; they could also have high status in one sphere of operation but not in another. This multi-dimensionality undoubtedly confounds attempts to compare women's status across countries. The interaction of the cultural context with the cogency of different indicators of women's status also adds to the confusion, since factors that contribute to high status in one cultural setting may have no relevance or may even lower women's status in another. For example, the practice of consanguineous marriages appears to correlate positively with women's higher status in the southern states of India (Dyson and Moore, 1983), but is cited as a reflection of women's lower status in the Middle East (Moghadam, 1992).

The list of the hazards of cross-country comparisons of women's status, we believe, does not negate attempts to measure women's status. It does, however, provide some guidelines for such comparisons. Specifically, it suggests that:

– Assumptions underlying the use of any indicator of women's status should be carefully elucidated. The careful specification of assumptions will help make explicit any cultural biases in the use of the indicator, and make it easier to determine whether the indicator is irrelevant or culturally inappropriate in any country;

– Whenever possible, indicators should be defined in terms of gender differentials. Not only do gender differentials measure gender equality, a desirable outcome of high women's status, but they minimize cross-cultural ambiguity on two counts: first, an indicator of the difference in women's and men's access to resources in the same country allows the cross-country comparison to be made in terms of these *differences*, and a "large" or "small" difference is likely to mean the same across cultures; and, second, comparisons made in terms of gender differentials have the advantage that they standardize for within-country socioeconomic conditions by comparing women's situation with that of men in the same country. Such standardization is required since the level of any given indicator is generally not determined by the gender stratification system alone, but is also influenced by factors unrelated to gender, which may vary across countries. Thus, conclusions based on the position of

women alone, although cogent from a human rights perspective, may be misleading as indicators of gender inequality;
– Given the multidimensional nature of women's status, as many dimensions as possible should be compared;
– Any summary measure of women's status should aggregate across multiple dimensions with each dimension being represented by multiple indicators. A justification for and assumptions underlying the use of indicators included in the summary measure should be provided.

In this paper we use the DHS data for a sub-sample of 25 countries surveyed since 1991 to fashion several different indicators of women's access to economic and social resources and opportunities. Wherever possible comparisons are made in terms of gender differences in such access. Where corresponding data on males are not available, women's situation is described in absolute rather than relative terms, using indicators that we believe to be relatively cross-culturally unambiguous. We begin by discussing which questions, among all those included in the DHS core questionnaires, are most amenable for the study of women's status. This discussion is followed by a sampling of indicators fashioned from DHS data that can be used to compare different dimensions of women's status across countries. Finally, we discuss one possible summary measure of women's status based on these and other indicators of women's status and rank 25 countries using this measure.

DATA

The Demographic and Health Surveys questionnaires typically have a household and an individual women's questionnaire. These questionnaires contain a set of core questions which are asked with minor modifications in all countries surveyed. The questions considered "core" have varied across the three phases of the DHS. Since the majority of countries compared in this paper were surveyed as part of the second phase of the DHS, this discussion is restricted to questions considered core in the second phase of the DHS[2].

[2] Of the 25 countries included in this paper, the ones not surveyed in DHS phase II are: Ghana, Kenya, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Turkey and Bolivia. These countries were all surveyed as part of the current (third) phase of DHS. For differences in the core questionnaires for DHS phase II and III see Macro 1994. Also note that not all questions in the core questionnaire need be asked in every country.

The *household questionnaire* collects information on sex, age, education, and household headship status or relationship to the household head for all household members and visitors. A member is any person who usually lives in the household, and a visitor is a non-member who slept in the household the previous night. In addition, information is also collected on the household ownership of selected consumer goods and the household's access to toilet facilities, water and electricity. Any adult in the selected household can be the respondent for the household.

The *individual questionnaire* collects data for women in the reproductive ages 15-49. Each eligible woman in the selected households is interviewed and information is obtained on reproductive behaviour and intentions, knowledge and use of contraception, availability of family planning, breast-feeding and health, and the woman's height and weight, and on the height and weight of her children age 5 or less. In addition, data are collected on the background characteristics of each woman: her marital status, education, employment, media exposure, and if she is married or has ever lived with a man, information on her husband's education and employment.

The data on reproduction, contraception, child health and child mortality have been the main focus of data collection and dissemination activities of the DHS. These data are extensively used to provide nationally representative estimates of fertility, contraceptive prevalence and child mortality rates. The household schedule is typically used to identify eligible women for interview, and the data on the background characteristics are used to "provide information on characteristics likely to influence fertility and contraceptive behavior" (IRD\Macro 1990). By contrast, for the analysis of women's status the data on the background characteristics of women and those collected using the household questionnaire take center stage.

Mason (1995, p. 3) suggests that indicators of women's status can conceptually be divided into those that are "indicators of the means to desirable outcomes or statuses in life", and those that are "indicators of the desirable outcomes or statuses themselves". Although some indicators of women's status are likely to be both the "means" and the "outcomes", suffice it to say that the DHS data permit the development of both types of indicators. Specifically, the DHS household data on education, socioeconomic status, and household headship generate indicators of gender inequality in access to resources. Such indicators not only inform whether the desirable outcome of gender equality in access is being achieved, but are also ideal, as argued earlier, for cross-country comparisons. Changes across cohorts provide information about changes over time. Individual level information on women's fertility, contraceptive use and

ability to discuss reproductive desires with husbands also provide indicators of whether "desirable outcomes or statuses" have been achieved.

On the other hand, individual level data on women's education, media exposure and employment yield indicators about the "means to desirable outcomes". A comparison of the education and employment status of husbands and wives tells us about potential resource inequities within households. Data on time to water source for women who live in households without water on the premises, childcare options for women who are employed and have a child less than age 5, and alternative dependency ratio estimates can be used to indirectly measure women's workload. Information on age at marriage and age at first birth can tell us the extent to which women's life chances are being limited.

Other examples of the types of indicators providing insight into the different dimensions of women's status are available elsewhere (Kishor and Neitzel, 1996). In this paper we present selected illustrations of what can be learned about women's status across 25 developing countries if the DHS data are used imaginatively. These examples illustrate the potential for examining women's status using DHS data.

THE RELATIVE POVERTY STATUS OF WOMEN AND MEN

The information in the DHS on the basic amenities available to each household and the ownership of consumer durables can be used together or separately to develop alternative living standards indices. One example of a living standards index based on DHS data is the Amenities and Possessions Index (API). This index is defined as a four-category (High, Medium-High, Medium and Low) living standards index based on an individual's access to the following basic amenities: toilet facilities, drinking and non-drinking water, and electricity, and to four consumer durables: radio, television, refrigerator, and car (see appendix). An individual is assumed to have access to these basic amenities and consumer durables if the household he/she lives in has these basic amenities and consumer durables[3].

[3] In the 23 countries for which these data are compared, the distribution of population across the API index is extremely skewed. The large majority of population is concentrated in most countries in the MEDIUM category, and the HIGH and LOW categories together account for more than 10% of the population in only 9 countries. This imbalanced distribution of the population across the values of the API is reflective of the very low living standards of the majority of the populations surveyed. Definition of categories of the API is in Appendix.

An examination of the sex ratio (number of men per 100 women) of the population in the different categories of the API can provide an insight into the relative poverty or wealth status of men and women. However, since the sex ratios of the populations of different countries vary, another approach would be to compare the representation of women relative to men in each API category and in the total population of the country. Women are over-represented in a given category of the API if the sex ratio of the population in that category is less than the sex ratio in the total population; similarly, women are under-represented if the sex ratio in the category is more than the total sex ratio.

In Figure 20.1, each country is represented by four bars, one for each API category. The length of the bar for any category is the absolute difference between the total sex ratio and the sex ratio of the population in that API category. All the bars representing negative values reveal under-representation of women in that category, and all the bars with positive values reveal over-representation of women in that category.

Women are over-represented in the HIGH API category in 13 of the 23 countries and this over-representation is about 5 points or more in all of these countries except Bangladesh. In addition, in all five of the Latin American and Caribbean countries, and in the Philippines and Pakistan, women are over-represented in this category by 10 or more points. Where women are under-represented, we see that under-representation exceeds 5 points in only about half of these countries. In the MEDIUM-HIGH category, women are over-represented in about half of the countries and under represented in the remainder. However, in this category, the over- and the under-representation is no greater than 10 points in all countries except Malawi and Rwanda. In these latter two countries, women are under-represented in this category by 25 points or more.

At the other end of the poverty-wealth spectrum women are over-represented in the LOW category in about half of the countries for which data are available, with over-representation being more than 5 points in only five of the countries. Also, in five countries women are under-represented in this category by more than 5 points. The largest under-representation is in the Dominican Republic (22 points). Finally, in the MEDIUM category, we see only very small negative and positive deviations of sex ratios from the total sex ratios for most countries. The only exceptions are Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic where women are under-represented in this category by over 8 points.

This comparison yields an important insight into women's relative poverty status: women are not necessarily found concentrated at one or the other end of

the poverty-wealth spectrum. Indeed, women, relative to men, are over-represented in the "rich" categories as often as they are under-represented; and they are under-represented in the "poor" categories as often as they are over-represented. Notably, the extent of over-representation of women in the HIGH category (when it takes place) is generally greater than the extent of under-representation. The opposite is true for the population in the LOW category. Further, there are distinct patterns discernible in the different regions of the world. In Latin America and the Caribbean, more men relative to women are found among the "poor" API categories, and many more women relative to men are found among the rich API categories. This is also true of some of the Asian countries. However, in the majority of the sub-Saharan African countries, the opposite appears to be true. No systematic differences are discernible in the North African countries of Morocco and Egypt.

FEMALE HOUSEHOLD HEADSHIP: INCIDENCE AND RELATIVE DISADVANTAGE

The incidence and relative disadvantage of female-headed households has relevance to the measurement of women's status for several reasons. Women who are household heads may be more autonomous and have more control over resources by virtue of their position than women who are not household heads. However, also by virtue of their position, female heads of household, like their male counterparts, may be the sole or main providers for their own needs and the needs of their dependents. The economic status and sustainability of female-headed households, and the relative vulnerability of those who live in them, will then depend on factors such as the characteristics of the household and the household head, the composition of the household, the relative disadvantage that women face in accessing societal resources as compared to men, and the relative advantage that women may have in terms of their apparent greater potential for accessing inter-familial support and resources through informal channels (Lloyd and Gage-Brandon, 1993; Haddad, 1990; Bruce, 1989).

In the DHS, the head of the household is "…the person considered responsible for the household. This person may be appointed on the basis of age (older), sex (generally, but not necessarily, male), economic status (main provider) or some other reason. It is up to the respondent to define who is the head." (IRD/Macro 1990c, p. 32). Note that this definition of household

headship has important limitations especially when studying women's status. The propensity of women to perceive themselves as the household head, or of others to report a woman as household head, especially if an adult male lives in the household, is itself likely to be a function of the status of women and will vary across cultures. In addition, this definition blurs the association of household headship with economic responsibility. Thus, while the interest in the sex of the household head derives largely from the assumption that the household head is mainly responsible for the economic and social welfare of the household, there is an unknown proportion of household heads as defined in the DHS, male and female, for whom this assumption may not hold. These definitional limitations need to be kept in mind during the discussion below.



Figure 20.1. Under- and over-representation of women in each category of API

Figure 20.2 gives the percentage of households headed by women, and the percentage of the total population living in female-headed households for each country. Female-headed households account for at least one in ten households in most countries and in about half of the sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries they account for at least one in five households. Female-headed households are most common in Ghana, Kenya and Namibia, where about one-third of all households are headed by females. Notably, female-headed households in all countries account for a smaller proportion of the total population than of total households, suggesting that female-headed households tend to be smaller than male-headed households. Nonetheless, at least one in ten persons lives in a female-headed household in most countries outside Asia. In Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, and the Dominican Republic between one-fifth and one-third of the population resides in female-headed households.

Thus, female-headed households, even on the basis of the very limited definition, are clearly an important phenomenon, especially outside of Asia. The relative position of female-headed as compared to male-headed households is examined along three different dimensions: their sex composition, the typical "type" of household (single adult, more than one adult, adults and children, and single adult with children), and their share among households classified among the "richer" API categories. While the last dimension directly measures the extent to which female-headed households are economically disadvantaged relative to male-headed households, the former two examine potential sources of disadvantage. To the extent that there is discrimination against females in accessing societal resources, a predominantly female composition of female-headed households could place such households in double jeopardy: not only are the female heads themselves disadvantaged relative to male heads in terms of access to societal resources, but a higher proportion of the members of female-headed households compared to male-headed households suffer from the same disadvantage. Among the different household types, "one adult with children" is likely to be the most vulnerable. The "one adult" type of household is also likely to be vulnerable if the adult is aged or infirm.



Figure 20.2. Percent share of female-headed households among all households and among the total population

Table 20.1. – Sex ratios of male- and female-headed households

Country	Sex ratio of male-headed households	Sex ratio of female-headed households	
		Including head	Excluding head
Burkina Faso	96.2	56.9	89.7
Cameroon	101.6	50.1	83.8
Ghana	125.2	50.1	92.7
Kenya	110.2	59.9	96.1
Madagascar	110.9	63.5	107.7
Malawi	111.0	54.6	93.7
Namibia	108.4	65.3	92.3
Niger	101.5	55.4	86.9
Nigeria	105.2	54.0	91.7
Rwanda	106.9	59.8	97.9
Senegal	97.0	60.6	78.9
Zambia	107.0	57.7	91.1
Egypt	109.0	64.9	117.6
Morocco	101.9	58.4	98.6
Bangladesh	105.4	59.5	101.9
Indonesia	105.1	52.4	98.7
Pakistan	110.4	73.8	108.6
Philippines	107.6	68.6	111.5
Turkey	103.7	49.4	98.0
Bolivia	105.2	54.2	99.5
Brazil	105.8	57.4	97.7
Colombia	103.0	57.5	96.3
Dominican Republic	110.6	64.6	107.2
Paraguay	108.0	66.2	113.6
Peru	105.3	63.2	101.7

A comparison of the sex ratios of female-headed households reveals predominantly "female" sex ratios both in absolute terms and in comparison with male-headed households (Table 20.1). Indeed, for every male in female-headed households there are between 1.4 to 2 women. In male-headed households, by contrast, there are more men than women in the great majority of countries.

Since it may be argued that the predominantly female composition of female-headed household results from such households necessarily containing at least one female -- the female household head -- sex ratios of female-headed households were recalculated excluding the household head (column 3). However, while exclusion of the household head does make the sex ratios of female-headed households more "masculine", it does not alter the fact that the composition of female-headed households in most countries is more "female" than that of male-headed households.

A comparison of the distribution of male and female-headed households across the different types of households (Table 20.1.A, in Appendix) reveals that male-headed households are predominantly of the "multiple adults with children" type. This category in general also accounts for the largest share of female-headed households. However, what is particularly notable is that among female-headed households the category "one adult with children" is significant in all countries, accounting for between 6% and 45% of female-headed households, but never accounting for more than 5% of male-headed households in any country. Also, in most countries a higher proportion of female than male-headed households are comprised of only one adult -- a category which could be vulnerable if such adults are old and infirm. Thus, there is much more compositional diversity among female than male-headed households, and a much larger proportion of female than male-headed households falls in the more vulnerable category of one adult living alone with children.

Finally, Figure 20.3 shows the share of "rich" households (households in the High and Medium-high API categories) among female- and male-headed households. Clearly, in the majority of countries a higher proportion of male- than female-headed households is "rich" -- the converse being that a higher proportion of female- than male-headed households is "poor". The only countries where "rich" households comprise a higher proportion of female- than male-headed households are: Burkina Faso, Senegal, Pakistan, the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic. In three of the remaining four Latin American countries male- and female-headed households do not appear to differ by economic status. Thus, in Latin America female-headed households are not necessarily more socioeconomically disadvantaged than male-headed households, but in most other areas of the world they are.

Overall the household headship data in the DHS, despite inherent limitations, provides evidence of both a significant incidence of female household headship and of the greater vulnerability of such households, especially in sub-Saharan Africa.



Figure 20.3. Share of households with High or Medium-High API value among female- and male-headed households

ACCESS TO SECONDARY EDUCATION

The DHS data on education can be used to study not only women's access to education but also gender differences in education in terms of both number of years of education and level of education. The level of education is a standardized variable with the categories: no education, primary, secondary and higher[4]. While "no education" corresponds to zero years of formal education in all countries, the number of years needed to complete primary, secondary and higher levels of education varies across countries.

Overall, there is little evidence of gender equality in education among the population age 15 and over, irrespective of the level of education that is examined (Table 20.2.A, in Appendix). The sex ratio of the population with no education is below 75 in 19 countries, and is below 50 in 8 countries (two women uneducated for every uneducated man). Thus, clearly the population with no education in all countries except Brazil and the Dominican Republic is predominantly female. By contrast, the population with secondary or higher education is predominantly male in all countries except Namibia and three of the Latin American and Caribbean countries.

However, the spread of education is a recent phenomenon and the value of education as a means to higher status is undoubtedly increasing over time. Thus, what is perhaps of more interest is the question: has women's access to education been increasing across cohorts, both absolutely and relative to men? Although there are several interesting patterns with regard to women's access to any education and primary education that can be discussed (Kishor and Neitzel 1996; United Nations 1995b), we focus on the absolute and the relative change in women's access to education above the primary level.

The proportion of women in each age cohort who have secondary or higher education rises in every country as we move from the oldest to the youngest cohort (Table 20.3.A, in Appendix). Clearly, access to secondary and higher education is increasing for women over time. An examination of the sex ratios by age (Table 20.4.A, in Appendix) reveals that there has been an increasing "feminization" of the population with secondary or higher education from older to younger cohorts in every country. Nonetheless, in 19 of the 25 countries the sex ratio even of the youngest age group (15-24 years) remains well above 100, implying that despite improvements, access to secondary and higher education remains highly discriminatory, with the exception of

[4] In countries where the education levels vary from these standardized levels, the country specific levels are available in the data sets as "country specific" variables.

Madagascar and Namibia in sub-Saharan Africa, the Philippines in Asia, and Brazil, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic in Latin America and the Caribbean.

WOMEN'S ACCESS TO EMPLOYMENT

Data on employment is typically available in the DHS only at the individual woman's level, thereby restricting analysis to women in the reproductive ages (15-49). Since comparable data are not gathered on the men, gender differences cannot be evaluated[5]. Nonetheless, an analysis of women's employment rates and types of employment permits an assessment of women's access to employment and associated potential for economic independence.

To elicit information on women's current employment the following question sequence is used in most countries[6]. First, women are asked: "Aside from your own housework are you currently working?" If the answer is no to this question, women are asked: "As you know, some women take up jobs for which they are paid in cash or kind. Others sell things, have a small business or work on the family farm or in the family business. Are you currently doing any of these things or any other work?" Women saying no to both these questions are considered to be not "employed". Women saying "yes" to either of these two questions are then asked whether they earn cash for this work, what their occupation is, where work is done (at home or away from home), and for whom work is done (family member, someone else, self employed). In addition, for women who are employed and have a child less than 5 years of age, information is sought on whether the respondent has the child with her when she works, and, if not, who takes care of the child. This sequence of questions permits an examination of several important aspects of women's employment with the important exception of women's control over their earnings.

[5] Data obtained from women on their husbands' employment are available and can be used to compare the employment of husbands and wives.

[6] The definition of employment used in the DHS is very broad so as to include all forms of women's labour force participation: formal and informal work, inside and outside the home, and work for payment in cash, payment in kind, or no earnings. An employment history for the last 5 years is available in a few of the DHS countries, but data on current employment status are available in all countries.

Women's labor force participation rates vary across countries. Figure 20.4 reveals that the percentage of women employed ranges from a maximum of 93% in Rwanda to a minimum of 16-17% in Bangladesh and Pakistan. The rates of employment are clearly highest in sub-Saharan Africa where in eight of the 12 countries, at least one in every two women is currently employed. Further, in three countries (Rwanda, Ghana and Madagascar) three or more out of every four women work. Among the remaining countries, only in Bolivia and Peru does the proportion of women employed exceed 50%. Several cultural and structural factors, especially those associated with the practice of spouses maintaining "separate purses", underlie the high rates of labor force participation of women in sub-Saharan Africa. These factors include the continuing practice of polygyny, marital instability and the fact that husbands and wives have separate expenditure obligations towards their natal kin, children and households (Blumberg, 1989).

For a significant proportion of women, being employed does not imply that cash is being earned. There is little research that explores the relationship of employment without cash earnings and women's status. Such research is needed, especially given the monetization of economies associated with economic development. Early research suggested that women's traditional work, which is often non-market and non-cash work, is devalued as urbanization and monetization proceeds, with consequent negative effects on women's status (Boserup, 1970). Whitehead (1994), writing about sub-Saharan Africa, faults Boserup's characterization of women being "relegated to the subsistence sector" on the grounds that the reality is far more diverse and complex. Whitehead emphasizes the conflict arising from the increasing duality in women's roles: the continued emphasis on independent production for the maintenance of their children coupled with an increasing demand by husbands for their unpaid labor on cash crop production. The increased time spent in unremunerated work does not translate into greater access to domestic resources and conflicts with the time required for fulfilling other economic obligations.

Recently, Dixon-Mueller (1993) has described unpaid work, even if it is productive and contributes to household consumption, as work unlikely to bring about change in gender relations or in fertility. More specifically, work without cash earnings has been found to be negatively associated with some aspects of women's autonomy in Egypt (Kishor, 1994). This is not surprising given that work without cash earnings eliminates, at a minimum, one of the most important single benefits of employment -- direct access to and control of financial resources. Any associated benefits, such as a greater say in household decisions, may also be minimized when women's work is not seen as directly

contributing to family resources. (Women working without cash earnings include those who receive no remuneration or only remuneration in kind.)



Figure 20.4. Percentage of women age 15-49 who are currently employed

From Figure 20.5 it is clear that not all employed women work for cash. In 7 countries, namely Cameroon, Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia and Turkey, at least one in four working women are working either with no remuneration or for remuneration in kind only. In Rwanda, which has the highest employment rate of all countries, the proportion of working women working without cash earnings is 38%. In most other countries between 10% and 20% of working women do not work for cash. The only countries where this proportion becomes negligible are Brazil and Colombia.

Employment of women in modern sector occupations, such as professional, managerial, technical or clerical occupations, is most likely to be associated with higher autonomy and status. This is not only due to the greater education and training embodied in women who succeed in obtaining and keeping such jobs; gains in status and autonomy also accrue because these occupations are likely to offer the maximum opportunity for exposure to new ways of thinking and doing things and for accessing networks outside those of the kin-group.

An examination of the occupational distribution of women across countries suggests a remarkable similarity. In almost all countries women are concentrated in one or two of the following three occupations: agriculture, sales or manual labor. These occupations together account for at least half to two thirds of all working women (Figure 20.6). Agricultural occupations are the highest employers of women in most countries and account for as many as 93% of women in Rwanda. Sales occupations on the other hand account for more than 20% of working women in sixteen countries and employ 60% of women in Burkina Faso. Only in the Philippines and in most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries are working women more evenly distributed across occupations.

By contrast, in most countries no more than 10% of women work in the professional, technical and managerial occupations. Egypt and Peru are the only countries with a quarter or more of their working women in these occupations. Even clerical jobs, which in general require less training and education than the professional and technical ones, do not account for more than 10% of working women in any country except Namibia, Egypt, and Colombia.



Figure 20.5. Percentage of working women who do not work for cash



Figure 20.6. Occupational distribution of all employed women

Women's employment does not bear a linear relationship with education in most countries (Table 20.5.A, in Appendix). The exceptions are Paraguay, Colombia and Malawi, where labor force participation rises with education. Rwanda is also unique in that labor force participation falls with education. A curvilinear association between education and employment is found in eight countries including Ghana. Despite this cross-country inconsistency, women with education higher than the secondary level are the ones most likely to be employed. In Namibia, Zambia, Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, women with "higher" education are about twice as likely to be working than those with no or primary education. Overall labor force participation among those with higher education ranges from 25% in Bangladesh to over 90% in Zambia. In at least half of the countries secondary education is not associated with high labor force participation.

The percentage of women working also does not vary consistently across countries by socio-economic status. Specifically, as the API value falls from "HIGH" to "LOW", the percentage employed increases more or less consistently in four countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Madagascar and Nigeria), falls in three countries (Namibia, Brazil and Paraguay), and does not vary unidirectionally in the remaining countries (Table 20.6.A, in Appendix). Notably, however, the percentage of working women who work without earnings rises more or less steadily as the API falls in almost all countries. This suggests that although women belonging to poor households are not necessarily the ones most likely to be working in every country, poor women are most likely to be the ones working without cash among those who work in every country.

In all of sub-Saharan Africa, except in Niger and Malawi, women with a child less than 5 years of age have a higher labor force participation rate than women who do not have a child less than 5 years of age (Figure 20.7). Further, in at least half of these countries, the percentage point difference in employment between those with and without a child less than 5 years is at least 10 points.

This pattern is the opposite of the one found in most countries of North Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, where women with a young child are much less likely than those with no young child to be in the labor force. The suggested positive association of labor force participation and childbearing in sub Saharan Africa can in part be explained by the cultural importance of women’s economic contributions for the maintenance of their children (Whitehead, 1994; Blumberg, 1989). Where economic dependence of women and children on the male head of the household has been culturally more acceptable and economically sustainable, women have traditionally withdrawn from the labor force at marriage or childbirth to concentrate their energies on what Papanek (1989) terms "family status production work".



Figure 20.7. Women's labour force employment by whether they have a child age 5 or less living with them

INDIRECT MEASURES OF WOMEN'S WORKLOAD

Traditionally, women are responsible for household tasks such as feeding, cleaning, looking after children, and providing care for the sick and the elderly. If, in addition, women work outside the home their workload is likely to be doubled or more, unless they are able to shift onto others some of their domestic duties. Women who work outside the home and have a child with them when they work is an example of the double burden that women bear.

The proportion of working women with a young child who work away from home ranges from 28% in Bangladesh to 92% in Egypt and Rwanda. Further, in more than half of the countries considered two thirds or more of the women who work away from home and have a young child say that least sometimes they have their child with them when they work (Kishor and Neitzel 1996); and in all but seven countries, close to one third of these women always have the child with them when they work (Table 20.7.A, in Appendix).

Scarcity of water is also likely to increase women's workload. If women have to fetch water, their workload is directly increased. Additionally, the time spent fetching water will compete with the time a woman needs to complete her other domestic tasks, including childcare, which she is unlikely to be able to shift onto others (Desai and Jain, 1994).

While the DHS has data on whether there is water available on the residential premises, and if not, the time required to fetch water, these data do not inform us about who in the household actually fetches water. The part children play in assisting in domestic tasks, including the fetching of water, is widely recognized (Adepoju, 1994; Oppong, 1987; World Bank 1989). Consequently, it may well be that water fetching is done as much by children as by the women themselves. Further, the amount of time needed for fetching water will depend not only on the distance from the water source, but also on the amount of water needed, and the time spent at the water source. There is no information in the DHS that would allow us to separate out these different components of the time spent on fetching water.

The shortcomings of the data imply that we cannot use the DHS data on time spent fetching water as a *direct* measure of women's workload. Nonetheless, we believe that these data are meaningful as an indirect indicator of women's workload on three counts. First, water is so essential to the efficient completion of household chores that its scarcity itself is likely to increase women's workload. The time taken to fetch water in this context is a measure of

this scarcity. Second, ensuring that water is available for household drinking and chores is part of women's domestic responsibilities; even if children are assisting women the fetching of water is an additional responsibility for women. Finally, if children spend time fetching water, they are less available to help out with other tasks which would help reduce women's workload.

A large proportion of women aged 15 or over live in households without household (non-drinking) water on the premises (Table 20.7.A, in Appendix). In nine of the twelve sub-Saharan African countries, and in Bangladesh and Indonesia, at least 80% of women live in households that need to fetch their water from outside their residential premises. In fact, in Bangladesh, Rwanda and Malawi almost all women do not have water available on their property. Egypt, Turkey, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru are the only countries where less than one third of women live in such households.

In addition, in most of the sub-Saharan African countries at least half of the women living in households with no water on the premises need more than 15 minutes to get to and from the water source. In all of the remaining countries, between 56% and 92% of women who live in households without water on the premises need 15 minutes or less to fetch the water.

Thus, even though the data do not tell us definitively who has to fetch the water, they do suggest that in several countries the fetching of water must add greatly, directly or indirectly, to women's workloads. This is most true for women in sub-Saharan Africa where a consistently high proportion of women live in households without water on the premises and the amount of time needed for fetching water is relatively high.

COMPARING THE EDUCATION OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES

Wives reports about their current husbands allow the comparison of characteristics of husbands and wives. This analysis is restricted to currently married women. Most wives have either less or the same numbers of years of education as their husbands in almost all countries (Table 20.8.A, in Appendix). Of the 25 countries, there are 16 where wives are most likely to have less education than their husbands; and another 7 where they are most likely to have the same amount of education. Only in Brazil and the Philippines are women most likely to have more education than their husbands and least likely to have less education than their husbands. Notably, the proportion of couples where the wife has more education than the husband is about one-third or more in

most Latin American and Caribbean countries, the Philippines, Namibia, and Madagascar.

However, we know that in almost all countries more males than females are educated, and that the average number of years of education is higher among males than females (World Bank, 1990). Also, the "demand" for an educated wife is likely to differ by the education level of the husband. Consequently, we should expect that husband-wife educational differences will vary by the education level of the husband.

In most countries, the majority of women married to men with no education also have no education. Further, in 21 of the 25 countries, wives are least likely to have more education than their husbands if their husbands have secondary or higher education than if they have primary or no education. Indeed, a wife who has a husband with secondary or higher education is 1.1 to 1.5 times as likely in most countries (and almost 2 times as likely in Turkey, the Philippines, Colombia, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay) to have lower education than a wife whose husband has only primary education. Clearly, women's disadvantage in education is greater at higher levels of husbands' education. Further, by using the percentage of husbands who have secondary or higher education as a proxy for the overall level of education in a country, we can examine whether the share of wives who have lower education than their husband increases or decreases as the level of education increases. Accordingly, Figure 20.8 plots the overall percentage of wives with lower education than their husbands against the percentage of husbands who have secondary or higher education, with each data point representing one country.

The regression equation (Figure 20.8) represents an inverted U, with the turning point at about x=50 percent of husbands with secondary or higher education. Thus, among countries with a low share (<50%) of husbands with secondary or higher education, an increase in this share is associated with an increase in the proportion of wives who have less education than their husbands; however, once the 50% threshold is crossed, the percentage of wives with lower education is likely to fall. Thus, cross-sectional evidence suggests that not only does the education of wives lag that of husbands as educational opportunities first expand, but the probability that a wife will have less education than her husband actually *increases* with continuing educational expansion, before it begins to decline.

DOUBLE EMPOWERMENT

A deeper understanding of women's status can be gained by combining two indicators together. For example, it has been noted above that large numbers of women, especially in several sub-Saharan African countries, are employed and a large proportion are working for cash. Employed women earning cash are likely to be "doubly empowered" if they are also educated. Information on employment can be combined with alternative educational levels to examine what proportion of women simultaneously score high on both indicators of status -- employment and education.



Excluding Malawi and Rwanda as outliers, the regression that best fits the data (with 20 degrees of freedom) is the estimated quadratic equation:

y =	1.93x	$- 0.02x^2$	+ 2.05	$R^2 = 0.73$
SE:	(.36)	(0.01)		

Figure 20.8. Percentage of wives with less education than their husbands by percent of husbands who have secondary or higher education

Transformational effects of employment and education are most likely when women have at least secondary education and are employed in the modern sector. However, few women in the countries considered simultaneously satisfy both these criteria (Table 20.9.A, in Appendix). Among all of the sub-Saharan African, North African and Asian countries included, other than the Philippines and Egypt, less than 5% of all women have completed secondary education and are currently employed in a professional, technical, managerial or clerical occupation. In the Latin American and Caribbean countries, the Philippines and Egypt, the proportion satisfying these criteria is only a little higher, reaching 14% in Peru.

Relaxing the education requirement to include women who have at least completed primary education, and relaxing the employment criterion to include not only work in modern occupations but also sales and skilled and unskilled manual labor (mixed occupations), the proportion of women who qualify increases substantially, ranging from 1.1% in Niger to a maximum of only 30.5% in Peru.

Finally, the minimal requirement that women have some education and work for cash, is the only one that nets at least one-third of women in about half of the countries--five in sub-Saharan Africa, none in North Africa, one in Asia and all of the six Latin American and Caribbean countries. Even so, in only one country, Madagascar, do more than half of all women have some education and work for cash.

Similarly, acknowledgement of intra-household inequalities in control over and access to household resources and decision making leads us directly to the question of the different sources of bargaining power within marriage (Hartmann, 1981; Bruce, 1989). Sources of bargaining power identified in the literature include intra-spousal differences in earnings and education (Safa, 1992a 1992b, Sen, 1989, 1990; Kerber, 1994). To the extent that wives are able to bring not only equality in education but also earnings to intra-household negotiations, we believe them to be better off (indeed to be doubly empowered) than wives who bring only one or the other.

Figure 20.9 shows the percentage of wives who have the same or higher education than their husbands and who are currently employed for cash. Burkina Faso has the highest share of wives (46%) who qualify as doubly empowered even though this equality of education stems largely from both husband and wife having no education. Madagascar, on the other hand, has 43% of currently married women with at least as much education as their husbands and working for cash. However, in Madagascar, unlike Burkina Faso, two out of three of these wives must have at least primary education. In addition

to Madagascar and Burkina Faso, there are five other sub-Saharan African countries (Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Senegal) and one Latin American country (Brazil) where at least one-third of wives qualify as "doubly empowered".

At the other extreme, in Egypt, Morocco, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Malawi (the only country in sub-Saharan Africa), 10% or less of currently married women have as much or more education than their husbands and work for cash. All other countries, including all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean except Brazil, have between 17% and 30% of all wives who qualify as "doubly empowered".

DEVELOPING A SUMMARY INDICATOR OF WOMEN'S STATUS

Indicators that reflect the separate dimensions of women's status each tell only a partial story about the level of women's status. For example, in Rwanda almost all women in the reproductive ages are employed; however, a large proportion work without cash earnings, and few working women have any education or work in the modern sector. Thus, while Rwanda will score high if women's status is measured by women's labor force participation rates alone, it will score low if the nature of work is taken into consideration. Similarly, in Ghana a large share of households are female-headed and female household headship is positively related to education. This suggests not only that a significant proportion of women have the autonomy that is likely to be associated with being a household head, but also that female household heads have a higher status due to relatively higher education. Simultaneously, however, households headed by females in Ghana are especially vulnerable since female-headed households are not only found to be more economically disadvantaged compared to male-headed households, but also the large majority of households headed by females are composed of only one adult (the female head) with dependent children. Women's economic vulnerability, all else being the same, is likely to be negatively associated with women's status.

Thus, there is clearly a need to summarize in some meaningful way all that can be learnt from DHS data about women's status. Undoubtedly, the defining of such a summary measure requires judgements, some of which will be controversial, about which indicators to select for inclusion, how to weigh the contribution of each indicator, and how best to summarize the large variance in values that the selected indicators will undoubtedly have across countries.

There is little precedence in the literature to provide guidance in trying to either select indicators or fashion threshold points for the indicators selected.

We have developed one possible summary measure of women's status based on 29 different indicators (listed in the appendix). The indicators include measures of a) women's relative poverty-wealth status (1 indicator), b) the incidence and vulnerability of female-headed households (5 indicators), c) the absolute and relative level of women's education, whether women's access to education is increasing over time, and women's access to media and involvement in reproductive decision making (8 indicators); d) women's extent and type of employment and workload (8 indicators), e) age at marriage and child-birth (3 indicators), and f) interspousal differences in education and employment (4 indicators).

In developing this summary measure we use a "minimalistic" approach in both the selection of indicators and the specification of threshold levels for indicators. By "minimalistic" we mean that the summary measure is defined in terms of a minimum level of women's status rather than a desirable level of women's status. This approach implies that threshold levels defined for indicators can be interpreted only as minimum cut-off points: a value for an indicator below this threshold level indicates a "low" absolute level of women's status as measured by that indicator and a value above the threshold level indicates only that the minimum criterion for that indicator has been met. *A value above the threshold level does not imply that the country has met any ideal or desirable standards for that indicator*. All indicators are given the same weight.

The need to maintain a comparative perspective requires that the range of values existing in the data be used as guides in selecting the minimum necessary threshold points. For example, ideally we may want "all women in the country to have at least some education"; practically, however, from a comparative analysis perspective, such a cut off point for the education indicator would be unrealistic, since no country would satisfy this condition. Selection of threshold points for indicators based on the range of values across countries allows assessment of each country's relative position. Thus, cut off points, or threshold levels, for most indicators are chosen to lie about midway in the range of available values. In the case of indicators reflecting change over time, the minimum acceptable direction of change is one that indicates improvement favoring women. We reiterate that these minimum levels for indicators are not be treated as ideal desirable levels: the minimum levels for indicators are the minimum "acceptable" given the actual range of values found in countries.



Figure 20.9. Percentage of women who have at least the same number of years of education as their husbands and who work for cash

The derived summary measure, which we call the Threshold Measure of Women's Status (TMWS), indicates the total number of criteria satisfied by each country. Scores on this measure are then used to rank countries on the extent to which they meet minimal women's status criteria. For every criterion a country satisfies it gets a score of 1; if it is unclear whether a country is satisfying a criterion or not (as when women's relative position appears to improve but not linearly) then the country scores half a point. Since Malawi, Rwanda and Turkey are missing information on one criterion each, and Nigeria, Indonesia and Paraguay are each missing information on two criteria, an adjusted total score, in the form of a proportion ranging from 0 to 1, is calculated for each country. The adjusted total score is the original total score divided by the number of criteria on which the country has been scored. The closer the adjusted total score is to 1, the closer the country is to satisfying at least the defined minimum threshold level of women's status. Countries are then ranked according to this adjusted total score on the TMWS.

Countries vary in terms of the dimensions of women's status that they do well on and the ones they do poorly on (Table 20.10.A, in Appendix). Nonetheless, no country scores a perfect 1. Thus, in absolute terms there is no country which meets even this set of minimum standards for women's status. The Latin American and Caribbean countries do *relatively* better on the TMWS than countries in other regions. With a score of 0.86, the Dominican Republic gets the highest rank. Bolivia is the only Latin American country to do poorly on the TMWS. The only non-Latin American/Caribbean countries that score above 0.70 are the Philippines, which has a rank second only to the Dominican Republic, and Namibia which has a rank of 5 just before Paraguay and Peru. Egypt and Morocco, the two North African countries, both meet about half of the criteria and rank about midway among all the countries considered. The countries that are worst off in terms of their rank on the TMWS are Niger in sub-Saharan Africa, with a score of 0.21 and the lowest rank, followed by Bangladesh and Pakistan in Asia.

Notably, the only countries in sub-Saharan Africa, other than Namibia, that have a relatively high rank are Madagascar (8), Kenya (10), and Ghana (11). These countries score relatively high on the TMWS in part because they all do better than any other sub-Saharan African country (other than Namibia) on education. However, it bears repeating that the rankings on the TMWS give only the relative status of women across countries and not the absolute position of countries with regard to women's status. Consequently, this comparison says nothing about the distance countries need to travel to improve the situation of women, nor does it tell us, even for countries scoring high on the TMWS, how far above the threshold level they are.

Given the experimental nature of this indicator, it is fruitful to compare how the ranks of countries on the TMWS compare with their ranks on other indicators that either measure gender equality or take gender inequality explicitly into consideration. Two such indicators are the Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Equality Measure (GEM) (United Nations, 1995a). The GDI is constructed using information on the overall achievements of women as compared to men on three dimensions: life expectancy, educational attainment, and adjusted real income. The GEM measures the economic, political and professional participation of women as compared to men, and uses information on income earning power, share in professional and managerial jobs and share of parliamentary seats (United Nations 1995a, Chapter 3).

Clearly, a comparison of the ranks of countries on the TMWS and the GDI and GEM cannot serve to *validate* the TMWS, since these indices are all based on dimensions of women's status which are only minimally overlapping. What it can do is to check for consistency across alternative indices of women's status and help to get a more complete picture of women's status in these countries. Examining three complementary indices, instead of just one, will allow us a greater insight into the situation of women in each country.

Since GDI and GEM values are not available for all of the 25 countries included in this report, the countries are re-ranked on the TMWS after excluding countries for which the GDI is not available. The new ranks are given in Table 11.A, in Appendix. If the TMWS rank for a country is different when only the countries for which GEM values are available are ranked, the alternative rank is given in parentheses[7].

The countries that have the highest TMWS values are also the ones that score relatively high on the GDI and GEM. Of the top seven scorers on the TMWS in Table 20.11.A, in Appendix (the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, Brazil, Colombia, Namibia, Paraguay, and Peru), Colombia and Namibia are not scored on the GDI. The remaining 5 countries all have ranks less than 7 on the GDI. The top scoring seven countries are, however, all ranked on the GEM and all but Paraguay also have a rank less than 7 on the GEM. Turkey and Indonesia do very well on the GDI but not on the TMWS; and only Indonesia does well on the GEM but not on the TMWS. The only other country which

[7] The GDI and GEM rankings reported here are not the original rankings available in Tables 3.1 and 3.5 of the 1995 Human Development Report (United Nations 1995); instead, they are the rankings that these countries would have had if their original ordering on the GDI and GEM was maintained but no other countries except those in this study were being ranked.

scores much higher on the GDI and the GEM (ranked 10 on both) than it scores on the TMWS is Cameroon. On the other hand Madagascar does better in terms of the TMWS than it does on the GDI. (The GEM value is not available for Madagascar.)

Overall, however, there is consistency in the rankings of countries on these three different measures of women's status and gender inequality. Indeed, seven countries have ranks on each of the available indices which do not differ by more than two points from one another; and in another 14 countries the ranks on at least two indicators do not differ by more than three points. This consistency is remarkable since the GDI, GEM and TMWS are not only measuring different aspects of women's status but they approach the measurement in different ways. Whereas the GDI and GEM rank countries using indices based on the actual values of indicators, the TMWS ranks countries on whether they have met *minimal* criteria or not. For example, if two countries have an equal score on the GDI (or GEM), then it can be unequivocally said that the sum of the indices that comprise the GDI (or GEM) is equal in the two countries. By contrast, an equal score for two countries on the TMWS implies only that they have met an equal number of criteria; distances from the threshold levels are not evaluated and thus nothing can be said about the values of the indicators in each country. Thus, while countries that score high on GDI and GEM are likely to have met the minimal criteria on which the TMWS is based, there is no guarantee that countries that have met the minimal criteria (i.e., score high on TMWS) will also score high on the GDI and GEM. Despite these differences, the fact that the three indicators give similar results suggests that there is interdependence among the numerous dimensions of women's status, and alternative ways of measuring do give relatively consistent results.

CONCLUSION

This paper has provided examples of the kinds of insights that descriptive cross-country comparisons of DHS data can provide into the different dimensions of women's status. One possible approach to summarizing the information was also discussed. Despite its shortcomings, and the large number of possibly controversial assumptions used in its construction, the summary indicator of women's status derived from DHS data was found to be consistent with other gender equality indicators. While this consistency cannot be taken as providing validation for the DHS-data based women's status indicator, it does

help build confidence in the validity of these data and underscores their utility for measuring women's status.

Overall, however, the objective of this paper was not to suggest that the examples provided are the only way, or even the ideal way, for utilizing the large amount of data available in DHS; instead, the objective was to introduce researchers interested in women's status to the *potential* for examining women's status using DHS data. These examples are also meant to encourage the development of indicators of women's status that can be used to provide insights into the circumstances of women's lives that will help us better explain demographic and health phenomena.

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APPENDIX

Definition of categories of the Amenities and Possessions Index (API)

Individuals are assigned the following values of the API index according to whether their household has the specified combination of basic amenities and consumer durables:

HIGH API: Bottled water or water piped into residence (or property, where relevant) for both drinking and non-drinking purposes; own (not shared) flush toilet, electricity, all four consumer durables namely radio, television, refrigerator and car.

MEDIUM-HIGH API: Any kind of drinking and non-drinking water source other than surface water; any kind of flush or pit toilet latrine or "other" toilet facilities; may or may not have electricity; at least two of the four consumer durables;

MEDIUM API (The residual category): Any kind of drinking or non-drinking water source including surface water and "other" water sources; any kind of toilet facility including those listed under no facility and "other"; may or may not have electricity; any combination of the four consumer durables including none;

LOW API: Only surface water for drinking and non-drinking purposes; no toilet facility; no electricity; none of the four consumer durables.

Criteria used to construct the summary measure of women's status

Relative Socioeconomic Status

1) Sex ratios are lower in "richer" than in "poorer" households: To qualify for a "yes" on this indicator the sex ratios of households in both the HIGH and MEDIUM-HIGH categories of the API in the given country have to be lower (favor women) than the sex ratios of the MEDIUM and LOW categories. If the sex ratios of only one of the "rich" categories is lower than the sex ratios of both the "poor" API categories the country is assigned a "U" (for "unclear").

Female Household Headship

2) More than 20% of households are female-headed: This indicator suggests that women are free to form households on their own. Further, women who are household heads are likely to have high autonomy;

3) The sex ratio in female-headed households is 100 or more excluding the household head: This variable captures the "double jeopardy" argument mentioned above. To qualify for a "yes", female-headed households in the country must have, on average, at least an equal representation of males and females among the members of female-headed households;

4) At most 25% of female-headed households consist of one adult and children: This indicator summarizes the vulnerability of female-headed households due to their composition;

5) Women with no education are less likely than those with education to be household heads: Female household headship is more likely to be associated with high women's status if household headship is positively related to education than if it is not;

6) female-headed households are at least as likely to be "rich" as male-headed households: This is a more direct measure of the socioeconomic status of female-headed households. The minimum criterion is that female-headed households should not be *more* socioeconomically disadvantaged than male-headed households. The assessment of "rich" is based on the percentage distribution of households across the API. To qualify for a "yes" on this variable, a higher (or about equal) proportion of female- than male-headed households have to be accounted for by the two API categories: HIGH and MEDIUM-HIGH.

Education and Exposure

7) At least 50% of women have four or more years of education: This indicator sets a "floor" for the minimum acceptable level of education. It specifies that women must have a higher probability of having some education than not having any. Less than four years of education is unlikely to have lasting benefits;

8) At least 20% of women have secondary or higher education: In addition to a "floor" in defining educational opportunities for women, we also need to examine whether women have access to higher levels of education. In 20 of the 25 countries considered, less than 40% of women have at least some secondary education. Thus 20% of women with secondary or higher education, a proportion which lies half way in the range for most countries, is used as the minimum threshold level;

9) Percentage of women with secondary or higher education increases as age decreases: If the percentage of women who have secondary education increases steadily as we move from the oldest age group (35-49 years) to the youngest age group (15-24 years) a country is assigned "yes" on this measure. If, however, the percentage of women with secondary or higher education is least among those who are 35-49 years but is higher among those 25-34 years than it is among those 15-24 years, we assign a "U" (for "unclear"). In these countries, there appears to be a decline but it is not steady;

10) Sex ratio of the population with primary education is 101 or less: This measure represents the ability of women to have at least about equal access as men to the lowest levels of education;

11) Sex ratio of the population with secondary or higher education is 110 or less: While ideally we would want no gender differences in access to education above the primary level, we find that few countries meet even the cut-off sex ratio of 110;

12) Sex ratio of the population with no education increases from older to younger cohorts: We have found that in most countries the sex ratio of the population with no education is extremely feminine and that of the population with either primary or secondary education is very masculine. Thus, if the sex ratio of the population with no education increases (tends towards equality) we can expect the sex ratio of the population with some education, primary or secondary or both, to be falling towards equality. To score a "yes" on this indicator, the sex ratio of the population with no education has to rise steadily as we move from the age group 50+ years to the age group 15-24 years. A country is assigned a "U" (for "unclear") if the sex ratio of the population with no

education is lowest among the population aged 50 years and above, but is lower among those aged 25-49 years than it is among those aged 15-24 years;

13) One third or less of rural women have no exposure to media: While access to some form of media is fairly common in urban areas, media exposure is limited in rural areas. However, not only do the majority of women live in rural areas in most developing countries, but it is precisely in rural areas where media exposure is likely to have the maximum beneficial effects for women's status. Thus, we define media exposure specifically in terms of rural women;

14) One third or more of women have discussed the number of children with their husbands: Even if women are not educated or exposed to the media, women may still have higher status if they have some control over reproductive decisions. This variable informs us about one aspect of such control.

Employment and workload

15) At least 50% of women are employed: A 50% cut-off point ensures that in countries which score a "yes" on this indicator women have a higher or equal probability of being employed than of not being employed;

16) At most 15% of employed women work without cash earnings: Working without cash earnings is likely to be negatively associated with women's status. Few countries are able to meet even the 15% cut-off point;

17) Labor force participation rises with education: For a country to qualify for a "yes", the labor force participation rates of women with secondary and with higher education must both be higher than the labor force participation rates of women with no or primary education; "U" (for "unclear"), implies that either women with secondary or women with higher education (but not both) have higher labor force participation rates than those with primary education or no education at all. Note that countries with a U-shaped relationship between education and women's labor force participation rates are assigned a "no" on this measure;

18)Labor force participation rises with socioeconomic status: This measure indirectly tells us whether employment is a "need" based phenomenon or not. If employment rises with socioeconomic status it is more likely to reflect true empowerment and choice, than if women work only because of poverty. Further this measure also reflects greater occupational choice. Socioeconomic status is measured by the API. For a country to qualify for a "yes", labor force participation rates of women in the API categories of HIGH and MEDIUM-HIGH must both be higher than the labor force participation rates of women from households in the LOW and MEDIUM API categories; countries are assigned a

"U" (for "unclear") if only women in one of the two API categories HIGH or MEDIUM-HIGH have higher labor force participation rates than women in both of the lower two API categories;

19) At least 10% of working women work in modern occupations: Modern occupations include all the professional, managerial, technical and clerical occupations. Women's representation in these occupations is almost nil in several countries as can be seen from the small number of countries that meet even this very low cut-off point;

20) At least 10% of women have primary education and work in modern or mixed occupations: Mixed occupations include sales and manual labor. This measure requires that countries meet two conditions simultaneously. Few countries have more than 20% of women who meet this criterion, thereby justifying the use of what appears to be an exceptionally low cut-off point of 10% for this indicator;

21) Less than 50% of working women provide child care while they work: This measure is based only on employed women who have a child less than 5 years. Employment is likely to be an additional burden for women who must provide child care even while they work;

22) Dependency ratio is 0.9 or less: The dependency ratio is defined as the number of children less than 5 years and persons 60 years or older per woman in the 15- 49 years age group. A dependency ratio of 0.9 implies that, on average, each woman in the reproductive ages is looking after less than one person.

Marriage and child-birth

23) Less than 25% of women age 15-19 are ever-married: A low proportion of women married between the ages of 15-19 years suggests that young women have options other than marriage during their teen years;

24) Less than 25% of women age 15-19 have had a birth: Early child-birth, besides limiting women's life opportunities, is also likely to increase health risks for mother and child;

25) Percentage of first births before age 20 declines from older to younger cohorts: This indicator is included in the summary measure to ensure that health risks and curtailment of life opportunities for women due to very early child-birth are declining over time. "U" is assigned to countries where the percentage of women with a birth before the age of 20 years declines as we move from the older to the younger cohorts but does not do so linearly.

Wife's education and employment relative to her husband

26) At least 50% of wives have equal or greater education than their husbands: Intra-household bargaining models suggest that large educational differences between spouses will translate into differences in relative power. Consequently, we define this measure to have a "floor" level such that a woman is at least as likely of having equal or more education than her husband;

27) At least 25% of wives work for cash and have the same level of education as their husbands: This indicator, like the one above, tells us whether women's individual characteristics put them at a disadvantage relative to their husbands;

28) Wives of husbands in modern occupations are most likely to be employed: This measure compares the labor force participation rates of women who are married to men in modern occupations with the labor force participation of women with husbands in any other occupation, excluding "husband has never worked". This variable also indirectly measures whether employment of women is positively associated with socioeconomic status or not;

29) At least 20% of wives of husbands doing agricultural work are themselves working in non-agricultural occupations: Work in non-agricultural occupations, even when the husband is in agriculture, is likely to be reflective of wider occupational choices for women.

Table 20.1.A. – Distribution of female- and male-headed households by type of household

Country	Sex of House hold head	Household type			
		1 adult	1 adult + children	Adults + children	1+ adults, no children
Burkina Faso	Female	16.9	28.7	46.9	7.5
	Male	4.2	0.7	82.7	12.4
Cameroon	Female	30.0	17.9	41.1	11.0
	Male	10.7	1.4	73.0	14.9
Ghana	Female	20.3	45.1	27.9	6.7
	Male	26.7	3.6	59.3	10.4
Kenya	Female	15.6	30.3	44.0	10.1
	Male	14.0	1.9	69.2	14.9
Madagascar	Female	16.2	23.7	46.4	13.6
	Male	4.2	2.2	80.6	13.0
Malawi	Female	12.8	38.6	38.5	10.1
	Male	6.1	1.2	74.7	18.0
Namibia	Female	7.9	13.9	66.9	11.4
	Male	9.7	1.6	69.5	19.2
Niger	Female	19.4	28.3	43.4	8.9
	Male	3.0	1.1	85.6	10.3
Nigeria	Female	23.1	26.7	37.4	12.8
	Male	8.9	1.7	75.1	14.3
Rwanda	Female	7.2	26.4	51.6	14.7
	Male	5.1	2.1	80.9	12.0
Senegal	Female	5.6	11.7	74.0	8.7
	Male	5.0	0.3	86.7	8.0
Zambia	Female	15.2	19.7	53.5	11.7
	Male	4.9	0.7	80.3	14.1
Egypt	Female	23.7	8.7	32.5	35.2
	Male	1.9	0.2	79.3	18.7
Morocco	Female	19.0	10.2	37.8	33.0
	Male	2.5	0.2	79.7	17.6
Bangladesh	Female	10.4	32.6	45.4	11.5
	Male	0.3	0.7	87.4	11.7
Indonesia	Female	25.2	11.0	35.1	28.8
	Male	1.6	0.4	78.3	19.7
Pakistan	Female	10.5	19.7	55.4	14.5
	Male	2.2	0.4	82.1	15.3
Philippines	Female	9.0	8.8	49.7	32.4
	Male	1.8	0.6	79.3	18.3
Turkey	Female	31.9	6.4	26.8	34.9
	Male	1.5	0.1	67.4	31.1
Bolivia	Female	19.4	22.4	35.7	22.6
	Male	5.5	1.6	75.4	17.5
Brazil	Female	16.7	16.1	44.2	23.0
	Male	4.2	0.5	74.1	21.2
Colombia	Female	12.2	13.9	43.0	30.9
	Male	4.8	0.6	73.2	21.4
Dominican R	Female	10.0	15.7	50.4	23.9
	Male	7.8	1.2	70.4	20.6
Paraguay	Female	11.8	13.0	46.9	28.4
	Male	4.3	0.7	76.1	18.9
Peru	Female	7.3	14.4	50.9	27.4
	Male	2.3	0.7	78.9	18.1

Table 20.2.A. – Sex ratio of the population age 15 years and over, by education

Country	Sex ratio by level of education			Sex ratio of population 15 years or more*
	None	Primary	Secondary or higher	
Burkina Faso	76.5	159.6	179.7	88.0
Cameroon	55.5	120.0	152.0	90.0
Ghana	56.0	97.0	182.4	85.1
Kenya	42.5	104.5	137.8	90.7
Madagascar	68.1	99.2	110.2	97.9
Malawi	44.0	144.3	273.9	95.7
Namibia	84.6	90.5	85.3	89.1
Niger	84.8	156.7	216.7	92.7
Nigeria	68.7	135.8	174.3	97.9
Rwanda	62.6	122.5	136.9	95.7
Senegal	70.5	116.2	185.0	85.5
Zambia	43.8	101.0	182.0	103.2
Egypt	56.1	116.2	170.3	105.1
Morocco	62.7	159.2	162.3	91.2
Bangladesh	69.8	110.1	200.8	101.6
Indonesia	43.9	101.0	137.6	95.2
Pakistan	68.1	198.4	262.6	108.8
Philippines	72.7	102.5	101.6	100.6
Turkey	36.8	99.8	189.2	96.1
Bolivia	32.8	87.0	126.0	90.9
Brazil	102.0	89.8	70.6	91.6
Colombia	95.3	89.6	85.3	88.3
Dominican R	103.7	96.4	84.0	95.2
Paraguay	49.8	96.4	111.6	98.3
Peru	27.5	90.0	112.9	96.1

* Includes population missing on education. This proportion is never greater than 2% except in Madagascar where it is 5.0%, Namibia where it is 2.4%, and the Dominican Republic where it is 2.2% of the population.

Table 20.3.A. – Percentage of women who have secondary or higher education, by age group

Country	Age group (years)		
	15-24	25-49	50 +
Burkina Faso	9.8	3.6	0.1
Cameroon	33.7	15.4	0.4
Ghana	11.9	9.4	1.5
Kenya	24.3	22.2	1.2
Madagascar	29.5	22.6	3.5
Malawi	4.4	3.7	0.2
Namibia	40.6	34.3	9.8
Niger	5.4	1.8	0.1
Nigeria	31.7	11.1	0.8
Rwanda	9.7	5.9	0.3
Senegal	11.6	7.8	0.4
Zambia	27.7	21.2	1.3
Egypt	59.3	25.1	4.9
Morocco	28.3	13.8	0.8
Bangladesh	28.3	13.6	2.4
Indonesia	44.8	20.9	5.0
Pakistan	25.4	12.9	2.6
Philippines	79.0	59.7	26.9
Turkey	33.4	17.7	4.9
Bolivia	65.6	40.2	13.9
Brazil	18.1	19.5	4.1
Colombia	63.8	49.1	16.1
Dominican R	46.8	38.2	8.8
Paraguay	42.9	31.6	11.4
Peru	78.0	56.6	27.0

Table 20.4.A. – Sex ratios of the total population and the population with secondary or higher education, by age group

Country	Secondary and higher			Total		
	15-24	25-49	50+	15-24	25-49	50+
Burkina Faso	166.3	194.7	-	100.0	80.0	87.6
Cameroon	121.9	187.3	-	93.2	91.6	82.6
Ghana	138.6	184.5	605.0	95.4	79.8	84.0
Kenya	100.8	162.4	420.8	94.5	91.0	84.0
Madagascar	93.2	121.1	207.4	104.2	95.8	91.6
Malawi	166.1	325.1	-	101.8	93.3	91.5
Namibia	70.2	95.0	114.4	96.0	88.1	81.1
Niger	186.1	267.5	-	88.7	92.3	99.9
Nigeria	131.1	227.8	793.3	98.4	93.1	106.8
Rwanda	125.6	133.8	-	95.7	97.5	91.6
Senegal	176.5	174.4	-	95.3	76.1	90.6
Zambia	133.4	228.5	759.8	101.5	104.3	104.7
Egypt	139.3	200.4	378.6	109.2	102.9	103.9
Morocco	136.7	189.6	547.6	90.1	90.5	94.3
Bangladesh	127.3	261.7	1012.3	86.0	109.1	113.2
Indonesia	114.9	156.3	258.1	90.6	97.3	97.1
Pakistan	207.7	299.1	710.5	105.0	106.1	120.0
Philippines	96.5	103.9	112.1	107.7	102.1	87.3
Turkey	160.5	219.0	251.0	93.4	100.4	92.2
Bolivia	111.8	136.4	155.3	92.4	92.1	86.5
Brazil	61.3	74.6	88.6	102.3	90.1	81.3
Colombia	76.8	90.1	102.4	85.3	89.7	89.8
Dominican R	68.0	96.2	115.2	92.7	97.2	95.1
Paraguay	101.0	117.7	129.5	95.8	104.1	90.7
Peru	100.9	119.7	134.8	95.8	96.6	95.4

Table 20.5.A. – Percentage of women who are employed, by level of education

Country	Level of education			
	None	Primary	Secondary	Higher
Burkina Faso	60.6	62.1	33.9	64.0*
Cameroon	72.7	57.5	32.7	37.0*
Ghana	84.2	70.6	58.8	79.2
Kenya	51.1	47.0	51.7	66.8*
Madagascar	79.3	82.6	66.0	59.0
Malawi	21.4	29.0	46.7	48.2
Namibia	30.8	26.5	40.9	78.4
Niger	43.4	43.5	32.5	-
Nigeria	63.4	66.3	46.4	66.9
Rwanda	97.8	94.2	60.5	-
Senegal	47.3	41.0	31.0	44.4*
Zambia	50.0	47.3	47.2	91.2
Egypt 1/	18.0	14.4	32.8	57.9
Morocco	21.2	26.6	23.6	45.2
Bangladesh 1/	18.6	13.2	8.3	25.3
Indonesia 1/	54.4	41.4	38.9	61.2
Pakistan 1/	17.9	10.8	12.5	27.8
Philippines	46.8	43.7	34.3	50.6
Turkey 1/	33.1	33.7	27.5	73.9
Bolivia	73.1	63.4	48.0	63.2
Brazil	47.5	41.4	59.4	83.8
Colombia	34.5	34.8	37.4	64.8
Dominican R	36.2	34.9	41.9	70.7
Paraguay	35.1	38.3	42.3	65.9
Peru	64.6	57.1	42.4	59.7

* Less than 50 cases.
\- Less than 25 cases.
1/ Ever married sample.

Table 20.6.A. – Women's labor force employment and employment without cash by the Amenities and Possessions Index

Country	% employed of all women				% of employed women working without cash			
	Amenities and Possessions Index				Amenities and Possessions Index			
	High	Med. High	Medium	Low	High	Med. High	Medium	Low
Burkina Faso	45.5*	51.9	60.0	57.0	-	7.1	15.7	14.0
Cameroon	33.6	36.7	61.9	83.7	9.7*	9.0	27.1	31.8
Ghana	54.9	67.9	75.5	82.6	5.1*	8.2	17.7	40.8
Kenya	48.7	59.1	48.5	43.2	3.5	4.3	18.3	31.3
Madagascar	58.6*	60.2	74.9	85.3	-	2.5	8.8	15.5
Malawi	57.9*	32.9*	25.8	28.4	-	-	8.6	15.9
Namibia	53.9	50.1	28.1	15.0	4.8	4.3	22.2	21.9
Niger	-	43.2	42.8	49.4	-	7.0	13.4	6.1*
Nigeria	53.9	60.4	60.5	67.6	13.5	22.7	23.4	39.8
Rwanda**	58.7*	55.5	93.9	97.4	-	1.2*	38.3	43.7
Senegal	48.1	38.1	46.4	33.3*	0.0	4.1	7.8	-
Zambia	46.7	46.7	49.4	43.1	2.4	4.3	10.4	22.8
Egypt	37.8	21.0	22.3	-	1.0	18.2	47.4	-
Morocco	34.4	20.5	22.6	14.7	2.0	7.1	52.7	64.5*
Bangladesh	15.5	11.6	16.2	16.0	9.6*	7.1*	8.5	-
Indonesia	48.5	41.6	43.4	57.0	NA	NA	NA	NA
Pakistan	11.6	10.2	18.5	11.7	-	7.5	26.2	63.2*
Philippines	66.4	48.9	36.9	43.1	1.3	2.2	10.8	37.1
Turkey	26.5	31.4	48.4	-	NA	NA	NA	NA
Bolivia	55.7	53.2	60.9	72.9	3.0	9.2	39.1	68.1
Brazil	57.0	48.2	42.9	41.8	1.7	1.6	7.0	8.0
Colombia	52.3	40.1	28.1	57.1*	1.0	2.6	7.0	-
Dominican R	57.2	45.2	32.7	38.5	5.6	7.4	11.5	51.8
Paraguay	55.1	45.3	30.4	-	0.1	5.0	33.4	-
Peru	57.8	49.9	52.8	61.4	3.1	6.1	31.7	46.6

* Less than 50 cases
**About 4% of respondents are missing on API and employment.

Table 20.7.A. – Two indirect measures of women's workload

Country	Women who have a child age 5 or less and work away from home		Women age 15 or more in households without water on residential premises/3	
	Total %	% who "usually" have child with them when they work	Total %	% for whom time to fetch water is > 15 minutes
Burkina Faso	70.0	59.4	84.2	62.1
Cameroon	77.5	39.1	87.0	52.9
Ghana 1/2/	76.6	48.3	81.9	49.7
Kenya	55.4	17.5	81.2	61.3
Madagascar	77.8	51.8	84.6	46.3
Malawi 4/	48.9	43.6	95.1	61.9
Namibia 4/	68.1	17.4	60.0	63.7
Niger	51.3	67.4	87.8	42.9
Nigeria 5/	64.8	46.5	89.0	54.0
Rwanda	91.5	52.5	98.1	71.9
Senegal	77.2	43.6	64.9	48.9
Zambia	69.5	45.1	66.9	47.3
Egypt 1/6/	92.4	23.7	22.9	40.8
Morocco	65.4	31.0	44.6	72.6
Bangladesh	27.5	-	95.6	10.0
Indonesia	-	-	89.3	8.55
Pakistan	53.9	48.5	69.0	28.7
Philippines 1/	67.7	10.5	37.7	17.3
Turkey	-	-	22.6	-
Bolivia 6/	75.6	-	42.4	31.8
Brazil 4/	77.7	10.7	23.4	44.2
Colombia 4/	69.5	13.8	10.2	25.4
Dominican R 1/	71.0	32.4	61.9	27.9
Paraguay 1/5/	50.7	18.6	62.2	8.9
Peru 1/	71.7	45.2	30.0	26.0

1/ Respondents excluded due to missing data on working women with young child range from 2-5% of all eligible respondents.

2/ In Ghana the cutoff was children aged 4 years. However, some women with children a few months older than 4 years were also asked these questions and are included in the tabulations.

3/ Water on premises includes (where available): water piped into residence or property, well on property, bottled water and rainwater.

4/ Respondents excluded due to missing data on time to water source range from 2 - 5% of eligible respondents.

5/ Data on water restricted to women 15-49.

6/ Data on water based on time to drinking water source rather than household water source.

Table 20.8.A.– Comparison of the level of education of currently married women with that of their husbands (Only for couples where information is available on the education level of both husbands and wives)

Country	All couples: % of wives whose education as compared to that of their husbands is:			Husbands education													Number of couples
				None			Primary				Secondary or higher				Unknown	Total	
				% of husbands	% of wives with education which is:		% of husbands	% of wives with education which is:			% of husbands	% of wives with education which is:			% of husbands		
	Lower	Same	Higher		Same	Higher		Lower	Same	Higher		Lower	Same	Higher			
Burkina Faso	9.4	83.6	6.9	83.9	93.8	6.2	7.4	73.2	12.6	14.2	4.7	78.1	12.8	9.2	4.1	100.0	5,230
Cameroon	40.0	47.0	13.0	41.6	89.1	10.9	28.6	55.6	22.7	21.7	26.4	86.2	6.8	7.0	3.4	100.0	2,863
Ghana	43.2	42.6	14.2	32.0	82.2	17.8	44.5	62.4	28.1	9.6	19.8	69.9	11.1	19.0	3.7	100.0	3,144
Kenya	56.6	25.9	17.5	12.1	68.3	31.7	51.5	58.7	18.3	23.0	35.2	73.0	22.5	4.5	1.1	100.0	4,581
Madagascar *	40.0	27.6	32.4	17.8	59.8	40.2	44.7	43.6	23.4	33.0	26.1	61.1	12.7	26.3	11.4	100.0	3,615
Malawi	66.0	22.8	11.2	21.5	77.0	23.0	66.9	83.4	7.7	8.9	10.7	89.3	8.6	2.0	0.9	100.0	3,463
Namibia *	35.4	31.7	33.0	28.4	56.4	43.6	32.8	39.1	16.8	44.1	35.5	60.2	25.6	14.2	3.4	100.0	2,203
Niger	5.8	89.1	5.1	91.9	95.1	4.9	4.6	81.1	11.0	7.9	2.3	88.2	5.0	6.8	1.2	100.0	5,526
Nigeria	27.7	62.8	9.4	57.9	91.4	8.6	24.0	57.6	27.5	14.9	17.8	77.7	17.6	4.7	0.3	100.0	6,789
Rwanda	43.9	28.2	27.9	33.1	62.9	37.1	59.9	64.5	10.7	24.8	6.1	79.3	12.2	8.5	0.9	100.0	3,761
Senegal	12.4	80.8	6.8	79.1	93.5	6.5	7.3	70.4	16.5	13.1	7.4	87.6	8.0	4.3	6.2	100.0	4,375
Zambia	65.8	19.6	14.6	9.1	58.8	41.2	49.5	62.3	19.7	18.1	40.5	84.8	10.7	4.5	0.8	100.0	4,424
Egypt	44.7	40.0	15.3	32.3	80.0	20.0	29.0	67.9	14.7	17.4	38.6	64.7	25.5	9.8	0.1	100.0	9,144
Morocco	30.2	62.1	7.7	61.3	93.1	6.9	19.7	78.5	12.9	8.6	18.5	79.1	11.4	9.6	0.5	100.0	5,100
Bangladesh	44.6	43.3	12.1	44.8	83.4	16.6	24.2	68.8	15.7	15.5	30.5	90.8	6.2	2.9	0.5	100.0	8,814
Indonesia	45.6	34.5	19.8	11.3	66.4	33.6	59.9	44.3	32.5	23.1	28.8	66.1	26.3	7.6	0.1	100.0	21,015
Pakistan	44.1	51.1	4.8	48.8	95.4	4.6	16.9	85.1	8.2	6.7	34.1	86.6	9.0	4.3	0.2	100.0	6,342
Philippines	31.4	33.5	35.1	2.4	53.1	46.9	40.8	16.6	33.9	49.5	56.8	43.4	32.3	24.3	0.0	100.0	8,877
Turkey	49.0	42.4	8.5	8.0	74.7	25.3	56.6	38.5	54.1	7.4	35.5	76.9	16.6	6.6	0.0	100.0	6,266
Bolivia	62.7	21.8	15.5	4.3	69.2	30.8	37.3	62.4	18.1	19.5	58.2	67.4	20.7	11.9	0.2	100.0	5,312
Brazil	24.0	33.3	42.7	17.8	51.8	48.2	66.7	26.5	27.3	46.2	12.7	44.3	39.1	16.5	2.8	100.0	3,536
Colombia	38.9	26.5	34.6	7.2	26.2	73.8	46.9	29.6	28.7	41.7	45.8	54.7	24.2	21.1	0.0	100.0	4,400
Dominican R *	41.9	19.2	38.8	10.1	26.8	73.2	47.1	34.7	18.6	46.7	36.5	62.9	17.9	19.2	6.2	100.0	3,951
Paraguay	42.3	27.6	30.1	2.0	24.2	75.8	61.2	31.7	32.2	36.1	36.1	62.5	20.1	17.5	0.7	100.0	3,543
Peru	53.0	30.1	16.9	2.3	69.5	30.5	32.7	48.1	28.8	23.1	64.7	57.4	29.3	13.3	0.3	100.0	8,728

* Percentage of couples with missing information is between 2% and 4%.

Note: Husbands with information missing on the number of years of education are excluded from the distribution.

Table 20.9.A. – Percentage of women with different combinations of education and employment for cash

Country	% of women who have at least completed secondary education and are employed in modern occupations	% of women who have at least completed primary education and work in mixed or modern occupations	% of women who have some education and work for cash
Burkina Faso	0.5	4.4	7.9
Cameroon	0.8	8.9	22.2
Ghana	1.6	23.1	39.8
Kenya	1.1	13.3	32.8
Madagascar	0.8	12.4	55.3
Malawi	0.7	3.8	14.8
Namibia	4.3	13.5	24.2
Niger	0.2	1.1	3.6
Nigeria	2.1	12.4	17.1
Rwanda	0.5	2.3	35.6
Senegal	0.7	5.0	9.5
Zambia	2.8	20.8	36.9
Egypt	8.8	9.5	11.5
Morocco	1.9	6.7	8.6
Bangladesh	0.6	2.4	4.9
Indonesia	3.5	10.3	NA
Pakistan	0.5	2.0	2.4
Philippines	8.7	24.8	37.6
Turkey	3.7	7.5	NA
Bolivia	6.9	21.6	38.1
Brazil	6.6	12.1	36.1
Colombia	9.3	21.4	36.0
Dominican R	9.2	20.4	35.8
Paraguay	6.0	19.6	35.2
Peru	14.2	30.5	41.8

NA: Not available

Table 20.10.A – Countries by total and dimension specific scores on the Threshold Measure of Women's Status

Country	Relative socio econo mic status	Female house-hold head-ship	Educati-on and expo-sure	Employ-ment and work-load	Marria-ge and child-birth	Wife's emp. & educ. rel. to hus-band's	Total Score	Score adjusted for no. of indicators	
								Total	Rank
Maximum score**	1	5	8	8	3	4	29	1.000	-
Burkina Faso	0	2	1	2.5	1	4	10.5	0.362	17
Cameroon	0	1	3	2	0	2	8	0.276	20
Ghana	1	2	4	2	3	2	14	0.483	11
Kenya	0	1	5	5	2.5	1	14.5	0.5	10
Madagascar	.5	3	6	3	2	2	16.5	0.569	8
Malawi	0	1	2.5 (of 7)	3	0	1	7.5 (of 28)	0.268	22
Namibia	0	2	7.5	6	2	3	20.5	0.707	5
Niger	0	0	1	1	0	4	6	0.207	25
Nigeria	na	0 of 4	1	2.5	1	4	8.5 (of 27)	0.315	19
Rwanda	0	1	2.5 (of 7)	1	3	2	9.5 (of 28)	0.339	18
Senegal	.5	2	1	1.5	1	2	8	0.276	20
Zambia	0	1	5.5	3	.5	1	11	0.379	16
Egypt*	.5	2	4	5.5	1	2	15	0.517	9
Morocco	.5	1	4	3	3	2	13.5	0.466	12
Bangladesh*	0	1	2	2	1	1	7	0.241	24
Indonesia*	.5	1	6.5	2 (of 6)	1	1	12 (of 27)	0.444	14
Pakistan*	1	3	1.5	0	1	1	7.5	0.259	23
Philippines	1	3	7	6	3	4	24	0.828	2
Turkey*	.5	1	4.5	3.5 (of 7)	1.5	1	12 (of 28)	0.429	15
Bolivia	1	2	5	3	2	0	13	0.448	13
Brazil	1	3	6.5	7	2	3	22.5	0.776	3
Colombia	1	2	8	6	3	2	22	0.759	4
Dominican R	1	4	7	7	3	3	25	0.862	1
Paraguay	na	2 (of 4)	7	6	2	2	19 (of 27)	0.704	6
Peru	1	3	6.5	5	3	1	19.5	0.672	7

Note: See appendix for indicators of each dimension.
* Only ever married women.
** The relevant maximum score for countries that are missing information on some indicators is given in the relevant cells.

Table 20.11.A. – Ranking countries on the summary measure of women's status, on the Gender-related Development Index and the Gender Empowerment Measure 1/

Country	Rank on the GDI 1/	Ranks on women's status summary measure if only countries for which GDI is available are ranked 2/	Rank on the GEM 1/
Burkina Faso	21	15	13
Cameroon	10	17	10
Ghana	11	9	11
Kenya	9	8(-)	not ranked
Madagascar	14	6(-)	not ranked
Malawi	20	19	17
Namibia	not ranked	- (5)	5
Niger	22	22(-)	not ranked
Nigeria	16	16	20
Rwanda	not ranked	- (-)	not ranked
Senegal	19	17	16
Zambia	15	14	15
Egypt	12	7 (8)	18
Morocco	13	10	14
Bangladesh	18	21	12
Indonesia	6	12	6
Pakistan	17	20	21
Philippines	5	2	1
Turkey	1	13	19
Bolivia	8	11	8
Brazil	2	3	7
Colombia	not ranked	- (4)	2
Dominican R	7	1	3
Paraguay	4	4 (6)	9
Peru	3	5 (7)	4

1/ These indices stand for Gender-related Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure defined in "Human Development Report 1995" Published for the United Nations Development Programme. New York: Oxford University Press. The Human Development Report 1995, ranks 130 countries on the GDI index and 116 countries on the GEM index (Tables 3.1 (p. 76-77) and 3.5 (p. 84-85), UN 1995). The GDI and GEM rankings reported here are not the original rankings; instead, they are the rankings that these countries would have had if their original ordering on the GDI and GEM was maintained but no other countries except those in this study were being ranked. The GDI is constructed using information on overall achievements of women and men on three dimensions: life expectancy, educational attainment and adjusted real income. The GEM measures the economic political and professional participation of women as compared to men and uses information on income earning power, share in professional and managerial jobs and share of parliamentary seats.

2/ Parentheses indicate the ranks these countries would have had if we had excluded the countries missing on GEM instead of GDI

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DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN EXTENDED FAMILIES AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: THE CASE OF BURKINA FASO

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Researchers and international organisations interested in issues concerning women frequently recommend their access to formal education and paid employment (including activities generating income) as the best way of improving their living conditions. Although such recommendations are nearly always formulated as objectives in the development programmes of all southern countries, in practise they seem increasingly hard to achieve, except for in a few areas such as Kerala in India (Jung, 1994). The question to be answered, therefore, is the following: Until economic development is achieved, until all citizens are given access to modern education and paid work, what can women do to improve the lives of future generations of women?

This study, conducted in Burkina Faso[1], seeks to answer this question. The objectives were threefold: 1) To provide an understanding of the decision-making process in households as it concerns fertility and other important issues; 2) To determine whether there was any preference for boys to the detriment of girls and the impact of such a preference on fertility; and 3) To identify strategic measures for improving the lives of the next generation of women.

Discussions relating to women's status in general and women in the developing world in particular need to be carefully examined. The importance of these discussions was made all the more obvious by the fact

[1] Case study of Dagara (from Ioba province/Dano), Moosé (from Sanmatenga/Kaya) and Nuni (from Sissili/Léo).

that they resulted in the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD, Cairo, Egypt, 5th to 13th September, 1994) recommending that more power should be given to women. This study is part of the efforts undertaken to implement the Programme of Action of the ICPD, which is relevant for the most part to developing countries such as Burkina Faso.

Decisions pertaining to fertility have been studied in major surveys, such as the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), in terms of the ideal size of families, the number of children conceived, and the knowledge and use of contraceptive methods. The results of these surveys revealed an important gap between a high level of knowledge of contraceptive methods and a low level of use. In Burkina Faso, the last DHS in 1993 and the 1996 survey on Knowledge, Attitudes and Practise (KAP) on AIDS, STDs, family planning and education for family life, revealed the same difference. However, despite these results, to our knowledge, few surveys have systematically addressed issues of decision-making regarding fertility. This study can thus improve our knowledge in this area.

Due to limited time and resources, only rural areas will be studied. The target populations are the Dagara, Moosé and Nuni ethnic groups living in certain areas in Burkina Faso. The Dagara were selected because their society is matrilineal (descent is designated through the mother) and they are therefore theoretically different from the Moosé and Nuni whose societies are patrilineal. The Moosé were selected because they represent 47% of the Burkinabe population. The Nuni were chosen because they have always been perceived as different from the Moosé regarding the status of women. In fact, Nuni women seem to have more freedom of movement and to be less burdened with work because they are less involved in agricultural activities. Moreover, the three ethnic groups have different contraceptive prevalence rates.

After reviewing the literature and sketching out a conceptual framework in the first substantive section, the immediate objectives and the corresponding hypotheses will be presented in the second section. The relevance of this study in Burkina Faso will be discussed in the third section. The methodology, presented in the fourth section, involves the gathering of quantitative data from one-on-one interviews and qualitative data from group discussions. The limits of the study are discussed in the concluding section.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND ELEMENTS OF A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

For a long time, issues concerning women, their status, positions and roles, were studied, discussed and evaluated in order to measure, among

other things, to what extent: 1) important roles of women in the household remained unrecognised; and 2) women's acquisition of power through education and access to economic resources enabled them to make greater contributions towards the development of their countries (Oppong, 1987). The same concern for the welfare of women emerged at the ICPD.

Although poorly defined and difficult to translate into other languages (Lassonde, 1996) "Empowerment of Women", which is the central issue of this study, is considered by the ICPD as an important objective and a reliable means of improving women's lives. The fundamental hypothesis seems to be that women currently have no power and that this is perhaps why they live in "precarious conditions".

Very close to the empowerment of women is the notion of equality of the sexes, which is also a subject of discussion, and one that implies a dynamic link between the social roles of men and women.

In addition to the Programme of Action of the ICPD, several declarations and treaties of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity have recommended improved access for women to power, especially in the public sector through the occupying of political responsibilities on an equal footing with men, as well as the respect of women's civil rights.

In the literature on the subject of the sharing of power between men and women, researchers are divided into three categories:

- Those who believe that women (especially women in sub-Saharan Africa) are universally subordinate and need to be given more power in order to become equal to men, by having a scope of action reaching beyond their reproductive life. This group is the largest and includes the Western feminist movement, which to a certain extent influenced the positions adopted by the ICPD (McIntosh and Finkle, 1995; Lassonde, 1996).

- Those who believe that African women in sub-Saharan Africa are no more subordinate than Western women but that they are engaged in different types of relations (Paulme, 1971). Some of the authors from this second group have quoted several examples in which African women have played important political and economic roles (Amadiume, 1987; Mack, Wilks, etc. in Romero, 1988).

- Those who believe that although African women in their relations with their husbands, do not benefit from all the ideal aspects of Western life provided by modernisation, they play important roles in the family (socialisation/education of the children) which enables them to change the living conditions of the next generation of women (see Deniel, 1985).

The second and third categories of researchers imply the following in their analyses:

- The education of the children (boys and girls) is ensured by the women (Baumann and Westermann, 1947; Lallemand, 1977) until the boys reach the age when they join the men, whereas the girls stay with the women. It is usually during this period of their lives that the division of labour between men and women is introduced by the women and then reinforced by the men. The girls must help with domestic chores whereas the boys are left alone until they are involved in activities reserved for men. Moreover, the women are expected to develop the character of their children whatever their sex (Renne, 1993:343, quoted by Oni, 1996:59).

- Marriages, including those of adolescents, which require complex negotiations and ceremonies, cannot be contracted without the cooperation of the women, who play an important role (Lallemand, 1977; Scheub, and Schildkrout, in Romero, 1988).

- Complaints about sisters-in-law and mothers-in-law are universal and are strong enough to influence the decisions of a couple (Lallemand, 1977; Deniel, 1985; Jung, 1994). The existence of such a diversity in the power exerted by women was evoked by Amadiume (1987).

- In African societies governed by matrilineal regimes women occupy a key position, since inheritance and status are acquired through the mother (Clignet, 1970; and Wilks in Romero, 1988). In these societies, there are biological fathers and social fathers. The latter are the brothers of the mother, and the child inherits from them. Therefore, in these systems giving birth to a girl is just as important as giving birth to a boy, which means that women play roles beyond that of procreation. In fact, in the matrilineal society of the Ashanti, women are treated as the equals of men in regards to solving important political problems, especially when they reach the age of the menopause. According to Wilks (in Romero, 1983:133), the fundamental role of the Ashanti woman is to reproduce the family line, not only biologically but socio-economically as well.

In agreement with the second and third categories of researchers, Amadiume (1987), in a case study of the Igbo of Nnobi in Nigeria, showed how colonialisation, including schooling and the Christian religion, eroded women's powers. She explains that women have lost their power because of the system of relations between men and women in Western society which was imported by the colonial institutions. These new values replaced the more flexible system of relations between men and women which existed in Igbo society. In fact, according to Amadiume, in this society there was a difference in the social relations between men and women and the biological relations based on sex. In other words, in such a system, roles of authority are not automatically reserved for men and those of lesser authority for women. Amadiume gives two examples of situations in which women held positions normally occupied by men. She describes these women as male-daughters or female-husbands.

During the International Conference on "Feminist Research in French-speaking Societies" (held in Quebec, Canada, from the 24-28 September 1996) three sessions were dedicated to evaluating feminism in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa. In these sessions, the discussions indicated that there were an increasing number of actions carried out by non-governmental organisations (NGO's) and women's associations, aimed at improving women's welfare. Moreover, although limited in number, African women authors, in the 70s, started to criticise in their works the living conditions of their sisters. Such movements and works have been categorised as feminist because they promote women. However, the discussions concluded that the Western feminist approach and ideas have not been completely endorsed in French-speaking sub-Saharan Africa (D'Almeida, 1994; 1996). This situation is true even for the few well-to-do women intellectuals. According to the discussions, this is in part due to the fact that typically African women, whether educated or not, want above all to be wives and mothers. The discussions also pointed to the fact that women are powerful in private but their power is often used by men for their own benefit. For example, political parties have used women to gain votes, and in Mali women's movements contributed to overthrowing President Moussa Traoré (Ba Konaré, 1993).

As far as the relations between power in the family and human reproduction/fertility are concerned, several researchers, who could be classified as socio-demographers, have tried to identify the most important aspects of women's family ties and relationships that help explain their fertility. The aspect most often referred to is status. In these studies, efforts have been made to define/measure women's status and to then establish links between this status and fertility (see Mason, 1993; Adams and Castle, 1994; Mhloyi, 1994 and Johnston, 1994; Mahmud and Johnston, 1994; Balk, 1994; and Oppong and Wery, 1994). Mason (1993) identified the shortcomings of conventional research on the status or position of women as a determinant of their fertility. According to Mason, problems arise in part because the definition of status varies from one researcher to another. She also provides a clear methodological approach which new research could benefit from.

Van de Walle and Van de Walle (1995) provide a good review of demographic literature on the status and position of women in sub-Saharan Africa. In this review, several authors are quoted (for example, Boserup, 1970; Blake, 1974; Stycos, 1982, Mason, 1984). The approach used by Jejeebhoy (1995) to explain reproduction/fertility behaviour is different. She rejects the concept of the status of women, which she feels is unclear, and decides instead to use the concept of autonomy. According to Jejeebhoy, who quotes Dyson and Moore (1983), "autonomy is therefore a better term to describe the extent to which women control their lives". Autonomy has been defined as "the capacity to obtain information and use it as a basis for

making decisions about things of concern to the individual and those who are close to her" (Jejeebhoy, 1995).

The literature points to the existence of a strong link between women's status and fertility. High fertility is seen as being contrary to a high status, because it reduces the possibilities for autonomy, formal modern education and exercising activities generating income -- which, among other things, are characteristics of high status. However, it has also been said that high fertility is a rational choice, at least for certain women who think it is a way of improving their status and their situation within the family. Hoodfar (1995), in a case study in Iran, shows that women choose to have many children to reduce the risk of being abandoned by their husband even if he should marry another woman. As one respondent said, "many women in polygamous unions may agree to look after one or two children who are not theirs, but very few women are willing to look after several children who would see them as usurping the place of their mother" (Hoodfar, 1995:126). Jung (1994) also discovered the same kind of reasoning among women from southern Asia concerning giving birth to a boy. According to Oni (1996:58), in Yoruba society the number of children a women has is often an important factor in her status within the conjugal household, the duration of her union and her relations with her husband and her in-laws. A delay in producing a child during the first years of her marriage leads to suspicion about her prenuptial behaviour. This suspicion results in hate and in most cases rejection by the in-laws if she is unable to have children or if all her children are girls.

Another aspect concerning women which socio-demographers, specialists in infant morbidity and mortality often study is the existence of a preference for boys to the detriment of girls. On the basis of the results of studies on infant morbidity and mortality in southern Asia (especially Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) and recently in sub-Saharan Africa (Legrand and Mbacké, 1995; Tabutin and Willems, 1995), researchers have suggested there was a difference in treatment (nutrition and health care) in favour of little boys. It would appear that the reason for such differences in treatment is a preference for boys. This would explain the observed differences in infant mortality according to sex.

On the one hand, the literature suggests that there is a need for a change in the distribution of power in society in general and in the family in particular, so that women may acquire more power to exercise their rights concerning fertility, including the use of contraceptive methods, and for them to be able to participate fully in the development of their countries. On the other hand, the literature suggests that women already exercise some power. However, it should be pointed out that regardless of the category that researchers belong to, they all agree that men occupy a central role when it comes to power in society. Indeed, in the matrilineal system women only play the role of an intermediary as far as inheritance is concerned, since the

child inherits from the maternal uncle and not from the aunt. The reason for this is no doubt because the woman does not accumulate wealth. When referring to "male-daughters" or "female-husbands" in describing women who exercise power, Amadiume shows indirectly that one cannot refer to power without referring to the male sex.

The similarities and differences between the categories of researchers mentioned above can be interpreted as being an indication that as far as power between men and women is concerned, it is difficult to talk of global domination or subordination in the strict sense of the term. One should rather talk about a dividing up of power, insofar as the man controls certain areas and the woman controls others. As Foucault (1984) says, power is exercised within the framework of relations, and it is multi-directional, operating from top to bottom but also from the bottom upwards. Within the framework of this study, according to the definition in the Petit Robert dictionary, a person has power when he or she has the possibility and the right to undertake an action or to decide that an action should be undertaken. Such a definition of power automatically implies a legitimisation of this power by the people who are subjected to it, but it also implies autonomy for the people who exercise it. In other words, for there to be the power to decide there have to be people who recognise that power by agreeing to carry out the decisions that can only be taken by people who are free to act as they please. In fact, according to Jejeebhoy (1995), quoted earlier, prefers the term "autonomy".

But what is a decision? According to Saussois and Dortier (1993, p.5) "Examination of the reality of decisions shows that deciding does not correspond to a precise, clearly identified phase at which point the decision is made... A decision is part of a process: it is built up, negotiated, made in a roundabout way over time." Despite the clearly elusive nature of the decision, decision-making or better, its process, requires the mental elaboration of all the possible actions on the basis of information received. In other words, one cannot say that a decision has been taken unless prior mental evaluation of the benefits and costs of each of these actions has been made (Weinberg, 1993). Therefore, acting according to custom becomes a decision if and only if one has information enabling alternative action. On the basis of this, however, it should be acknowledged that information under the form of new elements of knowledge does not exclude the weight of cultural values on the behaviour of an individual. Information can only lessen this weight to allow a rational decision to be made. On the basis of the preceding discussion, in order to gain a better understanding of the power relations in society, contradictory suggestions in the literature must be reconciled. It is with this goal in mind that this study examines the decision-making process in three rural communities in Burkina Faso.

Methodologically, Safilios-Rothschild (1970:539) found gaps in the approaches of studies on the structure of power in the family in her review of

literature in this area covering the period from 1960 to 1969. According to her, the problem resides in the fact that "most researchers in this area have used the terms "family power" or "structure of power" and the terms "decision-making", "family authority" and "influence" interchangeably". She also contends that family power is a multidimensional concept which cannot be measured only through decision-making. She concludes her article by suggesting that the methodological approach of studies on the structure of power needs to be improved by including the detailed analysis of all aspects of power, and from the point of view of all family members. Olson and Rabunsky (1972) have also raised similar questions concerning the conceptualisation and operationalisation of family power. The reflections of these authors are taken into account in this study. The result of decision-making and its process is studied. Moreover, the man and the woman (women) are interviewed individually.

OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES OF THE STUDY

Objective 1. To establish the links between fertility[2], the use of contraceptive methods[3] and the decision-making power of the woman by:

- determining how decisions are made concerning the number of children desired, the number of children conceived, and the use of methods of contraception: Who makes the decisions? The man, the woman, both of them, or other people? Is fertility the object of a decision or not?

> *Hypothesis 1.1 women have power[4] because they take part in making decisions concerning the number of children they want, the number of children they conceive and the use of contraceptive methods. This power can be different from the power exercised by men in the same areas.*

- Determining the relations that exist between decision-making power and the number of children conceived by sex: Does a high number of surviving children increase or reduce the woman's decision-making power in the family? Does the sex of the children conceived (the number of which is

[2] Fertility is defined here as being the number of children wanted by sex, the number of children conceived by sex, birth spacing and the resumption of sexual relations after a birth.

[3] In this case contraceptive methods are: modern methods (the pill, condoms, I.U.D., injectables, etc.) and traditional methods (periodic or post-partum abstinence, withdrawal, and monitoring of the woman's menstrual cycle).

[4] Power is defined here, in a simplified way, as being participation in decision-making in the household, for the woman as well as for the man.

influenced by infant mortality) influence the degree of decision-making power?

Hypothesis 1.2 The prospect of increased decision-making power for the woman through her offspring (translated into increased security) influences the number of children she wants and conceives, as well as her decision whether or not to use contraceptive methods. As a result the more children a woman loses the more she will conceive.

Hypothesis 1.3 The older a woman is and the more surviving children she has, the more she takes part in decision-making, both in her nuclear family and in her children's family.

- Determining if and how the decision-making process has changed from one generation to the next: Are decisions concerning fertility and decisions concerning the management of the family[5] more often negotiated between spouses now than in the past? Has the manner of negotiating changed? Is the extended family[6] less involved in the decisions taken in the nuclear family today compared with the past? In other words, has the negotiation of decisions moved from the extended family to the nuclear family, thus allowing improved interpersonal communication between the spouses[7]?

Hypothesis 1.4 The decisions concerning the number of children conceived, the use of contraception, and the management of the family are more often negotiated between spouses today than in the past. As a result, couples belonging to younger generations communicate better with one another, discuss a wider variety of topics and the wife participates more openly in decision-making.

Hypothesis 1.5 The degree of involvement of members of the extended family in the nuclear family's decision-making process has diminished over time.

- Determining the degree of autonomy[8] of the woman and whether it has changed from one generation to the next.

Hypothesis 1.6 Among young couples, women have greater autonomy.

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[5] Normally by management of the family we mean all the relations among members of the family, and the relations they have outside the family which concern the family. However, we will here limit the definition to traditional education of the children (boys and girls) up to the age of 7 (preparing children for life) and the woman's contribution in monetary resources ensuring the welfare of the family: current consumption (water, food, clothes, medicine, school supplies for the children) and consumer durable goods (accommodation, transport and other investments).

[6] The extended family is defined as being a group of relatives including the father/mother(s), uncles/aunts, grandparents, cousins and in-laws. Therefore, men in the extended family are not limited to husbands and women are not limited to wives. In contrast, the nuclear family is limited to the couple and their children.

[7] Interpersonal communication between spouses will be measured here by the number of subjects the spouses discuss together before making a decision; the number of leisure activities the spouses partake in together; and the amount of interference from members of the extended family in the nuclear family.

[8] The woman's autonomy is measured here by the possibility of her going out, of undertaking income-generating activities, of educating/informing herself or of participating in voluntary activities, with or without consulting her husband.

- Determining relationships among women: How do women influence decisions concerning the lives of other women, regarding fertility, the management of the family, the degree of autonomy of the woman and interpersonal communication between spouses?

Hypothesis 1.7 Women protect their daughters, with whom they have a cooperative relationship. On the other hand, they are hard and strict with their co-wives (in polygamous couples), their sisters-in-law (wives of their brothers) and their daughters-in-law, with whom they have relations characterised by rivalry. As a result, their participation in decision-making concerning their daughters will be different from that of decision-making concerning the other women.

- Gathering information on the spouses' contributions towards satisfying the needs of the household for current consumption and for consumer durable goods. Who contributes more, and how? What is the nature of the links between the degree of contribution to these needs of the household, decision-making power, fertility/use of contraceptive methods, and women's autonomy?

Hypothesis 1.8 There are no direct links between the number of children desired and conceived, the use of contraception and the contribution made by the woman to the needs of the household in current consumption goods and consumer durable goods.

Hypothesis 1.9 The greater the woman's contribution to the household's needs for current consumption and consumer durable goods, the more she takes part in decision-making in her home and the more autonomy she has.

- Determining the role of men and women in spacing of births, the resumption of sexual relations after a birth and the traditional education of the children: who has the greatest influence on the process: the men or the women? Is the attribution of these roles negotiated between spouses? For the education of the children, are the roles different depending on the child's sex?

Hypothesis 1.10 The woman plays a more important role than the man in the traditional education of the children (boys and girls up to the age of 7).

Hypothesis 1.11 The woman also plays a role which is as important as, if not more so, that of the man in the spacing of births and the resumption of sexual relations after the birth of a child.

Objective 2. To determine the existence of preferences for boys over girls by:

- Determining local practises concerning nutrition and care given to boys compared with that given to girls, and the reasons for such practises.

Hypothesis 2.1 Contrary to countries in Southern Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa (at least among the Dagara, Moosé and Nuni in Burkina Faso) parents do not make a conscious and calculated effort to treat boys better than girls.

- Determining the links between the natural composition of children by sex and fertility/use of contraception.

Hypothesis 2.2 The natural composition of offspring by sex influences the number of children born, since couples want both sexes to be represented among their children.

Objective 3. To identify strategic measures by verifying the hypotheses pertinent to objectives 1 and 2 by:

- Determining potential sources of power for women.

- Recording the points of view of the communities studied on the approach to be adopted for empowering women, by inducing them to compare the situation of women with that of men (in other words, are women perceived as inferior, equal, or superior to men?). What are the differences between men and women as perceived by the respondents? Is there a desire for change and if so in which direction?

- Determining how men and women could contribute to bring about changes in relations between men and women for future generations.

RELEVANCE OF THE STUDY IN BURKINA FASO

Results of Recent Surveys Conducted in the Country

The 1992-1993 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)

The DHS, which is the most recent one gathered between December 1992 and March 1993, provided, among other data, information on the knowledge and use of contraceptive methods. According to the results of the survey, 63% of women (all marital statuses included) know of the existence of modern methods of contraception (especially the pill and condoms). However, only 28% know where to obtain them. As far as the use of contraceptive methods is concerned, only 10% of the women who know of their existence have already used a modern method. At the time of the survey only 8% of women in union and of reproductive age used contraception and 4% used a modern method. Contraceptive prevalence was 26% in urban areas and 4% in rural areas for all methods. However, in urban areas women used modern methods (17%) more than traditional ones (9%). The opposite was observed in rural areas (1% for modern methods compared with 3% for traditional methods).

Table 21.1 – Contraceptive prevalence rates (%) in urban and rural areas in Burkina Faso, according to the type of method used, (women in union

Methods	Modern	Traditional	All methods

Urban areas	17	9	26
Rural areas	1	3	4
Source: DHS, 1993, Final Report.			

As far as future use of contraceptive methods is concerned, the survey indicates that 54% of women in union who were not users at the time of the survey did not intend to become users in the future, whereas 30% of them intended to become users and 15% were undecided. The reason most frequently given for the lack of interest in contraception was the desire to have more children (41%).

Concerning opinions and attitudes, the survey revealed that at least 69% of women of reproductive age and aware of the existence of contraceptive methods approved of family planning. However, only 25% of women in union had discussed this subject at least once with their partner. The part of the survey dealing with men revealed that men are more informed about the existence of contraceptive methods than women: 86% and 66% respectively. Further, 83% of men know of at least one modern method of contraception, irrespective of their marital status.

By comparing the responses of spouses, the results of the DHS revealed that in 45% of cases both spouses approved of family planning and in 13% both spouses disapproved. Although among many couples the women knew their husband's opinion (78% when he approved and 48% when he disapproved), the survey indicated a certain lack of communication between the spouses concerning family planning. In fact, 72% of couples never discussed family planning.

The DHS shows that the ideal family size is larger for men (7.1 children) than for women (5.7 children). Moreover, in 54% of the couples interviewed the men wanted more children than the women. Only for 18% of couples did the men and the women want the same number of children, and for 28% of couples the women wanted more children than their husbands.

1995-1996 Survey on Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices (KAP)

In late 1995 and early 1996 a Knowledge, Attitudes and Practises survey (KAP) on Family Planning, AIDS, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Education for Family Life was conducted nationally (data were collected from December 15th, 1995 to January 18th, 1996). As with the DHS, the KAP survey revealed that despite extensive knowledge of the concept of family planning, and of contraceptive methods and where to obtain them, the rate of use of these methods was rather low at the time of the survey: 25% of women and 37.8% of men in urban areas and 4.2% of women and 11.5% of men in rural areas used a modern method of contraception (38.1% of women in urban areas and 27.1%

of women in rural areas used some methods of contraception modern or traditional).

Table 21.2 – Contraceptive prevalence rate (%) in urban and rural areas, according to the sex of the users

Methods	All methods included		Modern methods	
Areas	Men	Women	Men	Women
Urban	48.7	38.1	37.8	25.0
Rural	29.9	27.1	11.5	4.2
Source: KAP survey, 1996, provisional report.				

Concerning family relations the KAP survey revealed that:

- Family members consult one another when there are problems to be resolved. However, women are more often consulted as mothers than as spouses. Men, on the other hand, are consulted as often as fathers or husbands, and sometimes as brothers.

- In rural areas spouses intervene more in the management of each other's resources than in urban areas. Men intervene more in the management of their wives' financial resources than the other way round. Moreover, the husband is usually the one in charge of managing resources.

The KAP survey gives us some indication about how decisions concerning the management of resources and other problems are made. But certain questions remain unanswered: For example, why do women consult their husbands more than their husbands consult them? What are the relations between decision-making and polygamy? These are important questions which need clarifying.

Regarding decisions concerning fertility, the KAP survey shows that the number of children desired is not a usual subject of conversation in Burkina Faso: Only 13.8% of women from rural areas say they had discussed this subject with their husbands compared with 48.5% of women from urban areas. The same difference between rural and urban areas was observed concerning men (19% and 57%, respectively). Moreover, 31.3% of women from rural areas and 11.2% from urban areas do not know how many children they want. An interesting result is that certain people (especially women) say they do not talk about how many children they want because they are afraid of the reaction of their spouse. It should be noted, however, that very few respondents had a fatalistic attitude, with answers such as "it is God's will."

Table 21.3 – Wives having discussed the subject of fertility with their husbands (percentages)

Area	Have already discussed the subject with their husbands	Do not know the desired number of children
Urban	48.5	11.2
Rural	13.8	31.3
Source: KAP survey, 1996, provisional report.		

The results of both surveys show that the contraceptive prevalence rates (all methods) increased by about 12 percentage points in urban areas (from 26% to 38%) and by about 23 percentage points in rural areas (from 4% to 27%) between 1993 and 1996. They also show that the difference between the knowledge and use of family planning and the lack of communication between spouses on issues concerning family planning persisted between 1993 and 1996. Therefore, the reasons behind the fact that despite the availability of several modern methods traditional methods are still used, need to be investigated. How are decisions concerning family planning made; and what are the reasons behind the increase in the use of contraception?

The KAP survey and (to a lesser degree) the DHS have certainly improved our knowledge on questions concerning decision-making in the family, and they highlight the importance of the topic. The present study will improve our knowledge concerning fertility issues and will complete the information provided by the DHS and KAP survey.

A Future Research Programme

At the Governmental Level

The National Population Council (CONAPO) (Ministère de l'Economie, des Finances et du Plan, 1996b) included in the section of its research programme dealing with socio-cultural and demographic themes a research project (which has not yet been started) on "The Transition from Traditional to Modern Family Planning Methods." The objective of this project is to identify and observe populations using modern contraceptive methods, in order to gain an understanding of their behaviour. This information will be used to develop a strategy for improving the use of modern contraceptive methods among other populations.

Our study, whose objectives are described above, will more than satisfy CONAPO requirements by improving knowledge on population issues in

Burkina Faso. In fact, it covers more questions and will target users and non-users in order to gain a better understanding of the differences between the two groups.

At the Level of National Research Institutions

Among other studies being conducted is one entitled, "Determinants of Fertility: Socio-anthropological Research", which is being carried out by the Community Health Laboratory (*Laboratoire de Santé Communautaire*), a project aimed at providing health and family planning services in Bazega Province in Burkina Faso. The study is limited to a single province, but it includes quantitative and qualitative data.

As in the case of the CONAPO research project, the scope of our study is wider since it deals with several questions and targets two additional ethnic groups: the Dagara and the Nuni. This will allow comparative analyses indicating possible differences among these three ethnic groups (Moosé, Dagara and Nuni) and from one region to another for the Moosé.

METHODOLOGY

Data Collection

Data Sources

Two types of data will be used to attain the objectives of the study: a) quantitative data, which will be gathered by individual interviews; b) qualitative data, to be gathered by interviewing focus groups. The combination of these two types of data was used successfully in the Central African Republic in the elaboration of the People and Family Code. Moreover, these two methods are complementary approaches and hence they are essential in gaining an understanding of such a complex phenomenon as the decision-making process involved in questions such as fertility and the management of the family. In fact, the individual interviews provide detailed information about the lives of the respondents, whereas the focus groups provide information on the respondents' opinions (based on their own experience and their knowledge of the community being studied) on important topics that are difficult to deal with in individual discussions. Moreover, the focus groups allow respondents to exchange opposing or contradictory points of view, making it ultimately possible for a consensus to be reached.

The individual interviews will be conducted before the focus group meetings. There will be more individual interviews than the number of participants attending the focus group meetings. However, all focus group participants will undergo an individual interview with the purpose of identifying them. Therefore, except for age, the selection criteria for the participants will be

the same for the individual interviews as for the focus groups. In fact, any married mother over the age of 15 may be interviewed individually whereas, as explained further on, participants must belong to specific age groups to take part in the focus groups.

Data Collection Methods

- Individual Interviews

The interviewing of each participant will be based on a questionnaire. The exact number of participants for the individual interviews will be decided later, on site. We expect to have approximately 125 people for each site.

- The Focus Groups

Contrary to the individual interviews, in which we expect to obtain detailed information on the lives of the respondents, the technique of the focus groups is used to obtain information of a general nature based on opinions expressed during discussions and which may be contradictory. The discussions or debates are conducted anonymously without any pressure being exerted on the participants. In fact, although the interviewers know the identities and situations of the respondents, their right to speak is not linked to their status. The first thing required for this method is the selection of the participants and the composition of the groups, which are made up according to two types of independent variables: homogeneous and heterogeneous variables.

The homogeneous variables are used to select the people who will take part in the study. These variables represent the characteristics which make the participants homogeneous. In other words, all the participants must share the same values for these variables, which must be considered as controlled effect variables. Heterogeneous variables are important because their effects are evaluated in the study, and they are used to make up the focus groups. As with the homogeneous variables, the members of a given group must share the same values for the heterogeneous variables. The idea is to compare the answers of one group with the answers of another for the concepts discussed. The differences obtained are explained as being the effects of the differences between the groups, therefore of the heterogeneous variables. Hence, contrary to homogeneous variables, the participants must have different values for these heterogeneous variables from one group to the next. On the basis of the above, in studies using focus groups only the variance between groups is explained, since the variance within a group is, by definition, zero.

The study of several heterogeneous variables provides more information but requires the creation of several groups, which in turn increases the cost and duration of the study. Therefore, because of limited time and funding, only a restricted number of heterogeneous variables have been taken into consideration. The variables examined in this survey for the focus groups are described in the two boxes:

Homogeneous Variables

1. Marital Status: All participants must be currently married (all definitions of marriage included except consensual unions).

2. Place of Residence: All participants must be residents of the capital city of a district (rural area) with a population predominantly made up of Dagara, Moosé, or Nuni (to be identified), having access to a complete range of contraceptive methods and to education.

3. Education: In Burkina Faso most of the residents of rural areas cannot read (except for retired people who have returned to live in their villages of origin, civil-servants working in these villages or people who have been taught to read and write). Since education is considered as an important variable, all people who are literate will be interviewed individually (if they meet the selection criteria for participants in the survey), and will take part in the focus groups. Education is defined in terms of literacy, since we believe it is an indication of the degree of success of formal education or basic schooling.

4. Use of Contraceptive Methods: The prevalence rate for contraception is low in rural areas. As a result, it would have been preferable that all the users identified through family planning clinics or individual interviews should take part in separate focus groups. However, after talking to the health staff (midwives) it became apparent that this would not be the best approach, since many of the women using contraceptive methods in rural areas do so without their husbands' consent. Therefore, these women would refuse to be selected for groups according to such criteria. Since ethics require transparency we have to respect the respondents' wishes.

Heterogeneous Variables

1. Age: Three groups will be considered (15-25, 30-45, and 50-70 year-olds). The first two groups were chosen because we believe they have different points of view, but are both of reproductive age and are therefore targeted by family planning programmes. The third group (the older one) was chosen because it includes the parents-in-law and uncles and aunts who can influence the members of the first two groups. If it proves to be difficult to determine age, the following criteria will be used to select participants: young married couples with children aged under 10, for the first group; couples who have been married for some time with children aged 10 and over, for the second group; couples married and having at least one son-in-law or daughter-in-law, for the third group.

2. Sex: Male or female.

3. Ethnic Group: The people interviewed will be either Dagara, Moosé or Nuni.

Although contraception is not a criterion for selecting participants for the focus groups, knowledge of this information will be used to interpret the discussions of the focus groups attended by users of contraceptive methods. The advantage of putting women who use contraceptives with non-users is that the former can indirectly influence the latter by making them aware of the advantages of family planning during the group discussions.

Age groups will be formed according to the women's ages. The husbands of these women will therefore tend to be older since men generally marry later than women. Therefore, there will be fewer focus groups for men whose ages will tend to be concentrated. We are aware that it would be preferable for the age groups to be continuous in covering the ages from 15 to 70 years, so that all persons belonging to this interval would be a part of the target population. We have decided to take three groups in a discontinuous manner for the focus groups because: a) many categories would increase the number of focus groups which would in turn increase the cost and length of the survey; and b) these three groups provide a good representation of the differences that are interesting for this study.

From these variables, a maximum of 18 focus groups will be made up (3x3x2, in other words the three age categories times the three ethnic group categories times the two sex categories. However, the actual number may be smaller because, as already stated, there may be fewer focus groups with men. Each ethnic group will be represented by a maximum of six focus groups. For each ethnic group two additional groups will be made up for participants who can read and write (one for men and one for women). Each group will have a maximum of 10 participants and a minimum of eight people. There will therefore be a maximum of 240 people taking part in the focus groups.

Data Analysis

The Variables

- Independent variables

In addition to the variables chosen for the focus groups, the following variables will be ascertained in the individual interviews: religion; migration; type of occupation (whether or not the activity generates income); age at marriage;

type of marriage (monogamous or polygamous); level of knowledge (contraception, sexually transmitted diseases, family code, etc.); degree of autonomy; degree of interpersonal communication between spouses; preferences for children of each sex; degree of contribution of spouses to the needs of the household in terms of current consumption goods and consumer durable goods; degree of intervention of the extended family in the lives of nuclear families.

- Dependent Variables

Use of contraception and fertility.

Table 21.4 provides a summary of the hypotheses to be tested, while Tables 21.5 and 21.6 indicate the variables needed to test each hypothesis.

Tableau 21.4 – Summary of hypotheses of objectives 1 and 2

Number	Hypothesis
1.1	Women have power because they take part in making decisions concerning the number of children they want, the number of children they conceive and the use of methods of contraception. This power can be different from the power exercised by men in the same areas.
1.2	The prospect of increased decision-making power for the woman through her offspring (translated into increased security) influences the number of children she wants and conceives as well as her decision whether or not to use contraceptive methods. As a result, the more children a woman loses the more she will conceive.
1.3	The older a woman is and the more surviving children she has the more she takes part in decision-making both in her nuclear family and in her children's families.
1.4	Decisions concerning the number of children conceived, the use of contraception and the management of the family are more often negotiated between spouses today than was the case in the past. As a result, couples belonging to younger generations communicate better with one another and discuss a wider variety of topics and the wife participates more openly in decision-making.
1.5	The degree of involvement of members of the extended family in the nuclear family's decision-making process has diminished over time.
1.6	Among young couples, women have greater autonomy.
1.7	Women protect their daughters with whom they have a cooperative relationship. On the other hand, they are hard and strict with their co-wives (in polygamous couples), their sisters-in-law (wives of their brothers) and daughters-in-law with whom they have relations characterised by rivalry. As a result, their participation in decision-making concerning their daughters will be different from that of decision-making concerning the other women.
1.8	There are no direct links between the number of children desired and conceived, the use of contraception and the woman's contribution to the needs of the household in current consumption and consumer durable goods.
1.9	The greater the woman's contribution to the household's needs, in current consumption and consumer durable goods, the more she takes part in decision-making in her home and the more autonomy she has.
1.10	The woman plays a more important role than the man in the traditional education of the children (boys and girls up to the age of 7).
1.11	The woman also plays a role which is as important as, if not more so, that of the man in the spacing of births and the resumption of sexual relations after the birth of a child.
2.1	Contrary to countries in Southern Asia, in sub-Saharan Africa (at least among the Dagara, Moosé and Nuni in Burkina Faso) parents do not make a conscious and calculated effort to treat boys better than girls.
2.2	The natural composition of offspring by sex influences the number of children

	born, since couples want both sexes to be represented among their children.

Table 21.5 – Variables required to test the hypotheses linked to objective 1: to establish links between fertility, the use of contraceptive methods and women's decision-making power

Hypothesis	Variables to be examined	Method of data collection
1.1	Sex (male/female); Participation in decision-making (number of children desired, conceived, use of contraception); Number of surviving children	Individual interview Focus groups
1.2	Insecurity (yes/no); Number of children desired, conceived, and surviving; Use of contraception	Individual interview Focus groups
1.3	Woman's age; number of surviving children by sex; number of decisions for which the woman is consulted (nuclear family/child's family)	Individual interview
1.4	Participation in decisions: Number of children desired, conceived; Use of contraception; Number of surviving children; Management of the family (education of the children [yes/no]; contribution to the needs of the family [current consumption and consumer durable goods]; communication between spouses; Age (man/woman)	Individual interview Focus groups
1.5	Degree of involvement of the extended family; Age (man/woman)	Individual interview
1.6	Woman's autonomy; Age (man/woman)	Individual interviews Focus groups
1.7	Mother-in-law/daughter-in-law relations; Relations between sisters-in-law; Treatment wished for daughters-in-law; Treatment wished for daughters	Individual interview Focus groups
1.8	Number of children desired, conceived and surviving; Use of contraception (yes/no); Contribution to the needs of the family (current consumption and consumer durable goods)	Individual interviews
1.9	Contribution to the needs of the family (current consumption and consumer durable goods); Number of children desired, conceived; Use of contraception; Number of surviving children; Degree of autonomy	Individual interview Focus groups
1.10	Education of the children (yes/no); Sex (man/woman)	Individual interview Focus groups
1.11	Participation in decision-making (birth intervals; Resumption of sexual relations)	

	Sex (man/woman)	Individual interview

Table 21.6 – Variables required to test the hypotheses linked to objective 2: to determine whether there is a preference for boys instead of girls

Hypothesis	Variables to be examined	Method of data collection
2.1	Practises: care/food given to boys/girls	Individual interview
2.2	Number of children wanted; Number of children conceived and number of surviving children per sex	Individual interview

Methods of Analysis

Each objective will be the subject of an article for publication. For the individual interviews, the questions have been designed in order to obtain the data needed to attain each objective and sub-objective. Therefore, an analysis using percentages and multivariate regressions will be done based on the individual questionnaire.

For the focus groups, the opinions obtained will be analysed using appropriate software programmes. The results of these analyses will also be used to test the hypotheses, as will the results of the individual interviews.

Survey Sampling and Sites

The target population will come from the capital city of a district (to be determined) of Ioba Province for the Dagara, from Barsalogho, capital city of a district of Sanmatenga Province for the Moosé, and from the capital city of a district (to be determined) of Sissili Province for the Nuni. These provinces have been chosen by taking into account the distance from the nation's capital, Ouagadougou (the researcher's place of residence). Ioba Province is located in the south-western region of the country, Sanmatenga Province is located in the central northern region and Sissili Province is in the central southern region.

Apart from ethnic predominance, the criteria for choosing study areas are: Each must be the capital city of a district, with a Medical Centre or a Medical Centre with a Surgical Unit. In either case, the complete range of modern contraceptive methods must be available. The existence of a literacy programme registered with the Institut National d'Alphabétisation (INA - National Literacy Programme) is also required.

The sample unit will be the couple (monogamous or polygamous) with one or more children (all wives will be interviewed in the case of polygamous households). As already indicated, the women from the couples targeted in the survey must be at least 15 years old for the individual interviews, and must belong to one of the age groups 15-25, 30-45, or 50-70 for the focus groups.

The men will be chosen as the spouses of these married women. From this population identified in each district capital city (without taking into account the place of origin of the interviewees), a random sample of at least 50% of the couples selected will be interviewed individually and some of them will take part in the focus groups. In the individual interviews spouses will be interviewed at the same time but separately.

However, in order to evaluate the impact of polygamy and monogamy, the sample will be selected taking into account the proportions of polygamous and monogamous households in the villages being studied. The households of village and land chiefs, if there are any, will be excluded from the target population. In fact, these households could possibly bias results because of their special characteristics (a greater than average number of wives and children).

LIMITATIONS OF THE SURVEY

Africa being a vast continent, it would have been interesting to conduct this study in other countries to allow comparative analyses. Moreover, the study in urban areas of the targeted ethnic groups would be very interesting. But because of a lack of time and funding, only rural areas and Burkina Faso will be studied.

Another major limitation concerns the methodology used for gathering the data. Given the fact that the focus is on the process of decision-making and how it has changed over time, the most appropriate data would be data collected longitudinally, or in any case over quite a long period and repeatedly. However, because of insufficient time and funds a longitudinal or multiround survey cannot be conducted. Since the respondents are from different age groups, we hope it will be possible to gather important information on the decision-making process in families and on how the process has changed.

Among the techniques used for gathering qualitative data, the focus group has been criticised by anthropologists, who prefer in-depth individual interviews or participatory observation. This is because they believe that focus groups provide biased information on the subject being studied. Although such a point of view may be well founded, we believe the problem will be minimised in this study, since focus groups will be used for gathering complementary information on specific themes. Most of the information will be gathered during the individual interviews.

Since the interviews will be conducted in Dagara, Mooré and Nuna, to ensure homogeneity it would have been necessary to translate the questionnaires into these languages before the survey. However, this will be impossible due to lack of time and funds. We will try to make up for this problem

by giving the interviewers a handbook providing them with definitions for all the concepts used in the questionnaire. The handbook will instruct the interviewers on how to conduct the interviews.

It would have been interesting for each ethnic group to be represented by at least two sites in rural areas. However, once again, due to lack of time and resources, only one site per ethnic group will be studied.

Lastly, given ICPD recommendations and the results of several studies, this study should focus on adolescents and single people, who take part as well as married people in negotiations concerning sexuality and which have an impact on fertility. Besides the lack of time and resources repeatedly referred to in this presentation, we have decided to limit ourselves to couples who are legally married since in the rural areas chosen for this survey sexual relations outside marriage are usually the exception (KAP survey, 1996). Moreover, when such relations do occur they are so severely punished that they cannot be the object of an interview.

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